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ABSTRACT
IDENTITY, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL RIVER
BASINS
Jack V. Kalpakian 
Old Dominion University, 2000 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
This dissertation tests the hypothesis that water disputes cause serious conflict 
within and between states. It uses a structured case study approach to see whether there is 
a link between the independent and dependent variables. It also considers the effect of 
other variables on serious conflict. Specifically it addresses the effects of national 
identity and the othering process on conflict. The three case studies are built around 
rivers in the drier parts of the world. This biases the dissertation towards affirming the 
established mainstream hypothesis which states that water disputes cause serious conflict. 
In all three cases, historical animosities and perceptions related to issues of national 
identity were instrumental in causing political conflict and war between and within states. 
In the Indus Basin, where water disputes have been resolved, conflict between and within 
India and Pakistan continued unabated. The conflict there dates to 1947 and has recently 
acquired a nuclear dimension. In the Nile Basin, religion and ethnicity were the primary 
factors causing all 20th century warfare there. The same pattern also held in the Tigris- 
Euphrates Basin. In short, water disputes were of no relevance in terms of causing 
serious conflict. In fact, a strong case can be made that serious conflicts cause water 
disputes.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Like any other field operating within the greater framework o f international 
relations, the field of studying international river systems reflects the wide diversity of 
theoretical thought in the parent field. The vast majority o f the field is either realist or 
post-realist. With the exception of a small school of alternative literature, the field holds 
that water disputes are a cause of serious conflict. Regarding theory, the dissertation’s 
conclusion is dedicated to applying the lessons learned from the rivers to international 
relations theory through commentary on the major schools. Since this is not a 
dissertation aiming to construct a theory, the commentary will be o f a general nature.
The commentary will not delve into the nuances of theory. It is more important to learn 
what the rivers say about the theories and not vice versa.
The assumption that water disputes lead to conflict is attractive, because we seek 
to ascribe rational reasons for conflict. Making war to get or keep water appears to be a 
rational act at first glance. This point of view is not informed by the insights of 
hydrology which suggest that it is better and cheaper to cooperate in the pursuit of water. 
Furthermore, water supplies can be generated or revitalized through recycling, reduced 
use, imports, desalinization, and the creation of "virtual water" through trade with water- 
rich states. More drastic measures include a shift to drought-resistence animals, reduced 
family sizes, and the immigration of a part of the population. Serious conflicts and war 
are almost never seen as a solution to a water dispute. Serious conflict is reserved for
This dissertation is written along the stylistic requirements of International Security.
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matters that touch people's identities such as their language, history, heritage, and self- 
image. Water, while vital, is not a cause o f conflict. The argument that there is a link 
between the water disputes and serious conflict is largely non-historical and reliant on 
projections offuture water shortages. Appreciation o f  the permanence o f  droughts in 
human history is largely missing. Water has been a precious commodity fo r a very long 
time. ^
The continued relevance of freshwater for civilized existence has attracted the 
attention of international relations analysts seeking to explain the conflicts between Israel 
and the Arab states as products of a dispute over the waters o f the Jordan River.
Analysts like Joyce Starr contend that the 1967 war was caused by Israel’s need for water 
and that the future holds more water wars.1 As the literature review later shows, the 
assumption argued for by Cooley and Starr had a presence in the literature concerning 
water disputes long before they wrote their respective works. The case for a link seems 
so convincing that no test of the basic underlying assumption has taken place within the 
discipline o f international relations, its branches or interdisciplinary offshoots. The 
assumption that water disputes cause serious conflict has not been put into the form of a 
hypothesis and tested. This glaring gap in the literature is filled by this dissertation.
Testing the hypothesis through a structured case study method led to a 
completely unforeseen result. Water disputes do not cause serious conflicts. The river 
basins used to test the assumption are in some of the world’s most war-prone areas: the 
Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Indus.
'Joyce R. Starr, "Water Wars," Foreign Policy, No. 82 (Spring 1991); John 
Cooley, "The War over Water," Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1984).
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The case studies have also been biased towards arid regions. This bias is designed 
to favor the hypothesis that disputes over water cause serious conflict. Despite this built- 
in bias, the dissertation shows no causative link between disputes over water and serious 
conflict. The two countries most dependent on outside sources of water are in Europe 
and Latin America, but Austria and Paraguay do not have conflicts over water disputes 
with their neighbors.2
DEFINING WATER DISPUTES AND SERIOUS CONFLICT
As the literature review later shows, there is a tendency to equate water disputes 
with serious conflict. Water disputes can and often do occur between states that have no 
serious conflicts with each other. The United States and its two continental neighbors 
have had many disputes over the Rio Grande River, the Colorado River and the Great 
Lakes, but these disputes have never been regarded as serious conflicts. A water dispute 
is disagreement between two states or sub-state territorial factions over the utilization of 
the water resources of a river basin such as the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia. Past 
water disputes like the quarrel between India and Pakistan over the Indus River are also 
included in this dissertation to gauge the effects o f the settlement of water disputes on the 
propensity of states to engage in serious conflict against each other. Water disputes are 
brought into the body of this work through the variable of water utilization. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, differences over the utilization of water and protests over 
unilateral development programs constitute water disputes in this dissertation.
2Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International 
Security," in Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., Global Dangers (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 103-117.
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The term "serious conflict" means war. tense diplomatic standoffs, insurgencies 
and openly hostile diplomatic relations. Serious conflict can be found in all three basins 
studied under this dissertation. Among the dozens o f  serious conflicts that have taken 
place in the three basins, not a single serious conflict has been caused by water disputes. 
Water disputes are simply another field for inter-state and inter-communal conflicts 
rooted in the questions of national identity. To use a domestic example, disputes over 
water in the United States end up being settled in court between armies o f competing 
lawyers. That this possibility exists in the United States suggests that water disputes are 
not, by themselves, the cause of conflict. But more importantly, as adversarial as 
American courts are, they pale in comparison with the bitterness of the relationships 
between Sudan and Ethiopia, India and Pakistan and Syria and Turkey. These conflicts 
are not merely more serious forms of the plaintiff/defendant relationship. The 
dissertation shows that they are products o f deep national identity-related factors dating to 
the formation of the various states and their relationship with each other and their own 
peoples. All three cases negate the link between serious conflict and water disputes.
METHODS
National identity is the cause of most o f the conflict in international river basins, 
but the research question is whether disputes over water cause serious conflict between 
and within states sharing a common river basin. The actors examined include both states 
and non-state actors capable o f independent military or paramilitary action. In order to 
contribute to the field in a meaningful way, the dissertation is formatted along the lines of 
all previous work involving international river systems as the primary object o f study or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
analysis. The sub-field’s leading analysts, cited in the literature review, all use one form 
or another o f the comparative methods developed by Theda Skocpol and ultimately John 
S. Mill. It is not the purpose o f this work to delve into the arcane debates surrounding 
this method. The method is sufficient for the purpose o f testing the field’s main 
assumption. As already stated, the structured case study approach is used by the leading 
analysts in the field of conflict in international river basins: Mariam Lowi, Nurit Kliot 
and Thomas Naff. The approach dates to the sixties when it was applied by Indiana 
University professor James W. Scott to study international river systems. Consequently, 
this effort falls squarely in a well-defined, albeit small, body o f literature concerned with 
conflict and cooperation in international river systems.3
The dissertation's case studies use sections devoted to specific variables: natural 
hydrology, utilization, regimes, conflicts and issues of national identity. Each case study 
opens with an introduction followed by the first variable which is the natural unaltered 
hydrology o f the river basin in question. The larger and more complicated a river basin 
is, the longer this descriptive portion of the case study.
The Nile has a far more complicated hydrology than the Indus River, and 
consequently, it takes more time to define and describe it. Furthermore, most of the 
previous work excludes Uganda and sometimes even Ethiopia, so the Nile has an 
unwarranted reputation for being given parsimonious discussion. With its dozens of
3James W. Scott et al.. International Rivers: Some Case Studies (Bloomington, 
Ind.: Indiana University Dept, o f Geography Occasional Publication No. 1, 1965); 
Mariam Lowi, "Rivers of Conflict, Rivers o f Peace," Journal o f  International Affairs, 
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Summer 1995); Thomas N aff and Ruth C. Matson, Water in the Middle 
East: Conflict or Cooperation? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Nurit Kliot, 
Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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tributaries and a basin spanning nine countries, it is the most complex river in the 
dissertation. It is also the only river in the basin not to experience a unifying imperial 
presence. Constantly shared by Egypt and Ethiopia since time immemorial, it never had 
a common regime imposed upon it like the Indus or the Tigris-Euphrates. Its dominant 
power, Egypt, has never fully disengaged from the countries it ruled in the past, so there 
is no true date o f decolonialization in the Nile. As a result, the Nile case study begins 
with Egypt’s invasion of the Sudan in the 19th century. In the Tigris-Euphrates basin, we 
have a date for the basin’s partition into several states after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. In the Indus basin, it is possible to use the partition o f India as a date of the 
"internationalization" of the river. The Nile system has never known a single unifying 
empire for a second reason as well, because the British never attempted to conquer 
Ethiopia. As a result, the Nile's conflict variable chronicles the conflicts that have been 
fought in the basin since the initial Egyptian foray into the Sudan in the 19th century. 
Conflicts with Ethiopia soon followed Egypt's Sudanese adventures, with disastrous 
results for both states. The complicated hydrology of the Nile and the many conflicts 
within it make the Nile a special case study. Given the complex nature of the basin itself 
and its tributaries and the different history, it is necessarily larger than the other two case 
studies. After a century of exploration, there are still some disputes over the extent and 
the size of the Nile and its drainage basin. Defining international rivers is the 
dissertation’s first task.
NATURAL HYDROLOGY 
The amount of water contributed by each country and its share of the drainage 
basin is described in as much detail as possible. It is not possible to begin talking about a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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river without knowing where it comes from, where it goes and how much water it 
discharges every year. Information on tributaries and the sources o f water in these 
various countries is also presented here. The path followed by the given river is also 
detailed. Once a river system is defined, it becomes possible to discuss the human 
impact and alterations of the river.
WATER UTILIZATION 
The second portion of the case study deals with the physical structures and 
utilization programs created by people on these rivers. This is primarily a description of 
the dams, irrigation schemes, hydroelectric projects, and their respective performance. 
This segment concludes with a discussion on the future population figures and projected 
agricultural needs. This section also addresses the concerns raised about the dramatic 
increases in population and their impact. Population is a function of agricultural and 
economic development. Population increases without a commensurate increase in 
agricultural or industrial output lead to starvation or increased poverty. Population 
increases also indicate future standing within a basin’s hierarchy of power, because 
armies are ultimately composed of people and not merely technology. It would be 
impossible, for example, for Egypt to bully Ethiopia if the latter had twice the population 
of Egypt along with the ability to feed itself.
Egypt’s rejection of the Sudan’s Nile Valley Project in the 1950s was an example 
of a water dispute. Ethiopia’s protests over the Aswan High Dam and Egypt’s 
displeasure with Ethiopia’s proposed dam projects are also examples of water disputes in 
river basins. In the Indus, the water dispute was about Pakistan’s right to use water 
originating in India. In the Tigris-Euphrates, the water dispute centers around Turkey’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP in its Turkish acronym). Water disputes manifest 
themselves in this dissertation through disagreements over proposed unilateral water 
development programs. In other words, a discussion o f water utilization programs is 
really a discussion about concord and discord over a river.
REGIMES
The third segment of the case study deals with treaties, agreements and other 
forms of regimes in the basin. According to the established hypothesis, countries with 
established water regimes would have fewer water disputes, and consequently should 
have fewer serious conflicts. The existence of water allocation regimes along with wars 
and other forms o f serious conflict would jaundice the hypothesis that argues that water 
disputes cause serious conflict. Within the realm of international relations, the case of the 
Indus River confounds cooperation-based international relations theories, because India 
and Pakistan maintain a harmonious hydraulic relationship while confronting each other 
militarily.
POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND WAR 
The fourth part concerns wars and other serious conflicts in the given basin and 
their causes. The chronicle of conflicts in each basin begins with the collapse o f the 
given basin-wide empire and the establishment of new entities that now have to share it. 
This is applicable for the Tigris-Euphrates and the Indus, but it presents some problems 
for the Nile, as has already been argued. Water disputes do occur in the arid basins 
studied in this dissertation, but they have not been a factor in serious conflicts in these 
areas. National identity consistently trumps water disputes as a causal factor in serious 
conflict. The role o f the conflicts in shaping the attitudes of the basins’ peoples and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
states towards each other will be examined very closely, Common memories are one of 
the means populations and states use to create a sense of national identity, and if a co­
riparian has been involved in massacres or revolt, it becomes the "other."
IDENTITY
Aside from the notion of the "other," national identity 1S linked with language, 
religion, culture and self-perception. It is often at the core ° f  the country’s raison d ’etre. 
Countries, particularly new states, attempt to construct a sense o f national identity out of 
the common myths, cultures and languages within their boundaries. It is not possible to 
discuss this topic without offering some definition o f "national identity." Anthony 
Smith, a student o f national identity, argues that there arPlwo competing definitions of 
this concept. He first describes what he considers to be Western conception of 
national identity. The components of a Western concept*011 of national identity are a 
sense of a political community, a community of laws an^ the equality of persons within 
the legal and political community described as a nation-?1316- According to Smith, the 
"ethnic" definition o f national identity is based on descei11- common myths and language. 
Despite their differences, these two models have influen£6tl each other. In addition, they 
do share a set of assumptions that enable analysts to defibe "national identity" to include:
1. an historic territory, or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all member^
5. a common economy with territorial mobility fdr members.
A nation can therefore be defined as a named hu/iian population sharing
an historic territory, common myths and historicm em ories, a mass
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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public culture, a common economy and legal rights and duties for all 
members.'1 [italics by Smith]
For Smith, these two concepts of national identity have cross-fertilized each other,
because of the vast influence of the Western world. As the source of myth, tradition and
culture, religion plays an important role in the formation of ethnic identity — which often
lies at the core of national identity, especially when the national identity in question is not
"Western" or "Civic." Religious identity emerges from "socialization and
communication." It is based on shared religious experiences and rituals:
They [sic, religious identities] are based on alignments o f culture and its 
elements — values, symbols, myths and traditions, often codified in 
custom and ritual. They have therefore tended to join in a single 
community o f the faithful all those who feel they share certain symbolic 
codes, value systems and traditions of belief and ritual, including 
references to a supra-empirical reality, however impersonal, and imprints 
of specialized organizations, however tenuous.5
National identity can help us understand security problems because it is 
organically tied to the concept of the "other." Martin Heidegger coined the term, and 
used the concept to philosophically justify Germany's aggression.6 But Heidegger was 
not the first philosopher to "other" peoples he dislikes. Aristotle certainly iooked down 
on the "barbarians" — who included all non-Greeks in their ranks. In contrast, modem 
scholars of international security, such as Ronnie Lipschutz and James Der Derian, use
4Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press, 
1991), p. 14.
5Ibid., p. 6. Smith cites M. Sprio, "Religion: Problems o f Definition and 
Explanation," in Michael Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches to the Study o f  
Religion (London: Tavistock, 1966).
6Richard Wolin, The Politics o f  Being (New York: Columbia University Press,
1990).
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the concept to explain (not justify) the sources of conflict and insecurity. Lipschutz
argues that "security, moreover, is meaningless without an 'other' to help specify the
conditions of insecurity." For Lipschutz and Der Derian, Nietzsche captured the essence
of the state and conflict in Beyond Good and Evil:
In the last analysis, "love of the neighbor" is always something secondary, 
partly conventional and arbitrary -- illusory in relation to fear o f  the 
neighbor. After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems 
secure against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again 
creates perspectives of moral valuation.7
It is impossible to be at war or in serious conflict without at least two identities in
competition, either internationally or internally. Furthermore, the national identities often
reserve a hostile place for each other as "others." Alternatively, a group’s identity can
be wedded to identity o f another through the mechanism o f religion or culture. A simple
framework is applied to reveal how national identity issues have influenced conflict in
the dissertation’s river basins. First, the dissertation examines the state's self-image and
self-definition. Does it attach religious and ethnic markers to its name? Is the nature of
the state in dispute internally? Does it face the threat of ethnic separatism? Second, the
dissertation reveals "other" in the case of each state or group within and without the state.
Third, the dissertation examines any special historical memories or circumstances that
operate within the national or ethnic identities of the groups under consideration.
A country's construction of its national identity causes conflict within and outside
its borders. Water disputes do not cause the conflicts, they are secondary fora for
7Fredrick Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (London: Oxford University Press,
1998); James Der Derian, "The Value o f Security," in Ronnie Lipschutz, ed., On Security, 
(New York : Columbia University Press, 1995) pp. 32-37; Ronnie Lipschutz, "On 
Security," in Ronnie Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York : Columbia University Press, 
1995), p. 9
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conflicts rooted in national identity questions-at most. The three major Indo-Pakistani 
wars, the Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq and Turkey and the Sudanese civil wars are not 
products of disputes over water. These conflicts are caused by clashes over the states' 
identities. In this section, the dissertation shows how each country and people views its 
co-riparian others. In particular, the basis used to construct the national identities o f the 
states in question are examined and critiqued. The dissertation shows who are the 
"others" within and without these various societies.
THE CASE STUDIES
THE NILE
At first glance, Egyptian hydraulic policy seems to confirm the initial hypothesis. 
Egypt seeks to monopolize the waters of the Nile at the expense of the other states in the 
basin. It sought to destabilize the Sudan in 1958 and incited a coup there to insure that 
the Sudan would be compliant in Nile-related matters. A closer examination, however, 
reveals that Egypt is not motivated by a desire to maximize its water supply. Plans to 
maximize Egypt's water supply must entail upstream storage in Ethiopia or Uganda. But 
Egypt is more concerned about controlling the Nile, because its Aswan High Dam wastes 
about 10 to 13 billion cubic meters (cubic kilometers) of water every year. Even the most 
ambitious Ethiopian Nile development programs call for the use of 6 cubic kilometers of 
Nile water a year. Egypt and the Sudan could easily compensate for the Ethiopian use of 
the river by increasing efficiency, lowering the level o f Lake Nasser, and by encouraging 
peasants to water their plants at night. Egypt's hydraulic policy is driven by a historical 
reality called the Fashoda complex — fear of a state more powerful than Egypt upstream.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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As a result, Egypt does not object to keeping Ethiopia at war and in poverty. The 
religious and ethnic animosities between and within Ethiopia, Uganda and the Sudan 
have served Egypt's interests well, but these interests are ethnic and religious and not 
hydraulic.8
Historically, Egypt has been the empire-building state in the basin. Its troops 
conquered the valleys and the plains of the Nile basin, but they have generally failed 
miserably when encountering well-organized mountain polities like Ethiopia and Darfur. 
The arrival o f the French at Fashoda in the late 1890s brought fear of Egypt's living in the 
shadow o f France or some other powerful state upstream. This fear continues to inform 
Egyptian foreign policy in the Nile basin. The Mahdist revolt demonstrated to Egypt its 
inability to dominate even the Sudan. As a result of these fears, the extremely inefficient 
and hydrologically inappropriate Aswan High Dam was built. The Sudan's decision to 
cooperate with Egypt in the building of the Aswan High Dam is a direct consequence of 
the pro-Egyptian attitudes of a large portion o f its elites and is actually in direct 
contradiction to the Sudan's own interests which are very similar to Ethiopia's. Conflicts 
in the basin have generally been about Egypt's and Britain's desire for empire and 
quarrels within countries about their respective national identities. Disputes over water 
have not directly caused serious conflicts, even when Egypt stood to benefit from 
fomenting war upstream.9
8Peter Chesworth, "History of Water Use in Sudan and Egypt," in P. Howell and 
J. Allen, eds., The Nile (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1994).
9P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A History o f  the Sudan: From the Coming o f  Islam to 
the Present Day (New York: Longman, 1988).
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THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES 
While the most powerful state in the Nile is downstream, the most powerful state 
in the Tigris-Euphrates basin is upstream. Turkey clearly possesses more power than 
Syria and Iraq. Its only equal in the basin may be Iran, but it is too early to comment 
about the relative strength of these two states with regard to each other. The Tigris- 
Euphrates states do not, generally speaking, cooperate with each other in matters of 
water. Turkey, like Egypt, regards the rivers to be its property and the supply o f water to 
Syria and Iraq a function of its charity. Syria has supported the Partia Karekerin 
Kurdistan (Kurdish Labor Party -- PKK in Kurdish) in the past and Turkey's Southeast 
continues to suffer from insurgency, despite the capture of the head of the PKK. It is 
tempting to attribute the past Syrian support of the PKK as retaliation for the dams on the 
Tigris and Euphrates (The GAP project), but the history of these two states suggests that 
even were the river absent, the bitterness remaining from the First World War would 
render the serious conflict between Syria and Turkey nearly inevitable. Such a conflict 
would not necessarily entail a war.
Neither Syria, Iran, Iraq nor Turkey has attempted to improve relations with other 
co-riparians. Iran and Syria tend to cooperate with each other against Iraq, but this is the 
extent of the friendship. Turkey’s claim to be a European country is based on a desired to 
avoid being associated with Arabs. This claim is also partially based on historic 
animosity for Arab peoples, because the latter in alliance with the British defeated Turkey 
in World War I and expelled and killed Turks living in Arab lands. Syrians and other 
Arabs also remember the treatment meted by Jamal Pasha to the leading families o f the 
fertile crescent during his tenure as governor of Syria, and return the ethnic hostility back
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to Turkey. Iran and Iraq have created a similar dynamic between each other as a result of 
the Iran-Iraq war; Syria and Iraq have done the same to each other in the context o f the 
internal Ba’ath rivalry.
In short, water disputes are not a cause of conflict. Water disputes can be solved 
between states, because they are engineering and allocation problems once the states and 
entities involved agree to solve them. Disputes over water are a function of pre-existing 
international and inter-communal struggles. They are an additional field of combat for 
these conflicts, but they lack causal effect on them. Turkey, Syria and Iraq can solve their 
water disputes, but they do not. They do not resolve their water disputes, because these 
problems have little to do with water itself. They are about feelings o f betrayal, national 
identity and a desire (largely unstated) by Turkey to return to the rank o f great powers as 
it once was. Ultimately, water disputes can be resolved through two tracks. The first 
track is related to allocation of water to the various states in the basin. There are adequate 
international precedents as well as a set of rules with which to divide the water, as Nurit 
Kliot shows. The second track involves the joint design and management of the various 
dams, headworks, canals and other infrastructure to manage the flow of water. Neither of 
these two things is outside human ingenuity, but they both entail a deliberate decision to 
cooperate with co-riparians and to take the interests o f local peoples into consideration. 
When there are powerful cultural and identity-related inhibitions to cooperation or when 
there is a desire by one state to dominate the basin, there would be no cooperation. In 
hydrology, the lack o f cooperation leads to sub-optimal outcomes, because valuable 
storage and irrigation sites are rejected on political grounds. Non-cooperation is a 
deliberate decision that is based on the premise that it is worth sacrificing some water to
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make co-riparians experience the unpleasantries of polluted water, water shortages and 
dependency. In other words, non-cooperation in international river systems is not caused 
by water disputes but is rather a deliberate decision to have water disputes as a part of a 
broader matrix of conflict between states, peoples and communities. Turkey’s decisions 
in the Euphrates must be seen in this light.10
THE INDUS
Turkey's desire to return to the ranks o f the great powers can be forgiven in light 
of the events in the Indian subcontinent. India and Pakistan have solved their Indus water 
allocation dispute through a treaty assigning water from certain tributaries to India and 
leaving Pakistan with the Indus itself and two major western tributaries. Despite the 
treaty, the wars did not stop. The conflict between the two states has also taken on an 
internal form with Pakistan supporting Kashmiri militants seeking union with Pakistan, 
Sikh Punjabi separatists and other factions within India. India, on the other hand, has 
been supporting Sindhi separatists and factions of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) 
in Karachi. The animosity between the two countries is so deep that newspapers call for 
nuclear war on occasion. Again, the national identity factor far outweighs the relevance 
of water disputes in terms of causing serious conflict. In fact, disputes over consumptive 
rights to Indus water no longer play any significant role in the Indo-Pakistani struggle. 
The only existing demands for more water in the Indus Basin are within India and 
Pakistan. In India, the demand for more water was a part o f the Sikh nationalist party’s 
(Akali Dal) petition with Indira Gandhi during the seventies. Punjab erupted into
I0Graham E. Fuller, Ian O. Lesser, Paul Henze and J.F. Brown, Turkey's New 
Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1993), pp. 49-51.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
f
17
violence not when Mrs. Gandhi refused to grant the Punjab more water, but when she 
ordered the army to storm the Golden Temple in Operation Bluestar. The unrest, troubles 
and terrorism in Punjab began after the entry of the Indian Army into the Sikh holy site 
and cannot be attributed to any other reason.’1 Ironically, the subsequent crackdown and 
economic stabilization of the state have made Punjab the wealthiest state in India. The 
Indus, more than any other basin, de-links water disputes from serious conflict.
LOGICAL FOUNDATION
The hypothesis that water disputes cause serious conflict is also implicitly tested 
in this dissertation by applying a counterfactual method of testing the causality ascribed 
to water disputes. While the actual methodology of counter-factual theory is not applied 
directly, it is implicitly present nonetheless. If water disputes cause serious conflicts, 
then it follows that serious conflicts in the past would also have been caused by the same. 
The absence of water disputes as a cause of serious conflict in the three basins examined, 
where conditions would be conducive to serious conflict over water, suggests that water 
disputes are not a cause of serious conflict.12 It is impossible to avoid the use of 
counterfactual logic in any attempt to link causes and effects or any attempt to leam from 
history.13 The roots of this approach lay in the world of law. It is well suited for testing
"Ashutosh Varshney, "Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu 
Nationalism and the Politics of Anxiety," Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 
337-262.
I2James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," 
World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 169-196.
13Phillip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, "Logical, Methodological and 
Psychological Perspectives," Items — Social Science Research Council: Counterfactual
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causality, because it allows us to eliminate alternative causes. "In order to ascribe a causal 
status to an actor or event, one should believe that but for the causal candidate in question 
the outcome would not have occurred. In other words, one must demonstrate that the 
causal candidate was necessary, under the circumstances, for the outcome to occur."14 
The case studies show that serious conflict has been erupting in relatively dry river basins 
over non-water related issues. This effort suggests that water disputes do not cause 
serious conflicts.
To judge the validity of the core counterfactual, the case studies implicitly use the 
six criteria, suggested by Tetlock and Belkin, to show that the hypothesis linking water 
disputes and serious conflict is weak and perhaps invalid. These standards are not 
absolutes, as their two creators themselves admit, but they are necessary for the proper, 
logical arrangement o f the evidence from the three selected basins. The first criterion is 
clarity. The independent and dependent variables need to be specified. In this 
dissertation, the independent variable is water disputes, the dependent variable is serious 
conflict and the alternative independent variable is national identity. Disputes over water 
are said to lead to serious conflict between states and groups, and the dissertation is a test 
of the cotenability o f this hypothesis. The second criterion is about logical consistency. 
The principles linking the dependent and independent variables must be cotenable. This 
is simple enough for a dissertation on river systems. Fresh Water is a limited natural
Thought Experiments in World Politics, Vol. 50, Number 4 (December 1996) 
<http://www.ssrc.org/decemitems 1 ,htm>. accessed 19 August 1999.
14Barbara A. Spellman and David R. Mandel, "When Possibility Informs Reality: 
Counterfactual Thinking as a Cue to Causality," In Press for Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, <http://www.Deople.virginia.edu/~bas6g/cf paper.html>. 
accessed 9 August 1999.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
resource. States and other groups may try to help themselves to water being used by 
others, leading to serious conflict. This is. on the face of it, a logical position. Yet, 
people and their creations are not so logical as the dissertation's three case studies show. 
The third criterion involves historical consistency (the minimal rewrite rule). This 
dissertation attempts no rewrites of history. Instead, it simply shows that water was not a 
factor in the wars that have tom these three dry basins asunder. The fifth criterion 
involves statistical consistency. In this regard, all camps in this debate are somewhat 
lacking. Useful statistical work has been carried out by people seeking to show a link 
between water scarcity (defined as vulnerability to shut-off) and conflict. The most 
vulnerable states (Austria and Paraguay) are not involved in water disputes or serious 
conflicts. Ultimately, this dissertation is squarely pegged to the sixth criterion described 
by Tetlock and Belkin — projectability. Is the field’s main assumption supported by 
events in the real world? This dissertation shows, after comparing the hypothesis to 
historical events and dynamics, that it is not.15 Technical terms from hydrology are 
defined in an appendix. In addition the dissertation’s divisions are described in the table 
below:
I5Tetlock and Belkin.
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Table 1: Chapters and Purpose.
Introduction Summarize and clarify methodology
Literature Review Place the work within its field
Nile case study Explains the division of water in a 
dominant downstream state context
Tigris-Euphrates Explores sources of non-cooperation in a 
dominant upstream state context
Indus Shows how de-linking water disputes 
from politics does not result in peace
Conclusion Summarizes the lessons learned
Appendix Hydrological terms




The field o f international riparian conflict studies is essentially realist or liberal 
but with different stances on whether water disputes cause conflict. Water disputes can 
occur between states that have friendly and generally non-conflictual relations such as the 
United States and Canada -two states with many water disputes but no serious conflict. 
Serious conflict is therefore not synonymous with disputes. Serious conflict is direct or 
indirect political and/or military' confrontation. A water dispute, on the other hand, is a 
disagreement over the allocation o f water resources in a basin. The primary question of 
this dissertation is whether water disputes lead to conflict. Realism and Liberalism offer 
us many insights into the issue but Critical approaches are also useful when discussing 
the issues that surround and complicate water resource issues. Virtually all international 
riparian conflict analysts assign some importance to cultural conflict and historical 
problems, but set them aside citing decreased relevance in the face o f water shortages. 
The water supplies are said to be decreasing due to several factors. These factors include 
global climate change,1 population growth (reducing the amount available per capita), and 
damming and other water diversion programs. The stipulated causes of water shortages 
vary from author to author. Nevertheless, almost all analysts in this field would fit neatly 
within a realist-liberal continuum within International Relations.
The field o f the study of international riparian conflict is divided into two major 
schools that do not adhere to any specific pattern. Realist thought can be found on both
‘Gleick, "War and Conflict," p. 101.
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sides along with Liberal and Critical ideas. The smaller of these two schools, the 
alternative school, holds that water disputes could exacerbate conflict, but that these 
shortages do not, by themselves, cause conflict. This school prefers to emphasize cultural 
identity, political, and economic variables as more important causes o f conflict. The 
second school, the mainstream school, is much larger. It draws into its ranks scholars 
from diverse intellectual backgrounds including institutional environmental security 
scholars, liberal institutionalists, and neo-realists. Compared to many other fields of 
study, this is a small field, and there are very few scholars attempting to explain or 
interpret the links between disputes over international river waters and serious conflict.
THE POLITICIZATION OF THE FIELD
The modem scientific and engineering field o f hydrology dates from the British 
studies of the Nile, the Indus and the Ganges during the 19th century. From the 
beginning, this scientific field has been a highly politicized enterprise. Hydrology is a 
field dominated by state sponsorship since its inception. Some o f the earliest modem 
hydrologists were British irrigation engineers attached to the Egyptian irrigation 
department. Political goals and interests dictated the adoption o f  unsound projects and 
the rejection o f projects that are sound from a water conservation point o f view but 
undesirable politically. Until the 1950s, the field of hydrology remained closed upon 
itself. The study o f international water issues, from a social sciences perspective, was 
limited to the study o f treaties on navigation and water consumption. The 1950s and the 
1960s brought the Middle East and its problems to the research agenda o f international 
relations and other social sciences. One o f the leading problems in the Middle East is the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
perceived relative scarcity of water. Consequently, water and hydrology began to seep 
into the study of conflict in the Middle East. Water disputes were used to rationalize and 
explain the Arab-Israeli conflicts and to find rationalize logical reasons for them. The 
field is marked with a disproportionate Middle Eastern focus, and the Jordan-Litani- 
Orontes area receives most of the attention. This disproportionate focus on the Middle 
East influences the methods and the approaches used by many scholars.
John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell (professors of Geography at the 
University of Michigan and the U.S. Air Force Academy respectively) are used here to 
illustrate the effect o f the focus on the Middle East on the methodology used by 
international relations specialists. In their book, The Euphrates River and the Southeast 
Anatolia Development Project, the two authors defend the Turkish Southeast Anatolia 
Project (GAP in Turkish) and implicitly posit that Syria has no right to use Euphrates 
water. The two authors explicitly state that they aim for what they call "clearer 
perspectives" with regard to the hydraulic relationship between Syria and Turkey. This 
"clearer perspective" unveils itself throughout the book: Syria does not contribute any 
water, Syrian water projects are inefficient, Turkey is entitled to use all the water in the 
Euphrates, and that the GAP is a worthwhile project. The two authors call for what they 
call a Pax Aquarum based on Turkish control over the water resources o f the Tigris and 
the Euphrates and their delivery (at a price) to downstream Arab states. Only in their last 
paragraph do Mitchell and Kolars try to address the Arab response to the Turkish 
hydraulic empire they propose. They openly state that they favor such a regional regime 
because Turkey is a NATO ally. The work falls short o f even the pretense of objectivity, 
and the two authors cede the problem of Arab acceptance of their plans to "diplomats and
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political scientists."2 The problems of the Middle East have proven themselves too 
complex for "diplomats and political scientists." and this suggests that Mitchell and 
Kolars really favor a fa it accompli approach which, given the region’s history, is a 
prescription for more instability, conflict and war.
While the book contains excellent data and other information, it is not useful as an 
argument due to the authors’ political preferences. Seminal issues like international law, 
the needs of the downstream states, and the treatment o f water as a common good are 
ignored in favor of supporting unilateral Turkish hydraulic plans for the Middle East. The 
natural water pipelines o f the Tigris and Euphrates have carried out what Turkey proposes 
to do mechanically for many millennia without cost or incident; the most important 
difference between a pipeline and a river is human control over the water -- and more 
specifically Turkish control. To be fair, Mitchell and Kolars can hardly be blamed for 
their approach, because the whole field o f riparian studies has been politicized for a long 
time. In the Nile case study, for example, this dissertation discusses the early and 
remarkable politicization o f Egyptian hydrology during days o f British rule in Egypt and 
afterwards. Firmly within a tradition that continues to this day, Kolars and Mitchell seek 
to expand the power of an ally; they take a major step toward prescribing Turkish 
hegemony. They assume that water is a valuable resource that needs to be secured for a 
military ally. They are not alone in promoting Turkish power, a Regime Theorist 
(discussed below) shares their goals. In other words, water is a cause for war, and Turkey 
needs to have as much as possible in order to be in a position of economic and
2John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast 
Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press,
1991), pp. 6, 89-100, 106-113, 143-164, 191, 274-282, 296-297.
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agricultural strength vis-a-vis non-allies. To that end, both their narrative and text are 
designed to serve Turkish interests and not knowledge. It is noteworthy that in a 1993 
article, Kolars (writing alone) steers clear of implicitly or explicitly endorsing the GAP; 
he instead provides us with a superb descriptive article outlining the status o f the Middle 
East’s water resources.3
Since the causes of various states and actors are diverse and as numerous as 
themselves, this dissertation avoids interaction with the bodies o f advocacy scholarship 
that litter the field. Instead, this dissertation focuses on the answer to the basic question: 
"do disputes over water cause conflict?" By focusing on this cause and effect 
relationship, the dissertation avoids the quagmire of advocacy scholarship.
Consequently, the review below includes only scholarship that attempts to answer this 
basic question.
THE ALTERNATIVE SCHOOL
The leading thinker in this school is Mariam Lowi. She argues that water 
shortages are not the cause of conflict. She posits that the conflicts themselves seed the 
national identities o f the peoples at war and prevent settlement o f water shortages. To 
that extent, she states that political solutions must precede hydraulic cooperation. It is 
safe to say that Lowi, a professor at the College of New Jersey and a onetime Woodrow 
Wilson Fellow, is most inclined towards quasi-critical approaches. She outlines the 
water problems of the Middle East and then argues that they cannot be solved without a
3John F. Kolars, "The Middle East’s Growing Water Crisis," Research & 
Exploration: Water Issue (1993), pp. 38-49.
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political settlement and then points out the hydraulic incentives for such a settlement.
Her primary research interests are the Jordan River and the West Bank aquifer. Her book. 
Water and Power, is about the Jordan River. Lowi argues that conflicts over 
International River Basins can provide the world with a wonderful opportunity for peace, 
after a political settlement is in place. Her primary focus is on one country— Israel. 
Unlike Mitchell and Kolars she argues that unilateral programs will not insure Israel’s 
well-being and that the solution of water disputes must necessarily take place after a 
political settlement has been found through negotiation. For Lowi, water is not a cause of 
conflict:
Furthermore, political conflicts are sometimes so visceral and primordial 
that they simply cannot be ignored; over the course of their duration they 
become an inextricable part o f the identities of the parties involved. Under 
such circumstances, technical collaboration cannot be facilitated; rather it 
must await political settlement.4
Lowi is a realist in the sense that she is pessimistic about the potential of functional or
institutional solutions in the absence of a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
She is also concerned about water’s relationship to power. In another article, Lowi
analyzes the role of water in the national identity of Israel. Remarkably, Israel’s
attachment to water is nearly identical to Egypt’s attachment to the Nile:
Water, because it is an essential ingredient o f agriculture, was and 
continues to be important to Zionists and to the state of Israel. It has 
always been linked in some fashion to their security-related concerns, 
whether o f an ideological, economic, or political nature. The primacy of 
water resources in the continued survival of the Jewish state has been 
elucidated unequivocally by former Prime Minister Moshe Sharett: "Water 
for Israel is not a luxury; it is not just a desirable and helpful addition to 
our system o f natural resources. Water is life itself It is bread for the 
nation -  and not only bread. Without large irrigation works we will not
4Lowi, "Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace," p. 123.
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reach high production levels . . .  to achieve economic independence. And 
without irrigation with not create an agriculture worthy of the name . . .  
we will not be a nation rooted in its land sure o f its survival, stable in its 
character, controlling all opportunities o f production with material and 
spiritual resource."5
While holding that a political settlement is an essential pre-requisite for a solution for the 
Middle East’s water problems, Lowi posits that a peace treaty ought to include a three 
stage process for addressing the water issue. First, an independent, international experts’ 
panel would be created by the parties. The panel would conduct studies of the water 
resources o f the West Bank and the Gaza strip. In the second stage, the panel would help 
the various sides fix the allocations. In the final stage, the panel would create monitoring 
bodies to oversee compliance with the agreement.6 While Lowi’s assumptions and 
arguments sharply contradict those of Thomas Naff (discussed later), her policy 
recommendations partially overlap his ideas about basin-wide technical cooperation. The 
only shortcoming of her scholarship is its narrow focus. She makes no attempt validity of 
her conclusions from the Jordan outside the Middle East. While she does study the 
Euphrates, the work is linked with a Jordan case-study and is inseparable from it, given 
that Syria is in both Basins. A comparison o f the position of water in Israel’s national 
identity with Egypt’s attachment to the Nile would have been most informative and would 
have freed Lowi from the narrow confines o f the Jordan valley.
5Mariam Lowi, "Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the 
Case of West Bank Water," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), 
pp. 123-124; Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale UP, 1975), p. 184.
6Ibid., pp. 136-136.
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A classical realist approach is offered by Ken Hughes Butts — a professor o f
Political Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Butts’ approach is global, and
he does not engage in deep analysis o f specific rivers or water resources, aside from those
in the Middle East. Essentially, Butts discusses water supply, water demand, water and
conflict, policy options, and the strategic implications o f water scarcity. He takes a global
approach, but he refers to specific case studies throughout his analysis. Unlike analysts in
the mainstream school, he holds that many conflicts can be mitigated through efficient use
of water. While conceding a link between water and conflict, he does not posit that the
causes of conflict can be attributed to water even when water is the apparent cause:
Beware of generalizations and linear thinking; it is difficult to prove that 
water causes conflict. The 1967 Arab Israeli War is a case in point.
Conflict generally has multiple causes, and it may be that water will serve 
as a catalyst to ignite existing flammable mixtures of ethnic, religious, or 
historical enmities. From the diplomatic perspective, the environmental 
security issues such as tensions over scarce water resources, may serve as 
a useful vehicle to promote communication and goodwill among potential 
regional combatant. Pnus while it may lead to conflict, water resource 
scarcity may also advance the foreign policy objectives of the United 
States or any other nation.7
Butts’ common-sense approach to the problem of water and conflict is hard to 
fault. Its only shortcoming is that it does not engage in an exposition of the "ethnic, 
religious, and historical enmities" that seem to carry more weight in as causes o f conflict 
than water shortages do. In addition, the connection between these cultural variables and 
water disputes is not discussed. Overall, we must remember that Butts’ readership is 
largely military and non-academic and perhaps not given to detailed discussions o f trans- 
cultural conflicts and othering processes.
7Ken Hughes Butts, "The Strategic Importance o f Water," Parameters: U.S. Army 
War College Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 79, 81.
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While small, the alternative school has been gaining some ground. An Iranian 
diplomat, Mr. Mostafa Dolatyar, and Prof. Tim S. Gray have published a dissertation on 
the topic o f conflict and water scarcity. Utilizing comparative policy analysis methods. 
Gray and Dolatyar argue that water scarcity and disputes do not cause conflict, because 
water is too precious an item to be put at risk in a war. They argue that water has been 
used as a weapon in war, but that the conflicts themselves were caused by reasons that 
had nothing to do with the division o f water. This analysis is compatible with other 
approaches used in the alternative school and offers immense potential for cross- 
enrichment.8
THE MAINSTREAM SCHOOL
All scholars within this school argue that water shortages in international river 
systems cause conflict and perhaps war. They argue that helping end the water problems 
may help reduce the conflict. Thomas Naff would like cooperation to begin, at a low 
level, even before political settlements are in place. The leading scholar in this approach 
is Peter Gleick who is extensively cited by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s project on 
conflicts in river basins. The core of Gleick’s approach is borrowed from Canadian 
scholar Thomas Homer-Dixon, so it is important to quickly explain Homer-Dixon’s 
argument. In two widely read articles, Homer-Dixon outlines the relationship between 
the environment and security, as he sees it. For Homer-Dixon, environmental 
degradation leads to social conflict, which in turn leads to violence. Decreases in the
8Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context 
fo r  Conflict or Cooperation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 210.
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quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, and unequal access to
resources lead to environmental scarcity. Increased environmental scarcity leads to
migrations and expulsions o f populations and decreased economic productivity. The
movement o f populations and decreased economic activity, in turn, lead to weakened
states, ethnic conflict, deprivation conflicts, and coups d'etat.9 Homer-Dixon deliberately
avoids discussing the topic o f security. He argues that he limits himself to conflict, and
more specifically violent conflict:
Unfortunately, the environment-security theme encompasses an almost 
unmanageable array o f sub-issues, especially if we define "security" 
broadly to include human, physical, social, and economic well-being. We 
can narrow the scope o f this research problem by focusing on how 
environmental change affects conflict, rather than security, but still the 
topic is too vast.10
Homer-Dixon implicitly rejects the traditional definitions o f security when he attacks 
realism and its premises. By rejecting the state, Homer-Dixon also rejects state-centered 
definitions of security. "Realism induces scholars to squeeze environmental issues into a 
structure of concepts including 'state,' 'sovereignty,' 'territory,' 'national interest,' and 
'balance of power.' The fit is bad, which may lead theorists to ignore, distort, and 
misunderstand important aspects of global environmental problems.'"1 Despite his 
apparent discomfort with Realism, Homer-Dixon’s influence within this school extends 
even to the neo-realist Thomas Naff who quotes him on at least one occasion. Homer-
9Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," p. 170.
l0Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On The Threshold," Global Dangers, Sean Lynn-Jones 
and Steven E. Miller, eds., (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 43-44.
“ Ibid., pp. 52-53.
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Dixon’s influence is felt within N affs work precisely because the two authors share the 
assumption that resource shortages cause conflict.
Like Naff, Gleick, a high-level researcher for the Pacific Institute for Studies in 
Development, is heavily influenced by Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work. Like the other 
two scholars, he argues that water is a cause o f conflict and war. In his often-quoted 
seminal work, Gleick begins by telling us that his article intends to outline the links 
between water and conflict. He then proceeds to discuss his definition of security. 
Naturally, he defines security to include the environment. While elaborating on his 
definition on the environment, he tells us that his argument includes a certain assumed 
"notion" -  that instability rises from environmental problems. In other words, he 
assumes his own argument from the start.12
Near the end of his first section, Gleick attempts to change the debate from 
whether environmental concerns can contribute to instability and conflict to when and 
where. Like many other analysts he proceeds to offer the customary cultural, economic, 
and socio-political causes of conflict. He also grants that it is very difficult to disentangle 
environmental causes of conflict from other cause. In his discussion of water in 
geopolitics, he discusses the Middle East and quotes Sadat’s and Boutros-Ghali’s remarks 
which link war and water. He discusses water as a weapon, the importance of water in 
economic development, the importance of water in health care and future conflicts over 
water. He concedes the presence of other causes, but he again dismisses their continuing 
relevance and turns to global climate change as a source o f support. Projected increases 
in aridity provide him with additional support, but he admits that the relationship between
12Gleick, "War and Conflict," p. 86.
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global climate change and water supplies is "obscure." Nevertheless, he continues on the 
basis of assuming that the future entails reduced water supplies for the Middle East and 
uses a computer model devised in Canada to test the effects o f reduced humidity in the 
Nile and the Litani.13
Gleick offers us indices of vulnerability by measuring the amount water 
withdrawn and comparing it to the renewable resources o f various countries. In addition, 
he lists the countries that rely on outside sources for their water. For Gleick, the most 
vulnerable countries in the world with regard to water are Congo (Brazzaville), Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Albania, and Austria. The absence of Middle Eastern states does not elicit a 
response from Gleick. He instead argues that these countries should be studied further. 
With the exception of Albania and Congo, these are relatively peaceful countries that 
generally cooperate with their neighbors and have had little difficulty, relative to the 
Middle East, with reaching agreements about water. Indeed, Gleick discusses some of 
Paraguay’s, Brazil’s, and Argentina’s joint projects. At no point does Gleick compare 
Paraguay with a country like Syria. Even Congo (Brazzaville) and Albania, despite their 
remarkable instability, have no riparian difficulties with their neighbors. Yet, it was not 
General Alfredo Strossner of Paraguay, but Al-Sadat (and later on Boutros-Ghali) who 
warned about war over water. Gleick concludes with a call for more treaties, more 
international laws and more regimes (both legal and institutional) to build on existing 
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The absence of regimes in the Middle East does not lead Gleick to weigh the 
difference between Latin America and Europe and the Middle East. As a result, his call 
for regimes is almost certain to strike deaf ears in the region he had initially identified as 
the most volatile. Furthermore, Gleick seems unaware of the historic politicization of 
hydrological services and o f hydrology in general. Even today, Egyptian hydrologists 
will not march to the aid o f their Israeli counterparts (and perhaps vice versa) with regard 
to methods and data. While his conclusions and his basic assumption about the 
relationship of water and conflict are identical to those of Naff, Gleick operates from an 
environmental security perspective identical to that o f Thomas Homer-Dixon. While 
N affs work can comfortably be classified as neo-realist, Gleick’s can be said to belong to 
Environmental Institutional Liberalism.
A neo-realist approach is offered by Thomas Naff to explain conflict and 
cooperation in International River Basins. In 1984, Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson, 
both then affiliated with the Middle East Research Institute of the University of 
Pennsylvania, published a study carried out for the Defense Intelligence Agency titled 
Water In the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation. In that early book, Naff and Matson 
delve into the history of the states involved as well as the hydrology of the Jordan, the 
Litani, the Euphrates and Shatt al-Arab the Orontes, and the Nile. According to Naff and 
Matson, water has been a primary motivating factor of Israeli foreign policy in the region. 
In their 1984 book, the two scholars state that water is a single factor among many which 
include nationalism, economics, and ideology when the causes o f conflict are analyzed.
To N aff s and Matson's credit, the causes of conflict are granted to be "complex" in a 
very serious and forthright way. This is especially true with regard to their discussions
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on the definition of such concepts as security and conflict. Naff and Matson offer 
cognitive maps and analytical model matrices that put interest power and riparian 
position in simple tables for each river to explain how use-pattems (potential conflicts) 
may emerge.15 Naff later refined his approach in an article in a 1993 edited volume; the 
1993 table is clearly derived from the tables Naff offered nine years earlier, but Naff 
credits another analyst for some of its aspects. In the newer article, he discusses both 
International and Islamic law in his later work and again offers us his refined matrix for 
predicting riparian basin conflict by evaluating both hydraulic and power-oriented 
factors. Despite the model’s simplicity and apparent parsimony, it contains many 
problems that I will discuss below. These problems include the accuracy o f the coding, 
the interpretations Naff offers, and the sensitivity o f the model to global change.
lsNaff and Matson, Water in the Middle East, pp. 181-198.
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Table 2: NafFs "Model for Determining Relative Power and Conflict Potential in Major 






Jordan Israel 5 9 5 19
Jordan 5 2 2 9
Syria 3 3 2 8
Lebanon 1 0.5 2 3.5
Euphrates Turkey 5 8 5 18
Syria 5 3 3 11
Iraq 4 2 1 7
Nile Egypt 5 7 1 13
Sudan 4 1.5 4 9.5
Ethiopia 3 0.5 4 7.5
SOURCE: Thomas Naff, "Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East," in Peter Rogers 
and Peter Lydon, eds.. Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Division of Applied Sciences, Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 
280.
Naff offers this table as a key towards understanding conflict in international river 
systems. Abandoning his concessions to complexity in his earlier work, Naff argues 
that the issues of ideology, religion, identity and ethnic identity are really veils that cover 
an underlying hydro-political conflict. He cites Thomas Homer-Dixon in order to exile 
culture and identity from river basin conflict studies. His table is a neo-realist 
mechanism par excellence. Three conclusions can be derived from this table. First, 
conflict is more likely when the lower riparian state is more powerful than upstream 
states. Naff uses this to explain the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Second, when the most 
powerful state is also the uppermost state ( thus controlling the headwaters), the potential
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for conflict decreases. Naff argues that the lack o f major Israeli-Syrian conflict has been 
helped with Israel’s seizure of the Golan heights. He also argues that Turkey’s dominant 
position helps prevent conflict with Syria and Iraq. Third, when there is relative equality 
of power, there will be potential for both conflict and moderate cooperation. Naff argues 
that this was the case during the 1950 in the Jordan basin.16
There are problems with N affs coding. We cannot gauge military power until the 
armies in question are tested -  that is fight each other. While we can be reasonably 
certain that Israel leads the pack in the Middle East when it comes to military power, we 
cannot be certain about NafFs other codings. Can Egypt today defeat Ethiopia? What 
form would such a war take? Given Egypt's past performance against Ethiopia in the 
1870s (when it had a similar advantage in technology and organization), the military 
power coding for the two countries is very open to question. Military power is about 
more than the number o f tanks and fighter jets. Recent developments with UNSCOM 
and the Iraqi government also suggest that Iraq may retain the capacity to produce 
weapons o f mass destruction, and N affs table does not account for such a possibility. 
Finally, the assessment that if the most powerful state is also the upstream state there 
would be little or no conflict is very questionable. Syria’s involvement with various 
Kurdish factions suggests that this assessment is flawed.
N aff s approach also leads him to disregard some historical realities and future 
possibilities. For example he argues that regimes and other aspects of cooperative 
behavior are a product o f an imbalance of power in the various basins. Following this
16Thomas Naff, "Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East," in Peter Rogers and 
Peter Lydon, eds., Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Division of Applied Sciences, Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 280-281, 283.
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line of logic, he argues that "only when Egypt, the Nile’s premier power, agreed, was the 
1959 treaty with the Sudan signed." Naff assumes that the Sudan wanted the treaty and 
that it was somehow begging Egypt for the agreement. The reality is that Egypt imposed 
the treaty on the Sudan through a campaign o f de-stabilization and through a coup d ’etat. 
He also disregards the fact that Turkey’s current power has not led to the establishment of 
cooperative arrangements in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Finally, he regards Israel’s 
military self-help in the Jordan as permanent, discounting Palestinian and Jordanian 
demographics and the possibility of estrangement between Israel and its leading ally.17 
To his credit, Naff once understood that the causes of conflict in International River 
Basins are "complex," and it is one of the aims o f this dissertation is to confront this 
complexity head on rather than to attempt to find ill-fitting "keys" and "models."
Given his solid analytical neo-realism. Naff surprises us with two 
recommendations that could have come from the pen of David Mitrany, the founder of 
functionalism. First, he suggests that grand cooperation is not possible in the Middle East 
with regard to International River Basins, so he suggests a lower level of cooperation -  
cooperation between scientists and technocrats in the various states within epistemic 
communities. Second, he recommends the creation of two types of institutions: River 
Basin data clearinghouses, and comprehensive institutions for regional hydrological 
issues. In these institutions, scientists and technocrats from the various basins would 
work together in a multinational environment.18 O f course, these recommendations
l7Ibid., pp. 276-278.
18Ibid., pp. 283-284.
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overlook the historic politicization of hydrology. Alternative school analysts would 
probably dispute the wisdom of his proposals in the absence of a political settlement.
Despite its title, Nurit Kliot’s book does not discuss whether water shortages 
cause conflict. It is built on the assumption that water disputes are a source of conflict.
A literature review of this topic would be incomplete, however, if it excluded a summary 
of Kliot’s book, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. Kliot’s efforts were 
sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the book seems to have 
benefitted a great deal from that relationship. Kliot’s book contains three case studies, 
the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Jordan. The Nile is treated in both in Middle 
Eastern and African contexts. The book is written from an Israeli point o f view, but its 
structure enables it to accomplish a degree of objectivity missing in many other works. 
Kliot’s method begins with detailed hydrology of the river basin, she then adds details 
concerning treaties and geopolitics, and concludes by applying International Law to 
determine the extent of each basin country’s share in the various rivers’ water. This 
approach is not new, but the addition of International law to natural geography and a 
description o f human alterations is not new.19 In essence, Kliot uses a greatly elaborated 
form of what has been a standard practice o f adding non-hydrological issues to standard 
descriptive natural hydrology and expositions of the human alterations to the 
environment. This approach is very old. For example, it was applied by James W. Scott, 
then a professor o f Geography at Indiana University, and others during the sixties.20 It
19Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict.
20James W. Scott et al., International Rivers: Some Case Studies.
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was also used by Naff and Matson in 1984. The case studies in the dissertation derive 
their organization from this basic approach.
Kliot applies this old approach and produces a very informative text for three 
important reasons. First, it is downwardly compatible with earlier approaches, because it 
includes a natural hydrology and a description of human activities in the basin. Second, 
Kliot discusses the political interactions of the various states in the region. Third. Kliot 
attempts to show how the application of the Helsinki principles (international river law) 
can be used to conclude the disputes. Ultimately. Kliot’s effort is hampered by its 
projection of what may Israel’s own attachment to water on the rest of the region and by 
the lack of depth in addressing historical issues. The dissertation has been enriched by 
Kliot’s efforts and actually builds on them despite finding the alternative school’s 
approach to be more accurate. First, the dissertation follows a classical river studies 
approach of including a hydrology and a description of human activity in the regions 
studied. Second, it discusses the political interactions of the various states in the region 
as well as international law. Third, it uses history and conflict to describe how peoples 
and states in the basins saw and still see their neighbors. For example, it does make a 
difference that Egyptians saw Ethiopia and Ethiopians as inherently unequal during the 
last century, nother example would be the profound religious antagonism between the 
Sudan and Ethiopia which has prevented the Sudan from exercising a break with Egypt — 
in direct contradiction o f its hydraulic interests.
In their book, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East, John Bulloch 
and Adel Dawish, two British journalists, argue that water will be causing wars in the 
Middle East. Their journalistic book is cited by the Turkish Foreign Ministry on its on­
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line position papers regarding water and the Middle East, so their work is serious and 
deserves serious scrutiny. The book covers the Jordan River, the Tigris-Euphrates basin, 
the Nile, and variety of other regions. As usual, they showcase Sadat’s threats to 
Ethiopia, and discuss the (current) continuous intrigue and diplomacy over water in the 
Middle East. By and large, the book is about the accepted conventional wisdom in the 
field -- i.e. water will cause war. It is easy to read and understand and contains many 
interesting episodes and events. Unlike FCliot, Bulloch and Darwish do not present us 
with a proper hydrology. They discuss the rivers and divisions o f water, but within the 
context o f their descriptions o f the international diplomacy being conducted by the 
various states. At one point, the two authors come within a paragraph of realizing that 
roots of the problem may be much deeper than they suspect. "According to Ethiopian 
and Sudanese representatives talking unofficially during water conferences, one cause of 
the constant friction is the Egyptian obsession with history (emphasis added)."21 If this 
were the case, why was history excluded from the effort?
John Cooley, then an ABC news correspondent, formulated a hydraulic 
perspective to explain all Middle Eastern history. For Cooley, the history o f  the Middle 
East is the history of the struggle over its water resources. He uses the 1967 war as 
ultimate proof of his thesis. Many other events in the Middle East, such as the Syria 
ultimatum to late Lebanese President Bashir AI-Gemayel, are interpreted through his 
paradigm. At various points, he argues that Arab states have quarreled over water. This 
is true enough, but Cooley ignores the fact that these very quarreling Arab states almost
2IJohn Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle 
East (London: Victor Gollancz, 1993), p. 105.
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never came to blows over water and were able to settle their disputes through the 
intervention o f other Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Arab states and 
Israel were able to informally cooperate before the 1967 war along the lines of the 
Johnston plan, so his emphasis on water may be misplaced. At most, he may be able to 
prove that water seems to motivate zero-sum Israeli water policies article, but it is 
doubtful that the Arab foreign policies are based on precisely the same motivations. He 
interprets Israel’s wars as essentially wars for water. As far as Cooley is concerned, the 
whole Arab-Israeli conflict is about water resources. We can therefore conclude that 
Cooley holds that solving water disputes would lead to solving the problems of the 
Middle East.22
Cooley’s approach is too neat, too parsimonious, and may not even have any 
theoretical applicability outside the Middle East. Furthermore, the role of Islam and the 
importance of cultural differences as a cause of conflict has been highlighted again lately 
in the tragedy of terrorist attacks in the region that have nothing to do with riparian 
conflict. It is safe to say that Osama ben Laden is not seeking a larger share of the water 
resources of a river in the West Bank. Instead, he engages in terrorism because he has 
what he regards as serious cultural differences with his victims. While the Middle East 
has suffered a disproportionate share of wars and other catastrophes, it has also enjoyed 
great periods of wealth, peace, and cultural accomplishment throughout its history from 
the time of the ancient Egyptians until its most recent zenith during the apex of the 
Turkish Ottoman Empire. To support his arguments, he needs to do a great deal more 
work.
22Cooley, "The War over Water," pp. 3-26.
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In a study by the University o f California Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation, Paul Williams argues that weaker downstream states can appeal to 
International Norms to protect their rights in water disputes with powerful upstream 
states. He also argues that downstream states can link their interests to those within the 
powerful upstream state seeking the release o f more water, these include those within the 
powerful upstream state who consume most o f the electricity. For example, Syria is 
advised to purchase Turkish electricity in order to support electric consuming interests in 
Turkey. Syria is enjoined to accept Turkey’s water development programs, purchase 
electricity from Turkey, and renounce what the author calls "Kurdish terrorism." The 
approach does not take into account any o f the historical difficulties that make these 
proposals impossible. With regard to William’s treatment o f this specific case study, his 
approach fails to account for the reality that the GAP is designed primarily for water 
consumption within the basin. While the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates does produce 
electricity for Western Turkey, it is primarily designed for irrigation. Turkey’s 
hydroelectric effort is concentrated on the Tigris instead. The economic arguments can 
also be a double-edged sword. By accepting Turkey’s offer of electricity sales, Syria 
would compete with the very Western Turkish electricity-consuming interests that 
Williams identifies as useful to Syria due to their demand for more water releases. 
Furthermore, Williams’ work does not address the internal factors within Turkey that led 
to the "Kurdish terrorism" he normatively maligns. In short, the Liberal Regimes 
approach fails to function as an explanatory tool, because it is not without its own interned 
politicization. It is about norms created by people, and who these people are matters. 
Williams lectures Syria on what to do, but his prescriptions would amount to a forfeiture
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of independence from a Syrian perspective given that country’s painful relations with 
Turkey. This lack of in-depth historical analysis in Williams’ work limits its 
applicability or explanatory capability.23
The difficulties inherent within the mainstream school have led to some attempts 
to continue to attribute conflict causality to water disputes. Arun Elhance, a professor of 
geography at the University o f Illinois at Urabana-Champaign. Elhance argues that while 
disputes rising from water scarcity do not cause wars, water scarcity can cause immense 
social, economic and other disruptions in the third world . The resulting instability, he 
claims, can cause acute conflicts between states. These conflicts according to Elhance 
can fall short o f war. By "war," Elhance seems to mean conventional army-to-army. 
inter-state warfare. By "conflict," he means unconventional conflicts within states that 
"spill" across the border to other states.24 Unfortunately, such a distinction cannot be 
upheld in an age where the state has been forced to share the stage o f international 
politics with dozens o f armed and unarmed interstate actors. In essence, Arun attempts to 
smuggle water disputes into discussions o f conflicts in international river basins by 
assigning them secondary causality. History and factors that led to the creation of 
conflicts o f identity are not given a thorough hearing in the book, and when history is 
addressed, it is not a history o f the conflicts within a basin but rather the history of water
23Paul Williams, "Water Usually Flows Downhill: The Role o f  Power, Norms, and 
Domestic Politics in Resolving Transboundary Water-Sharing Conflicts," Policy Paper 
29 (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1998),
<http ://www-i gc. ucsd. edu>. accessed 10 December 1999.
24Arun P. Elhance, Hydro-Politics in the 3rd World: Conflict and Cooperation in 
International River Basins (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Instute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 
225-271.
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disputes and related treaties only. The revolts and rebellions in the Sudan are relegated to 
3 or 4 pages, without any analysis of the core reasons behind the conflict there.
THE DISSERTATION AND THE LITERATURE
The dissertation makes a unique and lasting contribution to the field for five 
important reasons. First, the dissertation is unique in this field because it combines 
hydrology, international law, treaties and agreements, conflict- history and national 
identity as well as water disputes. All of these issues are discussed, because they offer us 
a fuller picture o f the problem raised by the initial research question. By ignoring history, 
the mainstream school treats the question in a vacuum. It assumes that conflicts between 
peoples and states are motivated by material things done, that national historical memory 
is as short as it is in North America and that its own perceived objectivity is a 
consequence o f its refusal to deal with historical factors. While some members of this 
school, particularly KJiot and Naff, have made significant contributions towards 
understanding the question at hand, its is clear that ignoring history and the factors that 
shape peoples’ national identities is a map that leads us nowhere.
Second, by moving away from the Jordan this dissertation tests the conclusions 
that have been reached by Lowi from that particular river. As Lowi argued and Kliot’s 
work implicitly demonstrated, there may be serious limits with regard to the 
generalizability o f conclusions reached by studying the Jordan and the West Bank 
aquifer. If, as Lowi suggests and Naff s 1984 work indirectly implies, Israel regards its 
spirituality as water-dependent, then it would not be a typical actor in a typical riparian 
basin.
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Third, the dissertation moves away from the Middle East. The manner with 
which the Nile is dealt is crucial. The focus there is not simply Egypt and the Sudan. 
Ugandan, Rwandan, Ethiopian and Southern Sudanese history and the conflicts over 
national identity in those countries are discussed and compared to water disputes as a 
source of conflict. The third case study is entirely from outside the Middle East. Given 
that this field has seen its genesis in the Middle East, time has come to see whether 
conclusions derived from the region can be applied elsewhere. The answer given by the 
alternative school seems better suited towards explaining water disputes and conflict in 
the Nile (as an African river) and the Indus.
Fourth, the dissertation tests some of the assessments based on the only models 
existing within this field. Up to this time, Naff s judgment calls have not been tested and 
no alternative viewpoint has been provided. Other models exist but they are concerned 
with the reaction to dam construction in an upstream and downstream bifurcation. N affs 
models are really the only application of numerical measurement in this field and they 
have not been compared to the historical record. On a prime facie level, they leave much 
to desired, and it is important to test them, and other smaller measures derived from them 
completely.
Fifth, the strength of the mainstream school’s asserted causality between water 
disputes (and water dependency) is tested in the dissertation. According to Gleick,
Austria is among the most vulnerable countries to water problems, but we have not yet 
heard of Austrian plans to invade Slovenia or Hungary in order to secure water. We have 
not heard of Paraguayan plans to invade Bolivia for water either. In contrast, it has 
become customary for leaders in the Middle East to declare that they would wage war
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"only for water" and be praised for it in Western circles. This praise was most recently 
heaped on Jordan’s late King Hussein for promising to wage war "only for water." 
Ironically, Islamic tradition enjoins sharing water so the late King’s remarks may have 
had multiple audiences. The same statements, were they to come from an Austrian 
leader, would probably disturb Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary.
By using arguments and information provided by both schools, the dissertation 
itself serves as a bridge. While the overall flow o f facts and logic supports that 
conclusions reached by the alternative school, much of the research conducted by the 
mainstream school has proven itself useful and sometimes essential in this endeavor. 
Kliot’s data and N aff s structure are essential for building the case studies and conducting 
the comparisons between the various river basins. Ironically, the dissertation finds that 
the alternative school’s basic conclusion, derived from the Jordan, that there is little 
relationship between water disputes and conflict is confirmed by the methods and 
techniques used by the mainstream school.
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CHAPTER III 
THE NILE CASE STUDY
The appearance o f modem forms of hydrology enabled human beings to control 
rivers as large and powerful as the Nile, so it was only a matter of time before 
governments, including Egypt's, began to hatch plans for controlling and allocating water. 
Policies were drawn to construct dams and other water projects. The primary focus of 
this case study is to examine the conditions that have led to the peculiar mix of conflict 
and cooperation in the Nile basin. To do so, this case study examines the causes and 
consequences o f national water policies. The first section, Natural Hydrology, examines 
the natural flow o f water from the highlands of Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region into 
the delta of Egypt. Specifically, the water contribution of each country is explored.
The second section, Water Utilization, addresses the issue o f water use by the 
various states. In the case of the Nile, Egypt and the Sudan use the vast majority o f the 
river's water. By and large, Ethiopia and the Central African states have not yet built 
major dams or water projects on the river, but population growth and the demands o f 
modem economies are forcing Ethiopia and the Central African states to consider 
developing the Nile. Their hopes for economic and agricultural development can be seen 
as a threat by Egypt, and to a lesser extent, the Sudan.
The third section, Regimes, of the study addresses the international regimes that 
have been constructed to manage the resources of the Nile basin. The study examines 
whether the current regimes provide for conflict resolution and dispute management 
among the various riparian states. The history and interests of the various Nile river basin
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regimes are discussed and analyzed. This section addresses questions like: Were the Nile 
regimes imposed by a local or international power, or were they the product of local 
consensus? The various regimes that have governed Nile waters were, and are, often 
dominated by Egypt; the implications of this are discussed in this section.
The fourth section, Political Conflict and War, addresses political and military 
friction between and within the various states on the Nile. Is there conflict in the Nile 
basin? Are concerns over access to water an explicit or implicit casus belli? Have 
countries modified their policies with regard to conflicts between and within 
neighboring states in order to address concerns over water? Several o f the riparian 
countries are either in civil war or have experienced civil war recently. Have the 
neighboring states fomented or abetted these conflicts to further their water interests? 
Have there been non-water related conflicts? What motivated these conflicts?
The fifth section, Identity, discusses national identity. This is the control variable. 
What factors shape the self-image and national raison d'etre of the various states in the 
Nile basin? What role does religion play in the various states? Who is the "other" within 
and without the various Nile states? And, what effect does the perception of the "other" 
have in the national policies of the various states in the basin? What role did the colonial 
period play in the formation o f national hydrological elites? What prejudices do these 
elites bring to work? What effect do these prejudices have on conflict and cooperation in 
the river basin? The sixth section. Implications, discusses the implications of the case 
study for the field of international relations. What can the case study tell us about the 
contributions of the discipline? The main purpose of the case study is to find out whether 
disputes over access to Nile waters are a cause of conflict between the various states in
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the Nile basin. Naturally, the variables o f cooperation, conflict, water use, and identity 
are framed in a natural setting that defines the hydrology of the Nile river basin.
NATURAL HYDROLOGY
There is some dispute as to the extent of the Nile river basin, the countries 
within its limits, and the length of the actual river. One analyst includes the Central 
African Republic in the Nile basin area, but most do not.1 There is a wide range of 
figures within the literature as to the length of the river and the size o f its drainage basin. 
Depending upon sources used, the size o f the drainage basin varies from 2.978 million 
square kilometers TO 4.0 million square kilometers. If one were to include Ethiopia, the 
Sudan, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, the Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda, and Burundi in 
the basin area, the drainage area would be 3.03 million square miles and would include 
250 million people. The length of the Nile, by the definition used for this study, would 
be some 6,825 kilometers. According to Nurit Kliot, a leading specialist on international 
river systems, the confusion over the length of the Nile and the area o f its drainage basin 
is probably caused by the "difficulty o f including secondary and tertiary tributaries in the 
Equatorial Lakes region." This study follows Kliot's precedent and utilizes the definition 
used by the Register o f  International Rivers and the United Nations. This definition has 
several advantages over other definitions, because it probably includes all the major 
secondary and tertiary tributaries.2
'D. Jovanovic, "Ethiopian Interests in the Division o f the Nile Waters," Water 
International, Vol. 10 (1985) pp. 82-85.
2Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 15.
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As the above definition implies, the river has a wide variety o f sources in many 
countries. These sources include major lakes like Lake Victoria and minor rivers like the 
Atbara Nile. Before following the path o f the river from the Equatorial Lakes region to 
Egypt, this study lists the major known sources of the Nile by their country of origin. 
Listing the sources of the Nile by their countries of origin is important, because upstream 
water projects almost invariably threaten the water supplies o f downstream countries. In 
the case of the Nile, an interesting irony quickly becomes apparent. The country that 
contributes the most water to the river, Ethiopia, uses almost none of its water and the 
country that contributes almost nothing to the system, Egypt, uses the lion's share of the 
water.3
ETHIOPIA
The most important tributary to the main Nile is the Blue Nile (known in Ethiopia 
as the Abbay river). The Blue Nile emerges from Lake Tana in Ethiopia. The Blue Nile 
has a catchment area of 324,530 square kilometers.4 Aside from Lake Tana and the Blue 
Nile system, Ethiopia contributes water to the Nile system through the Sobat and Atbara 
rivers, two lesser river systems it shares with the Sudan, which together contribute about 
half the water provided by the Blue Nile. The currents o f the Blue Nile have a reputation 
for being extremely rapid. Indeed the gradient (slope) of the Blue Nile is steep, so it 
drains its catchment rapidly. In addition, the Blue Nile drains water brought to Ethiopia 
by the annual monsoon, so it is sensitive to global environmental changes such as the El 
Nino cycle. In the past, the Ethiopian contribution to the main Nile was considered to be
3Ibid.
4Ibid., p. 20.
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about 84-86 percent o f the total water. But given the current El Nino cycle and the 
continuous drought in Ethiopia, it is most probable that the Ethiopian contribution of the 
Nile system's has declined to about 70-80 percent. Terry Evans, an expert on the Nile, 
goes even further and estimates that the Ethiopian contribution has probably declined to 
60 percent.5
Counting water contributions is very difficult because of problems associated 
with evaporation. The Nile’s source, Lake Victoria, is estimated to lose 3.5 cubic 
kilometers a year to evaporation. Another 13-30 kilometers are lost at the Sudd swamps 
in central Southern Sudan. In addition, 10 cubic kilometers are lost in the Machar swaps 
of the Sobat river. When these evaporation figures are compared to the main Nile's mean 
annual discharge of 90 cubic kilometers at Aswan, Egypt,6 the relevance o f evaporation 
to the Nile question becomes very apparent. 7 Under any method of accounting for water 
contributions to the main Nile, it is clear that Ethiopia contributes most o f the water. 
Between 1910 and 1970, the Blue Nile, the Sobat and the Atbara contributed an average
5Terry Evans, "History of Nile Flows," in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile 
(London: School o f Oriental and African Studies, 1994), pp. 19-21; Michael Hulme, 
"Global Climate Change and the Nile Basin," in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile 
(London: School o f Oriental and African Studies, 1994), pp. 59-82.
6Evans, "History of Nile Flows," p. 36.
7J.V. Sutcliffe and Jeremy Lazenby, "Hydrological Data Requirements for 
Planning Nile Management," in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile (London: School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 1994), pp. 112-117.
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of some 77.7 kilometers o f water a year to the main River Nile.® Without question, 
Ethiopia is the primary water contributor to the Nile system.9
THE SUDAN AND EGYPT 
The Sudan's contribution to the Nile River system is rather limited . While it 
controls most of the drainage basin, very little water actually originates in the Sudan.
Two Blue Nile tributaries, the Dinder and the Rahad lie within its territory. Only a few of 
the water-bearing tributaries of the Sobat River are located within the Sudan. In addition, 
the Sudan is the site o f most of the water loss through evaporation in the Nile river 
system. Consequently, the Sudan can be thought of as a negative contributor to the Nile 
river system.10 Like the Sudan, Egypt contributes almost no v/ater on its own to the Nile 
River system,11 although it is the most important player in terms of high consumption o f 
Nile waters, a role discussed in the section pertaining to water use.
UGANDA AND THE GREAT LAKES STATES 
While Uganda controls only 7.7 percent of the Nile basin, it controls 44 percent o f 
Lake Victoria and 600 kilometers o f the upper White Nile's channel. In addition, it has a 
share in all the major great lakes of Central Africa or controls them outright. The most 
important tributary o f Lake Victoria is the Kagera River, which flows into lake Victoria
®Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 26.
9Paul Howell, Michael Lock and Stephen Cobb, eds., The Jonglei Canal (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 29.
10Odidi Okidi, "A Review o f Treaties on Consumptive Utilization of Waters of 
Lake Victoria and Nile Drainage Basins," in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile, 
(London: School o f Oriental and African Studies, 1994), p. 195.
“ Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 30.
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from Rwanda and Burundi. It contributes 7.9 billion cubic meters of the White Nile's 
18.3 billion cubic meter outflow from Lake Victoria. Kenya controls only 5 percent of 
lake Victoria, but it has 25 percent of its catchment area. Tanzania controls 51 percent of 
the lake and 44 percent of its catchment area. Finally, the Congo (Kinshasa) is also a 
basin state because it controls portions o f the Great Lakes the Nile flows in and out of, as 
well as the Semliki River which contributes some 4.69 billion cubic meters of water to 
the Nile system a year. Eighteen percent o f the water originates in Tanzania, 30 percent 
comes from Kenya, 12 percent originates in Uganda, and 43 percent o f the water comes 
from Rwanda and Burundi.12 Over the last two centuries, an elaborate system o f 
harnessing Nile waters has been created to facilitate the utilization o f the river's water 
resources.
WATER UTILIZATION
The natural hydrology of the Nile, as described above, is modified by a vast 
system of dams, barrages, and canals. First, this section discusses the various water 
development programs that have been built in the Nile basin. Second, it presents patterns 
o f Nile water consumption by the various basin states. Third, the population growth in 
the basin states is discussed along with its future implications.
EGYPTIAN WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Modem irrigation and water management systems in the Nile basin date from the 
reign of Khedive Muhammad Ali in Egypt. A former Albanian soldier of fortune in the
l2Ibid.; Mamdouh Shahin, The Hydrology o f  the Nile Basin (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
1985), p. 318.
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Ottoman service, Muhammad Ali seized control of Egypt by eliminating its Mamluk 
elites in an infamous 1799 massacre, and by 1805, he was in total control o f the country . 
He wanted to modernize Egypt and build an empire. Muhammad Ali understood that 
realizing his ambitions would require radical restructuring of traditional Egyptian 
society, economics, politics, and most importantly, agriculture. He redistributed land and 
ordered the introduction of new crops including fruits, sugar cane and cotton. These new 
crops required a drastic change in the Egyptian irrigation system. The solution was to set 
up barrages in the two branches of the Nile that flowed into the Mediterranean, the 
Damietta and Rosetta. These barrages were designed to hold back water when it flowed 
at summer levels in order to allow it to flow into canals normally used at high flood 
levels. Work on the barrages began in 1843 and was completed in 1861. Muhammad Ali 
died in 1848, long before he saw the success of his scheme. The barrages brought large 
scale cotton cultivation to Egypt at a time when world cotton prices were very high due to 
the U.S. Civil War. The success of these early barrages led to the construction o f several 
additional barrages and a dam at Aswan. The first ("low") dam at Aswan was built in 
1912 with a storage capacity of 1 cubic kilometer. The Aswan low dam's capacity was 
expanded to 5.1 cubic kilometers in 1934.13
Eager to surpass this early stage of modem water development and construction 
of barrages and dams in Egypt, the new Egyptian republican government adopted the 
Aswan High Dam project. The dam was built in 1960 with Soviet support. It stands at 
110.7 meters above the river bed, it is 980 meters at the base, and it is 3,820 meters 
long. The dam’s reservoir is designed to hold some 162 cubic kilometers o f water, when
I3Chesworth, "History of Water Use in Sudan and Egypt," pp. 67-69.
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the water reaches a level of 175 meters. Electricity can be generated when the reservoir 
is 146 meters and contains more than 30 cubic kilometers of water. If the water level 
falls to 123 meters, 6.8 cubic kilometers of water, the lake, given Egypt’s use, cannot rise 
again. "Live storage" is some 90 cubic kilometers, reflected with a water level o f 175 
meters at the dam. This means that 70 cubic kilometers are not available for use if the 
hydroelectric generation function o f the dam is to continue normally. The dam can 
produce 1,750 mega-watts of electricity a year.14 Using the Aswan High dam, as well as 
the older dams and barrages and their replacements, Egypt irrigates some 2.4 million 
hectares of Nile Valley old lands and 200,000 hectares of reclaimed land. Egypt's land 
master plan envisions more reclamation in the future.15
Water from the dam flows into an ancient, and perhaps inefficient irrigation 
system. The most basic problem is the reluctance of Egyptian peasants to irrigate at 
night, when evaporation rates are much lower. In addition, the canal network suffers 
from decay and negligence. There are 30,000 kilometers of canals in Egypt, and many of 
these canals have not been converted from open ditch irrigation to underground piping. 
During the 1970s, Egypt converted 1.05 million hectares to piped irrigation, but the 
Egyptian irrigation system remains very inefficient. Estimates for wasted water range 
from 20 percent to 50 percent o f the total used by Egypt every year for irrigation. In
14Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 41, 44.
l5Dale Whittington and Kingsley Haynes, "Nile Water for Whom? Emerging 
Conflicts in Water Allocation for Agricultural Expansion in Egypt and Sudan," in Peter 
Beaumont and Keith McLachlan, eds., Agricultural Development in the Middle East 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1985), p. 125.
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terms of cubic kilometers o f water, estimates range between 6.7 and 8.0.16 An 
appropriate analogy to describe the Aswan High dam and its associated irrigation system 
would be to liken the project to the motorization of an ox-cart with the latest diesel 
engine. Clearly, the construction of the dam was motivated by factors outside the realm 
of water resource utilization and hydrology.
A gigantic dam at Aswan had been proposed in some form or another since 1876. 
The Aswan High Dam's cause was championed in 1948 by Adrian Daninos, an Egyptian- 
Greek engineer. Daninos' proposals were rejected by Dr. H.E. Hurst, the British 
hydrologist in control of the Egyptian irrigation service. After the 1952 revolution, 
Daninos found a more receptive audience among the ruling Free Officers. Hurst's grounds 
for rejecting the Aswan High Dam were sound from the perspective o f water resource 
management. Hurst pointed out that a reservoir behind the Aswan high dam would lead to 
tremendous water losses due to evaporation.17 Hurst's critique o f the Aswan High Dam 
project has been validated by the dam's evaporation statistics. The evaporation and 
seepage figure for 1986 is low primarily because the reservoir contained only half its 
water storage capacity, consequently, there was less evaporation and seepage.18 The full 
significance of these loses cannot be understated. These loses represent a significant
l6Kingsley Haynes and Dale Whittington, "International Management of the Nile - 
- Stage Three?" The Geographical Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1981), p. 24; Kliot, Water 
Resources and Conflict, p. 62.
I7Robert Collins, "History, Hydropolitics, and the Nile: Nile Control: Myth or 
Reality?" in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile (London: School o f Oriental and 
African Studies, 1994), p. 119.
I8Roy Stoner, "Future Irrigation Planning in Egypt," in P. Howell and J. Allan, 
eds., The Nile, (London: School o f Oriental and African Studies, 1994), p. 196.
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drain on Nile resources. For example, Sudan's entire annual share o f Nile waters, as per 
its 1959 treaty with Egypt, is 18.5 cubic kilometers.'9
Table 3: Evaporation and Seepage From The Aswan High Dam Reservoir: Lake 













1970 45.4 9.3 1980 103.1 12.8
1972 69.2 12.4 1982 99.1 12.5
1974 67.0 10.8 1984 72.9 9.7
1976 108.4 15.0 1986 53.7 5.7
1978 109.0 13.9 1988 41.4 12.5*
SOURCES: Egyptian Ministry of Public and Works and Water Resources as cited by 
Chesworth, "History o f Water Use in Sudan and Egypt," p. 76; 1988 figures are an 
estimate by Kliot in Water Resources and Conflict, p. 44; storage figures are from Stoner, 
"Future Irrigation Planning in Egypt," p. 197.
A second major problem with the Aswan High Dam is the risk, illustrated in 
1986-1988, of its fall to dead-storage levels as a result o f  drought in Ethiopia and/or the 
Great Lakes region. Dead storage is the level from which a dam's reservoir, given normal 
use, cannot rise from again and at which it would not be possible to use water. A second 
problem with the Aswan High Dam is the risk of the collapse of water levels to "dead 
storage" levels during years of extended droughts in upstream areas. In fact, Egypt nearly 
faced a "dead storage" crisis during the dam's earliest years. Explaining the filling of the 
reservoir, Roy Stoner, an irrigation engineer at the University of Southampton, argues
I9Dale Whittington and Elizabeth McClelland, "Opportunities for Regional and 
International Cooperation in the Nile Basin," Water International, Vol. 17 (1992), p. 146.
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that the Sudan would have been able to prevent the reservoir's creation simply by drawing
on its allotment during the seventies:
A great deal of the rise [of the Lake Nasser reservoir] was attributable to 
two very good years, the floods of 1974 and 1975. What is interesting 
from Egypt’s point of view is that if the Sudan had taken only 5 kms3 per 
annum extra during this period, the lake would have fallen to its dead 
storage level of 30 kms3 by about 1983 and would never have risen above 
it thereafter, even allowing for the large flood of 1988. Measures for the 
Sudan which will perhaps enable that country to use its full allocation of 
18.5 kms3 in the future are under consideration. If  that is indeed achieved 
and the modest Nile flows do not improve, then Egypt will suffer very 
serious shortages.20
Aside from seepage and the risk of "dead storage," the Aswan High Dam brought 
about some devastating changes to the natural environment. The Nile does not merely 
stop at Aswan, as Nasser claimed, it effectively dies as an ecosystem. The dam has had 
ten primary environmental consequences. First, no water is left for natural ecosystems, 
and the drainage to the sea serves only to flush out agricultural, industrial, and urban 
effluents. Second, the silt that once fertilized Egypt is now accumulating in Lake Nubia 
-  the Sudanese side of the Aswan High Dam reservoir. Third, the dam's silt-free water is 
eroding the Nile's river-bed downstream, and new dams need to be built to control this 
problem. Fourth, the absence of the silt means that Egyptian fanners are forced to use 
chemical fertilizers, which are costly to produce and/or import. Fifth, with the absence of 
replenishing silts, the fertile Nile Delta is being lost to the sea. Sixth, the controlled, 
regular slow flow o f water in the river is altering the soil along its banks, because the 
soils were exposed to a river with a variable water level before the dam. Seventh, the 
sixth factor, when combined with fertilizers and other chemicals, has drastically changed
20Stoner, "Future Irrigation Planning in Egypt," p. 197.
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the river’s aquatic life. Eighth, without its annual flood, the Nile no longer flushes clean, 
and in the region around Cairo, it has become extremely polluted. Ninth, water pumped 
into dam-associated desert land reclamation projects seeps through the desert's salty crust 
into the water table below. While the water table rose by four meters, it has also become 
brackish Tenth, the Mediterranean Sea fish species that depended on silt for food have 
now disappeared, but fish production at Lake Nasser largely replaces this loss.21 The 
Aswan High Dam continues to cost Egypt a great deal of money and environmental well­
being.
There were, and still are, alternatives to the Aswan High Dam. Hurst advanced a 
"Century Storage" or the "Equatorial Nile Project" plan that stored water for Egyptian 
and other riparian use in Lake Albert and other equatorial lakes where the geology allows 
for storing vast amounts of water with little increase in the water surface exposed to 
evaporation. In addition, equatorial storage offered the benefit of using rainfall to 
substitute for evaporation. Hurst's planning emphasized the need to treat the river as a 
complete system: under Hurst's plan, all the water projects needed to be coordinated by 
all the basin states. Hurst estimated that "full Nile control" can be accomplished through 
a basin-wide storage capacity of 500 cubic kilometers. Terry Evans, a British 
hydrologist, updated Hurst's work in 1994. Evans argues that full Nile control would 
require a storage capability of 600 cubic kilometers. Furthermore, using Hurst's K, a 
statistic used to correct the tendency o f the Nile to consistently have longer periods of 
drought and flood than would be predicted by statistical theory, Evans argues that the
2IChristiaan Gischler, Water Resources in the Arab Middle East and North Africa 
(Cambridge: Middle East and North Africa Press Ltd., 1979), pp. 22-24.
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Nile's reliable yield at Aswan is 78 cubic kilometers a year.22 Currently, the Sudan and 
Egypt presuppose an annual yield of 84 cubic kilometers. Hurst's suggestions have found 
an audience in the post-imperial policy-making world. Shortly after Sudanese 
independence in 1956, the Sudanese government hired two British hydrologists, H. A. 
Morrice and William Allan, as its irrigation advisors. Allan and Morrice used the newly 
available IBM computer technology to model Nile hydrology. The result was a 
modernized and more sophisticated version o f Hurst's plan. Like the Hurst plan, it 
envisioned storing water in the equatorial lakes and the construction o f Canal to  drain the 
Sudd swamps. The Sudanese government called the new plan the Nile Valley Plan. The 
plan was "vehemently rejected" by Egypt.23
Another alternative was developed by Ethiopia and the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation between 1958 and 1964. While relatively inexperienced in the region, 
especially when compared with British bureaucracies, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
nevertheless produced a very thorough and detailed study of the Ethiopian Blue Nile 
region encompassing " its hydrology, water quality, geology, physiography, mineral 
resources, sedimentation, land use, ground water, and local economy."24 After 
completing its 17 volume study, Land and Water Resources o f  the Blue Nile Basin: 
Ethiopia, the Bureau recommended that Ethiopia construct four dams on the Ethiopian 
Blue Nile. These dams were to have a combined storage capacity of 51 cubic kilometers
22Evans, "History of Nile Flows," pp. 50-51.
^Collins, "History, Hydropolitics and the Nile," pp. 120-121.
24Giorgio Guariso and Dale Whittington, "Implications of Ethiopian Water 
Development for Egypt and Sudan," Water Resources Development, Vol. 3 (1987), p.
1 1 1 .
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and a hydroelectric power generation capability of 25 billion kilowatt-hours or roughly 
three times the electricity produced by the Aswan High Dam. From these reservoirs, 
Ethiopia was to use 6 cubic kilometers a year to irrigate 434 ,000 hectares o f land. The 
effects o f these dams on downstream states were studied by the Bureau o f Reclamations. 
The Bureau calculated that the Blue Nile flow into the Sudan would be reduced by 8.5 
percent or about 4 cubic kilometers.25
Ethiopia’s plans caused alarm in Egypt. But, Egypt's alarm about forthcoming 
hydrological catastrophes, were unfounded. Collins, Whittington, and McClelland argue 
that the Ethiopian dams, if well managed, would increase the water available to Egypt 
and the Sudan. To a great extent, the Bureau of Reclamations' plan paralleled the Nile 
Valley plan initially endorsed by the Sudanese government. Both plans involve storing 
water in areas of little evaporation and would lead to substantial water savings from 
evaporation alone. As 1986 showed, when the Aswan High Dam reservoir is low, losses 
from seepage and evaporation are very low. Under the Ethiopian/U.S. plan, Egypt and 
the Sudan would receive more water than they currently unilaterally allocate for 
themselves.26 Despite these obvious benefits, Egypt totally rejected these plans and 
pressured the Sudan to sign the 1959 Nile Waters agreement endorsing the construction 
of Aswan High Dam. From a hydrological standpoint, constructing a dam at Aswan 
constitutes immense and unjustifiable waste in terms of seepage and evaporation. Collins
25Dale Whittington and Elizabeth McClelland, "Opportunities for Regional and 
International Cooperation," p. 149; Collins, "History, Hydropolitics and The Nile," p. 
123-124; U.S. Department o f the Interior, Bureau o f Reclamation, Land and Water 
Resources o f  the Blue Nile: Ethiopia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1964).
26Ibid.
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explains that Egypt's motives for constructing the Aswan High Dam were political, not 
hydrological:
That both the Sudanese and Egyptian allocations could still be higher is 
simply due to the Aswan reservoir being operated at relatively low levels, 
thus reducing evaporation losses below the estimates of the treaty 
([Guarsio,] p. 112). Egypt, however, would not be the beneficiary of 
additional water in years of high flood, which would then be stored and 
regulated in the Blue Nile reservoirs, not at Aswan. Moreover lowering 
the level of Lake Nasser in order to limit the evaporable loss would 
concomitantly reduce the hydroelectric power, but in return, Egypt would 
receive additional water for irrigation. Ethiopia could, of course, 
malevolently withhold water it did not need in a year o f low rainfall to 
threaten disaster in the Nile Valley. The Egyptians have historically deeply 
feared this threat to their survival, and such an action would be tantamount 
to an act of war. It was just such a fear, in the jungle of predatory nation 
states, which determined the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.27
Political domination of the hydrological agenda in Egypt extends to the
reclamation efforts discussed in brief earlier. While Egypt attempts to make its deserts
bloom, the vast, fertile clay plains of central Sudan lie thirsty for irrigation water. Two
analysts who studied the politics of Nile water, Dale Whittington and Kingsley Haynes,
conclude "that if Egypt and Sudan were one country, "no one would seriously consider
Egypt's current plans for massive reclamation of desert lands while deep clay soils o f the
Blue Nile plain lay idle."28 As illustrated by Hurst's objection to the dam, the arguments
against the dam have had a long and largely un-refuted history. Thinking along Hurst's
lines, John Foster Dulles ended United States support for the Aswan High Dam project.
27Colllins, "History, Hydropolitics and the Nile," p. 124.
28Whittington and Haynes, "International Management of the Nile," p. 142.
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because he considered it a dangerous economic and ecological endeavor that would taint 
the United States in the minds of the Egyptian public.29
SUDANESE WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Like Ethiopia, the Sudan has plenty of rain-fed agriculture and is far less
dependent on the Nile Generally speaking, the Sudan is fortunate to enjoy a substantial
quantity o f rain, especially in the Al-Gadarif area near the Ethiopian border. Of the 11.2
million hectares under cultivation in the Sudan, 9.5 million are rain-fed. The best soils in
the Sudan, however, lie within the White and Blue Nile catchment basins, and the Sudan's
rain-fed agriculture is vulnerable to the same droughts that have plagued Ethiopia during
the last twenty years. Consequently, the Sudan cannot afford to ignore irrigation
altogether.30 There are three dams and associated irrigation schemes in the Sudan.
Egypt's goals and agendas dominate dam and irrigation projects in the Sudan. Even when
both countries were under British influence or rule, Egyptian priorities came first. In a
1925 letter to Ziwar Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, the British High Commissioner,
Lord Allenby, reassured the Egyptians that their interests were paramount, despite
Britain's plans to construct a dam on the Blue Nile for the Gezira scheme:
I need not remind your Excellency that for forty years the British 
government watched over the development of the agricultural well being 
of Egypt, and I would assure your excellency at once that the British 
Government, however solicitous for the prosperity o f  the Sudan, have no
29Peter Rodman, More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and The Struggle 
For the Third World, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), p. 75.
30Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 65; Whittington and Haynes, 
"International Management o f the Nile," p. 130.
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intention o f trespassing upon the natural and historic rights o f Egypt in the
waters o f the Nile, which they recognize today no less than in the past.31
As pro-Egyptian as the British were, at the very least they acquired an admission 
from Egypt that the Sudanese were entitled to some of the water through the 1929 Nile 
Waters agreement. In addition, the 1929 agreement left a vast amount o f water 
unallocated. As the Aswan Dam and the Egyptian-imposed 1959 Nile Waters agreement 
later proved, the upstream states lost the ability to use British bureaucracies to restrain 
Egypt with the advent o f de-colonialization and the erosion o f  British power. These two 
treaties will be discussed at length in the section pertaining to regimes, but they are 
crucial to understanding Sudanese water development projects.32
There are four dams located within Sudanese territory. O f these, the Jebel Aulia 
dam is reserved for Egyptian use. The dam was built in 1937 thirty miles South of 
Khartoum to provide Egypt with "timely water." This meant storing water for release 
into the White Nile when its levels fall down. The Jebel Aulia Dam can hold 5.5 cubic 
kilometers, but it suffers from a very high evaporation rate o f 2.8 cubic kms.33 Upstream 
from the Jebel Aulia Dam, several pump schemes have sprouted over the years. These 
technically serve 182,000 hectares, but in reality, the effective area of the Jebel Aulia 
Dam is 41,000 hectares. It is important to remember that the dam's primary purpose is to 
regulate water for Egypt, and Sudanese use of the Jebel Aulia Dam is a secondary priority
3‘Edmund Henry Allenby, British Viscount and High Commissioner of Egypt, as 
cited by John Waterbury, Hydropolitics o f  the Nile Valley (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1979), p. 65.
32Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 37.
33Whittington and McClelland, "Opportunities for Regional and International 
Cooperation," p. 150.
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for the dam. The pumping equipment is in disrepair, and the low levels of the White Nile 
during September preclude the full utilization of the dam for Sudanese irrigation.34
The Sennar Dam is the oldest dam in the Sudan, built in 1925 to provide water 
to the Gezira-Managil irrigation scheme. The scheme is the largest singly-administered 
irrigation program on earth, covering 880,000 hectares. This land is mainly used to grow 
cotton, which is the Sudan's principal cash crop. The second largest irrigation scheme in 
the Sudan is the Khashm al-Girbadam irrigation project. The project was completed in 
1966 on the Atbara river, a tributary of the main Nile. The Khashm Al-Girba Dam can 
hold some 1.3 cubic kilometers of water, but siltation has reduced the dam’s capacity to 
about a third of the original planned amount. Similar problems haunt the Sennar Dam. 
The Roseires and Khashm Al-Girba dams were built with Egyptian support in order to 
compensate Sudan for the displacement of its citizens who lived in the old Haifa region, 
now covered by Lake Nubia/Lake Nasser reservoir o f the Aswan High dam. The New 
Haifa irrigation project was designed to cover 164,000 hectares in the Atbara River area. 
Salinity, siltation, and drainage problems have drastically reduced the effective area of 
the project. The Khashm Al-Girba, Sennar. and Roseires dams generate 12, 15, and 250 
mega-watts of electricity respectively — the three dams have been the backbone o f 
Sudan's power grid. Located on the Blue Nile, upstream from the Sennar dam, the 
Roseires dam, with a storage capacity of 2.4 cubic kilometers, is also used for irrigating
34Ibid.
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the 64,000 hectare Rahad project. A canal carries the water from the reservoir to the 
Rahad River where it is pumped out to the irrigated area.35
These projects were built with Egyptian support. Indeed, Egypt traditionally 
views the Sudan as its "backyard." 36 These projects were built to benefit Egypt and not 
the Sudan and the Sudan’s own preferences were sidelined. Soon after the Sudan 
proposed the Hurst-inspired Nile Valley plan, Egypt began a propaganda campaign 
against the Sudanese government. Egyptian propaganda extolled the Aswan High Dam 
and the unity of the Nile Valley. After Egypt failed to force Sudan from its positions 
over the Aswan High Dam and the Nile Valley Plan, it attempted to launch a military 
expedition to annex disputed territory in the Sudan and failed. Thereafter, Egypt moved 
to impose economic sanctions against the Sudan. The ensuing unrest in newly 
independent Sudan led to the country’s first coup d'etat on 17 November 1958. The new 
Sudanese leader, Major General Ibrahim Abboud, signed an agreement with Egypt over 
division of Nile waters under terms favorable to Nasser. The resulting 1959 Nile Waters 
Agreement increased the water allotments to both Egypt and the Sudan and reduced the 
unallocated water quantity to nil. The Sudan received Egypt's consent and support for 
building the Roseires and Khashm Al-Girba dams. More importantly, the agreement set 
the ground for a 50-50 water split for any additional waters conserved in the Sudan.37
35David Knott and Rodney Hewett, "Water Resources Planning in the Sudan," in 
P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 
1994), p. 209-211; Robert Collins, "The Economy," in Helen Metz ed., Sudan: A 
Country Study (Washington, D.C.rU.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 148-150.
36Bulloch and Darwish, Water Wars, p. 110.
37Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 87; Collins, "History Hydropolitics and 
the Nile," p. 121.
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It was this important provision that led to the latest and perhaps the most 
catastrophic water project in the Sudan, the Jonglei Canal. Hurst envisioned the Jonglei 
Canal as a part o f his "Century Storage" proposal. Without canalizing the Sudd swamps 
in South Central Sudan, any Great Lakes water storage plans would be useless, argued 
Hurst. If Great Lakes storage were to be worthwhile, the Sudanese Sudd swamps had to 
be canalized.38 The first stage o f latter-day incarnation of the Jonglei Canal was not 
linked to Hurst's upstream storage proposals. In essence, the contemporary plan 
proposed transferring water out o f the Sudd swamps without entailing savings elsewhere 
in the system. As proposed by the Sudanese-Egyptian Permanent Joint Technical 
Commission on the Nile (PJTC), stage I of the canal would extend from the Dinka 
village of Jonglei to the point where the Sobat River flows into the White Nile. Storage 
in Lake Albert is relegated to stage II of the current scheme. The canal would vary in 
width between 28 to 50 meters. It was to have a depth of 4-7 meters and a water flow 
rate of some 3.5 kilometers an hour. While first proposed in 1904, the canal could not be 
built without a significant improvement in digging technology. Developing the required 
technology took until the sixties. The German firm of Orenstein and Koppel 
accomplished the required technological breakthrough by designing and building the 
"Bucketwheel" for the French firm, Compagnie de Constructions Internationale (CCI). 
Used to dig a canal in Pakistan in 1964, the machine weighs 2300 tons and is over five 
stories high; it moves across eight caterpillar tracks. The most important part of the 
Bucketwheel is its laser-guided digging wheel, equipped with 12 buckets. By June 1978,
38H. E. Hurst, The Nile: A General Account o f  the River and the Utilization o f  Its 
Waters (London: Constable, 1957) pp. 304-309.
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the Bucketwheel came back to life on the Sudd's swampy floodplain, called toic by its 
Nilotic inhabitants — the Dinka, the Nuer and the Shilluk.39
While the problems associated with the canal appeared in the discourse of the 
rebel Southern Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, the canal did not cause the civil war. 
The SPLA put the Bucketwheel out of commission in 1983. It sits today on the toic at 
the canal's 267th kilometer, rusting into oblivion. Even if peace were to come to the 
Sudan, it is unlikely that the canal can ever be completed given the financial condition of 
the Sudan and the decay o f the completed sections of the canal. It is clear that the 
economic costs of the Jonglei Canal were enormous for the Sudan, both in terms of 
economic hardships for the local residents and the social rents that needed to be paid in 
order to secure their cooperation. More importantly, the canal was extremely expensive 
to the Sudan in terms of political stability and peace. The Sudan was to share some 3.8 
cubic kilometers on an equal basis with Egypt at Aswan as a consequence of the canal. 
According to Israeli water scholar Nurit Kliot, the Sudan's best interests lie in reaching 
accommodation with Ethiopia over the Blue Nile and concentrating on the clay plains in 
Central Eastern Sudan. The plains of the Blue Nile are very fertile. These plains are 
largely populated by Arabic-speaking peoples, and they would be safe from the SPLA or 
a future independent state in Southern Sudan. Yet, the Sudan does not seem to develop
39Collins, "History, Hydropolitics and the Nile," pp. 126-128; Whittington and 
McClelland, "Opportunities for Regional and International Cooperation," p. 148; 
Thomas Ofcansky, "Historical Setting: Independent Sudan," in Helen Metz, ed., Sudan: 
A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 34-36.
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its water resources with its interests in mind. Kliot remarks that "the Sudan has 
subjected her will to Egypt and may do so again."40
Properly understood, Sudan's water development projects are largely a function of 
Egyptian policy. When the Sudan attempted to pursue its own interests in 1958, Egypt 
invited a coup d ’etat. While Egypt is probably capable of using military force to defeat 
the Sudan and any other Nile basin states, imposing a water regime favorable to its needs 
can be guaranteed only through the military occupation of areas in the remote mountain 
vastness of Ethiopia and the swamps o the upper Nile—a very expensive proposition.41 So 
why does the Sudan constantly defer to Egypt with regard to water development policy? 
Why does Egypt view the Sudan as its backyard? The questions about Jonglei and the 
Sudan's general policy of cooperation with Egypt are directly related to the primary 
research question o f this study, because these questions target the conditions that lead to 
co-operative behavior.
ETHIOPIAN WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Unlike Sudanese water programs, Ethiopian projects do not usually enjoy 
Egyptian approval. Traditionally, news of Ethiopian water projects IS greeted with 
alarms, or threats o f war, or by both, in Cairo. As stated earlier, Ethiopia's agriculture is 
primarily rain-fed. But, the droughts of the last two decades have harmed Ethiopia's 
traditional agricultural sector. Generally speaking, Ethiopia has been pursuing the
40Collins, "History, Hydropolitics and the Nile," p. 127; Kliot, Water Resources 
and Conflict, pp. 57, 68-69, 71.
41J. Anthony Allan, "Evolving Water Demands and National Development 
Options," in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile (London: School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 1994), p. 308.
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development o f hydroelectric power. By 1994, Ethiopia had acquired the ability to 
produce 400 MW of electricity a year. In addition to its portion o f the Nile basin, 
Ethiopia has some smaller rivers that run largely within its own territory into Kenya and 
Somalia. All told, Ethiopia has the theoretical potential to produce 4,000 MW of 
electricity a year. There are only two operational Ethiopian Nile development projects, 
and both are primarily designed for hydro-electric power generation. The first power 
station, Tis-Issat, is located 25 kilometers from the Blue Nile's outlet from Lake Tana.
The second completed Ethiopian project on Blue Nile is the Fincha hydroelectric plant 
with a capacity to generate 100 MW of electrical power a year. The Fincha reservoir is 
also being used for irrigation. It can hold only 0.3-0.5 cubic kilometers o f water.
Ethiopia uses the Fincha dam and other minor projects to draw about 1.0 cubic kilometers 
for irrigation.42
With regard to future irrigation projects, Ethiopia may attempt to claim 40 cubic 
kilometers o f Blue Nile water a year.43 Yet, it is not entirely clear how and to what 
extent Ethiopia will proceed with irrigation projects. Only one concern is clear,
Ethiopia plans to charge users for irrigation water. Otherwise, the country is uncertain 
with regard to the proper approach to developing irrigation projects. Installing a modem 
high-technology irrigation system requires $10,000-515,000 of public investment per 
hectare. Clearly, Ethiopia cannot afford such expenditures. More substantially, in terms
42Zewdie Abate, "The Integrated Development o f Nile Basin Waters," in P. 
Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 
1994), p. 229; Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 66-67; Jovanovie, "Ethiopian 
Interests," p. 84.
43Jovanovic, "Ethiopian Interests," p. 85.
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of plans and projects, Ethiopia is already planning to develop hydroelectric power 
stations on the Blue Nile. There are 12 such power stations are already in the planning 
stage. About 80 percent of Ethiopia’s planned hydroelectric power generation capacity 
will be located in the Blue Nile Basin.44 Ethiopia seems to believe that hydroelectric 
power is easier to develop, because it can be exported; thus, these programs can, 
eventually, pay for themselves.
Ethiopia has constantly asserted its right to use the Blue Nile for the benefit o f its 
population in several international fora since 1957. During the 1977 UN Water 
Conference in Mar de Plata, Argentina, Ethiopia argued that it had the right to develop 
the Blue Nile independently. Ethiopia pointed out that Egypt constructed the Aswan 
High Dam without consulting Ethiopia. At various other times, Ethiopia has offered 
plans for irrigating various tracts of land in the Blue Nile and Baro-Akobo (known as the 
Sobat in the Sudan) basins.45 As mentioned earlier, these irrigation and hydroelectric 
plans are not being well received in Cairo. Egypt's sensitivity to Ethiopian Blue Nile 
development projects cannot be overstated. Egypt's reactions occur both at a political 
and hydrological-professional level. For example, Sadat threatened war with Ethiopia 
over the Blue Nile,46 and Egyptian hydrologists have traditionally reacted with
44Abate, "The Integrated Development," pp. 230-231.
45Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 67-68.
46Waterbury, Hydropolitics, p. 78.
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unrestrained passion at the very suggestion that any other country may have a legitimate 
claim on Nile waters, especially when the country in question is Ethiopia.47
UGANDAN AND GREAT LAKES WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Egypt’s attitude towards Ethiopia contrasts sharply with its earlier policy towards 
Ugandan water development programs. During the short interval of time when Hurst's 
integrationist outlook was official Egyptian policy in the late forties and early fifties, the 
British government representing its dependencies in East Africa (Uganda, Tanganyika, 
and Kenya) reached an agreement with Egypt that allowed Uganda to build the Owen 
Falls Dam. Egypt agreed to compensate Uganda for a portion o f the dam's cost, because 
it could be used for storing water in Lake Victoria for the benefit o f Egypt. Negotiations 
for the agreement began in 1948 and were concluded in January 1953. The technical 
form of the agreement, called the "Draft Heads Agreement," had been reached in 1948. 
The Owen Falls Dam raises the water level of Lake Victoria by one meter; as a result, the 
lake holds an additional 68 cubic kilometers of water. The purpose of the Owen Falls 
Dam is hydroelectric power generation. The dam can generate 1,150 MW o f electricity a 
year.48
The Owen Falls Dam's success can be attributed to the fact that Britain controlled 
Egypt and had managed to make Hurst's plan official Egyptian policy. As long as Egypt, 
the Sudan, and the British East African dependencies remained under British control, the 
1929 Nile Waters agreement also remained law in East Africa. The exchange of notes
47Mamdouh Shahin, "Discussion and Response: Discussion of the Paper Entitled 
'Ethiopian Interests in the Division o f the Nile River Waters,"' Water International, Vol. 
11 (1986), pp. 16-22.
48Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 39, 50.
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between Britain and Egypt prohibited developing Nile resources, "save with the previous 
agreement o f the government o f Egypt." By the mid-fifties, however, the British 
governments in East Africa quietly moved towards exploring the issue o f irrigation. A 
British hydrological firm was hired by the East African governments. Sir Alexander 
Gibb and Partners, conducted a survey of Uganda and the Nile regions o f Tanganyika and 
Kenya. Gibb and partners recommended the use of 1.31 cubic kilometers to irrigate 
various areas in East Africa. Other irrigation projects and contingencies called for an 
additional 0.394 cubic kilometers of water. All told, the three rain-rich East African 
territories claimed 1.704 cubic kilometers o f water. After the "Free Officer" coup in 
Egypt, the Suez crisis, and the humbling o f independent Sudan in 1958, the prospects of 
having Egyptian cooperation quickly melted away. The British East African 
governments attempted to initiate dialogue with Egypt and the Sudan at the time of the 
1959 Sudanese-Egyptian Nile Waters Agreement, but these efforts failed. Egypt and the 
Sudan refused to recognize the right of the East African states to any Nile Water. Egypt 
and the Sudan stated that, under the 1929 agreement, these countries have a right to 
excess water--water not used by the downstream states. Furthermore, the Egyptians and 
their new Sudanese allies argued that since no "excess water" existed, the East African 
countries were not entitled to any water.49 Given subsequent stances taken by Egypt and 
the Sudan, Uganda was extremely fortunate to have been able to build the Owen Falls 
Dam.
49Paul Howell, "East Africa's Water Requirements: The Equatorial Nile Project 
and the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. A Brief Historical Review," in P. Howell and J. 
Allan, eds., The Nile (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1994), pp. 85, 
88-89, 96, 98-103.
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With independence in the early sixties, the three former British East African states 
began to react to the positions taken by Egypt and the Sudan. President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanganyika (renamed Tanzania after its union with Zanzibar) announced the "Nyerere 
Doctrine." Under that doctrine, independent Tanganyika refused to recognize any 
agreements signed by Britain on its behalf. Furthermore, Nyerere insisted that 
Tanganyika had a right to develop its water resources as it saw fit, without consulting 
other countries. Uganda and Kenya followed Tanganyika's lead shortly thereafter. While 
some analysts, such as Robert Collins, blame the Nyerere doctrine for the destruction of 
the Equatorial Nile Project and various other forms o f Hurst's intergrationalist approach, 
blame probably should be assigned much further downstream. By 1959, Britain itself 
was considering abrogating the 1929 Nile Waters agreement when it learned that Egypt 
and the Sudan were planning to divide the river without consideration for the needs of 
the British East African dependencies.50 Despite being rhetorically based in nationalism, 
the Nyerere Doctrine does not represent a radical, nationalist departure in East African 
foreign policy. It is simply the implementation of policies that Britain was already 
considering at the time o f its departure from East Africa.
Currently, the three former British East African states use the 1.7 cubic kilometers 
of water they proposed to the Egyptians and the Sudanese in the fifties. In addition, they 
may be using an unknown quantity (6-7 cubic kilometers?) of Lake Victoria's water for 
lake-side agriculture; unfortunately, no data exists with regard to the proportion of water 
actually drawn from the lake for irrigation, and it may be that lake-side agriculture simply 
uses the fertile shore soils and relies on rain for watering. Kliot estimates that Uganda,
50Ibid., p. 96; Collins, "History, Hydropolitics and The Nile," p. 122.
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Kenya, and Tanzania will increase their use of Nile water to 2 cubic kilometers. The 
primary water source for these projects will be flood control waters and hydroelectric 
plants But these countries are not the only Central African Great Lakes states planning to 
use Nile-related waters. The Kagera Basin Agreement envisions using the Kagera river, 
the main tributary of Lake Victoria, to irrigate 90,000 hectares and to increase the use of 
water in an addition 200,000 hectares. Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda are the 
signatories. Aside from irrigating various areas o f land, the Kagera Basin Agreement 
includes a planned hydroelectric power station at Rusumo Falls. The agreement foresaw 
the use of 2 cubic kilometers o f water, but it could not be implemented due to insufficient 
resources and civil war in Rwanda and Burundi.51
Surprisingly, Egypt and the Sudan have not been as uncooperative with these 
three states as they have been with Ethiopia. While Egypt and the Sudan rejected an East 
African claim for 5 cubic kilometers of water in 1961, they clearly have an interest in 
flood control--an area in which their interests partially overlap with those o f the Great 
Lakes states. The Central African Great Lakes states have created some regimes to 
develop their Nile resources and to equalize their negotiating position vis-a-vis the 
Sudanese-Egyptian Permanent Joint Technical Commission. Aside from the Kagera 
Basin Agreement, the Lake Basin Development authority (LBDA) has been created. The 
LBDA includes the three states of former British East Africa.52 The study discusses the 
role and extent o f the major regimes in another section. The Owen Falls Dam is the last 
major water development program that needs to be discussed by this study. The next
51Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 69-70.
52Ibid., p. 83; Howell, "East Africa’s Water Requirements," p. 103.
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focus o f this section will examine the water use patterns that result from the complex 
infrastructure installed in the Nile basin.
PATTERNS OF WATER USE IN THE NILE BASIN
The infrastructure built by and for the benefit of Egypt leads to lopsided Egyptian 
advantage in terms of water consumption patterns. Egyptian and Sudanese consumption 
is governed by the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan. Ethiopia 
consumes one cubic kilometer of Nile water, while the three former British East African 
states are known to consume at least 1.7 cubic kilometers. The Kagera Basin Agreement 
has not been fully implemented, and no data is available for Rwanda and Burundi's 
consumption of Nile-bound waters. While Egypt sometimes helps itself to waters left 
unused by the Sudan, it generally abides by its quota. But, the reality o f the quota is 
"softer" for Egypt than it is for the Sudan. The quota is based on the average annual Nile 
discharge between 1900 and 1959. If the figures available for the 46 years preceding 
1900 were included in the average, the Nile's average discharge would be calculated at 91 
cubic kilometers with a standard deviation of 16.8 cubic kilometers a year. With the 
Sudan bound not to use 18.5 cubic kilometers a year, Egypt can reap a vast water bonus 
during flood years. During drought years, Egypt can still insist on using its full quota. 
Properly understood, the Egyptian "quota" is really a floor figure for Egyptian water 
use.53
Egypt reuses some of its water every year. In 1990, Egypt enjoyed 12 cubic 
kilometers of return flow water from agricultural and urban use. Egyptian wells provided 
an additional cubic kilometer of groundwater. Egypt utilizes some 68.5 cubic kilometers
53Haynes and Whittington, "International Management of the Nile," p. 19-20.
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a year, not counting the losses from evaporation and seepage. These figures do not 
include any additional waters that may arrive at Aswan during wet years.54 These 
factors, combined with the unknown quantity of water that is used at the shores of Lake 
Victoria and unknown consumption figures for Rwanda and Burundi, render the table 
below nominal in some respects. The most important pattern that emerges from the table 
is Egypt's dominance in water consumption.
Table 4: Contribution and Consumption o f Nile Waters by States or Regions (in cubic 
kilometers).




Great Lakes States 12.0 1.7
SOURCE: Whittington and McClelland, "Opportunities for Regional and International 
Cooperation in the Nile Basin," p. 146.
AGRICULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
Despite nearly monopolizing the Nile, Egypt leads the basin in food imports. The 
country is forced to devote one third or its imports for food. Eighty percent o f Egypt's 
export revenues are devoted for food imports. Today, these food imports include some 
75-80 percent o f the cereals consumed in Egypt. In 1974, only four years after the 
completion of the Aswan High Dam, Egypt became a net importer of food and by 1981, 
the country was importing 48 percent of its food.55 Egypt has been forced to increase its
54Ibid., p. 22.
5SJ.A. Allan, "Evolving Water Demands and National Development Options," in 
P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile, (London: School of Oriental and African Studies,
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food imports because its population has grown dramatically. The rate o f population 
growth in Egypt is about one million people every nine months. Population growth is a 
vital aspect of any discussion concerning Nile water, because Egypt uses 88 percent of its 
water for agriculture. Agriculture, o f course, is essential for keeping any population alive 
and well.56 Egypt has been forced to import food despite the fact that it has been able to 
increase agricultural production at a rate that matched population growth in the 1980s. 
Other countries in the basin have also seen their populations rise at a meteoric pace 
during the twentieth century. The table below, devised by Kliot, highlights the food 
problem facing the entire basin:





















Ethiopia 49.2 66.4 2.6 2.9 -2.1 85
Tanzania 27.3 39.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 88
Burundi 5.5 7.4 2.9 2.9 1.7 95
Uganda 18.8 27.0 3.6 3.4 -0.5 92
Rwanda 7.2 10.2 3.4 3.4 1.1 76
Kenya 24.0 35.1 3.5 3.8 3.4 107
Sudan 25.2 33.6 2.8 2.8 0.8 75
Egypt 52.4 64.2 2.4 1.9 2.7 123
SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 76-77.
1994) pp. 302-303. Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 78-79.
56 Amikan Nachmani, Water Jitters in the Middle East, Security and Policy 
Studies, No. 32 (Ramat Gan, Israel: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, June 
1997), pp. 70, 72.
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O f all the states in the basin, only Egypt and Kenya were producing more food per 
capita during 1988-1990 than they were during 1979-1981. Drought may be a culprit, but 
increased agricultural output per capita, by itself, does not necessarily translate to food 
independence or "food security." While Egypt did raise agricultural production by 23 
percent on per capita basis between the two time periods, its dependence on foreign 
imports did not decrease. Instead, the opposite happened, and Egypt today imports more 
food than ever before. Clover production for meat and work animals may be the culprit, 
but the increased pressure that population growth puts on the country cannot be denied. 
Egypt's attempts at using land reclamation to increase production have also failed.
Today, the reclaimed lands constitute about 7.7 percent o f agricultural land in Egypt, but 
they produce only 2 percent of all agricultural output.57 Egypt's failure to produce enough 
food led to massive food aid and food importation. Kliot documents this problem in the 
table below:
57Whittingron and Haynes, p. 129.
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Ethiopia 118 687 54 573 538 17
Tanzania 431 73 148 76 22 7
Burundi 7 17 6 - 2 18
Uganda 36 7 0 17 35 8
Rwanda 3 21 19 - 7 9
Kenya 15 188 2 112 62 10
Sudan 125 586 46 19 335 18
Egypt 3,877 8,580 610 1,427 1,210 31
SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 77.
These two tables partially reflect the upstream consequences o f Egyptian policies. 
Ethiopia and the Sudan saw their agricultural production decline during the droughts. 
Setting aside the hardships of civil war, the Sudan was prohibited by treaty from 
expanding its irrigated areas. While not bound by treaty, Ethiopia could not use the Nile 
to mitigate famine due to civil war and dire poverty. The droughts did not extend to 
Central Africa, and most of the states there did not face the famines that haunted Ethiopia 
and the Sudan in the 1980s. Nevertheless, population growth has weakened all o f  the 
basin states, including Egypt. It can be argued that Egypt was able to escape unscathed 
from these difficulties because it could import food. But Egypt was also the beneficiary 
o f massive aid from its allies abroad. Alliances are rarely eternal, and Egypt may one day
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face the problems that currently cripple the upstream states. Egypt’s population growth
rate is very high, and so is Ethiopia's. Population growth will continue to ravage the
whole basin. The United States Bureau of the Census estimates significant increases in
the populations o f the basin states during the next three decades:
Table 7: Current Population and the 2010 and 2020 Population Projections For Nile 
Basin States in millions.
Country 1996 2010 2020
Ethiopia 57.17 81.17 100.81
Tanzania 29.06 36.08 40.10
Burundi 5.94 8.23 10.20
Uganda 20.16 26.36 30.87
Rwanda 6.85 10.08 11.04
Kenya 28.18 33.92 35.24
Sudan 31.07 47.51 58.55
Egypt 63.58 80.69 92.35
SOURCE: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, as cited by The World 
Almanac and Book o f  Facts: 1997, (Mahwah, N.J.: World Almanac Books, 1997), p. 
838-839.
These numbers have both agricultural and military implications. The upstream 
states will face immense pressures to unilaterally develop Nile water resources for 
hydroelectric power and agriculture at the expense of the decidedly pro-Egyptian status 
quo. Conversely, the larger populations may force these states to cooperate with regard 
to developing Nile resources along Hurst's line, because cooperation would increase the 
water available for irrigation and hydroelectric power. Either alternative, though, 
presupposes a departure from the current state o f water consumption in the basin. The
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population figures for Ethiopia could be even higher; Abate estimates population figures 
o f 122, 161, and 215 million for 2020, 2030, and 2040 respectively.58
Thus far, Egypt has been the only country to openly speak of a military solution to 
its water problems, and it is very clear that Sadat's audience was the Ethiopian leadership 
in Addis Ababa . As Ethiopia's population grows, the credibility of Egyptian military 
threats declines. Countries with large populations can field large armies, and even when 
defeated, are usually very difficult to control in a direct way for long periods o f time. It is 
difficult to see how Egypt can militarily dictate and control the hydraulic behavior of 215 
million Ethiopians in 2040, while at the same time struggling to feed its own population. 
In contrast, international regimes are certainly a better alternative for reducing conflict 
and promoting cooperation in the basin. In the following section, this study will 
concentrate on the historical and current regimes of the Nile basin.
REGIMES
The regimes constructed on the utilization of Nile waters mirror the physical 
infrastructure constructed on the river. Like the dams in Sudan and Uganda, they reflect 
Egyptian priorities and preferences. These priorities and preferences do not reflect the 
current international consensus on the management of common basin resources reflected 
in the "Helsinki rules." The "Helsinki rules" represent the doctrine o f equitable 
distribution o f riparian basin water resources. The doctrine postulates that each country 
in the basin is allowed to use its water resources only to the extent that its use does not 
harm other countries. Devised in 1966 by the International Law Commission, the
58Abate, "The Integrated Development," p. 230.
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Helsinki rules, along with rules emanating from two other compatible doctrines, represent 
the current status quo in international jurisprudence referring to international river 
systems.59 There are eleven variables that govern the distribution of water under the 
Helsinki rules:
a. the geography of the basin, including in particular, the size of the
drainage area in the territory o f each basin state;
b. the hydrology of the basin including, in particular, the contribution of
water by each state;
c. the climate affecting the basin;
d. the past utilization o f the waters o f the basin including, in particular,
present utilization;
e. the economic and social needs of each basin state;
f. the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each state;
g. the comparative costs o f alternative means of satisfying the economic
and social needs o f each basin state;
h. the availability of other resources;
i. the avoidance of unnecessary waster in the utilization of waters of the
basin;
j. the practicability of compensation to one or more o f the co-basin states
as a means of negotiating settlements over conflicts among users;
k. the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied without
causing substantial injury to another basin state.60
In essence, Kliot's work represents the application o f these variables to various 
Middle Eastern river systems. Very early on in her Nile case study, she concludes that 
Ethiopia "should be entitled to a large portion of Nile waters. "6I on the basis o f the 
Helsinki rules. The Helsinki rules and related compatible approaches represent the broad
59Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 6; Jon Martin Trolldalen, 
International Environmental Conflict Resolution: The Role o f  the United Nations (New 
York: UNITAR, 1992), p. 79.
“ United Nations, Integrated River Basin Development, revised edition, (New 
York: UN Dept, of Economic and Social Affairs, 1970), pp. 78-80; Kliot, Water 
Resources and Conflict, pp. 7-10.
6IKliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 28.
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international consensus on river basins, but this consensus does not extent to the countries 
in the Nile basin, because Egypt and the Sudan reject the right o f other states to claim a 
share of the water. As we saw earlier, the three former British East African states have 
reserved the right to develop Nile waters emanating from within their borders as they see 
fit. Ethiopia has also consistently asserted a similar position. Sudan and Egypt have been 
able to cooperate. Sudanese-Egyptian cooperation, however, has been premised on the 
exclusion of other basin states. Two treaties have defined cooperation between Egypt and 
the Sudan: the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements.
THE 1929 NILE WATERS AGREEMENT 
The two contracting parties for this early treaty were Egypt and the United 
Kingdom. The UK was acting on behalf of the Sudan and the three British East African 
dependencies. After the assassination of the British Governor-General o f the Sudan in 
Cairo in 1924, the British administration in the Sudan threatened to expand its irrigation 
projects. In response, Egypt established a small, three-man commission headed by an 
independent Dutch engineer assisted by one Egyptian and one British engineer. This 
small Nile Waters Commission produced a number of recommendations that were 
attached to the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. The agreement was premised on annual 
water yield of 84 cubic kilometers. The agreement assigned 48 cubic kilometers to 
Egypt, 4 cubic kilometers to the Sudan, and left 32 cubic kilometers unallocated. As 
discussed earlier, the 1929 agreement reflected the priorities and needs o f Egypt. Egypt 
got a virtual veto over the development o f Nile water resources in the Sudan.
Furthermore, Egypt insisted that the treaty be considered as a temporary agreement, with 
a permanent agreement to be reached once the question o f the future of the Sudan has
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been resolved.62 The British East African territories were bound by the treaty.
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda could not develop their Nile resources without the prior
agreement o f Egypt.
Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no 
irrigation or power works are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile 
or its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows so far as these are in 
the Sudan or in the countries under British administration, which would, in 
such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either 
reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date o f its 
arrival or lower its level.63
The agreement, like the 1925 letter from Lord Lloyd, ratified Egyptian paramountcy in
the British dominated upstream Nile countries. Uganda could not, without Egyptian
permission, build the Owen Falls dam. With the 1952 collapse of British power in Egypt
and the subsequent independence of Sudan and the East African states, the agreement was
moot sometime between the completion of the Owen Falls dam and the 1959 treaty. The
treaty remains the most widespread regime created in the Nile basin. Unlike the 1959
treaty, it included all the Nile countries aside from Ethiopia and the Belgian Congo
(Kinshasa).
THE 1959 NILE WATERS AGREEMENT 
The rise of Nasser in Egypt brought about some rhetorical changes in Egyptian 
policy. The independence of the Sudan in 1956 presented Egypt with a remarkable 
opportunity. Unlike Britain, Egypt's partner in the Anglo-Egyptian Co-dominium of the
62Odidi Okidi, "History o f The Nile and Lake Victoria Basins Through Treaties," 
in P. Howell and J. Allan, eds., The Nile, (London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies, 1994), pp. 326-327; Howell, "East Africa’s Water Requirements," p. 85.
63Clause 4 (ii) o f the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, as cited by Paul Howell, "East 
Africa’s Water Requirements," p. 85.
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Sudan, Nasser's Egypt was located immediately to the north of the newly independent 
country. For the Egyptians, Sudanese independence may have presented an opportunity 
to rid themselves of the British checks that had hitherto encumbered Egyptian activities in 
the basin. As stated earlier, the Sudan sought the professional services of a British 
hydrological firm. Armed with a neo-Hurstian study, the Sudanese government went into 
negotiations with Egypt with an integrationalist perspective. Egypt not only rejected the 
Sudanese position, it destabilized the Sudanese government, invited a coup, and finally 
forced the 1959 agreement on the Sudan. Any examination of the events of 1958-1959 
would lead one to believe that the 1959 agreement was a product of Egyptian hegemony. 
Nevertheless, Thomas Naff, an expert on water-related conflict, argues that "only when 
Egypt, the Nile's premier power, agreed, was the 1959 treaty with the Sudan signed."64 
Naff tries to argue that river-basin regimes require hegemons like Egypt. But his 
arguments make several flawed assumptions. First, the Sudan's preferences, in the 
absence of Egyptian-induced duress and when hydrological interests were held 
paramount, were clearly against the 1959 water agreement and its associated Aswan High 
Dam. Second, the regime is not Nile-wide; it is simply an agreement between Egypt and 
the Sudan and it excludes all other countries in the basin, Third, Naff implies that the 
1959 agreement was a net-positive to the Sudan. Given the economic, social, and 
environmental problems associated with the Jonglei canal and other Egyptian-related 
projects in the Sudan, it is very doubtful that the 1959 treaty was a net benefit to the 
Sudan.
^Naff, "Conflicts and Water Use in the Middle East," p. 277.
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There were ten important points in the agreement. First, unlike the 1929 
agreement, the one of 1959 was designed for the "full utilization of Nile waters." Second, 
the agreement did not abolish or repeal the 1929 agreement as far as Egypt and the Sudan 
were concerned. Third, the agreement calculated Egypt's established rights on the basis 
of the 1929 water allocation. Fourth, Sudan consented to the building of the Aswan 
High Dam and Egypt agreed to permit the construction o f the Roseries dam on the Blue 
Nile. Fifth, the "additional" water resources created by the Aswan High dam (22 cubic 
kilometers) were divided between Egypt and the Sudan after the previously allocated 
shares and evaporation (estimated at 10 cubic kilometers) were taken into account; Egypt 
received 7.5 cubic kilometers and the Sudan's share was increased by 14.5 cubic 
kilometers to 55.5 and 18.5 cubic kilometers respectively. Sixth, the Sudan was to 
advance a water loan of 1.5 cubic kilometers a year until 1977. According Raj Krishna, 
an expert on treaties, the water loan may have lasted well beyond November 1977. 
Seventh, Egypt paid $15 million dollars to the Sudan as compensation for the 
displacement of Sudanese citizens displaced by the Aswan High dam. Eighth, the Sudan 
agreed to undertake projects in the Upper Nile region to increase water supply jointly 
with Egypt; these projects included the Jonglei canal. Ninth, the Permanent Joint 
Technical Commission (PJTC) composed of an equal number of Egyptians and Sudanese 
hydrologists was established under the agreement. Tenth, the two states agreed to adopt 
common policies with regard to the claims o f other riparian states. If Egypt and the
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Sudan accepted a claim by another riparian, they were to share equally in creating the 
third country's share o f the water.65
Rather than being an opening for negotiations with other countries, this tenth 
point virtually insures that the Sudan, rather than Egypt, will bear the lion's share of any 
allocations to a third country. Suppose that Egypt and the Sudan accept an Ethiopian 
claim of 6 cubic kilometers of water. Egypt would be forced to forgo 3 cubic kilometers 
of water out of 55.5—an amount that it could save elsewhere through improving irrigation 
and perhaps even operating the Aswan High Dam at a lower level. Sudan would be 
forced to forgo 3 cubic kilometers out of an annual quota o f 18.5 cubic kilometers.
Worse still, this aspect of the agreement allows Egypt to blame the Sudan for any 
rejections of water claims by other co-riparians, because the Sudan, under this agreement, 
is forced into a position that renders serious consideration for the needs o f other basin 
states moot. Not only does the tenth point benefit Egypt, it allows the country the option 
of pretending that it supports allocations for third parties while being able to count on the 
Sudan to reject the claims o f Ethiopia and the Great Lakes states. Egypt keeps the water, 
and the Sudan pays the diplomatic price. Thus, it would be hard to conclude that the 
1959 agreement benefits the Sudan in any way. Rather than reaching an agreement with 
Egypt, the Sudan's interests would have probably been served by helping itself to the 
water or reaching some accomodation with Ethiopia. By 1958, Nasser's Egypt was busy 
creating enemies for itself, and the Sudan could have sought alliance with the West or 
with Israel to check Egypt's military superiority. The strange Sudanese-Egyptian
6SRaj Krishna, "The Legal Regime of the Nile River Basin," in Joyce R. Starr and 
Daniel C. Stoll, eds., The Politics o f  Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1988), pp. 28-30.
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structure, which manifests itself in the 1959 treaty, led some o f the other basin states to 
pursue cooperation with each other.
GREAT LAKES STATES’ REGIMES 
Thus far, three regimes have appeared in the Nile basin area of the Great Lakes. 
The earliest regime was a 1965 agreement that brought together Egypt, Sudan, and the 
three former British East African states. In 1961, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika 
wanted to conduct a survey of Lake Victoria. Lake Kyoga, and Lake Albert. They 
appealed to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. By 1965, the five states 
signed an agreement for conducting the survey with the United Nations Development 
Program. The survey was conducted by the World Meteorological Organization. Later, 
the agreement was extended to Rwanda and Burundi.66 Of course, this regime was for the 
purposes of generating information only. It contained no mechanism for dispute 
resolution or allocation.
The Lake Basin Development Authority was formed by the three former British 
East African States in 1982, and while it is mentioned in Paul Howell's 1994 article, it 
remains a rather obscure body. Books about development of agriculture in Kenya and 
Tanzania do not even mention the Authority. Furthermore, Powell makes an appeal to 
the outside world to finance the LBDA and develop it as a competitor to the PJTC.67 
Okidi refers to the Authority as an economic development agency used by Kenya 
primarily to coordinate the development of its Lake Victoria region with Ugandan and
^Ibid., p. 31.
67Howell, "East Africa’s Water Requirements," p. 103.
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Tanzanian planning efforts.68 Uganda and Tanzania also cooperate within the context of 
the Kagera Basin Organization (the FCBO). The KBO was established in 1977. It 
currently has four members: Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. While the KBO is 
a strong organization with extensive legal powers,69 it lacks the funds and has not 
managed to accomplish its goals.
TECCONILE
Tecconile is the latest regime to emerge in the Nile valley. It includes all the Nile 
states except Ethiopia. The organization was established during the Nile 2002 conference 
that was held in Khartoum in February 1994. The stated purpose o f the organization is to 
"deal witrh the technical aspects of Nile water cooperation among Nile-basin states."70 
Tecconile has been set up to study the technical aspects of integration. Ethiopia has 
refused to join the organization, and it seems to be little more than a confidence raising 
measure. "As one observer at the Khartoum conference remarked: 'Tecconile might give 
Nile countries a bit of confidence in dealing with each other, but it will not be the father 
of a water allocation and management system.' That can only come if Ethiopia is brought 
into firm negotiations with Egypt."71
68Okidi, "History of the Nile," p. 343.
69Krishna, "The Legal Regime," p. 31.
70Brian Scudder and Jon Wild, "Water: Whose Nile Is It Anyway?," The Middle 
East, No. 233 (April 1994), p. 34.
7lIbid.
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ANALYSIS OF NILE REGIMES 
An editorial in the Al-Ahram, Egypt's virtually official newspaper, strongly 
suggests that Egypt is opposed to any changes in current status quo. Dr. Rushdie Sa’id, 
an editorialist for the newspaper, attacked the 22 August 1997 Wall Street Journal 
editorial which called for a Nile-wide water allocation regime. Sa’id proceeded with 
statements arguing that no other country has any rights to Nile water. Britain, Ethiopia, 
the United States, and Israel are blamed for allegedly attempting to de-Egyptianize the 
Nile:
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the River Nile was a pure 
Egyptian river. It had been studied, and plans for its use were placed in 
the Public Works Ministry, which employed some o f the best hydrologists 
in the world at the time. In the twenties o f this century, the English 
introduced cotton to the Sudan which necessitated taking an appropriate 
amount o f water, in a manner suitable to Egypt. The amount of water was 
limited within the context o f the "give-and-take" that lasted between 1929 
and 1959 -- when the issue was settled with the water distribution treaty 
that followed the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Ethiopia refused 
to recognize this treaty despite the fact that it used no Nile waters at the 
time . . .  In the sixties, the United States found it useful to use the Nile as 
an issue to force Egypt away from the independent discourse it was 
following at the time. It sent a large delegation of its experts to study the 
sources of the Nile in Ethiopia in order to suggest projects for utilizing the 
water sources, but Ethiopia did not need water resources at that time . . .
It further increases suspicions is that the experts advising the IMF on Nile 
study projects worth up to one hundred million dollars are specialists in 
conflict management and resolution--a discipline invented by the Jews to 
manage Israel’s conflicts with its neighbors. Now, they seek to bring 
conflict to the Nile basin.72
These arguments strongly suggest that Egypt views the Nile as its property and 
the water allotment to the Sudan as a necessary concession o f  Egyptian water rather than 
an obligation under an international regime. Furthermore, Sa'id's statements clearly
^Rushdie Sa'id, "What is Behind Opening the Nile Water Distribution File? Al- 
Ahram (3 September 1997), p. 12. In Arabic.
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indicate that Egypt is not willing to accept the Nile as an international river and that 
Mamdouh Shahin's suggestion with regard to providing two cubic kilometeres of 
emergency water for Ethiopia during drought years is a questionable offer.73 The offer is 
designed to foil outside criticism for Egypt's monopolization o f Nile waters while 
Ethiopia starves due to drought. Sa'id obviously assumes an Egyptian audience, so he 
speaks freely in his newspaper article. Near the end, he attempts to sugar-coat his 
arguments by stating that the Nile "should be a bridge for peace," but "peace" here seems 
to mean the proverbial "peace o f Saladin"—peace built on a foundation of utter 
dominance by one side and total capitulation by all others. Sa'id's language, and to a 
lesser extent Shahin's, embody some core Egyptian attitudes towards other co-riparians.
In a 1995 speech, the Egyptian minister for Public Works invited the other Nile states to 
cooperate with Egypt in the development of the Nile. He placed heavy emphasis on not 
"harming any country" through water projects. He also stated that "the Nile is Egypt's 
life, representing its past civilization, its present base, and its future fortune."
Furthermore, he emphasized the role of "international law and justice." The Egyptian 
interpretation o f international law, of course, does not recognize the right o f other 
countries to Nile water. The emphasis on "harm" is simply a pre-set pseudo-criteria that 
no upstream country can meet on the ground that any water project would harm Egypt.
In essence, Sa'ed's editorial is a blunt, undiplomatic restatement o f the Public Works 
Minister's declarations two years earlier.74 Talking about cooperation, while doing
73Mamdouh Shahin, "Discussion and Response," p. 19.
74Mohammed Abdel Hady Rady, "Satisfying National and International Water 
Demands," Water International, Vol. 20 (1995), pp .9-10.
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everything possible to prevent it, has been Egypt's formula to prevent the development of 
water resources upstream for decades. John Bulloch and Adel Darwish outline Egypt’s 
approach:
Egypt is the Oliver Twist of the Nile: it always wants more, Thus, its 
policy is not only to maintain its current supplies, but also to prevent, if 
possible, other countries from increasing their take, and to induce those 
upstream states to go in for projects that will benefit Egypt as well as 
themselves—the Jonglei Canal in Southern Sudan is the prime example of 
this. One senior Egyptian planner told us: "Although Egyptian officials 
always talk of cooperation, and appear to favor cooperation among the 
nine states on the use of the Nile water, they always add a footnote in the 
way of'yes, but as soon as civil wars, political troubles and other conflicts 
end' or 'when African countries are politically stable ... etc.' It would be 
naive to think that the Egyptians don’t have plans to exploit the politically 
unstable situation in some African countries—those which have unfriendly 
governments or are considering plans that would affect the flow o f the 
Nile. Egypt always wants these plans postponed—indefinitely." Another 
diplomatic method used by Egypt is shown by its representatives in 
International gatherings. Their opening argument is always that many 
riparian countries can rely on rainwater for irrigation, while Egypt is 
totally dependent on the Nile and the Sudan relies on the river for half its 
needs."75
The great irony is, of course, that Egypt's water supplies could be greatly 
increased through cooperation with other co-riparians. Egypt can  get more water by 
weaving a Pan-Nile regime that binds all the states in the basin to its water supply system 
by supporting the implementation of a modernized form of Hurst's "Century Storage" 
plan and the U.S. Bureau of reclamations project in Ethiopia. None of these projects can 
realistically be built without Egyptian participation, Egyptian input, and a strong 
Egyptian voice in their management. From a hydrological (or water maximizing) 
perspective, current Egyptian policy is not rational. Egypt's need to control the Nile is 
not, in the final analysis, a function of its water needs. In its national water policy, Egypt
7SBulloch and Darwish, Water Wars, pp. 94-95.
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seems to highlight the word "national" rather than "water." Put another way, Egypt's 
realism in the Nile basin is not a hydrological realism. These attitudes have shaped and 
been shaped by the conflicts that have plagued the Nile basin since the rise o f  
Mohammed Ali in Egyp and is discussed in the following sections.
None of the regimes in the Nile basin provide for conflict resolution mechanisms. 
The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement and the Kagera Basin Organization represent 
agreements on pre-set quantities or goals. Under Oran Young's classification o f 
regimes,76 the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement represents an imposed regime, because 
Britain represented both the Sudan and its East African territories. "Imposed" could also 
be used to describe the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, because Egyp, foreed a change in 
the Sudanese polity in order to accomplish its goals. Tecconile and the Hydromet survey 
of the Great lakes represent negotiated regimes; these two regimes were designed to 
gather information or build confidence, and they do not involve dispute resolution or 
water allocation. Unlike the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, the Kagera Basin Agreement 
seems to be the product o f consensus and negotiations, bu, its organizational offspring 
lacks the funds to become effective. O f course, none o f these regimes include Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia does not shrare in the Kagera Basin, so it would be unrealistic to consider its 
inclusion there. But it is the primary contributor o f water to Egypt and the Sudan, so it 
would be logical to expect its inclusion in Nile Water regimes established by these two 
countries. Since Ethiopia and the Sudan share dependence on erratic rain and the thy clay 
plains o f the Blue Nile region, a self-generating agreement or regime is reasonable to
76O ran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes fo r  Natural 
Resources and the Emnronment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1989), pp. 84-89 
Young classifies regtmes mto three categories: self-generating, imposed, negotiated.
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predict, but such a regime has failed to emerge. In addition, the 1959 agreement 
represents a greater imposition on the Sudan (and its non-party, Ethiopia) than the 1929 
agreement.
While Egypt and the Sudan do not share hydrological interests, Egypt shares a 
common language and faith with the ruling elites in the Sudan. The Sudan and Ethiopia 
share common hydrological and agricultural interests, but the ruling elites in the two 
states have different languages and religions. Ethiopia's ruling elites have been Amhara 
and Tigray. These elites have traditionally had either a Coptic, secular, or atheist 
religious orientations. There are, of course, large numbers o f Ethiopian Muslims, but 
Islam never enjoyed the official dominant role it plays in the Sudan or Egypt. Ethiopian 
Emperors have been Coptic in faith, and post-monarchical Ethiopia has never had a 
Muslim for its head of state. This makes Ethiopia unique in the Nile basin, and without 
partners in the region aside from Eritrea. To complicate matters, about 10-15 percent of 
Egypt's population is Coptic; and despite Boutros-Ghali’s protests to the contrary, it well 
known that the Egyptian Copts face a great deal o f social discrimination and pressure. In 
addition to Muslims, the Sudan has also large numbers of Catholics, Protestants, 
traditional religionists, and both Egyptian and Ethiopic Copts. From this complicated 
confessional picture, something akin to Huntington’s clash o f civilizations may emerge to 
partially explain the lack o f a regime that includes Ethiopia.
The Kagera Basin Organization includes a number of countries that share some 
similar characteristics. Unlike Ethiopia and Egypt, these countries are products of 
Western colonial powers. Tanzania was ruled by Germany and then the United 
Kingdom. The British also ruled Uganda and Kenya. Belgium governed the Congo,
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Rwanda, and Burundi. Groups such as the Hutu and the Tutsi, as well as related Bantu­
speaking groups, exist in all these states. Western forms of Christianity dominate the 
confessional landscape in these states, and only Tanzania has a substantial Muslim 
minority. Unlike Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Sudan, these states have generally separated 
religion from politics. A Muslim, Idi Amin, ruled Uganda, and Muslims have played a 
role in the government o f Tanzania. Cooperation seems to be taking place within a 
sphere of shared cultural, ideological, and civilizational parameters. Egypt is willing to 
pay water rents to the Sudan, on its terms of course, but not to Ethiopia or the Great 
Lakes states. Does the opposite apply to conflict? Does conflict occur between members 
of the three categories of state (Arab-Islamic, African-Secular, Ethiopic) described here?
POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND WAR
Egypt is the only country that has stated openly that it would fight for Nile waters. 
Presidents Sadat and Mubarak have openly said that Egypt will fight if its water supplies 
are threatened. For Sadat, the Nile may have simply been another word for Egypt. Sadat, 
whose mother was Sudanese, regarded Egypt as distinct from the Arab world. In a 1978 
conversation with Mousa Sabri, a leading Egyptian journalist, Sadat said, "We survived 
as a great nation for almost 5,000 years without the Arabs ... But look there, Mousa, 
[pointing South]... we cannot survive without Africa."77 Yet Sadat's African orientation 
took a very unusual form. While clearly proud of his African heritage, Sadat was quite 
willing to wage war against Ethiopia for the right to control the Nile:
77Anwar Sadat, President o f Egypt, as cited by Bulloch and Darwish in Water 
Wars, p. 84.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
We do not need permission from Ethiopia or the Soviet Union to divert 
our Nile water ... If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile 
Waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force. Tampering 
with the rights of a nation to water is tampering with its life and a decision 
to go to war on this score is indisputable in the international 
community."78
Sadat made these statements in 1980; he was reacting to Ethiopian protests of Egypt’s 
plans to divert Nile waters to the Sinai peninsula and to Israel's Negev desert. Under the 
current status quo, Egypt pursues a policy of preventing the development o f Nile 
resources in Ethiopia. It would be very difficult for Ethiopia to stand aside as Egypt sells 
water outside the basin. Thus, any water sales outside the basin need to take place under a 
secure clear water-allocation regime that includes all Nile states in order to avoid friction 
and conflict. In 1979, Egypt threatened war against Uganda, because Idi Amin had 
threatened to destroy the Owen Falls Dam and to poison the waters flowing into Egypt 
and the Sudan. Mubarak threatened war against the Sudan during the 1990-1991 Persian 
Gulf War, because the Sudan had sided with Iraq during that war and threatened to 
destroy the Aswan High Dam. The Sudanese and Ugandan governments had threatened 
to use force first, so the Egyptian response was clearly understandable. The 1980 
diplomatic confrontation with Ethiopia ended peacefully, with no Egyptian water 
transfers to Israel.
In contrast, the cries for war in the Egyptian parliament during the late 1980s- 
early 1990s cannot be understood on rational grounds. The drought had lowered the 
water levels in Lake Nasser, and the parliament asked Dr. Hamid al-Taheri, a renowned 
Egyptian hydrologist, to prepare a report. Al-Taheri presented his report in 1992. Instead
78Anwar Sadat, President o f Egypt, as cited by Raj Krishna, "The Legal Regime," 
p. 33-34.
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of addressing the causes o f the drought or ways that would allow Egypt to use water more 
efficiently, al-Taheri singled out Ethiopia and Uganda for blame. Instead of conducting a 
study within his profession, al-Taheri politicized his work in a manner that is perhaps 
unique to Egyptian hydrology. The biggest threats Egypt faces, he said, were Ethiopian 
and Ugandan water development programs. He also blamed Israel for Egypt's difficulties 
with Ethiopia and for the Sudanese civil war. The Egyptian parliament responded with 
"shouts of'W hen are we going to invade the Sudan?’ and 'Why doesn't the air force bomb 
the Ethiopian dams?'"79 Egypt's saber-rattling, and "Oliver Twist" policy, with regard to 
Nile waters, does not make hydrological sense. They inhibit upstream cooperation and 
subsequently reduce the water available to Egypt. The history o f conflict in the basin 
provides ample clues.
EGYPT INVADES THE SUDAN: 1825 
Egypt’s past forays into the Sudan were successes. Egypt invaded the Sudan in 
the early 1800s in order to simply seize territory and populations. Between 1820 and 
1825, Muhammad Ali expanded his Egyptian domains southward deeper into the Sudan. 
He was, to some extent, replicating the Ottoman conquest o f Lower Nubia and the Red 
Sea Coast three centuries earlier. His motives were clear. Muhammad Ali wanted to 
eliminate a remnant of the Mamluks that had taken shelter in what is today called 
Northern Sudan, and he also wanted to increase his territorial holdings, provide for 
additional sources of taxation, and increase the supply o f slave-soldiers-the Jihadiya.
There were, at the time, four Islamic Northern Sudanese polities capable o f offering 
some resistance: Darfur, the Funj Sultanate o f Sennar, Metemma (the Ja’ali tribal
^Bulloch and Darwish, Water Wars, pp. 88-90.
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confederation), and the Shayqiyya tribal confederation. Sennar was the most powerful 
polity in Northern Sudan, and had its internal affairs been in order, it is highly doubtful 
that Muhammad Ali’s expedition would have been successful. The Funj Sultanate of 
Sennar did not offer resistance, because it was in a period o f political turmoil with 
temporary power being held by a junior minister. The Funj monarch was only a nominal 
ruler who quickly made his submission to Muhammad Ali’s forces. Muhammad Ali’s 
army defeated the rulers of Metemma and the Shayqiyya and co-opted the two tribes into 
his new regime. As a more centralized and organized order, Darfur proved more 
difficult to defeat. Nevertheless, Muhammad Ali’s forces were able to wrest Kurdufan 
from the Sultanate o f Darfur. Expansion into Darfur proper and the Southern Sudan 
came at a later date.80 Darfur and Southern Sudan and even Northern Uganda were later 
added by Khedive (Regent) Ismail by 1881 -- the year of the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan.
EGYPT INVADES ETHIOPIA: 1875 
The first major conflict in the modem history of the Nile reveals a great deal 
about the subsequent problems that would haunt the basin. Egypt’s motives with regard 
to the conflict were clear: empire and revenue. Control over Nile waters was not a 
motivating factor in the Egyptian invasion. Even assuming a much smaller knowledge 
base on the Nile at the time, the Egyptians clearly knew that some of "their" water came 
from Ethiopia, but this was not the motivating factor behind the war. Ismail’s comments 
about Yohannes IV were revealing. First, Ismail never questioned his own right, as a 
Muslim, to appoint religious officials for a faith other than his own. Second, he 
constantly disparaged the legitimacy of Yohannes IV, another sovereign, comparing him
80Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, pp. 47-80.
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to a mere Egyptian bishop. Nowhere in the discourse surrounding the war did the word 
"water" appear. The war was about expanding Ismail’s domains and revenue. Finally, 
the war shows clearly that Egypt, even with an immense advantage in military 
technology, some Ethiopian allies, and control over the Red Sea coast, did (and perhaps 
does not and will not) not have the reach to control Ethiopia. Ismail Pasha had inherited 
the Egyptian realm in 1863. He sought to revive his grandfather’s imperial program and 
to expand Egyptian territory further still. He had rules o f succession to the Egyptian 
throne changed in favor to his first bom son. and he acquired the title o f  Khedive, or 
viceroy. The new rules of succession and the new title marked Ismail’s interests in 
independence and empire. Like his grandfather, he constructed many projects and built a 
modem army and a navy. In so doing, he increased Egypt’s foreign debt from 3 million 
sterling pounds to 100 million sterling pounds, after 15 years on the throne. Thus, he 
needed to generate new revenues quickly and needed to expand his tax base. Ismail had 
already acquired territories in what is today known as Eritrea and Ethiopia, but the core of 
Ethiopia remained outside his reach. The Egyptian-ruled territories along the Red sea 
(the Red Sea coast from Swakin to Massawa) and in Ethiopia were at the time Ottoman 
territories, and Ismail wanted territories with no Ottoman strings attached. Beset by 
financial problems and a desire for an empire with minimal Ottoman influence, Ismail 
decided to transform his military assets to economic ones through the conquest of 
Ethiopia.8' Egypt began its expansion program in Ethiopia by attempting to capitalize on 
the decentralized nature o f the Ethiopian Empire. Emperor Yohannes IV, whose main
81Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV o f Ethiopia: A Political Biography 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 54-55.
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power base was in Tigray, was the overlord o f dozens of kings, chieftains, shiekhs, and 
other potentates, and some of these vassals were willing to betray their emperor. In a 17 
September 1875 letter to Arakel Bey Nubar. the Ottoman-Armenian Governor of 
Massawa, Ismail outlined his new policy o f aggression against Yohannes. An Egyptian 
force of 2,500 soldiers, commanded by the Danish officer Soren Arendrup, was sent into 
Ethiopian territory. The force was destroyed by Ethiopian forces loyal to Yohannes on 
the night of 15-16 November 1875. A second Egyptian force sailed from Suez to 
Massawa on 15 December 1875. This second force had 12,000 soldiers. Yohannes 
fielded an army of perhaps 50,000-100,000, including 6,000 soldiers armed with 
firearms, 3,000 cavalry, and 18 cannons against the invading Egyptians. In a bloody 
battle on 7-10 March 1876 near Kaykhor, Ethiopia, Yohannes and his allies defeated the 
Egyptians. Still, Ismail did not abandon his designs on Ethiopia, and the conflict did not 
end until Yohannes defeated Wolde Mikael, the Ethiopian governor of Hamasen, who 
had taken side with the Egyptians. Ismail did conclude a peace treaty with Yohannes.82
THE MAHDIST WARS: 1883-1899 
Egypt’s failure in Ethiopia was followed by defeats in the Sudan. These defeats 
continued until the British intervened directly in Egypt and the Sudan. The Mahdists 
went to war with Ethiopia and Egypt for the purpose of spreading their variety o f Islam. 
They did not confront and fight the British, the Egyptians, the Ethiopians, and the Italians 
for the sake o f  securing Nile water. There were five major Mahdist wars. First, the 
Mahdists waged war against the Egyptian government in the Sudan and expelled it. 
Second, they invaded Ethiopia with mixed results. Third, they waged war against
82Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, pp. 30-31, 54-83.
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Darfur’s royal household and replaced it with their own governor. Fourth, they waged 
war against Egypt and failed. And finally, they resisted the successful Anglo-Egyptian 
invasion of the Sudan between 1896-1899. The Mahdist movement was a messianic 
religious movement. Many persons and groups joined the Mahdi for political, economic, 
and even xenophobic reasons, but at its core, the movement was composed of true 
believers. The Mahdist movement took its name from the title claimed by its founder and 
first leader, Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdullah, a riparian Sudanese Arab from the 
Dongola. Mahdi means "rightly guided one." The title was seldom used without the "a l" 
prefix, implying that Muhammad Ahmad was the Mahdi. He was a local cleric, lacking 
the formal education in Islamic studies. His religious education took place literally at the 
feet o f Sudanese mystics and religious teachers. Before his entrance into the world of 
war and Anglo-Egyptian imperial politics, he was a member of a sufi mystic order called 
the Sammaniyya. After leaving the order, Muhammad Ahmad set up a religious practice 
on the White Nile island of Aba. He began sending letters to Sudanese grandees claiming 
to be the expected Mahdi -- a messiah who will lead the re-founding and purification of 
Islam. Soon, he began attracting followers, and his claims grew. He began to claim to be 
the Imam, the apostle o f God, and the re-creator of the life of the prophet Muhammad.
He attracted former slave merchants who saw their industry destroyed by Ismail and his 
Governor-General o f the Sudan, Charles Gordon. He also attracted people who resented 
the fact that Christians held powerful offices in the Egyptian administration of the Sudan. 
Among his leading supporters were the Baqqara (cattle raising) Arabs of the marchlands 
between Northern and Southern Sudan who were interested in "killing the Turks and not 
paying taxes." He managed to recruit Beja tribesmen (pejoratively called "fuzzy-wuzzies"
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by the British) from the Red Sea hills. His revolt began at Aba island and moved into 
Southern Kurdufan. The Mahdi welcomed captured Jihadiyya into his armies. Unlike 
other Mahdist troops, the Jihadiyya, now mainly in Mahdist service, were equipped with 
firearms.83
Soon, the Mahdi was coming to the attention of the British. After destroying the 
nationalist government of Ahmad Urabi Pasha in Egypt in 1882, Britain was now 
ascendant in Egypt. In 1883, Britain allowed Egypt to re-establish an army in order to 
defeat the Mahdi. The Egyptian government hired General William Hicks, a former 
officer in the Indian army, to lead its expedition against the Mahdi. Hicks was defeated 
and killed by Mahdist forces outside Obeid, the capital of Kurdufan on 27 September 
1883. After the destruction o f Hicks’ army, Charles Gordon was again appointed 
Governor-General of the Sudan. He arrived in his former capital on 14 February 1884, 
and began attempting to organize evacuation and resistance. Gordon was incapable to 
stopping the Mahdist flood, and on 25 January 1885, Mahdist troops entered Khartoum 
and Gordon was killed during the battle.84 The Sudan, except Equatoria, under the rule of 
the German-Muslim Amin Pasha, and Suakin on the Red Sea coast, was now under 
Mahdist rule.85 The Mahdi did not live long to enjoy his victory. He was succeeded by 
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(the ugly bull) Al-Ta'ishi who was given the title of Khalifat al-Mahdi — the successor of 
the Mahdi.
In 1887, the Mahdists moved quickly to regain control Darfur.86 From a 
contemporary perspective, the war in Darfur can be explained as the Mahdists’ 
consolidation of their position in Western Sudan, although it was a "foreign" war to 
some extent. In contrast, the war against Ethiopia clearly constituted trans-boundary 
Mahdist aggression. In Ethiopia, Yohannes IV was resisting Italian pressure and 
incursions at the time o f the Mahdist invasion o f 1888. Twice that year, Mahdist Emir 
Hamdan Abu Anja crossed the border with an army and advanced as far as Gojjam in 
central northern Ethiopia. Yohannes IV retaliated by invading the Mahdist state in March 
1889. On 9 March 1889, a fierce battle broke out between the Ethiopian and Mahdist 
armies at Gallabat, Sudan. The Ethiopians were initially very successful, but a stray 
bullet wounded and later killed Yohannes. The Ethiopian army withdrew, and some 
Mahdists took pursuit, killing many of Ethiopia's nobles. The head and crown of 
Yohannes were taken by the Mahdists to their capital, Omdurman; while the Mahdists 
could claim victory, the war was extremely expensive in terms of casualties on both 
sides.87
As unwise as the war with Ethiopia may have been for the Mahdists, the 
campaign against Egypt was suicidal. By July 1889, a Mahdist army had moved 60 miles 
into Egyptn but on 3 August 1889, the Anglo-Egyptian army defeated the Mahdists near
“ Ibid., p. 102.
87Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV, pp. 238-249.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
the Egyptian village o f Tushki. The Mahdist commander, Emir Abd ar-Rahman AI- 
Nujumi, was killed and the Mahdists lost both an army and a successful commander.
This defeat did not stop the Mahdists. In 1891, they attempted to capture Anglo-Egyptian 
Suakin, but the British and the Egyptians routed them. In 1893, they attempted to invade 
Eriteria which had fell to the Italians after the death of Yohannes IV, but the Italians 
defeated them at Agordat. The following year, the Mahdists attempted to expand their 
domains deeper into Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria, but failed.88
The final Mahdist war was a product of the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan 
in 1898-1899. The Anglo-Egyptian forces advanced up the Nile during these two years. 
General Herbert Kitchener defeated the Mahdists in a series o f battles including the well- 
known battle of Omdurman. Aside from the initial Mahdist war, which can be thought of 
as a sort of war o f independence, this was the only war that the Mahdists did not start.
For the British, ridding their newly-reacquired possession, the Sudan, from the French 
took precedence over dealing with the remaining Mahdists. Consequently, the Anglo- 
Egyptian army scrambled up the Nile to confront the French at Fashoda. A dozen French 
officers and about 100 Senegalese soldiers, led by Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand, 
arrived on the Nile from Brazzaville in the French Congo in July 1898 with plans of 
containing the British and the Egyptians. Confronted by Britain and Egypt, France 
abandoned its claim on the Upper Nile. On 11 December 1898, Marchand's troops 
lowered their tricolor, and evacuated the Upper Nile. France was in turmoil over the
88Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, pp. 104-105, 109-110.
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Dreyfus affairs, and could not confront Britain at the time.89 For the British and the 
French, the Fashoda incident became another colorful colonial confrontation. For the 
Egyptians, however, fear of a strong power occupying the Upper Nile became a national 
complex.
The motives of the British and the French were clear. The European colonial
scramble for possessions in Africa was at its zenith during the 1890s. The Egyptians had
come to the Sudan to build themselves an empire too, but they had an interest in a
pacified country South of their border to prevent its use as a base against the Khedival
regime in Cairo. The Mahdists were primarily motivated by religion, believing that they
were the only true Muslims. Their attacks always followed spumed invitations to join
their movement. In January 1888, Abdullahi had written to Yohannes IV explaining that
Anu Anja was sent to Ethiopia, because Yohannes had refused to embrace Islam and
submit to the Mahdists.90 Abdullahi had also sent letters to the the Khedive o f Egypt, the
Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, and Queen Victoria inviting them to convert to the
Mahdist variety o f Islam and to submit to the Mahdist state. He had warned Queen
Victoria about the dire consequences of refusal:
Thy soldiers thought only of retreat from the Sudan with discomfiture and 
defeat, whereof they had more than enough . . .  Thus hast thou erred in 
many ways, and art suffering great loss, wherefrom there is no refuge for 
thee save by turning to God the King, and entering among the people of 
Islam and the followers of the Mahdi, grace be upon him. If thou wilt do 
thus ... then shalt thou achieve thy desire of perfect felicity and true repose 
... the like of which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, or heart of man 
conceived. But if thou wilt not turn from thy blindness and self-will...
89Alan Moorehead, The White Nile (London: Penguin, 1971), pp. 330-345.
^Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV, pp. 243, 245.
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thou shalt be crushed by the power of God and his might, or be afflicted 
by the death o f many of thy people, who have entered on war with the 
people of God, by reason of thy Satanic presumption.91
While the letter suggests that the Mahdists were not aware of the considerable
power of the British Empire at the time, they were not the religion-crazed dervishes that
linger in cinema. It is clear that the Mahdist state managed to preserve law and order at
least in Northern Sudan. Its greatest failure, aside from its wars against its neighbors, was
its revival of slavery and slave-raiding in Southern Sudan. While they kept some
members of the European micro-communities as hostages and prisoners, they left most
remaining Europeans alone as long as they at least pretended to embrace Islam.92
THE SUDANESE-EGYPTIAN CONFRONTATION OF 1958 
Superficially, this confrontation would initially appear to be the product of a 
dispute over Nile waters, but closer examination reveals otherwise. The 1958 
confrontation between Egypt and the Sudan had its roots in THE Sudan's independence 
process. Unlike most other third world countries, Sudan had two colonial masters rather 
than one. As a direct consequence o f the Mahdist wars, Britain and Egypt ruled the 
Sudan jointly, and the Egyptians wanted to link the Sudan to Egypt once the British 
departed. In the mid-fifties, Northern Sudanese politics was centered around the 
relationship of the Sudan with Egypt. The National Unionist Party (NUP) favored close 
relations with Egypt. The Umma (Nation) Party (UP) composed o f the followers o f the 
Mahdi's family, favored total Sudanese independence from both Egypt and Britain.
91 Abdulahi Al-Ta’ishi, Khalifa of the Mahdist Sudan as cited by Moorehead, The
White Nile, p. 283.
92Moorehead, The White Nile, p. 278.
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During 1953-1954, Nasser began an offensive based on charm in the Sudan. He 
instructed his minister for Sudanese Affairs, Salah Salem, to spend large sums of money 
in the Sudan to induce the Sudanese to support some form o f integration with Egypt after 
independence. The Umma Party reacted to Salem's program by mounting protests and 
attacking Egypt in its newspapers, revealing evidence of Egypt's support for the NUP. 
Despite the Umma Party's protests, the NUP went on to win the last pre-independence 
election in the Sudan, and its leader Ismail al-Azhari became Prime Minister. Once in 
office, the NUP changed its tune with regard to Egypt; despite voting for the NUP, most 
Sudanese people favored independence. Consequently, the NUP no longer sought union 
with Nasser's Egypt. Azhari's new policy was supported by the Umma Party and the 
British as well as his own party. By April 1955, the Sudanese government was 
negotiating with Egypt over the revision of the 1929 agreement, and its representatives 
were constantly rejecting Nasser's Aswan High Dam proposal in favor o f an all-Nile 
water-resource development program.93
While the Sudanese government was conducting negotiations with Egypt, the 
garrison of the Sudanese army in Torit in Southern Sudan revolted. The revolt was 
partially a direct result of Britain's "Sudanization" policy which placed Northern 
Sudanese officers in command o f Southern Sudanese troops. The Northern Sudanese 
officers tended to view their Southern Sudanese troops as racially-inferior infidels. 
Egyptian propaganda in Southern Sudan had capitalized on these attitudes in order to win 
Southern Sudanese support for closer ties to Egypt. Egypt was already toying with the 
idea of supporting the rebels to pressure the Sudanese government to yield on the Nile
93Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972), pp. 110-113.
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question. Azhari and the British Governor-General o f the Sudan, Sir Knox Helm, reacted 
swiftly to the mutiny. With Helm's assurances of a pardon, the Torit rebels surrendered, 
and Nasser lost a chance to destabilize the Sudan. By November 1955, British and 
Egyptian troops had been substantially withdrawn from the Sudan. At that point, Helm 
proposed to Nasser that the Sudan be declared an independent state. Nasser rejected 
Helm's proposal on the ground that the Egyptian people still believed in the unity of the 
Nile valley. Britain reacted by informing Azhari that he should declare independence on 
1 January 1956. Furthermore, the British assured Azhari that he could count on their 
support should Nasser attempt to derail Sudanese independence. Sir Knox Helm then 
took his annual leave, and Azhari declared the Sudan an independent sovereign state at 
the Govemor-General's palace on the morning of 1956's new year's day. Britain then 
instantly recognized the independent Sudan, and Nasser had no choice but to follow.94 In 
short, Azhari and Helm handed Nasser a humiliating defeat.
From 1 January 1956 until November 1958, every Sudanese government rejected 
Egypt's proposals for a dam on the Nile at Aswan. Furthermore, the Sudan refused to 
recognize the 1929 Nile waters agreement. In addition, Sudanese politicians appeared in 
Halaib to campaign for votes in February 1958. Halaib is a triangle o f land on the Red 
Sea (far away from the Nile) whose ownership is disputed by Egypt and the Sudan.
Nasser issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal o f Sudanese administrative and 
police organs from Halaib. When talks with Nasser failed, the Sudanese government 
petitioned Dag Hammarskold to convene a Special Session of the UN Security Council.
94Ibid., pp. 113-115.
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At that point, Nasser abandoned his campaign to absorb Halaib. Egyptian military units 
heading toward Halaib were turned back. In the wake of the Halaib affair, the anti- 
Egyptian Umma Party won the Sudanese elections in a landslide.95 Only one person (an 
Egyptian officer) is said to have been killed during the dispute.
As stated earlier in the sections pertaining to the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement and 
the construction of the Aswan High Dam, Egypt abandoned the dispute over Halaib and 
began a campaign to destabilize the elected Sudanese government through economic 
sanctions and propaganda. Nasser also invited a coup d'etat in the Sudan. Major-General 
Ibrahim Abboud deposed the Umma government in November 1958. Abboud was 
smitten by Nasser. He capitulated to all o f Egypt's demands, and thereby compromised 
the country's independence from Egypt.96 While the initial opposition of the 
overwhelming majority of the Northern Sudanese political spectrum to the Sudan's 
unequal political relationship with Egypt is easy to comprehend, the failure of the Umma 
Party and the NUP to reverse this policy after Abboud's departure remains a puzzle. It 
would follow that the restoration of democracy in Northern Sudan would have led to the 
cancellation o f the 1959 Nile Waters agreement and the expulsion o f Egyptian 
hydrological technicians from the Sudan, but this did not take place. The current 
Sudanese Islamic Fundamentalist government which has aided anti-government terrorists 
in Egypt continues to abide by the 1959 agreement and cooperates with Egypt over Nile 
issues. In fact, Abboud is considered a hero by Sudanese Islamic fundamentalists. The
95Ibid„ pp. 285-286.
96Ibid„ p. 287.
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Sudan's initial rejection of the 1959 Nile Waters agreement suggests that its later 
acceptance of Egypt's demands was and is not premised on Sudanese material interests.
The 1958 confrontation was initiated by Egypt. Egypt had been facing Sudanese 
opposition to its Nile schemes, and Halaib may have been a diversionary move on the 
part of the Egyptians. The root of the dispute, however, was Egypt’s de-facto rejection of 
the Sudan's independence. The British managed to subvert Egypt's voice in the 
condominium with regard to the Sudan's independence, and Nasser was probably nursing 
a grudge against the Sudanese. In addition, Egypt regards the Sudan as its "backyard," 
and it could never allow it to become truly independent. It is noteworthy that the Umma 
Party did not object to relations with Egypt per se; it simply rejected Egyptian hegemony 
before 1958. The imperialist impulses that motivated Mohammed Ali and Khedive Ismail 
did not end with the overthrow of their dynasty, and Nasser was imitating Mohammed 
Ali in Syria as well as the Sudan. The relationship between the confrontation and water 
disputes is far less than causal. This argument is supported by several factors. First, this 
case study has already illustrated that the Aswan High Dam was not built for hydrological 
reasons; consequently, disputes over the dam are really disputes about Egypt's right to 
control the river. Second, Nasser’s imperious tendency is a matter o f fact. He united 
Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic and attempted to destabilize pro- 
Western Lebanon prompting the United States to intervene in 1958. Third, Nasser had 
opposed Sudanese independence, and his subsequent policies towards the Sudan reveal 
that he did not regard it as a sovereign country. Fourth, the conflict over Halaib 
illustrates that Egypt seeks to dominate the Sudan even in areas where the Nile is not a 
factor. The confrontation o f 1958 was not about Nile Waters or the territory of Halaib, it
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was about Egypt's desire to dominate its Southern neighbor. The Halaib dispute has re­
erupted recently, and the territory currently has competing administrations. Despite 
Egypt's entry into Halaib, the Sudanese government has not altered its pro-Egyptian 
policies on the Nile. The Sudanese government questioned the agreement only once. 
During the Operation Desert Storm, the Islamic fundamentalist government of the Sudan 
threatened to shell the Aswan High Dam, but made no attempt to actually do so.
SUDANESE CIVIL WARS
The current Sudanese civil war is the country's second internal conflict. Abboud 
aimed to impose Islam and the Arabic language on the Southern Sudan. He forbade 
Christian missionaries from operating in the South and took over their schools. Heought 
to make the Sudan an Arabic-speaking Muslim country. Naturally, the people of the 
Southern Sudan could not accept the forceful imposition o f an alien language and an alien 
religion. By the 1960s, the Southern Sudan had developed a political party opposed to 
Northern rule, the Sudan African National Union (SANU), and a loosely organized 
independent rebel army centered around some of the Torit rebels who had rejected 
Helm's pardon — the Anya Nya or "Snake Poison." The rebels received support from the 
Democratic Republic o f the Congo, Uganda, Israel, and other countries.97
Israel aided the Anya Nya, because it sought to destabilize Egypt's ally — the 
Sudan. In the early to mid-sixties, Ugandan leader, Appollo Milton Obote had identity- 
bsed reasons to support the Southern Sudanese. "The Uganda Government sympathized
97Francis M. Deng War o f  Visions: Conflict o f  Identities in the Sudan 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 12; Holt and Daly, A History 
o f the Sudan, pp. 181-183,200.
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with the Anya Nya fighters in the South, interpreting the civil war in racial terms as a 
struggle of Africans against Arab domination."98 Obote later shifted Uganda's position 
towards Nasser, the Arabs and the non-aligned movement, because most o f his neighbors 
had adopted pro-Palestinian positions after the 1967 Six Day war. Consequently, the 
Anya Nya intervened in Ugandan politics and helped depose Obote in 1971. With the 
establishment o f Idi Amin Dada on the seat of power in Uganda, the rebels could again 
count on Israeli and Ugandan aid. As a Langi, Obote's earlier policy could be understood 
as solidarity with the Southern Sudanese who included many of his fellow Nilotes in their 
ranks (the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer tribes in Southern Sudan). Amin had similar motives.
His West Nile Province tribe, the Kakwa, speaks a Sudanic language which is closely 
related to some non-Nilotic languages in Southern Sudan. Despite being a Muslim, Amin 
would support the Southern Sudanese until they reached an agreement with the Sudanese 
government.99 Phares Mutibwa, an Ugandan scholar, explains the multi-layered nature of 
Amin's identity:
Amin's background-being a Kakwa-Nubian and a Muslim, and coming 
from West Nile- was crucial in the events that followed. One writer has 
aptly observed that "as he became older and acquired power, he considered 
himself first and foremost a Nubian/Kakwa, secondly a Muslim, thirdly, a 
West Niler and fourthly a[n] Ugandan. Consequently, the closest people 
around him came in this order which was later repeated in his choice of 
senior operatives and agents."100
98Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985 (New 
York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 52, 66, 95.
"Phares Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, A Story o f  Unfulfilled Hopes 
(Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1992), p. 90.
I00lbid., p. 81. In Uganda, the term "Nubian" means a descendent o f the Sudanese 
troops stationed in Egypt's Equatorian garrisons. It has also come to mean a Muslim 
West Nile tribesman
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As Obote and later Amin aided the Southern Sudanese, the Arab world aided the 
Sudanese government. Consequently, the Sudanese civil war intensified and hundreds of 
thousands o f Southern Sudanese either lost their lives or fled into exile in neighboring 
states. As early as the mid-sixties, the strain o f the war brought intense opposition to 
Abboud in Northern Sudan. By 1964, professional, student, and labor unions began to 
indicate their opposition to the government. Junior officers in the army were plotting to 
overthrow Abboud, and no solution seemed to be in sight for the Southern problem. In 
response to these pressures, Abboud dismissed his cabinet. He appointed a transitional 
apolitical Prime Minister and an all-party government including two independent 
Southern Sudanese ministers. Abboud realized that he could not rule the Sudan after his 
troops fired on protestors and killed twenty people. On 14 November 1964, Abboud 
resigned as chief of state, and the de jure democracy was restored.101
The restoration of democracy did not end the war in Southern Sudan. A round 
table conference was organized in Khartoum on 16 March 1965. SANU and other 
Southern parties negotiated with the government and with Northern opposition parties.
The conference failed to produce a solution to the civil war, and SANU and the other 
Southern parties could not persuade the Anya Nya to negotiate a peaceful end to the war. 
By 1968, the Southern parties lost all incentive to cooperate with the government.
William Deng, the president o f SANU, was killed in Bahr al-Ghazal in May 1968. The 
killers are assumed to have been members of a government patrol. Furthermore, the
101 Deng, War o f  Visions, p. 12; Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, pp. 181-
183.
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political situation in Northern Sudan was unstable. A succession of weak coalition 
governments could not develop the economy or solve the problem o f the civil war in 
Southern Sudan. The army and the Anya Nya began a cycle of atrocities that continued 
until the end o f the war. As in 1958, the instability o f the polity tempted the army to 
depose the elected government, and Colonel Ja'afar Mohammed al-Nimeiri and a junta of 
colonels and junior officers took power in a bloodless coup on 25 May 1969.'02
Nimeiri immediately promoted himself to Major General, and began negotiations 
with the Anya Nya's nascent political arm, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Through the mediation of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, the 
government and the SSLMJAnya Nya agreed on a formula for the autonomy o f the 
Southern Sudan on 27 February 1972. Nimeiri's government implemented its agreement 
with the SSLM as the Regional Self-Government Act fo r  the Southern Provinces. The 
agreement provided an autonomous government for the Southern Sudan, with an elected 
assembly and a cabinet. The Southern Sudanese would control their own local 
governments, educational policies, public health, mineral and natural resources, and 
police forces. The central government in Khartoum retained control over foreign 
relations, defense, currency, and intra-regional affairs. The Anya Nya's troops were 
incorporated into the Sudanese People's Armed Forces.103 The agreement worked for 
more than a decade, and the guns remained silent until 1983.
l02Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, pp. 181 -194.
,03Ibid„ pp. 194-202.
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The second and current Sudanese civil war erupted in 1983. Nimeiri's desire to 
abandon the Addis Ababa accords was the primary factor in the renewal of the war. First, 
on 1 June 1983, Nimeiri abolished the Southern region and created three regions in the 
South that correspond to three old Southern Provinces. Second, he imposed Islamic law 
on the whole country. By September 1983, Southern units in the Sudanese army 
revolted.104 To complicate matters, the Southern Sudanese soon split into three factions: 
the mainline Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), SPLA-Bahr al Ghazal, and the 
Nasir-SPLA. Unlike the mainline SPLA, the smaller dissident factions preferred to either 
settle with the government or to argue for the independence of Southern Sudan -- a goal 
renounced by the mainline (Torit) SPLA.105 At the time of writing, the Bahr al-Ghazal 
SPLA has returned to the fold. Initially, the SPLA itself was a junior competitor of the 
Anya Nya II, but it soon eclipsed and absorbed its rival, despite considerable initial 
difficulty. John Garang de Mabior, the leader of the SPLA, estimated that some sixty 
percent o f his troops came from the Anya Nya II.106
With the growth of the SPLA, Nimeiri turned to his primary overseas ally-the 
United States-for assistance. As the only Arab leader who stood with Egypt after the 
Sinai accords, Nimeiri could count on some measure o f United States assistance. Nimeiri
104Sharif Harir and Teije Tvedt, "Forward," in Sharif Harir and Teije Tvedt, eds., 
Shortcut to Decay: The Case o f  the Sudan (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 
1995), p. 5.
105Raphael Badal, "Political Cleavages within the Southern Sudan: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Re-Division Debate," in in Sharif Harir and Teije Tvedt, eds., Shortcut 
to Decay: The Case o f  the Sudan (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995), pp. 
105-126.
106John Garang de Mabior, The Call for Democracy in Sudan, Mansour Khalid, 
ed., (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1995), pp. 54-55.
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had buttressed his relationship with the United States through what seemed to be a firm 
commitment to secularism and multiculturalism. Nimeiri's image in the United States 
remained constant, despite his abandonment of the Addis Ababa accords-which were the 
underpinnings o f secularism and multiculturalism. For the United States, the Sudan's 
strategic location and support for the Camp David accords mattered more than America’s 
democratic values.107 Domestically, Nimeiri's intolerance grew. Early in 1985, Nimeiri 
and his new National Islamic Front (NIF) allies sentenced Mahmoud Mohammed Taha to 
death. The 76-year old Taha was the founder of the Sudan's Republican Brothers — an 
Islamic movement stressing tolerance and co-existence with non-Muslims. Taha was 
hanged on 18 January 1985. Within two months, Nimeiri turned on the National Islamic 
Front, and imprisoned its leaders.108 Taha's hanging marked the end of any hopes for a 
secular Sudan.
Given Ethiopia's support for the SPLA, Nimeiri argued that the SPLA was a 
Marxist insurgency. Libya had been aiding the SPLA too, and the United States found 
itself bound to support Nimeiri. The Sudanese president visited the United States on 27 
March 1985, and was welcomed by President Reagan. During his plane’s refueling stop 
in Egypt, the Sudanese Army deposed him. General Swar al-Dhab,led the revolt. He 
promised a return to democracy and an end to the civil war. Much to the consternation of 
the United States and Egypt, he normalized relations with Libya-which promptly 
withdrew its support from the SPLA. General Swar al-Dhab failed to accomplish the
l07Deng, War o f  Visions, pp. 363-369, 376-377.
l08Sharif Harir and Teije Tvedt, "Sudan Chronology Since 1972," in Sharif Harir 
and Teije Tvedt, eds., Shortcut to Decay: The Case o f  the Sudan (Uppsala, Sweden: 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995), pp. 266-267.
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goal of peace in the South, partially because the NIF rejected peaceful solutions. He did, 
however, restore democracy in the Sudan. The Umma Party won the April 1986 
elections, and Sadiq al-Mahdi, a descendent o f the Mahdi, formed a broad-based 
government. General Swar al-Dahab ceded power to the elected government and retired 
from military service on 6 May 1986. Sadiq attempted to end the war through 
negotiations, but his need for NIF support in Parliament prevented him from meeting the 
SPLA halfway. Sadiq suspended Islamic law. and tried to abolish it. The Democratic 
Unionist Party, a former coalition partner, managed to reach an agreement with the SPLA 
for a ceasefire in 1988. But with no end to the civil war in sight, Sadiq lost his 
credibility. Subsequently, the NIF, with support from certain sectors in the army, 
overthrew Sadiq on 30 June 1989. The new government, dominated by the NIF and its 
sympathizers in the military, declared its opposition to the DUP-SPLA agreement. The 
government o f Lt. General Omar al-Bahsir and Hassan al-Turabi continues the war 
against the SPLA and has constantly refused to compromise on the issue o f the 
"September laws" -- as Islamic law came to be known in the Sudan.109
On 10 December 1996, Sadiq al-Mahdi fled from house arrest to Asmara, Eritrea. 
Upon arrival in Asmara, Sadiq placed his Umma Party in a military coalition (the 
National Democratic Alliance) that encompasses the SPLA, the DUP, the Beja National 
Congress, and other groups. For Sadiq and his Umma Party, the only remaining 
alternative for dealing with the current government is armed struggle.110 The war has
l09Ibid., pp. 268-270; Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, pp. 217-225; Garang 
de Mabior, The Call, pp. 54-55.
110Ma'aouya Yas, "A Horse and a Party to Thwart Bashir's Organs: Al-Mahdi Left, 
When Will al-Turabi Leave?" Al-Wasat, (16 December 1996), pp. 16-18. In Arabic.
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been a pendulum-like affair. The government scores victories only to see the SPLA 
revive itself and fight back. After a short pause and even support for the Sudanese 
government, the new governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea continued the Marxist junta 's 
(Dergue) policy of supporting the SPLA, because the Sudan began to support new 
Islamic insurgencies within their borders. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, the United States, 
and perhaps Israel have been aiding the rebels. Egypt does not assist them, even though it 
accuses the Sudanese government of terrorism. In a speech in Kampala, Uganda, the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, indicated United States support for the 
SPLA and its allies in the Sudanese civil war. She offered $20 million in military aid and 
weapons to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Albright also met with the leaders o f  the six 
factions in the rebel National Democratic Alliance which includes the SPLA.111
The SPLA and its allies are fighting the government over the issue of Sudan's 
national identity. As Francis Deng, a scholar at the Brookings Institutions, argues, the 
root of the war is a "war of visions" concerning the identity of the country. It is not a 
simple North-South war, but a war about "what" the identity o f the Sudan is. Many 
Northerners agree with the SPLA's description of the Sudan as an African country. These 
Northerners are now squarely in the SPLA's camp, which now includes even the neo- 
Mahdists of the Umma Party. Deng uses terms like a "crisis of identity" to describe the 
causes o f the Sudan's problems. He argues that the Sudan has much in common with
11 ‘James McKinley Jr., "Albright in Uganda, Steps Up Attack on Sudan's Reign of 
Terror," The New York Times (11 December 1997), p. A7; Yasin Miheisi, "Sudan-
Uganda Tug o f War, Intensified Exchange of Accusations, and Opposition Victories," 
Sudan News and Views, No. 27 (1 July 1997), <http://webzonel.co.uk/www/sudan>. 
accessed 20 December 1997.
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apartheid-era South Africa, and that the Arabized Islamic Northern section of the country
is attempting to impose its identity, especially its component language and religion, on
the rest o f the country. For Deng, this is the most important factor in the causes o f the
war."2 Deng’s argument is supported by Peter Nyot Kok's analysis of the Sudan as a
Jellaba (literally: the robe-wearers or Arabized Muslim Northern Sudanese) state. Kok,
a Southern Sudanese scholar working in Germany, combines his cultural analysis with
economic observations:
The Jellaba saw and still see their interests as lying in maintaining their 
hegemony by all means. Their approach to the unavoidable historical task 
of state- and nation-building was and still is self-centered and self-serving.
Their priority in the consolidation o f their grip on, and privileged position 
in, the Empire on the Nile which was bequeathed to them by the British.
In constitutional terms, the Jellaba sought to impose the conservative- 
hegemonic model of state and nation-building: e.g. establishing the 
Islamic State, and building a Sudanese nation united by Islamic religion,
Arabic language and Arab culture. In economic terms the Jellaba pursued 
a top-down model o f economic development which aggravated the 
marginalization of the peripheral Sudan-the lands of the Nubas, the 
Nubians, the Beja, and of the Southern Sudanese. The "center," i.e. the 
region along the Dongola-Kosti axis, which is also the cradle and the 
heartland of the Jellaba, becaflie, as it were, the power-house of the 
Sudanese economy, although this "center" itself constitutes a "periphery" 
in the context of the global economy. In the process, the Jellaba control of 
the Sudanese state and economy, and their consolidation o f that control, 
have resulted in grave injustices for the rest o f the Sudanese, injustices 
which, with time, have become structural to the very institutions and 
processes of the Jellaba state. An attempt is made in this work to show 
how such structural injustices cannot effectively be redressed in simple 
power-and-wealth-sharing in a Federal or regional autonomous context.
Such constitutional arrangements cannot dismantle the structures of 
hegemony.113
1I2Deng, War o f  Visions, pp. 15-16.
ll3Peter Nyot Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan: Analysis, Evaluation 
and Documentation (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1996), pp. 14-15.
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Kok's economic analysis o f the conflict in the Sudan is heavily dependent on
cultural variables. The Jellaba economically and politically discriminate against non-
Jellaba for reasons that have little to do with business and political power. To a large
extent, the Jellaba have allowed their own security and economic well-being to be
sacrificed in the pursuit of the Arabization and Islamization o f the Sudan. Thus, it can be
argued that the Jellaba perspective values the promotion o f Islam and the Arabic
language above profits and security. This preference explains the Sudan's strange
attachment to Egypt and the failure o f the Umma Party and the DUP to stand squarely
against Islamic law during the last democratic government. The construction of the
Sudan's national identity shall be explored in depth in a later section. Cultural factors are
the crucial cause of war between Northern and Southern Sudan. Water disputes have
played a minimal role in the conflict. The SPLA's destruction of the bucketwheel was
spectacular, but the Jonglei canal was not the cause of the revolt. The cause of the war
lies in the cultural policies pursued by the Sudan's Arabic-speaking rulers. Eritrean
President Isaias Afowerki has elegantly summarized the policy of successive Sudanese
governments towards the South:
Regard the Southerners as inferior; impose Islam and Arab culture on the 
South, supplement this cultural aggression by force and violence; deprive 
the South of a meaningful sharing o f power and the country's resources; 
exploit and manipulate the serious weaknesses o f and secondary divisions 
among the Southerners; pursue policies and measures that push the South 
towards secession and then accuse it o f secessionism; establish external 
alliances one after the other to weaken and crush the Southern cause; 
routinely enter into promises and just as routinely betray them; and grant 
nominal and short-lived autonomy. 114
ll4Isaias Afowerki, President o f Eritrea, "Conflict in the Sudan," Paper presented 
at the 7th Pan-Afcrican Congress, Kampala, Uganda (14 April 1996), p. 6 as cited by 
Kok, Governance and Conflict, p. 15.
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Afowerki was a Sudanese government ally during the Ethiopian Civil War, so his words 
carry a measure o f credibility that some Southern Sudanese analysts may not enjoy. In 
addition, his forces had attacked the SPLA in 1991, so he is a newcomer to the SPLA 
camp. Until 1993, Eritrea had good relations with the Sudanese NIF government. The 
NIF's decision to support the Eritrean Islamic Jihad organization may have doomed the 
relationship.115 As beneficiaries of the Sudanese government's aid both during Nimeiri's 
rule and afterwards, the Eritreans have acquired first hand knowledge of the Sudan and its 
problems.
The problems of the Sudan are many. During the current Sudanese civil war, 
about 1.5 million people have died, and the slave trade has been revived. Sudanese Arab 
slave raiders openly raid for slaves in Southern Sudan, and various western charities pay 
thousands of dollars to purchase the freedom o f Southern Sudanese slaves. The only 
positive consequence of the war has been the development, in the North, o f  interests 
opposed to the war and the policy of enslavement. Arabization and Islamization. The 
first Northern Muslim groups to side with the SPLA were the Fur tribesmen o f the 
Western Sudan and Ingassana of the Blue Nile Province. Gradually, the SPLA has added 
allies from the Muslim Beja and the religiously diverse Nuba of Kurdufan. It is 
important to note that none of these groups speaks Arabic. The SPLA has also added the 
DUP and the Umma Parties to its list of allies — traditional parties that represent Northern 
Arabic-speaking Muslims. The SPLA has recently signed separate peace accords with
II5Tesfatsion Medhanie, Eritrea and Neighbors in the "New World Order" — 
Geopolitics, Democracy and "Islamic Fundamentalism," Bremer Afrika-Studien Band 15 
(Hamburg, Germany: LIT Verlag, 1994), pp. 78-101.
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Baqqara Arab tribes, such as the Rizegat and Misiryah, that have traditionally favored the 
NIF government. The SPLA's vision of a secular, pluralistic Sudan seems to be gaining 
converts in Northern Sudan. Speaking from exile (probably from Eritrea), Sadiq al- 
Mahdi argued that the SPLA's agreements with the Rizeigat and Misiriyah will serve as 
the model for establishing peace in the Sudan. "We have encouraged all Arabs to make 
peace with their brothers to end the war being waged by the National Islamic Front 
government," claimed Sadiq."6 These small peace accords are a source of hope, because 
the o f the failure of recent direct negotiations between the government and the SPLA in 
Kenya. Change in the Sudanese polity, along the lines supported by the SPLA and Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, would go a long way to pacify the Sudan's relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
The NIF is attempting to destabilize Eritrea and Ethiopia by arming Islamic militants in 
both countries. Ethiopia and Eritrea are targets of Sudanese intrigue because of their 
close relations with Israel and the United States. Medhanie, an analyst o f the Horn of 
Africa, sees this relationship as an impediment to Eritrean independence, but it probably 
reflects the secular values of the governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa.117
ERITREAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
I16Deng, War o f  Visions, pp. 460-463, 483; Joint Military Command/National 
Democratic Alliance, 1 July 1997, "Joint Military Command Press Release," Sudan News 
and Views No. 27 <http://webzonel.co.uk/www/sudan>. accessed 20 December 1997; 
Karin Davies, "As Civil War Ravages Sudan, Soldiers Use Slaves for Payment," The 
Virginian-Pilot (13 February 1998), p. A 17; Karin Davies, "Decrying Sudanese 
Influence, Factions Cling to Peace Pacts — Arabs, Black Christians Find Ways to 
Coexist," The Virginian-Pilot (13 February 1998), p. A 19.
n7Mehanie, Eritrea and Neighbors, pp. 23-26, 129-131.
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Ethiopia's relationship with the Sudan is historically tense. The Sudan allowed 
Eritrean fighters to use its territory in their campaign against Ethiopia and though its 
army confronted Ethiopia on the border, there were no full wars between the two 
countries. In 1972, Emperor Haile Selassie brokered the Addis Ababa accords which 
ended the first Sudanese civil war. Nevertheless, Ethiopia complained that the Sudan 
continued to allow the Eritreans to use its territory as a base. In 1975, with the Emperor 
Haile Selassie deposed, Sudan attempted to mediate between the new junta (the Dergue) 
and the Eritreans, but the negotiations faltered. A year later, the so-called "mercenary" 
leftist coup was attempted in Khartoum. Nimeiri blamed the Soviet Union, Libya and 
Ethiopia for the coup attempt, and the Sudan recalled its ambassador from Ethiopia in 
1977. A tense, sometimes violent, stand-off took place for between the Sudanese and 
Ethiopian armies at the border for several years afterwards. Nimeiri supported Somalia 
during the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden conflict and began to more actively support the 
Eritreans. In retaliation, Ethiopia began to support the SPLA. Nimeiri was overthrown in 
1985, but the new Sudanese government could not reach an agreement with Ethiopia 
about the SPLA or the Eritreans.118
Aside from the war in Eritrea, Ethiopia also faced a number of other internal civil 
wars. These can be described by region: Tigray, Oromia, and the Ogaden. The Western 
Somali Libertation Front revolt in the Ogaden can be regarded part o f the conflict
ll8Edmond J. Keller, "Chapter 4: Government and Politics" in Thomas Ofcansky 
and LaVerle Berry, eds., Ethiopia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991), <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ffd/cs/ettoc.html>: Thomas 
Ofcansky, "Chapter 5: National Security," in Thomas Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry, eds., 
Ethiopia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ffd/cs/ettoc.html>.
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between Somalia and Ethiopia; in addition, the Ogaden is outside the Nile basin and 
outside the ambit o f this case study. The Eritrean revolts, however, were more critical, 
because of the Sudan's involvement. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) revolted 
against Ethiopian rule in 1961 with 11 guerrillas. Its strength slowly grew during the 
1960s. By 1970, the ELF was large enough to fracture into two: the quasi-Marxist and 
certainly socialist Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and the ELF proper. During 
1972-1974, an internal civil war ensued between these two Eritrean factions. The EPLF 
defeated the ELF and consolidated its position against the Ethiopian government in rural 
Eritrea. There was a lull in the fighting while Ethiopia went through the revolution, but 
once the Dergue consolidated its position, it sought to re-integrate Eritrea into Ethiopia. 
With the fresh arrival of large supplies of Soviet weapons in 1977-1978, the Dergue 
deployed 100,000 troops against both the ELF and the EPLF. The two Eritrean factions 
combined their forces, which now totaled 35,000 semi-regular troops, to fight the 
government. The well-supplied Ethiopian army, however, was able to recapture most of 
Eriteria and to destroy the ELF; the EPLF, on the other hand, survived."9
With the EPLF left as the only effective Eriterian rebel movement, it began to 
consolidate its hold on the areas left in its control. It sought and received Sudanese help, 
which ultimately meant United States help, since the United States was backing the 
Sudan in its confrontation with Ethiopia. The EPLF withstood 6 major Ethiopian 
offensives and emerged stronger in the 1980s. It began to deploy captured armor against 
the government and assisted the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in its war 
against the Ethiopian government. The TPLF was founded in 1975, and engaged in little
119Ibid.
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more than rural terrorism against traffic at first. It slowly grew thanks to Eriterian 
support, and the negative impact of the Dergue's Eritrean campaigns on rural areas o f 
Tigray province. The TPLF, now indirectly Western-supported, was able to depose the 
Dergue by capturing Addis Ababa in 1990, which ensured Eritrean independence. Unlike 
the wildly successful TPLF and the EPLF, the Oromo Liberation Front has not been able 
to attract the same degree of support from the Oromo areas it claims. It was founded in 
1973 and has received some Sudanese support. It was a distraction for the Ethiopian 
government, which was already fighting several wars at the same time.120 The Dergue's 
collapse did not end Ethiopian support the Southern Sudanese. In addition to Ethiopia, 
newly-independent Eriterea is also supporting the SPLA in order to thwart the current 
Sudanese government's attempts to export Islamic revolution to the multi-ethnic, secular, 
and United States-aligned Eritrea.
The Eritrean war for independence can be traced to the death o f  Yohannes IV. 
After his death, the Ethiopian Empire had fallen into chaos until the rise o f Menelik. The 
Italians took advantage o f the chaos and expanded their domains to include all of today's 
Eritrea. Most of the country had been under Egyptian control during the 19th century, 
and the Ethiopian Emperor's authority there was nominal throughout most of the 
territory's history. Eritrea has nine ethnic groups, and each was affected differently by 
Italy. About half the people belong to the Coptic Church and the rest are Muslims.
Italy's presence altered the region for good. Italy broke down the communal, quasi- 
feudal, and traditional structures of Eritrean life and society. Upon the conquest of
,20Ibid.
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Ethiopia in 1936, the Italians made Eritrea the industrial center of their East African 
Empire. About 60,000 Italians lived in Eritrea among one million Eritreans. The British 
defeated the Italians in 1941 and took over Eritrea, but they made no substantial changes 
in Italy's policies there. They did, however, end some of Italy's racial laws and 
preferences. In 1951, the British "returned" Eritrea to Ethiopia under an agreement that 
allowed Eritrea autonomy in domestic affairs. But Emperor Haile Selassie had no desire 
to respect Eritrean autonomy. He disestablished education in Tigrinya (for Christians) 
and Arabic (for Muslims) in favor of Amhara -- the official language o f Ethiopia. He also 
abolished the country's separate autonomous government, prompting the ELF to begin an 
armed struggle against both his government and its immediate successor -- the Dergue.
In essence, the war was fought for the national independence of Eritrea. The Eritreans 
were motivated by a strong sense o f non-ethnic territorial nationalism. The Ethiopians, 
on the other hand, were motivated by their imperial tradition during Haile Selassie's 
reign. His vision o f an Ethiopia that encompasses Eritrea was also shared by the men 
who overthrew him, albeit in Marxist guise.121
Finally, it is important to note that some may argue that the Ethiopian (and 
Sudanese) civil wars have helped Egypt.122 In reality, these wars have hurt Egypt. The 
civil wars derailed Ethiopia's proposed water development projects as well as soil 
conservation projects. While it is clear that Ethiopia has not been able to hold back any
121Roy Pateman, Eritrea: Even the Stones Are Burning (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea 
Press, 1990), pp. 3-23.
I22Scot E. Smith and Hussam M. AI-Rawahy, "The Blue Nile: Potential for 
Conflict and Alternatives for Meeting Future Demands," Water International, Vol. 15,
No. 3 (1990), p. 218.
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water for its use, Egypt's supply base still remains lower than it would be if  upstream 
storage had been negotiated with Ethiopia, as shown earlier. Furthermore, Ethiopia's 
inability to implement soil conservation policies brought high volumes o f soil to the 
Sennar, Khashm al Girba, and Aswan High Dam reservoirs. The sedimentation has 
shortened the dams' operational lives and usefulness. By refusing to cooperate, Egypt is 
shortening the life-span o f its own Nile management infrastructure.123
THE CHAOS IN UGANDA
Throughout Uganda's turbulent history, the Owen Falls dam has not been a factor 
in the country’s internal or external conflicts. In February 1979, Amin threatened to 
destroy the dam and poison the river.124 But, Amin was grasping at straws, because he 
was facing a Tanzanian invasion and increasing dissent at home in 1979. Uganda's 
internal and external armed conflicts have been largely about ethnicity; more specifically, 
they have been about which politician or military leader, with the support o f his ethnic or 
religious community, gets to rule the country. As implied in the earlier discussion about 
Amin's and Obote's support for the Southern Sudanese, Northern Uganda is very similar 
to the Southern Sudan in terms o f its ethnic and linguistic composition. The Sudanic 
peoples of Uganda's West Niie Province are linguistically related to the peoples of the 
Sudan's Equatoria Province. The Alur, Langi, and Acholi peoples of Northern Uganda 
share linguistic similarities with the Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer. The Nilo-Hamitic peoples
I23S. April Smith, "A Revised Estimate of the Life Span o f Lake Nasser," Journal 
o f  Environmental Geology and Water, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), pp. 123-129.
124Atekar Ejalu, "Amin's Doomsday Plans," New African, (March 1979), pp. 47-
50.
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of the Uganda's Northeast are also represented in the Southern Sudan. In Southern 
Uganda, Bantu-speaking peoples (Baganda, Batoro, Bakiga, Banyankile, Banyoro and 
others) represent the overwhelming majority of the population. In addition to these 
ethnic differences between Ugandans, religion has also divided the country. Catholics 
and Anglicans are the largest religious communities in the country. These two Christian 
denominations, together with some indigenous forms of Christianity, have the following 
of 66 percent of the population. Sixteen percent of all Ugandans are Muslim, and most of 
the remaining 18 percent follow traditional African religions. These religious preferences 
cut across all ethnic lines. Uganda’s diversity led the British to consid ceding Northern 
Uganda to Southern Sudan while they were devising the country's map, but they quickly 
discarded that idea. 125 As a result, Uganda faced a daunting task of nation-building at 
independence.
In 1962, independence was secured through an alliance composed o f  the the 
protestant, Northern based Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the the Kabaka Yekka 
party. Under Prime Minister Appollo Milton Obote (a Langi from Northern Uganda), 
the UPC favored a centralized state, but the Kabaka Yekka (the "king alone") party 
favored the continuation o f the status quo which granted the kingdom o f Buganda a 
federal status within Uganda. Three other kingdoms also enjoyed limited federal powers, 
but Northern Uganda was under direct Britsh rule. Uganda's independence constitution 
reflected the arrangements the British had made with the traditional rulers, especially the 
kings of Buganda who had acted as Britain's agents in the 19th century. The State 
President of Uganda, Sir Edward Mustea II, was also the Kabaka (king) o f  Buganda; Like
l25Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p. 4.
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Obote, Mustea was an Anglican. Nevertheless, a power struggle broke out between 
Mustea II and the Prime Minister. In 1966, Obote used Amin and the army to rout 
Mustea and his Bugandan supporters, and the king barely escaped with his life to fly into 
exile in Britain where he died in poverty three years later. The Bugandans were defeated 
despite being the largest ethnic group, because they were under-represented in the army. 
The Kabaka did have non-Buganda supporters in the army such as General Shaban 
Opolot, but Obote had forced them into retirement. The British had favored Northern 
tribes for the army, because they felt that Northern tribes are more politically reliable in 
Southern Uganda — the center and core of the country. Young Bugandan men were 
discouraged from military pursuits, and their kingdom paid a dear price for its civilian 
orientation. In 1967, Obote abolished the kingdoms, and established a republic. The 
army was allowed to ravage Buganda and appropriate for itself what it could.126
But Amin's alliance with Obote was short-lived. Obote began a nationalization 
program that alienated the British and the business community. In foreign relations, he 
began to side with the Arab world against Israel. He also further alienated Britain by 
protesting its South African arms sales program. In addition, he ended his support for the 
Sudanese Anya Nya in order to secure his position in the Arab world. These four groups 
(the British, the businessmen, the Israelis, and the Southern Sudanese) became 
increasingly threatened by Obote, and began to look for a replacement. Obote also 
planned to rid himself of Amin through the same procedures he used to oust Opolot.
Amin was aware o f Obote's plans, and planned to overthrow his ally and mentor. He also
l26Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, pp. 22-64; Omara-Otunnu, Politics and 
the Military, pp. 48-77.
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began to attend the prayer meetings of an Islamic group headed by the Mustea's Muslim 
uncle in order to indirectly court Bugandans. With British. Israeli. Anya Nya, and 
Bugandan support, Amin initiated his military take-over on 25 January 1971 when Obote 
was out of the country. Obote found himself exiled in Tanzania.127
Initially, Amin followed a policy of religious pluralism and alliance with Britain 
and Israel. He allowed the Bugandans to bring Mustea's body home from Britain and 
gave him a state funeral. He reversed Obote's nationalization policy to the delight o f both 
local and British businessmen. He put Uganda squarely on the side of the Southern 
Sudanese. Israeli advisors returned to Uganda, and Amin was facing a degree of isolation 
in Africa for his pro-Western policies. But, Amin was ordering Acholi and Langi army 
officers and enlistees secretly executed, because he believed them to be loyal to their 
fellow Lwo-speaker, former President Obote. He stepped up recruitment of his 
countrymen from the West Nile province to replace the murdered or discharged Acholis 
and Langis. His troops also devastated Acholi and Langi areas in Northern Uganda.
Once the Southern Sudanese reached a settlement with Nimeiri in the Sudan, he felt that 
he no longer needed the Israelis, so he ordered them expelled. He also felt that the 
Israelis understood his modus operandi and feared that they would depose him. At the 
suggestion of Egyptian President Sadat, he had approached Libya for military aid, and by 
April 1972, Israel and Uganda ended their relationship. Amin then turned his eyes on the 
Ugandan South Asian community. He expelled it to Britain and other Commonwealth 
countries after nationalizing its assets. In June 1972, Idi Amin and Nimeiri signed a 
military pact binding each country to assist each other in case of an external attack. Amin
127Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military, pp. 92-101.
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nationalized Uganda’s British investments by December 1972. Uganda threatened to 
invade Tanzania and seize a 100-square mile tract called the Kagera Salient in order to 
make the Kagera river the natural border between itself and Tanzania. With the new 
Western hostility towards Amin, Obote and his exiled supporters attempted an invasion 
with Tanzanian support in September 1972, but they failed.128
Amin abandoned his policy of religious pluralism and began actively using the 
state to promote Islam. He agreed with Qadhafi's arguments about a clash between 
Judaism and Islam in the Middle East and sought to secure Uganda for his faith. Uganda 
was admitted to the Organization of the Islamic Conference in February 1974, and Amin 
began to recruit Muslims into the army and bureaucracy, especially after he survived a 
Kakwa-led coup. Amin was striving hard to stamp out Christianity in Uganda, and made 
no apologies for it. On 17 February 1977, Amin executed the Anglican Archbishop of 
Uganda, Janani Luwum and banned 26 Christian organizations. His bellicose attitudes 
did not stop at Uganda's borders; in October 1978, Amin ordered his army into Tanzania's 
Kagera Salient. Tanzania responded by launching an offensive that drove Amin's troops 
out. Tanzania then invaded Uganda along with various exile groups including Obote's 
forces, and Amin was deposed in April 1979 by Ugandan exiles and Tanzanian forces. 
Libya and Zaire attempted to save Amin, but their forces were no match for the 
Tanzanian army. The dictator fled to Saudi Arabia.129
128Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, pp. 78-101; Omara-Otunnu, Politics 
and the Military, pp. I l l ,  117.
l29Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military, pp. 115 123, 137-138, 143; Mutibwa, 
Uganda Since Independence, pp. 109-114.
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Amin was gone, but he left a sad imprint on the country, because violence became 
an integral part of the political system during his rule. Two presidents came and went in 
1980, and the country saw the political return of Obote. After winning the 1980 elections 
that followed Amin's removal, Obote began to punish both Bugandans and West Nilers 
for opposing him. One faction, the Bantu-based National Resistance Army of Yoweri 
Museveni, refused to accept the results o f  the elections and left for the bush country of 
the Luwero triangle to fight Obote. Obote's troops began to slaughter Bugandans and 
other Bantus opposed to his rule. Despite all these massacres, Obote failed to secure his 
rule, because he could not extend his support base beyond the Langi. The Acholis 
believed that he was using them as cannon fodder against the NRA, so they abandoned 
they old Langi allies, embraced the West Nilers and marched to Kampala to depose him 
under their Generals Tito Okello and Bazilio Okello. But the Acholi regime could not 
reach a true accommodation with Museveni. On 26 January 1986, the NRA ignored the 
peace agreement it had signed with the Okellos a month earlier by taking over the 
government.130
But Uganda's ethnic conflict is far from over. As pro-Okello scholar Omara- 
Otunnu points out, the NRA is a Bantu government drawn heavily from Museveni's tribe, 
the Banyankole and the Buganda. Northern Ugandans no longer enjoy a near-monopoly 
on soldiering and have not received a real voice in Museveni's government. So, they 
have resorted to warfare and have found a reliable ally in the Sudanese government. In 
retaliation for Museveni's assistance to the SPLA, the Sudanese government has been
130Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, pp. 149-177; Omara-Otunnu, Politics 
and the Military, pp. 145-181.
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supporting three insurgencies in Uganda. Two Islamic insurgencies have been organized 
to destabilize the West Nile Province, and an Acholi-based quasi-Christian insurgency 
called the "Lord's Resistance Army" has been created to disrupt the Acholi and Langi 
Provinces in Northern Uganda.131
Armed conflict and the political process became indistinguishable in Uganda. 
Uganda's basic problem has been the historical inseparability o f politics, ethnicity, 
religion, and violence. Water disputes have not played any role in the country's conflicts, 
except as an empty threat by Amin— a man whose identity matrix proved extremely 
useful for understanding the conflicts in Uganda and the Sudan. As a Kakwa, Amin was 
very willing to ignore his religious sympathies to support his fellow Sudanic-speakers in 
the Anya Nya (which included the Sudanese Nilotes as well as representatives of virtually 
every Southern Sudanese group). As a Muslim, he was comfortable in ignoring his 
affinities for West Nile people who did not share his religion. A West Nile provincial, he 
gladly sacrificed Ugandan interests to enrich his fellow West Nilers. While Amin's 
values, goals, and means are clearly not shared by most people in the Nile basin, his 
approach to his identity is common.
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI
The details o f this tragic conflict are now generally known to the world outside 
the Nile Basin. Ever since independence, these two small states have struggled with their 
dual tribal identities—Hutu and Tutsi. The recent genocide was simply the latest espisode 
of a dispute that has sporadically ignited since independence. As with Uganda, some of 
the blame for these massacres must rest with Belgian policy in these two territories. They
13‘James McKinley Jr., "Allbright in Uganda," p. A7.
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preferred the Tutsis, because of political reliability resulting from their minority status. 
Other analysts blame the scarcity of land for the massacres. These explanations warrant 
some merit, but they leave some crucial questions unanswered. For example, if the 
placement o f blame on pro-Tutsi Belgian policies as the sole or primary cause of the 
massacres in these two countries does not account for the fact that the Belgians have been 
gone for decades. The most recent round of extermination was probably the most 
vicious episode in this rivalry; in other words, the Belgians have not told Hutu militants 
to initiate the genocide along the lines it followed.
Second, if pre-colonial society in Rwanda and Burundi entailed peaceful relations 
between the two groups, why did the two sides adopt "othering" behavior towards each 
other? The designations "Hutu" and "Tutsi" would have not been needed if some degree 
of mutual alienation and therefore conflict did not exist. If, as President Carter claimed, 
these names were simply occupational designators, there would have been some Hutus in 
positions o f authority and power in pre-colonial times. Finally, the latest killings were on 
the basis of ethnicity and not land ownership. If  the conflict was truly about land, 
landless peasants would have been killing landlords regardless o f ascriptive identity. As 
with Uganda, the Nile played no role in these disputes, except as the carrier of the 
victims' bodies
CONFLICT IN THE NILE 
Virtually every war in the Nile basin concerned identity issues such as religion, 
language, or even territorial nationalism (in Eritrea's case). The only country to go to war 
for the traditional reasons of acquiring land, population, and tax revenues has been Egypt. 
Out o f the economic and strategic expansion policies o f Mohammed Ali and his heirs
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
came an Egyptian mind-set that sees the Sudan as Egypt's backyard and the Nile as 
Egypt's water. These Egyptian attitudes are resented by Ethiopia and the East African 
states and cherished by the Sudan. Egyptian analysts ignore the domestic causes of the 
Sudan's problems and blame Israel for supporting the Southern Sudanese. Implicitly, the 
Egyptians are essentially saying that the Southern Sudanese have no right to seek allies 
and friends in their struggle to defend their traditions, languages, religions and basic 
human rights. In other words, Egyptian hydrologists are saying the Southern Sudanese 
ought simply accept the Arabic language and Islam in order to secure what they believe 
to be Egypt's interests there. Yet, there is little hydrological basis for maintaining the 
current dam network on the Nile. The Egyptian hydrological community, can be 
described as a scholarly community concerned that a power may rise in the Upper Nile or 
in Ethiopia and demand a share in the Nile's water or "threaten" Egypt's water supplies. 
As argued earlier, upstream storage could easily save enough on seepage and evaporation 
at Aswan to cover Ethiopian, Eritrean or East African water allocations without 
jeopardizing a reasonable, negotiated share for Egypt that would approach current levels 
of use, if not exceed them.
Egypt probably regards the Sudanese-Ethiopian dispute as beneficial because it 
prevents these two states from cooperating. But it is Egypt that has been the greatest 
loser, because it would have stood to benefit immensely from Ethiopian and Sudanese 
upstream storage and soil conservation programs. Egypt values control more than it 
values water. It seems to fear having neighbors that can negotiate in earnest. It can 
cooperate with the Sudan, because of the Northern Sudan's cultural dependence on Egypt, 
especially in terms of religious education and access to the Middle East. The Sudan (or
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at least its Arab leadership) is also the only other Nile state whose rulers speak Arabic 
and whose official religion is Islam. Its focus is on Egypt, and its national self-image is 
deeply attached to the Nile as a sort o f link to Arabian peninsula. Despite severe conflicts 
of interests, these two states have generally cooperated over the Nile and have avoided 
war in modem times. The Sudanese Mahdist invasion of Egypt followed the pattern 
established for other times and places within the basin; the Mahdists were invading Egypt 
to meet what they believed to by the requirements of their faith and identity. The 
Mahdist wars have left their mark on Sudan, Ethiopia, and even Uganda. Yohannes IV is 
lionized in Ethiopian songs, and the Mahdists' battles against the Ethiopians, the British 
and the Egyptians are still celebrated in the Sudan. In Uganda, the Mahdist state cut off 
Egypt's Equatorial province with a German Muslim, Amin Pasha, at its helm. Amin 
Pasha's troops formed the basis for the first British units in Uganda and settled in the 
West Nile Province as "Nubians." Uganda, with its already diverse population, was thus 
given a new ethnicity to include in its political game. The Mahdist era also made 
cooperation between Ethiopia and the Sudan more difficult, and has led the Ethiopians 
and the Sudanese to define each other as "the other."
IDENTITY
EGYPT
Egypt styles itself an "Arab" state, despite its long non-Arab past. Islam is the 
official faith of the state. But many Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists would like to make 
Egypt even more Islamic. They have lashed out against Egypt’s Coptic community and 
have treated it as an internal "other." The Copts (10-15% of Egypt's population) were
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among the first to feel the brunt o f Islamic fundamentalism. In June 1981, militant Copts
clashed with radical Muslim fundamentalists in a poor Cairo suburb. The Muslim
Brotherhood's Al-Da'wa accused the Copts o f insulting Islam and gathering arms to kill
Muslims. In September 1981, Sadat ordered 3,000 people jailed. Most o f these political
prisoners were Muslim fundamentalists. For the sake of balance, Sadat also ordered
leading Copts, including Pope Shenouda III, locked up. But the genie of fundamentalist
anger did not stop with the Copts, it reached Sadat himself. It burst on the world stage on
6 October 1981, on the eighth anniversary o f Egypt's "victory" on the Suez canal in the
1973 Yom Kippur war. Lt. Khalid al-Islambuli and four other members o f the al-Jihad
organization were convicted of regicide and executed.'32 Since Sadat's death, various
Islamic fundamentalist groups have used terror to undermine the Egyptian government,
often with the Sudanese National Islamic Front government’s support. Disputes over the
role of Islam in the polity lies at the core of the struggle over the national identity of
Egypt, and the Copts have not been the only "others" in the discourse of those who wish
to establish Egypt as an Islamic state. Americans, Jews and Westerners are also labeled
as evil. For example, al-Da'xvah, the Muslim Brotherhood's newspaper, wrote:
The United States is the leader of the international crusade of neo­
colonialism. The Muslim World in general and the Arab region in 
particular are considered prime targets for American designs because of 
their energy resources, strategic location, and tremendous markets. The 
United States would not permit competition from any rival in its quest to 
monopolize the pillage of Islamic wealth. It may allow others a small
I32Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 16-18,41-92,98-102; Stanley Reed, "The Battle for Egypt," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September-October 1993); Hrair R. Dekmejian, Islam in 
Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse, N.Y.:, Syracuse University 
Press, 1985), pp. 89.
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share so long as they enhance the strategic objectives o f the American 
crusade against Islam and Muslims ... The United States implements its 
scheme through both its own CIA and client Muslim rulers who sold out 
their religion, country, nation, and honor. The price for selling out is for 
these client rulers to stay in the seats o f pow er... They have been 
instruments for the American Zionist designs to consolidate Israeli 
aggression in Palestine. The latest chapter of this American game is to 
frighten is to concoct a false peace between the Arabs and the Jews. The 
American intention is to get the Arabs to shift away from Israel to a 
hostility toward the Soviets. True they are all enemies ... But to frighten 
Arab rulers by an impending Soviet threat is only a trick to make them 
accept a false peace with the Jews, the arch-enemies o f  God, his Prophet, 
and the faithful. How naive our rulers would be if they swallow the 
bait.135
The historic Coptic nature of Ethiopia makes the country, in some respects, 
Egypt's primary "other" — at least for those who see Egypt as a Muslim country. But the 
perception o f Ethiopia as an "other" is not limited to Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists. 
In previous sections, we saw how the Khedive Ismail of Egypt regarded Yohannes IV as 
inferior to Egyptian Coptic bishops. Sadat's threats to Ethiopia also assume a certain 
degree of Egyptian supremacy with regard to Ethiopians. Furthermore, the 
fundamentalists’ hostility to the Copts is not limited necessarily to Egypt's borders, 
because they do not recognize the legitimacy o f borders. Instead, Islamic 
Fundamentalists recognize barriers between people on the basis of religion. The 
fundamentalist challenge to the Egyptian state threatens the established national identity 
of the country. Under Nasser and Sadat, Egypt became the core of the Arab world. 
World War I was "the midwife o f Arab nationalism," and Egypt was influenced by the 
sentiments that fed the Arab Revolt. These sentiments found fertile ground in Egypt's
mAl-Da ’wah as cited by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt," 
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1982), p. 89; Ibrahim was cited by Rubin, 
Islamic Fundamentalism, pp. 101-102.
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educated elites who looked back at Egypt's pre-Ottoman Arab and Islamic period and 
resented Britain's informal control over the country through its Consul-General Lord 
Cromer-who functioned as Egypt’s de facto governor. In addition, European nationalism 
was also influencing these very same educated classes. Consequently, Egypt's 1956 
republican constitution declared that the country is "a part of the Arab nation." In theory, 
Arab nationalism includes everyone who speaks Arabic in the national community, 
regardless o f religious beliefs and other cultural or racial factors.134
This secular definition o f national identity offends Egyptian Islamic 
fundamentalists, because they seek to exclude the Copts and any other non-Muslims from 
the national community and the polity. They seek to define membership in the political 
community by religion alone, but, they face a very difficult task. Unlike other countries 
in the basin, Egypt also enjoys a strong sense of community created by the Nile itself. Its 
shores constitute the vast majority o f habitable land in Egypt. In Egypt, people are 
forced to live in a single well-defined space—the Nile valley; and egged on by a powerful 
local common culture, Syrians, native Fallahin, Greeks, Bedouin Arabs , Albanians, 
Nubians, Berbers, Turks, Tuareg, Italians, Armenians, Chechens, Cherkess and Gypsies 
have had no choice but to emphasize their commonalities or "Egyptian-ness" in order to 
coexist. As a result, assimilation (or at least a very high degree o f integration) into 
mainstream life becomes inevitable. Given the reality created by the Nile, most Egyptian 
Muslims recognize the Copts as their fellow Egyptians, even if they wish to see Islam 
further emphasized as the state faith or feel that Coptic Christianity is an inferior or false
134William Polk, The Arab World Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), pp. 136-143,206-207,301-302.
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religion. In short, the Islamic fundamentalist attempt to undermine the Nile-derived 
sense of national identity by dividing Egypt into a dominant Muslim society and a 
subservient Coptic underclass faces a very strong social barrier stemming from the social 
consequences of the Nile's geography. So, the Islamic fundamentalists resort to terror.135
Sadat's emphasis on the Nile, at least in terms o f creating an Egyptian national 
identity, was and remains accurate. Unfortunately, Egypt's concern with the Nile finds its 
highest expression in the "Fashoda complex." This "complex" induces Egypt to seek a 
very high degree of control over the river and fears the appearance of powerful states or 
entities upstream. John Waterbury, a political economist and a student o f the Middle 
East, coined the term. It essentially refers to an Egyptian fear that an unstable upstream 
crisis would affect the flow o f water to Egypt. Egypt fears an independent state in 
Southern Sudan and is attempting to solve the Sudanese civil war diplomatically without 
taking sides, despite the Sudanese government's support for terrorists in Egypt. This 
concern about the situation upstream leads Egypt to regard every upstream water project 
it does not control (or influence) as a threat. It also prevents Egypt from cooperating with 
Ethiopia on upstream storage programs. The power of the Fashoda complex is derived 
from its close association with the most vital component of Egypt's national identity — the 
Nile itself. Without the Nile, Egyptians would be sharply divided along the lines of 
religion, dialect and ethnicity that have been submerged in the river's mud and water.136
135Farouk Mustafa, Professor, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The University 
o f Chicago, Summer 1995; Norman Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The 
Ancient Roots o f  Apocalyptic Faith (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 
pp. 3-31.
I36Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 88; Naff and Matson, Water in the 
Middle East, pp. 143; Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society
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The importance of the Nile in terms of the Egyptian national identity and its 
associated Fashoda complex are o f cardinal importance in terms of understanding the true 
dynamics behind the political decision to build the dam. The Aswan High Dam was 
really built to cope with the Fashoda complex, not to provide power and water. Despite 
John Waterbury's arguments, it was not built for geopolitical purposes, because it puts 
Egypt’s very survival into question. The Aswan High Dam is slowly destroying Egypt's 
most productive land—the delta. The lack of replacing sediment has allowed the sea to 
expand and poison the land in the triangular delta. The 22,000 square kilometers 
constituting the delta are crucial for Egypt’s agriculture and economy, but the sea is 
expanding at an annual rate o f 100 meters inland along certain sectors of the shoreline.137 
John Foster Dulles, the late former United States Secretary of State, was correct about the 
dam, but this has become obvious only recently. In short, the Fashoda complex, through 
the mechanism o f the dam, is slowly killing Egypt.
THE SUDAN
The Nile divides the Sudanese as much as it unites the Egyptians. The Southern 
Sudan's borderlands with the North lie immediately North of two of the White Nile's 
tributaries — the Bahr al-Ghazal and Sobat rivers. Worse still, the Sudan is also suffering 
from a bloody debate over the national identity of the country. There are two sides to the 
issue of national identity in the Sudan. Each perspective contains a definition o f the
Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 19; Yehoshafat 
Harkabi, "Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six Day War," Orbis, Vol. 11, 
No. 3 (Fall 1967), pp. 677-91.
137Laura Jean Penvenne, "Disappearing Delta," American Scienctist, Vol. 84 No. 5 
(September-October 1996), pp. 439-440; Charlene Crabb, "The Mud That Was Egypt," 
Discover, Vol. 15, (January 1994), p. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
national identity o f the Sudan, "others," and crucial formative historical memories that 
have caused the war in the Sudan. It is important to emphasize that the second Sudanese 
civil war has evolved into a clash o f two visions o f the Sudan's national identity rather 
than a simple war between the North and the South; nevertheless, it is still useful to talk 
about a "North" and a "South," because the NIF government draws most o f its support 
from Northern Arab Muslim communities, while the National Democratic Alliance's 
military backbone remains the predominantly Southern SPLA.
THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT VISION 
For many in the North, the Sudan is a profoundly Muslim country whose 
government must reflect Islamic values and laws. The roots of this view of the country 
are very old. The Sudan received its first Christian Ottoman governor, Arakel Bey Nubar, 
in the late 1850s. A relative of Arakel Bey Nubar of Massawa, he had to face down a 
tribal revolt immediately after he assumed office. A powerful Arab Muslim tribe, the 
Skukriyya, almost revolted because they strongly objected to a non-Muslim governor.
The governor was able win the support o f the tribe through a display o f personal 
courage.138 Courage did not, however, save Charles Gordon some thirty years later. For 
many in the North, the Sudan cannot be understood without Islam. Prof. Abd Al-Latif 
Al-Buni, a pro-NIF Sudanese political scientist, argues that Islam is the most essential 
component of the Sudanese national identity. He attacks missionaries and the Christian 
churches for preventing the "spread o f Islam" in the South through the "establishment of 
an educated Christian class in the South with views incompatible to its sister class in the
l38Holt and Daly, A History o f  the Sudan, p. 72.
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North." Al-Buni argues that the Islamization o f the South is essential to insure the 
region’s "national unification with the North." He further argues that "Southern political 
parties . . .  resorted to Christianity only to give the South an identity distinct from that of 
the North."139 For Al-Buni and many other Northern Sudanese, religion is the critical 
component of the Sudan's national identity. From their point o f view, to be Sudanese is 
to be a Muslim. To be a Christian, a traditional religionist, a Jew or a Hindu is not to be 
Sudanese.
This vision of the Sudan's national identity is linked with a special outlook toward 
Egypt. After heaping praise on Abboud, Bashir, and Turabi for their respective 
Islamization policies, another pro-NIF academic outlines "the facts" about the Sudan:
1. The Sudan enjoys a strategic position known to the great powers. The 
great powers know the Sudan's political, military and economic value. 
Consequently, they deal with it in light o f this understanding by various 
means. And at this point, we must say that the traditional colonialist ways 
do not suit this age or its discourse. Therefore, the language of interaction 
[with the Sudan] differs radically [from that used in the past], so that it 
would enter from the door of realizing national direct and indirect strategic 
interests to the path o f economic pressure, the encouragement of internal 
problems, and threats to external security such as the ties and alliances 
created by the great powers with the Sudan's immediate neighors.
2. There are attempts and efforts designed to end the Sudan's identity as a 
people composed o f an Islamic majority and and attempt to reveal and 
declare a separation between the Arab and Islamic nature o f the country 
and the regimes it had seen. And we must emphasize that the efforts to 
destroy the Sudanese people's national identity were a gamble in the hands 
o f the countries greedily desiring proximity to the Sudan's strategic 
location; thus, the foreign policies o f its neighbors (Egypt, Libya, and 
Ethiopia to be precise) must be and can only be watched and with the the 
context [of great power ambitions] in mind.
139Abd al-Latif Al-Buni, Nimeiri's Islamic Experiment in the Sudan (Khartoun, 
Sudan: The Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1995), pp. 6-9. In Arabic.
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3. The Sudan's Islamic direction is an original reality in the path o f  the 
Sudanese people since the entry o f  Omaru Ibn Al-As, may God be satisfied 
with him, into Egypt, conquering it and spreading Islam until the 
announcement o f  the Islamic Shar'ia in September 1983 AD. And at the 
head o f the opposition against the Islamic direction stand world-wide 
crusader currents wearing the clothes o f secularist thought and other anti- 
Islamic thought sects. This truth was revealed clearly in the period of 
struggle and frustration that immediately preceded and followed the fall of 
Nimeiri when the American-Israeli element was revealed without 
disguise.140
Al-Sayir leaves no doubt about the "other" as far as he is concerned. The "other" 
is the Christian (both Western and Coptic), the Jew, the secular Westerner, anyone who 
points out the Sudan's religious and ethnic plurality and even Mubarak's quasi-secular 
Muslim government in Egypt. Despite Al-Sayir's condemnation, Egypt is central to the 
Muslim Arab Northern Sudanese version of the country's national identity because it is 
the source o f the faith. Abboud was probably the first to realize that the post­
independence hostility to Egyptian hegemony could not be sustained among the Arab and 
Islamic oriented elites in the North despite the Sudan's clear national interest in a Pan- 
Nile water management regime like the Nile Valley plan and a settlement with Ethiopia. 
He probably also understood that Nasser would use Egypt’s religious appeal to further 
destabilize the Sudan. Abboud's primary' failure was his inability to understand that 
attempting to Arabize and Islamize the South would lead to an intensification o f the civil 
war and a tremendous blow to the Sudan's hopes of economic development. He 
miscalculated the true cost of capitulation to Nasser, because he believed in Islam's and 
Egypt's centrality to the Sudan's national identity. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement 
became the symbol o f the special relationship between Egypt and the Sudan, and
l40Habib Ahmed Al-Sayir, The Sudan From Nimeiri to Bashir (Khartoum, Sudan: 
Khartoum University Press, 1995), p. 15. In Arabic.
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subsequent Umma Party and NUP/DUP governments could not remove it. In the Sudan, 
the Nile itself does not enjoy the position it enjoys in Egypt. For the Northern Sudanese, 
its importance lies in the fact that it is the river that goes to Egypt.
With regard to the civil war, Nimeiri tried achieve what Abboud could not, but he 
was only temporarily successful. Nimeiri's rule can be divided into two periods that 
correspond with changes in his character and personality. In the first period, Nimeiri 
was a secular man with tolerant religious and ethnic attitudes. True enough, he was the 
dictator who ordered the execution of coup plotters and banned political parties, but he 
did not attempt to impose his religious beliefs or culture on anyone. In short, he was 
capable of accepting cultural, albeit not political, pluralism. Sometime in the early 1980s, 
he entered into an alliance with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, the forerunner of the 
NIF, to curb the influence o f the banned Umma Party. In addition, he began to ponder his 
personal religious status. He found himself increasingly attached to his faith, and his 
secularism waned.141 One afternoon in the early eighties, Nimeiri appeared on television 
at the home o f a rather religious but moderate Muslim Sudanese singer (Salah Ibn al- 
Badia) and claimed that the prophet ordered him to followed "the straight line o f Islam" 
in a dream. Sudanese secularists were shocked, and many non-Muslims living in the 
North began to make plans for departure. In September 1983, he imposed Islamic law 
and began traveling the path blazed earlier by Abboud with the same catastrophic results 
for the country.
THE SPLA VISION
141Deng, War o f Visions, p. 12.
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For the SPLA's forerunners, the Anya Nya I and II, the Sudan was an illegitimate 
state that needed to be broken into two. The SPLA and its Northern allies, on the other 
hand, have adopted a vision for a united "New Sudan." Garang and his supporters reject 
the debate over the Sudan's Arab versus African identity. They prefer to regard the 
country as a territorial entity whose inhabitants have rights and responsibilities on the 
basis of political citizenship rather than religion -- "Sudanism" instead of 
"Islamism/Arabism" or "Africanism." This vision is premised on the equal legitimacy of 
Islam, Christianity and traditional religions within the country’s national identity. The 
SPLA regards Senegal and Tanzania as models for its approach to religion. Tanzania, 
with its Christian plurality, has had Muslim presidents and Senegal, with its 
overwhelming Muslim majority, was led by a Catholic for decades. Garang de Mabior 
argues that the New Sudan would have the same degree of tolerance and comfort with 
religious issues. In order to accomplish this goal, the SPLA calls for the separation of 
Church, Mosque and State. The SPLA and its allies also call for the establishment of a 
federal, decentralized state in the Sudan to account for the size and diversity of the 
country.142
The SPLA is willing to accept the Arabic language as the official language of the 
Sudan, but it insists that its acceptance of the language does not entail an acceptance of an 
exclusively Arab identity for the Sudan. At the Koka Dam Conference in 1986, Garang 
de Mabior stated the South's position with regard to the Arabic language and culture:
142Garang de Mabior, The Call, pp. 118-141, 204,209-210, 213, 215, 216-220, 
251-254, 257-261
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Taha al-Noumahn, a journalist, quotes John Garang, the leader of the 
SPLM-SPLA, as having endorsed Arabic as the national language of the 
Sudan. Mansour Khalid also reports that Garang said in his address to the 
Koka Dam meeting in March 1986 that Arab culture "is our culture and 
Arabic is our language, and they are here to stay." Paraphrasing Garang, 
[Mansour] Khalid added, "It is the racially biased hegemony that is to go."
In his address to the Koka Dam Conference, Garang spoke on the issue of 
languages: "We are a product of historical development. Arabic (though I 
am poor in it — I should learn it fast) must be the national language in a 
new Sudan and therefore we must learn it. Arabic cannot be said to be the 
language of the Arabs. English is the language of the Americans, but that 
country is America, not England. Spanish is the language of Argentina,
Bolivia, Cuba and they are those countries, not Spain. Therefor, I take 
Arabic on scientific grounds as the language of the Sudan.'"43
From the Southern perspective, the "other" is the Northerner who tries to impose his faith
on an unwilling South. For the South and some o f its allies, the ultimate "other" is the
historic and modem Arab slave raider/trader and the Northern soldier with his "bearded"
Bren guns. The wars have led to songs about the "other," with the Dinka lodging a
complaint with God about the treatment they receive from the Arabs:
Our land is closed in a prison cell 
The Arabs have spoiled our land 
Spoiled or land with breaded guns 
Is the black color of skin such a bad thing 
That the government should draw its guns?
The police pacing up and down,
Gunners causing dust to rise,
Cowards surrendering to the arms? . . .
South o f Deng, son of Kwol,
What is the Government doing 
Is not a good thing;
Waving their bren-guns 
Counting their [empty] shells 
Then saying, "One million shots 
Have not subdued the Ngok [Dinka]."
Our case is in the Court with the people above 
The Court is convened between the clouds . . .
l43Deng, War o f  Visions, pp. 450-451.
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[Our ancestral spirits] have a cause
They seated the Court
And called God
Then said, "God, why are you doing this?
Don't you see what has become of the black skin."144
According to Francis Deng, these two visions have become national identities. 
Furthermore, he implicitly argues that the SPLA's positions represent a last ditch effort to 
maintain the unity o f the Sudan. If the North continues to insist that the Sudan is Arab, 
despite its African heritage and continues to attempt to impose an Islamic Arab identity 
on the South the only solution left for the Sudan would be partition. The role of the Nile 
in the formation o f the national identity espoused by the South akin to the river's role in 
Egypt—the SPLA's flag includes a milky grey color symbolizing its life-giving waters.
The Sudanese government's flag, in contrast, is composed o f the four pan-Arab colors: 
green, red, white and black — the colors of the prophet's first four heirs and the divisional 
colors of the four nominal Mahdist Khalifas.'*5
ETHIOPIA
One o f the Mahdists’ greatest mistakes was the foolhardy attempt to invade 
Ethiopia. The country was and largely remains a Coptic-dominated state. Today, two o f 
its three leading regional states are overwhelmingly Coptic (Tigray and Amhara) and the 
population o f the third dominant state (Oromia) is split evenly between Christians and 
Muslims. O f the remaining six states only three impoverished and underpopulated states 
enjoy Muslim majorities (Harar, Ethiopian Somalia, and the Afar Regional State). The
,44Ibid.
I45Ibid., pp. 228,434-435.
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remaining three states are either o f mixed Christian-Muslim population or o f animist 
preference. In addition, the Ethiopia o f Yohannes’ days saw itself as a country under 
siege by Muslim powers. In a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm, dated 17 February 1881, 
Yohannes complains bitterly of the encroachments on Ethiopia by the "Gragn" (the 
Muslims who invaded Ethiopia in the 1500s) and the "Turks" (Egyptians) who 
"ambushed and killed [his] emissaries . . .  they also Islamize the Christian population." 
Yohannes asks for the Kaiser to second personnel into the Ethiopian service.146 While 
Yohannes’ vision certainly included Ethiopia’s Muslims, it still viewed Islam as the 
other; this perspective is easily understood when Egypt’s incursions and weirs are taken 
into account. Ethiopia, although multiethnic, is not a country created by colonial fiat like 
its neighbors. Except for a short period under Italian rule, the country remained 
independent for centuries. Unlike the Mahdists, it was able to repel European colonial 
empires repeatedly and preserve its independence. Its dogged resistence to colonial 
encroachment served as a model for other regions in Africa. Today most African states 
use the colors o f the Ethiopian flag -- itself rooted in the rituals of the Coptic church.
GREAT LAKES STATES
The three states in former British East Africa have had a mixed record in coping 
with issues o f identity. Tanzania organized itself around the socialist ideology of 
ujumma — togetherness or union in Swahili. The armed forces of Tanzania are drawn 
from organizations affiliated with the country’s ruling party. The country has adopted a 
secular orientation and has been able to maintain peace between its Christian, Muslim and
151 Yohannes IV, Negus of Ethiopia, "Letter to Kaiser Wilhelm I," 17 February 
1881; the whole text o f the letter is included by Gabre-Sellassie in Yohannes IV, appendix 
A, pp. 258-259.
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Animist communities. Predominantly Muslim Zanzibar enjoys autonomy and its 
president is Tanzania’s vice-president. Like Tanzania, Kenya can be said to have 
successfully dealt with its identity issues. There have been occasional outbursts o f 
Somali separatism in eastern Kenya, but these movements have slowly died down. 
Kenya’s government is led by the Kikuyu, the country’s largest tribe. The Kikuyu’s 
homeland includes the capital city of Nairobi. While Kikuyu dominance is a source of 
some friction in the country, Kenya’s internal differences never erupted into inter-ethnic 
armed conflict among non-Somali groups. During the early 80s, the Air Force attempted 
a coup, but failed miserably. It was reorganized as a part of the army. Kenya’s and 
Tanzania’s relative successes in containing the genie of ethnic and tribal separatism 
contrast sharply with Uganda’s tragic history.
Like the Sudan, Uganda is an artificial state whose borders do not reflect coherent 
cultural, geographic or economic realities. Unlike Tanzania and Kenya, it developed 
plenty of "others." The enemies of the Ugandan state, more specifically the enemies of 
Amin and Obote, have been Uganda’s own people -- especially those whose tribal 
affiliation was out o f the ruler’s favor. The current Ugandan government is clearly 
attempting a Kenyan approach to the problem by concentrating power in the numerically 
powerful Southern Bantu tribes like the Buganda, while including cooperative Acholi, 
Langi and West Nile factions in the governance of the country. With the current regime, 
Uganda has begun to define the other in terms of foreign states and powers. Museveni is 
an open enemy o f the Sudanese and Congolese governments and is a supporter of 
insurgencies in both countries. Uganda bans political parties because Museveni fears that 
they will become vehicles for tribalism. Renewed tribalism would restore Amin’s legacy
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and would prevent the building o f a territorial identity that includes all tribes and 
religions. Rwanda and Burundi face a similar challenge. The Tutsi governments o f both 
countries face Hutu insurgencies and the issue of either country’s national identity is not 
settled.
CONCLUSION
The Nile teachs us a great deal about the role, relevance and identity of the state. 
Throughout the basin, the classical Weberian definition o f the state, i.e., the sole 
institution in society with corporeal capability and legitimacy, does not apply. Non-state 
actors like rebel movements, such as the SPLA, EPLF, Islamic Jihad and the LRA, not 
only brandish weapons, but also control territory, tax and even enjoy a large degree o f 
legitimacy within the territories of the states they fight. The utility o f the state as the 
object of analysis is greatly reduced as a result of the rise of the said non-state actors. All 
o f these groups are organized along lines defined primarily by identity.
Identity also serves as the cause motivating all o f these groups. The aim is either 
to alter the identity of the state or set up a new state dedicated to an alternative identity. 
The state has slowly become an instrument for promoting the identity o f its dominant 
group. Consequently, it has been reduced to an object. It is becoming less and less o f an 
independent actor in International Relations. In the Nile basin, the state is effectively not 
an actor but a tool brandished by sub-state actors to promote their identity-related 
perspectives both domestically and across international borders. As one ascends the Nile, 
the presence of a unified national identity diminishes. The states o f former British East 
Africa and the Sudan have not completed the task of creating a single national identity.
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Ethiopia, while more successful, has not yet managed to accomplish the degree of 
internal unity achieved by Egypt. Despite its success, Egypt continues to suffer from 
Islamic Fundamentalism and discrimination against the Copts. Aside from serving as an 
indicator o f loyalty in Nile basin conflict, identity is also the object o f conflict. The war 
in the Sudan is ultimately about the relationship between the country’s Arab/Islamic and 
African components.
The case study also questions the possibility o f coding variables that evaluate 
power. While a state may enjoy immense advantages in military, economic and 
technological power, these factors may not be relevant on the battlefield. And, the 
battlefield may not be the decisive factor in a conflict. Egypt was defeated by Ethiopia in 
1870s despite it overwhelming military, economic and technological superiority. Thomas 
NafF s table, shown in the literature review, leaves out many important and relevant 
variables such as distance, willingness to fight and the ability to withstand heavy battle 
deaths. War and conflict seem to have caused water disputes in the Nile basin, and issues 
of identity were the most important causes for war and conflict. Egypt and the Sudan did 
not quarrel over water in 1958, the root o f the quarrel was Egypt’s Fashoda complex 
which had become a part of Egypt’s national identity matrix.
The Nile case study shows that things do not cause war, people do. Oil, water, 
land, wealth, the balance of power and the international system have all been cited as 
causes of war. Environmental degradation also joined this list recently. The Nile case 
study suggests that these causes of war need to be questioned. The conflicts between and 
within the states of the Nile basin are largely conflicts o f  identity. Egypt’s 19th century 
policy of imperial conquest was the only exception to this pattern. At any rate, securing
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Egypt’s water supplies was not a goal o f  the policy, and identity-related variables 
informed Egypt’s invasions of the Sudan and Ethiopia. The perspective that argues that 
water disputes are not a causes of conflict seems to be much better supported by the Nile 
case study.
The argument, discussed in the literature review, that water disputes are a function 
of political conflict is a much more accurate account o f the relationship between water 
disputes and conflict than alternatives offered by Naff and others that posit that water 
disputes cause war. Cooperation in the Nile basin followed "civilizational" lines. Egypt 
is most willing to cooperate with the Sudan, a country with whose leadership it shares a 
dominant faith and a dominant language. Of course, this is at least a partial confirmation 
of Huntington’s thesis o f the "clash o f civilizations."
The Sudan has consistently acted against its best hydrological interests in order to 
promote its relationship with Egypt, which is seen by its Northern leadership as the core 
of the Sudan’s being or raison d'etre. Egypt and the Sudan have not been as 
uncooperative with the former British East African states as they are with Ethiopia. It is 
important in this instance to remember that all five states have hydrologists that are at 
least partially British-English speaking, having attended either British universities or 
British-pattem educational institutions in their respective states. Ethiopia does not posses 
such an elite. Ethiopian hydrology, such as it is, is largely a product of U.S. and Soviet 
educational systems. This study strongly suggests that conflict in international water 
basins is not necessarily caused by disputes over water.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES CASE STUDY
Like the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates basin has been a cradle o f civilization. Its 
history until 1914 seemed secure. The Sunni Ottoman Empire of Turkey and the Shiite 
Safavid Empire of Iran had settled their frontier zones with the Kharun River and a few of 
the Tigris’ tributaries remaining with Iran. The last serious challenge to Ottoman control 
of the basin was the Egyptian invasion o f Syria and Ottoman Anatolia by the 
independence and modernization-minded Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali in 
the 19th century. With the eruption o f World War I, the picture changed dramatically.
The war finalized the destruction of the Ottoman order and led ultimately to the 
establishment of a Kemalist state in Turkey. Kemalism is an unusual form of 
nationalism. Whereas in other nationalisms, the state is created through an appeal to 
some elements of cultural commonality, Kemalism seeks to have the state impose 
commonality. Consequently, groups that do not conform must either be assimilated or 
marginalized demographically. World War I also altered Turkish views o f the Arabs. 
Turkey had to share the Tigris-Euphrates basin with two new states, and instead o f being 
the prophet’s people, Arabs became, for many Turks, traitors. The last Ottoman ruler of 
Syria did a great deal to harm the reputation of Turkey in the Arab world through 
deportations, massacres and callous agricultural policies resulting in starvation. The well 
of friendly, neighborly relations between Syria and Turkey was poisoned long before it 
was dug.
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Turkey is currently attempting to "solve the Kurdish problem," by economically 
integrating the Kurds into Turkey through the Southeast Anatolia Program (GAP in 
Turkish). The policy also has the not co-incidental side-effect o f depriving Syria o f water 
by greatly reducing the flow the Euphrates into that country. Turkey’s motives in both 
instances are intimately tied with its nationalities policy. Turkey precluded any attempts 
to divide the water on the basis that "it is Turkish water." The country’s refusal to 
negotiate with Syria is rooted in its rejection o f the outcome o f World War I, especially 
with regard to the Arab role in that war. The Turks’ attitudes towards Arabs are so 
profoundly negative that cooperation is very unlikely. Furthermore, Syria was left with 
no choice other than using the Kurds against Turkey in order to induce cooperative 
behavior in Ankara. Syria itself is extremely about Turkey and shares some views with 
Greece and Armenia regarding that country. So, it cannot, at this time, negotiate with 
Turkey in good faith. Faith, in the sense o f religion, drives Syria’s relations with Iraq.
Both Syria and Iraq are Ba’athist states ruled by relatively small minority groups 
(10-15 percent) but the similarity ends there. Iraq has moved beyond authoritarianism 
and can be rightly regarded as a totalitarian state. Its army and bureaucracy are of 
Ottoman origin, dominated by Sunni Arabs. The precarious demographic position of 
Sunni Arabs in Iraq and their exclusion o f  effective representation o f other groups in the 
center of power forces the regime to treat the vast majority o f its population with utter 
brutality. The religious, political and ethnic differences between Iran and Iraq fed the 
potential for war. The war became inevitable when Iraq perceived, wrongly as it turned 
out, that Iran was not going to be able to resist effectively because o f its ongoing 
revolution. Iraq’s behavior suggests that the country’s leadership does not view its
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Kurdish, Iranian, and Shiite Arab opponents in human terms. Iraq did not begin the war 
with Iran because of the Kharun, an Iranian river that flows into Iraq, or the Iranian 
Tigris tributaries. It began the war for oil and for reasons related to its own lack of 
national identity. Its quarrel with Syria begins to make sense only when the nature of the 
current leadership in Syria is taken into account. Syria is led by its Alawite community, a 
sect long scorned in the Islamic world. As the GAP dams were built, Iraq consistently 
blamed Syria rather than Turkey for its water shortages. Iran has not engaged in disputes 
over water issues, and its internal nationalities policy seems to be very balanced. Its only 
serious ethnic conflict has been with the Kurds, and other ethnic groups, especially Azeri- 
speakers, seem to be integrating into the mainstream o f Iranian life without any state 
compulsion to do so.
Much of the region’s instability stems from the lack of a Kurdish state and the 
Kurds’ desire to be left alone if not allowed to be free. The only major conflict with a 
clear nexus to water, the confrontation between Syria and Turkey, is really about historic 
mistrust and a clash of identities. This clash is fed by the view of the Arabs as an other in 
Turkey and the inevitable demonization of Turkey and Turks in Syria in the aftermath of 
World War I. Conflict caused by an apparent dispute over water turns out to be a 
conflict caused by a clash o f Turkish and Arab national identities. The dispute over water 
feeds and exacerbates a pre-existing conflict, but does not cause it. The Tigris-Euphrates 
basin has witnessed many such conflicts in the past and undoubtedly, these past conflicts 
have made problem-solving in the region very difficult.
This case study, organized in the same manner as the Nile case study, presents us 
with a much grimmer picture than the Nile. There is no cooperation whatsoever here. At
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least, in the Nile Basin, Egypt and the Sudan cooperate and the Central African Great 
Lakes states attempt to cooperate as much as possible. The Tigris-Euphrates basin, on the 
other hand, is reminiscent of the Islamic portrayal of the Jahiliya -- the Hobbesian state of 
nature that existed in the Arabian peninsula before Islam. More than a million people 
have died in wars in the basin since 1918, and there is no sign that the chaos is ever going 
to end. It is as if the Tigris-Euphrates basin is a cursed plot of enchanted land.
NATURAL HYDROLOGY
The Tigris-Euphrates basin has not been studied as well as the Nile basin. As a 
result, there is a substantial variance in reported annual mean discharges of both rivers.
For the purposes o f this dissertation, figures used by Nurit Kliot and the team of Kolars 
and Mitchell will be accepted as authoritative in order to provide the study with a 
maximum degree of consistency.1 From a purely hydrological point o f view, the Tigris 
and Euphrates basins are joined only at the Shatt al-Arab waterway in Iraq. Nevertheless, 
they can be treated as a single basin, because three of the four major co-riparians have a 
share in both basins. Iran has a share only in the Tigris River, but it contributes a great 
deal of water to the river and to the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and cannot be ignored in this 
study. The Euphrates drains 66,000 square kilometers in Saudi Arabia but the Saudi 
contribution to the river is nil. And while Saudi Arabia controls various wadis (dry 
creeks) that discharge into the Euphrates during storms, it can be excluded from this case 
study. Like Saudi Arabia, Armenia can also be excluded from this case study, because
‘Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 108-109; Kolars and Mitchell, The 
Euphrates River, pp. 85-105.
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while some Tigris waters originate in Armenia, the country's contribution to the system is 
likely to be minimal. Furthermore, the Armenian contribution to the river would travel 
through Iran and Turkey to reach the river, thus raising the risk of counting the water 
twice, so it would be prudent to exclude the country from this case study. In this section, 
the case study will examine the water contributions of each of the four major co-riparians: 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
TURKEY
Most o f the water in the Tigris-Euphrates basin originates in territories controlled 
by Turkey. Turkey controls 125,000 square kilometers o f the Euphrates' catchment area 
o f444,000 square kilometers. For comparison, the State o f Maryland is about 33,000 
square kilometers. In addition, the country controls 1,230 kilometers o f the river's 3,000 
kilometer main channel. O f the river's total annual average discharge o f  28.2-30.5 cubic 
kilometers, Turkey contributes 26.5-28.5 cubic kilometers.2 The Euphrates proper 
begins at Kharput at the confluence of the Kara-Su (Black River) and the Murat-Su (Wish 
or Spirit River). Kharput is located 400 kilometers west o f  Lake Van. After Kharput, the 
Euphrates flows into a valley, and it cut across the Taurus mountains to the Syrian 
border. The Euphrates crosses into Syria at Jerablus, where its elevation begins to drop 
2 meters every kilometer.3 The two major tributaries o f the Euphrates, the Balikh and 
the Khandur rise in Syria and contribute 1.7-2.0 cubic kilometers of water. Mamdouh 
Shahin, a leading Egyptian hydrologist, and the U.S. Corps of Engineers regard Syria as
2Peter Beaumont, "The Euphrates River -- An International Problem o f Water 
Resources Development," Environment Conservation (Lussane), Vol. 5 (Spring 1978), 
pp. 37-38; Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 112.
3Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River, p. 4.
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the source of both of these tributaries. Kolars and Mitchell, however, regard Turkish 
controlled territories to be the source of these tributaries. In this debate, they are 
supported by Kliot who argues that the two lesser rivers are "almost certainly fed by 
Turkish springs." Mitchell and Kolars implicitly acknowledge that they are in a debate 
over the sources of the river when they state that they are "presenting evidence" about the 
Turkish origins of the two rivers. Furthermore, these two analysts are clear about their 
reasons for disputing the Syrian sources of these two rivers. "The Khabur is cited as 
Syria's significant contribution to the discharge of the Euphrates and offers a quid pro 
quo basis for Syrian claims to use of the river." Frankly put, Kolars and Mitchell reject 
non-Turkish or non-Turkish approved use of the river on the basis of Turkey's immense 
contribution to its annual discharge. While the normative views held by Kolars and 
Mitchell may have merit, they cannot guide a physical description of the sources of the 
water. Kliot is more cautious and does not accept Mitchell's and Kolars' case outright, 
perhaps because she accepts the Helsinki rules as a basis for sharing international river 
systems.4
Like the Euphrates, the Tigris River draws most of its water from Turkey. Its 
tributaries are shared by Turkey, Iraq and Iran. It rises near Diyarbakir in Southeastern 
Turkey, flows eastwards and links up with the Batman-Su (Batman is a town in 
Southeastern Turkey). After a short 100-kilometer span within Turkish territory, the 
united Tigris flows into Syria. Syria controls only 44 kilometers of the river's main
4KoIars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River, p. 167; Kliot, Water Resources and 
Conflict, p. 115; U.S. Army Corps o f Engineers, Water in the Sand (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Army, 1991); Mamdouh Shahin, "Review and Assessment of Water Resources in 
the Arab Region," Water International, Vol. 14 (1989), p. 213.
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channel. Turkey contributes 21 cubic kilometers of water to the main Tigris river, which 
amounts to 100 percent of its discharge. Turkey also controls 45,000 square kilometers 
of the river's 375,000 square kilometer drainage basin and 400 kilometers of its 1,862 
kilometer long main channel.. With regard to the tributaries, however, a different and 
more complicated picture emerges. Unlike the Euphrates, the Tigris tributaries 
contribute 26.7-29-4 cubic kilometers to the river. The river is also infamous for its 
floods, irregularity, and rapid flow. It is similar, in some respects, to the Blue Nile. 
Turkey shares in the Tigris' Greater Zab tributary. It controls 6000 square kilometers of 
the tributary's 26,000 square kilometer basin and 22 kilometers o f its 800- kilometer long 
main channel. The Zab adds 10-13.5 cubic kilometers of water to the Tigris’ 21 cubic 
kilometers, and 7-10.5 cubic kilometers of this water originates in Turkey. The remaing 
water comes from Iraq. Turkey easily contributes 70 percent o f the water in the system. 
The Tigris' remaining tributaries originate in Iran and Iraq.5
SYRIA
Syria's contribution to the Euphrates and the Tigris system is minimal. As 
discussed earlier, it is clear that Syria contributes a disputed amount o f water to the 
Khabour and the Balikh. Syria controlls 27,900 square kilometers of the Khabour's 
36,900 square kilometer basin and 460 kilometers o f its 730 kilometer-long network of 
streams and creeks (Turkey controls the balance o f both). Of the Balikh's network of 
channels and streams, Syria controls 10,400 square kilometers o f the Balikh's 14,400 
square kilometer basin and 105 kilometers of the small river's channell network (Turkey
5Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River, p. 6; Kliot, Water Resources and 
Conflict, p. 112.
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controls the remaining portion o f the basin and a 100 kilometers o f  the river’s streams). 
Syria makes no discemable contribution to the Tigris. At most, Syria contributes about 
1.7-2 cubic kilometers of water to the Euphrates through its main drainage area and its 
tributaries. Its share of the combined water discharge o f the two rivers is about 2 
percent.6
IRAQ
Unlike Syria, Iraq makes a substantial contribution to the total discharge of the 
two rivers, but its contribution is not as great as that of Turkey. Although Iraq controls 
66,000 square kilometers o f the Euphrates basin and 1,060 kilometers o f its main 
channel, it does not contribute any measurable quantity o f water to the river. It is in the 
Tigris basin that the country makes a water contribution. Despite containing 292,000 
square kilometers of the main river's basin and 1,418 kilometers o f its main channel, Iraq 
does not make a contribution to the Tigris' main channel. Its contribution is concentrated 
in the river's tributaries: the Greater Zab, the Lesser Zab, the Adhaim, and the Diyalah.
All of these rivers, except the Adhaim, are shared with other states; all told, Iraq 
contributes 8-9 percent of the river’s water.
6Ibid.
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Greater Zab Turkey (7-10.5) 20,000/26,000 580/800 1-3
Lesser Zab Iran (5.7-6.2) 18,900/21,500 280/350 1.0-1.5
Adhaim none 13,000 200 0.8
Diyalah Iran (4-5) 30,600/32,900 270/520 0-1.5
SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 112.
IRAN
As table shows, Iran contributes about 9.7-11.2 cubic kilometers o f water to the 
Tigris system. Iran's greatest contribution to the overall basin, however takes place after 
the Tigris and Euphrates unite to form the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Kharun River, 
the longest in Iran, drains into the waterway bringing 20-24.8 cubic kilometers of water 
annually. The river drains 67,340 square kilometers controlled by Iran. Iran contributes 
at least 21 percent of the water in the Tigris-Euphrates-Shatt al-Arab system, making it 
the second most important source of water in the basin.7
WATER UTILIZATION
In antiquity, the Tigris-Euphrates basin’s water development programs were 
predominantly Mespotamian rather than Anatolian. In sharp contrast to the past, today’s 
leading water development projects are upstream in Turkey. The Nahrawan canal was 
built in the 6th century AD, and it was used to transport water from the Tigris to the
8George C. Cressy, Crossroads (Chicago: J.P. Lippincott, 1960), p. 147.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
Diyalah river for agriculture. The canal was 300 kilometers long and about 30 meters 
wide. The Nimrod dam, a 10-meter high, ancient marvel, diverted the water for the canal. 
The ancient canal was destroyed by the Mongols in the 12th century. Water and thirst 
have been used as a weapon in the region. King Nebuchnezzar used the canal system to 
defend Babylon, and Assyrians used floods as early but effective weapon of mass 
destruction. The catastrophic end of the Nahrawan canal symbolized the decline of 
agriculture in Mesopotamia. The Mongol conquest represented the failure of the local 
Islamic regimes in the Tigris-Euphrates to defend the territories and to raise the necessary 
revenue for maintaining armies and the canal system. The ostentatious life o f the 
Abbasid Khalifas, such as Harun Al-Rashid, helped devastate their progeny and their 
immediate successors -- Iranic and Turkic dynasties such as the Buwayhids and the Kara- 
Quoyunlu. Modem Iraq has been able to use two ancient water projects, Lake Abu 
Dibbis and the Habbaniya barrage, to store water. These two ancient projects have a 
combined storage capacity o f 46 cubic kilometers of water.8
TURKISH WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
In sharp contrast to Iraq, Turkey’s earliest surviving dams date from the 
seventeenth century. Turkey is blessed with levels o f rain, and its agriculture did not need 
irrigation until recent times. Current water development projects date from the 1960s.
The primary motivations for Turkey’s projects in the Tigris-Euphrates basin have been
9Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 116-117.
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related to energy, economic development, and induced political and social change in an 
area characterized by the predominance of a rather unhappy minority.9
The first major Turkish water development program in the basin was the Upper 
Keban Dam. The dam is located near the city of Keban. While the dam was built strictly 
to provide electricity for Ankara and Istanbul, it does have a storage capacity of some 30 
cubic kilometers. The United States’ Hoover Dam, in comparison, stores 35 cubic 
kilometers o f water. The dam is not considered a part of Turkey’s ambitious 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP in Turkish). Work on the Upper Keban Dam began 
in the 1960s and ended in 1974. The dam’s reservoir began to fill that year, with 
catastrophic results. A drought hit the fertile crescent that year, and much acrimony 
broke out between Syria and Iraq over Euphrates waters. The Arab League and the 
Soviets were able to pressure Syria and Iraq to settle their dispute peacefully, but the 
problems did not end. The construction of a dam in Syria followed the construction of 
the Upper Keban Dam. Turkey was able to increase the flow to the Euphrates to 450 
cubic meters per second by using the reserves in the Keban Dam. Turkey’s infusion of 
stored water into the system helped prevent further conflict. The Keban dam is very 
efficient, because it is located in a low-evaporation, high-rainfall area. It wastes only 
0.48 cubic kilometers of water a year when its lake enjoys a surface of 675-680 square 
kilometers. During its first year of operation, the dam suffered some seepage to an
9Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River, pp. 9, 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
underground cavern that has since been filled, compounding the problems downstream. 
The dam has an installed capacity 1,240-1,360 MW of electricity.10
MAJOR DAMS AND WATER WORKS OF THE GAP
The Euphrates phase of the GAP infrastructure begins downstream from the 
Upper Keban dam. Of the six dams planned in the Turkish-controlled section o f the 
Euphrates basin, three have been completed: the Upper Keban, the Karakaya, and the 
Attaturk dams; three additional dams, the Birecik, the Karkamis and the Adiyaman, are 
still under construction. Like the Upper Keban, the Karakaya dam is intended for 
electricity production. It can hold 9.5 cubic kilometers of water in its reservoir in order 
power to its 1800 MW turbines. The Upper Keban and the Karakaya dams are dwarfed 
by the giant Attaturk Dam -- the most important GAP project. Located 181 kilometers 
downstream from the Karakaya Dam, the Attaturk Dam is the world’s sixth largest dam. 
Its reservoir can hold 48 cublic kilometers o f water, making it larger than the Upper 
Keban and Karakaya dams combined. In terms of size, the dam’s embankment volume is 
84.5 million cubic meters, five times the size o f the Upper Keban Dam. Its installed 
power capacity is 2,400 MW, and its waters will irrigate 730,000-882,000 hectares — 
making the Attaturk Dam’s irrigated area at least the second largest scheme in the world. 
The Attaturk Dam is now complete, but its associated irrigation works are not yet fully 
implemented." According to Kolars and Mitchell, the dam’s associated tunnel and canal
l0Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East, pp. 93-95; Kliot, Water Resources 
and Conflict, pp.121,122, 127; Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River, p. 35.
"The ARI Group (An auxiliary of Turkey’s Motherland Party), GAP Project 
Investments, <http://www.arigroup.org/english/proiects/proiectmain.html>. accessed 28 
June 1998; Kolars and Mitchell, The Euphrates River, pp. 34-43; Kliot, Water Resources 
and Conflict, pp. 126-129.
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works are "the largest in the world, containing a twin-bore 26.4 km tunnel, 283 km of 
main canals, 150 km of secondary canals, and 200 km of tertiary distribution canals."
The twin-bore tunnel will deliver water to the Sanliurfa (Urfa) and Harran plains. A 50 
MW powerplant is installed at the end o f the tunnel system. At the powerplant, the water 
is to be divided into two streams to irrigate the two plains. Independently o f  the two 
tunnels, the Hilvan-Siverek canal will carry water pumped from the reservoir some 244.6 
kilometeres (150 kilometers on the main canal and the balance on its extensions) from 
the reservoir to the Siverek and Hilvan plain-a small dam is to regulate the canal’s water 
flow; the Mardin-Ceylanpinar system is a component of the Hilvan canal, the subsystem 
will irrigate the Mardin and Ceylanpinar plains -- more than 265 kilometers away from 
the reservoir. Another Attaturk Dam-associated irrigation project is the Bozova project 
which aims to use water pumped from the reservoir to irrigate some 85,000 hectares. Six 
additional major construction projects on the Euphrates remain incomplete:
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Table 9: Pending Turkish Euphrates GAP Projects.
Name Type Irrigated Installed Approx. Other
Area (ha) MW Location Information
Birecek Dam-
hydroelectric
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SOURCES: John Barham, "Dam Developers Wear Down Bureaucrats’s Hostility to 
BOT," Financial Times (7 December 1995), p. 7; Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, 
pp. 129.
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Turkey’s projects on the Tigris basin are even less complete than those on the 
Euphrates. The Tigris phase o f the GAP. although large by world standards, seems to be 
an afterthought when compared to the plans for the Euphrates. In essence, the projects on 
the Tigris River will not affect its flow into Syria and Iraq as much as similar projects on 
the Euphrates. Since the Syrian portion o f the Tigris is very small, the practical effect of 
Turkey’s policy on the Tigris is to provide Iraq with the water resources to compensate 
itself for its loses on the Euphrates. As this study shows later, Iraqi water policy is 
somewhat compatible with Turkey’s plans for the region. Turkey’s motives for sparing 
Iraq the water shortages it visits upon Syria may have to do with its desire to use Iraq 
against Syria, and to purchase its cooperation with regard to its constant operations in 
Northern Iraq against the Syrian-supported insurgency of the PICK (Kurdish Workers’ 
Party). The GAP project is also closely associated with United States and European 
interests in the region, and the Atlantic alliance has recently shown that it is willing to 
look the other way when Iraq smuggles oil through Turkey or when Turkey decides to 
ethnically cleanse its Kurdish-populated Southeast. This suggests the relative over­
emphasis of the Euphrates over the Tigris is blessed not only in Ankara but elsewhere.12
12 James Risen, "Iraq’s Oil Smuggling," The New York Times, Vol. 147 (19 June 
1998), p. A l; Robert Olson, "Turkey-Syria Tensions since the Gulf War: Kurds and 
Water," Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, No. 2 ( May 1997), p. 189.
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Table 10: Pending Turkish Tigris GAP Projects.
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North of 
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SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 130.
Despite having the quiet support o f the United States and Europe, the GAP was 
beset with financial difficulties of the first order. Turkey pioneered the "Build-Operate- 
Transfer" scheme to finance the GAP. In addition, it has created private firms to build, 
own, and operate the dams and sell the water and electricity produced. Thirteen such 
firms have been established by the GAP Holding Company and the Turkish treasury.
One firm is the Lower Euphrates Project Company (AFP in Turkish), which controls the 
Attaturk Dam and its associated projects. The company projects annual revenues o f U.S.
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$535 million in power sales and $510 million in wate. At the time of writing, the firm 
currently projects an annual profit o f $650 million, and plans to offer 25% of its shares 
on the Turkish and international capital markets for about $2.0 billion.13 Much o f the 
GAP’s funding came from commercial banks and Turkish companies created to raise 
capital and to act as partners to international companies based in Austria, Germany, Italy, 
France, Belgium, the United States, and the United Kingdom. For example, the German 
firm of Philip Holzmann created a partnership with the Turkish firm Gama Endustri 
under the financial guidance o f Chase Manhattan Bank. Some European governments 
have guaranteed the risks undertaken by their firms; Austria, for example, issued export 
credits and helped arrange a U.S. $45.5 million loan for an Austrian-led Consortium 
which included three Austrian firms (Elin Voith, JM Voight, and Verbund Plan) and two 
Turkish companies (Yuksel Insaat and Temel Su Engineering). Thanks to Austria’s 
efforts, its firms earned a share in the $170 million contract to build the Karakamis Dam, 
which is located a  mere 4.5 miles away from the Syrian border. Iraq and Syria have 
threatened to blacklist, sue, and boycott firms and countries participating in the GAP.14
Turkey resorted to un-orthodox financial schemes because the World Bank and its 
related organizations refused to support the GAP. The project involves possible 
violations of the rights o f international riparian states' rights. International funding was
I3The ARI Group (An auxiliary o f Turkey’s Motherland Party), GAP Project 
Investments <http://www.arigrouD.org/english/proiects/proiectmain.html>. accessed 28 
June 1998.
I4Alan George, "Syria and Iraq Threaten Anti-European Action," The Middle East, 
No. 255 (April 1996), p. 21.
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conditioned on Turkey reaching water-sharing agreements with its neighbors.15 Sharing
water is not on Turkey's agenda. According to then-Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel,
now the president of Turkey, the Arab states o f the fertile crescent have no rights to the
water: "Why should they have any right to the waters o f Turkey? Do we have a right to
the petroleum of these downstream countries? The upstream countries have an absolute
right to use the water as they see fit. The Turkish waters are not international waters."16
Turkey (and Syria in the case o f the Yarmuk) both violate international norms when it
comes to international rivers. International law, as it currently exists, "has recognized
that a river and its resources are the property o f the community of all riparian states.'"7
To that extent, the dams constitute a violation of the established norms between states.
Indeed, the GAP dams have been called a "water weapon":
Despite advance warning from Turkey o f the temporary cutoff, Syria and 
Iraq both protested that Turkey now had a water weapon that could be 
used against them. Indeed, in mid-1990, Turkish President Turgut Ozal 
threatened to restrict water flow into Syria to force it to withdraw support 
for Kurdish rebels operating in southern Turkey. While Turkish 
politicians later disavowed the threat, Syrian officials argue that Turkey 
has already used its power over the headwaters of the Euphrates for 
political goals and could do so again. When the Turkish projects are 
complete, the flow o f the Euphrates River to Syria could be reduced by up 
to 40 percent, and Iraq by up to 80 percent. It is sometimes a short step 
from capability to implementation. The ability' o f Turkey to shut off the 
flow o f the Euphrates, even temporarily, was noted by political and 
military strategists at the beginning o f the Persian Gulf conflict. In the 
early days of the war, there were behind-the-scenes discussions at the 
United Nations about using Turkish dams on the Euphrates river to
I5Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 131.
I6Rustom Irani, "Water Wars," New Statesman and Society (3 May 1991), p. 25.
I7Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 6; Julio Barberis, "International 
Rivers," in R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia o f  Public International Law, Vol. 9 
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986), pp. 213-214.
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deprive Iraq o f  a significant fraction of its fresh water supply in response 
to its invasion o f Kuwait. While no such action was ever take, the threat 
o f the "water weapon" was again made clear.18
Syria is heavily dependent on the Euphrates for its drinking water, agriculture, industry,
and for some of its electricity. By 1989, Syria's population was growing at the rate of 3.7
percent a year, and its demand for water was rising accordingly.19
THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE GAP 
The Syrian response to the GAP has taken a rather violent form. Syria responded 
by supporting the insurgent Kurdish Labor Party (abbreviated PKK in Kurdish). Syrian 
support for the PKK may have increased after 15 January 1990. On that day, Syria 
lodged a formal diplomatic protest with Turkey for diverting Euphrates waters on 20 
November 1989.20 Turkish suspicions about Syrian support for the PKK may have been 
heightened by a Syrian fighter's destruction of a Turkish commercial aircraft in Turkish 
airspace which took place after Turkey threatened Syria with water shortages.21 By 1992, 
it was absolutely clear that Syria was actively aiding the PKK again. In April 1992, 
during a Syrian visit to Ankara for reviving the security protocol, the Turkish interior 
minister claimed that Syria was allowing the PKK to use the Lebanese Bekaa valley for 
training purposes during a visit to Ankara for reviving the security protocol.22 Turkey's 
claim about the PKK bases in Bekaa was apparently true. Immediately after a Turco-
I8Gleick, "Water and Conflict," p. 94,
l9The Economist, "Send for the Dowsers," (16 December 1989), p. 42.
20Keesing's Record o f  World Events (1990), p. 37201.
24Ibid„ p. 37595.
22Keesing’s Record o f  World Events (1992), p. 38874.
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Syrian treaty was signed on 30 January 1995, the Syria closed these two bases in return 
for Turkish water supplies o f  500 cubic meters per second.23 A similar agreement was 
reached in January 1992, without any tangible consequences as far as the PKK's activities 
are concerned.24 Turkey has arrested Ocalan, and Syria seems to have been bullied away 
from supporting the PKK at the present time, but Syria still enjoys the Kurdish card, and 
may play it again if it can be assured of Iranian or Russian allies in a confrontation with 
Turkey.
The PKK offered Syria an excellent opportunity to subvert Turkey. Syria does 
not have the power to directly threaten Turkey. The dams, which were supposedly being 
built to benefit the Kurds o f the Southeast, loomed as a threat to Syria's existence. Syria 
could not invade Turkey. It could not supply the PKK with the tools o f conventional 
warfare required to "win" a national liberation war, because that would have brought 
Turkey's wrath and probable invasion of Syria. It could try to make the situation in the 
rural Southeast beyond Turkey's control by providing a few light arms and real estate in 
Lebanon. Syria could also use the PKK as a bargaining chip in return for guaranteed 
water supplies. Once the PKK became established in Turkey, it was an even greater asset 
to Syria since Assad could close the bases while retaining the ability to supply his allies 
across the border should Turkey attempt to use the dams as a water weapon against Syria. 
Llike the case o f the Nile, where no direct link between water and conflict exists, the 
Syro-Turkish confrontation over the Euphrates has clear cultural causes.
26"Syria, Turkey Seek Closer Security Cooperation," Reuter (30 January 1995).
24"Iraqi Kurds Condemn Turkish Push Into Northern Iraq," Reuter (20 March 
1995); Christopher Panico, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review 
(April 1995), p. 173.
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ASSESSING THE GAP
The Nile’s primary problem lies in inefficient infrastructure, and the Aswan High 
Dam wastes 13-15 cubic kilometers of water a year. The Nile’s legal structure and 
treaties reflect Egyptian power, but they at least exist. In sharp contrast, Turkey’s dams 
are extremely efficient, at least from the point o f view of evaporation and seepage. Water 
loss from the entire Turkish system is between 1.5-2.0 cubic kilometers a year out of an 
already installed capacity o f 88-100 cubic kilometers of water. This compares favorably 
with the Nile where the Egyptian Aswan High Dam reservoir wastes some 13-15 cubic 
kilometers a year out o f total reservoir capacity of 162 cubic kilometers (but often 
containing only 84-115 cubic kilometers). To Turkey’s credit, the Upper Keban Dam has 
been used to help Syria and Iraq in times of natural drought. Unfortunately, the Tigris- 
Euphrates basin is also unlike the Nile in another way -  it lacks meaningful regimes, 
partial or otherwise. When completed, the GAP will add 1.7 million hectares of land to 
Turkey’s current total o f 3.2 million hectares under irrigated cultivation. It will also 
entail the addition of 8,753 MW of installed electrical generation capacity -  which equals 
70 percent o f  Turkey’s current capabilities.25
Aside from political difficulties, there are two problems with the GAP. First, it is 
a very expensive system. The project has a projected cost of $21 billion dollars, and 
according to the ARI group (an auxiliary of the Turkish motherland party), $12 billion 
have already been spent by the time of writing. The program’s difficult funding methods 
have caused serious delays. Second, it is clear that it is far more economical for Turkey 
to use these funds to clean up existing power generation facilities and upgrade them.
25Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 122, 131, 127, 137.
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According to John Barham, a reporter for The Financial Times, Turkey could increase 
electrical production by as much as 10 percent by undertaking minor repairs at the Upper 
Keban Dam and other older facilities.26 Nevertheless, it is very clear that the GAP is, at 
least from an overall hydrological point o f view, a good idea. Yet, it is clearly troubling 
from one important hydrological angle. Turkey’s installed reservoir capacity on the 
Euphrates is at least three times the annual discharge o f the Euphrates. To fill Turkey’s 
reservoirs alone, the Euphrates would have to be prevented from reaching the Syrian 
border for about three to four years. This suggests that Gleick’s use of the term "weapon" 
to describe the GAP dams is appropriate; given the absence of a clear agreement between 
the three states over the two rivers, the motives o f its builders cannot be viewed without a 
jaundiced eye. Thus, it is possible to argue that GAP’s ultimate shortcomings are 
political, both internally in Turkey with regard to the Kurds and internationally with 
regard to Iraq and Syria.
SYRIAN WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Despite its aridity, Syria enjoys some rain. Out of 5,503,000 hectares under 
cultivation in Syria, 3,336,000 are rain-fed. Since 1960, irrigated land may have shrunk 
by as much as 20 percent due to water-logging, salinization, and other problems. Syria 
plans to irrigate 397,000 hectares in the Euphrates basin.27 There are two existing major 
water projects on the Syrian stretch of the Euphrates, and a third is underway. Syria’s 
largest dam is the Al-Thawra (The Revolution) Dam at Tabqa on the Euphrates in Central
26Barham, "Dam Developers," p. 7; Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 125, 
131, 136.
27Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 139.
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Eastern Syria. The dam holds 11-12 cubic kilometers o f  water and loses 1.6 cubic 
kilometers of water every year. It is not an efficient dam. losing perhaps sixteen times as 
much water as a dam of the same size in the Turkish-controlled highlands to the north. It 
has 800 MW of installed hydroelectric power generating capability, but only 136,000- 
250,000 hectares of its planned 640,000 hectares of irrigation projects are in production. 
The second existing Syrian program on the Euphrates is the Ba’ath Power station. This is 
a small dam with a 0.9 cubic kilometer reservoir. It is used to generate electricity from a 
64-75 MW powerplant, and to regulate the flow of the Euphrates. Syria’s third Euphrates 
project is the Tishreen Dam. This dam will be located northwest of Aleppo, near the 
Turkish border at a place called Manabij. It will hold about 1.88 cubic kilometers of 
water and will be used for hydroelectric power generation with an installed capacity of 
630 MW and to regulate the flow of water into Lake Assad (the reservoir of the Al- 
Thawra Dam). A Chinese firm, Sichuan Machinery, will supply and install the turbines. 
The $ 165 million project is being partially funded by a $ 125 million loan from the Arab 
Fund For Economic and Social Development o f Kuwait. Syria has plans for a small dam 
on the Khabur, which will hold 0.66 cubic kilometers o f water and irrigate 40,000 
hectares; consultants and contractors include Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners of the 
United Kingdom and various French and German firms. Two small dams are also 
associated with the Khabour dam project. The two small dams, built by local state- 
owned Syrian firms, hold a combined total o f  0.30 cubic kilometers of water for irrigating 
up to 150,000 hectares. Syria’s programs, in light of Iraqi and Turkish projects, can be 
described as modest. Syria’s primary problem with irrigation is the inefficiency caused 
by the gypsum deposits that dominate its portion of the Euphrates. The gypsum deposits
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damage Syria’s canal works and prevent efficient irrigation. Gypsum causes substantial 
wasteful loss o f water in Syria’s canals, pipes, and fields. Syria is slowly implementing 
solutions to the gypsum problem. These measures include lining the soil beneath the 
canals with impermeable layers o f material. Syria does have alternative sources of water 
outside the Tigris-Euphrates basin; these include the Orontes (Asi), the small rivers in the 
Latakia region, and the streams and groundwater resources of the Damascus region; to 
date, the country has constructed 135 small dams on these rivers and plans to develop 
more.28
While Syria does need to develop its hydroelectric resources, it has a small 
quantity of oil and moderate deposits of "sweet" and "sour" natural gas, enabling it to 
meet its energy needs in a diversified way. Syria is shifting from fuel oil to natural gas in 
its thermal power plants, enabling it to save its oil reserves for the export market. Syria 
has obtained a pledge from Argentina to purchase a medical nuclear reactor once a peace 
treaty is signed with Israel. Furthermore, it has signed an agreement with Russia to 
cooperate on peaceful uses of atomic energy. One project (TEAS), will link the Syrian, 
Turkish, and Jordanian power grids, and Syria will be able to obtain electricity from the 
very Attaturk Dam it protests. Syria has also obtained a promise from Lebanon, whereby 
the Lebanese would import 10% of its electricity from Syria. Overall, electrical prospects
28Alan George, "Dam it, it’s Our Water," The Middle East, No. 229 (December 
1993), pp. 32-33.
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are bright in Syria.29 Consequently, Syria’s future demand for electricity may be met 
without developing additional hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates.
Syria’s water development projects may suffer from the same sorts of political 
problems that plague Turkey’s GAP. During 1974, Iraq asked Syria to release an 
additional quantity of water (200 cubic meters per second) in order to compensate it for 
its loses due to drought and the filling of the Al-Thawra Dam. Syria released the water, 
and the year passed without conflict. In 1975, when the Upper Keban Dam was also 
being filled, Iraq protested that Syria was releasing only 197 cubic meters per second out 
o f a natural flow o f 920 cubic meters per second. Syria protested that it was sending 71 
percent o f the water released by Turkey to Iraq. The crisis was solved through Saudi and 
Soviet mediation. Under the agreement, Syria released an additional unknown quantity 
of water to compensate Iraq. Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson doubt whether the 1974- 
1975 crisis really involved water. It is clear that Iraq and Syria reached some sort o f 
informal arrangement over the division of waters that flow from Turkey rather easily.
The real problem seems to have been the newly found freedom of the regime in Baghdad 
to destabilize Syria. Until 1975, Iraq, under Saddam and Abu Bakr, was fighting against 
the Mullah Musa Barzani revolt in Northern Iraq. That year Abu Bakr and Saddam 
reached an agreement with the Shah which ended his support for Mullah Musa Barzani. 
Suddenly, Iraq was free to torment its fellow Baathist rival. Syrian troops shifted from 
the Israeli front to the Iraqi border. Naff and Matson’s views seem to be supported by 
internal Syrian events. Assad’s security forces arrested some 120-200 Syrians believed to
29Energy Information Administration, United States Department of Energy, Syria 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/svria.html>. accessed 28 June 1998.
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be sympathetic to the party’s exiled "historic” leaders in Iraq. According to Naff and 
Matson, Assad probably wanted to eliminate any possibility of Iraqi mischief by staging a 
controlled confrontation over water distribution issues with Iraq.30
IRAQI WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Like Syria, Iraq enjoys some rain. It is able to cultivate some 11.5-40 million 
hectares of land a year. The reason behind this disparity lies in the contradictory and 
confusing pile of statistics on Iraq. All told, Iraq probably has some 2.77 million hectares 
under irrigated cultivation.31 As stated earlier, Iraq was fortunate to inherit some 
operational ancient waterworks -  Lake Habbaniya and Lake Abu Dibbis. These lakes 
were modified for flood control and their waters were used during the dry season. The 
two lakes remain in working order storing some 46 cubic kilometers o f water. In 
contrast, the Naharawan Canal and the Nimrod Dam are long gone. Nevertheless, the 
despotates that created them seem to remain. Iraq’s modem hydraulic infrastructure dates 
from 1911-1914, when the Ottoman Empire undertook the construction of the Hindiya 
Barrage on the Euphrates. Over the decades a series o f other barrages followed. The 
Hindiya, Abu Dibbis, Ramadi, and Falluja barrages impede, divert, and regulate the 
Euphrates; the Kut and Samarra barrages carry out the same tasks on the Tigris. The 
Diyalah Barrage diverts the small Tigris tributary’s waters for irrigation projects. 
Completed in 1985, the Falluja Barrage is the newest barrage in Iraq. Another important 
Iraqi non-dam water project is the Lake Tharthar water storage facility. Built in 1950, 
Lake Tharthar was created artificially from the Tharthar depression. It can store 30 cubic
30Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East, pp. 91-95.
31Mamdouh Shahin, "Review and Assessment," p. 208.
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kilometers o f water in a lake under a surface area o f 2,700 square kilometers. Lake 
Tharthar links the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and helps Iraq compensate Euphrates water 
deficits with surpluses from the flood-prone Tigris. Iraq is resorting to the Tigris in order 
to compensate for the shortages on the Euphrates. These shortages are a direct 
consequence of Syria’s and Turkey’s need to fill their respective reservoirs. Iraq is 
following the hydraulic script wished for by Ankara.32 Iraq’s dams are few in number 
and some are still incomplete.
Table 11: Iraqi Dams, Operational and Proposed.
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SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 121.
32Shahim Tekeli, "Turkey Seeks Reconciliation for the Water Issues Induced by 
the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)," Water International, Vol. 15 (1990), p. 215.
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Like Syria, Iraq can resort to non-Tigris-Euphrates sources o f water. The Kharun 
River flows from Iran into Shatt al-Arab without any Iranian extractions; some 20 cubic 
kilometers enter Iraq every year from Iran, and these waters may offer Iraq some 
breathing room with regard to Syrian and Turkish extractions from the Euphrates. In 
better times, Iraq could also import food by exporting oil. The economic meaning o f this 
policy was that Iraq used oil to create "virtual water" -  water it would not have to use to 
produce food. In effect, Iraq pursued this policy due to its poor agricultural output before 
the invasion of Kuwait. The sanctions and the subsequent difficulties in Iraq have shown 
this policy to be dangerous.
The primary problem of Iraqi agriculture is salinization. Much of Iraq’s arable 
land remains uncultivated every year in order to reduce its levels of salinity. Some 80 
percent o f Iraq is affected to some extent by increasing levels of salt. Despite its massive 
investment in agriculture, Iraq produced less food in 1977 than it did during 1960. The 
agricultural practice of over-irrigation is feeding the problem of salinity. It would not be 
inappropriate to state that Iraq is slowly becoming a salt valley like the dead sea -  some 
one billion tons o f salt have been deposited in Lower Iraq by 1960. This problem is 
leading to decreases of some 30-50 percent of normal agricultural yield.33 Given Iraq’s 
behavior during the last 40 years (since the 1958 coup), it is an open question whether 
successive Iraqi governments have taken agricultural problems seriously enough.
33Cressy, Crossroads, p. 390; Van R. Aart, "Drainage and Land Reclamation in 
the Lower Mesopotamia Plain," Nature and Resources, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1974), pp. 11-17; 
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 158-159.
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IRANIAN WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Iran does not have any water development programs on its Tigris tributaries or on 
the Kharun. It is doubtful whether Iran will develop of these rivers in the immediate 
future, given the engineering challenges they pose. Iran is probably capable o f 
developing the Diyalah and the Lesser Zab for agriculture or power generation, but it 
does have abundant waters outside the basin and does not need to develop its share of the 
Tigris-Euphrates, albeit that these resources are not evenly distributed.
PATTERNS OF WATER USE IN THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES BASIN
As with Ethiopia and Egypt, current contribution and consumption patterns in the Tigris-
Euphrates basin reflect heavy downstream use. Unlike the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates
basin’s total output is not entirely known. Table 12 shows that that Turkey and Iran
contribute the vast majority of the system’s water while consuming little o f it.
Table 12: 1990 Annual Water Consumption Patterns in the Tigris-Euphrates in Cubic 
Kilometers.






SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 114, 148.
This picture is, however, altered by the rapidly changing pattern of water use. In the past 
Turkey used very little water, and Iraq used a great deal. Nowadays, the pattern is being 
changed, and the results are catastrophic for Syria and Iraq. Projections based upon
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Turkey’s pledge to release 16 cubic kilometers o f Euphrates water a year -  an amount 
equal to Iraq’s projected 2000 use from the same river. With Syria dependent on 
abstractions from the Euphrates roughly equal to six to ten cubic kilometers of water by 
2000, Iraq will be left with some 6.5 cubic kilometers of Euphrates water. But some 5 
cubic kilometers will need to be flushed into the Shatt al-Arab waterway to keep the 
river’s ecology at a minimal level o f balance. In short, the GAP project means that Iraq 
may have to abandon its agriculture on the Euphrates. Turkey would like to see Iraq use 
Tigris waters as a replacement. Indeed, Iraq is diverting water surplus from the Tigris 
into the Euphrates. The table below outlines the problems that will probably be facing 
Iraq and Syria in 2005.
Tabie 13: Projected 2005 and 2040 Water Consumption and Projected Water Surpluses 
and Deficits in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin by State in Cubic Kilometers.
Country 2005 Projected demand 
(Surplus or Deficit)
2040 Projected Demand 
(Surplus or Deficit)
Turkey 10.7-14.7 (+32 to + 36) 28.7 (+18)
Syria 6.5-7.5 (+9.5) 13.4-13.9 (-0.5 to +2.7)
Iraq 59.5 (-12.5 to -6.5) 61.7 (-14.1 to -10.6)
Iran ? ( > +  11.2?) ?(?)
SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 143-149.
The GAP’s impact on Iraq is nothing short of catastrophic. In addition, Syria is 
also bound to suffer, according to Kliot, if Turkey experiences any droughts or restricts 
the flow of water. The GAP renders Turkey the only country not subject to water scarcity 
at the expense of both Iraq and Syria. Despite being funded by a country openly allied 
with Turkey, Kliot is compelled to say that "the picture presented here clearly shows that
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the patterns o f ultilization are inconsistent with reasonable and just water utilization in 
both spirit and practice."34 Missing from Kliot’s original table, Iran represents a wild 
card in this equation. As it currently stands, Iran does not utilize its Tigris-Euphrates 
tributaries and the Kharun to any significant extent. The Kharun puts some 24 cubic 
kilometers o f water into Southern Iraq and the Iranian tributaries of the Tigris pour some 
11.2 cubic kilometers o f water into Central Iraq. A growing population may alter this 
picture permanently, and the Iranians may be forced to develop these resources in the 
future. Iran’s current disinterest in developing these resources may be the last chance to 
reach agreements regarding the future developments of these resources. Unfortunately, 
political realities render this observation an inhabitant of the province of dreams.
AGRICULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
The decline in available water to both Syria and Iraq could not have come at a 
worse time for these two countries. Both Syria and Iraq have seen their respective 
populations grow to reach levels hitherto unpredicted. Consequently, these two countries 
needed to increase food production to keep up with their population growth. Iraq’s 
record, in particular, has been dismal. According to Kliot, it grew less food in 1977 than 
it did in 1961; Iraq’s failed agricultural policies did not get replaced, and by the 1990s, 
the country was importing some 80 percent of its food. In essence, the Iraqis depended 
on a policy of substituting oil for "virtual water" in the form o f imported food crops. The 
United Nations sanctions on Iraq proved the folly of such a policy, and the country is now 
in dire straits. Syria has fared only a little better with its more modest projects and rain-
34Ibid.
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fed agriculture, perhaps because of corruption and population growth. Kliot provides us 
with two tables that put the problem in perspective.
Table 14: Population Growth and Agricultural Productivity in the Tigris-Euphrates 
Basin.






























Turkey 55.9 67 2.3 1.8 3.0 97
Syria 12.5 18 3.6 3.6 -0.6 80
Iraq 15.6 26 3.6 3.4 No data 92
Iran 54.6 69 3.0 2.3 4.0 104
SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 153.
Turkey and Iran were the only countries in the region to see growth of their 
agriculture keep pace with population growth. Syria’s program, although probably better 
performing than Iraq’s, is also clearly below par. Iran and Turkey had not significantly 
increased their production on a per capita basis. Syria’s position is closer to Iraq’s in 
terms of food imports, at least in absolute terms. Overall the picture for the region looks 
grim, and only Turkey and perhaps Iran can escape the crunch brought about by rising 
populations and the problem o f water. According to the 1997 CIA Factbook, live animals 
and other foods constitute some 15 percent of Syria’s imports.35
3SThe Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 1997, 
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/sv.html>. accessed 28 June 1998.
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Table 15: Food Importation into the Tigris-Euphrates Basin by State.













as a %age 




Turkey 3.177 13 0 7
Syria 2.091 22 4.0 17
Iraq 2.834 no data no data 15
Iran 6.250 22 no data 12
SOURCE: Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 154.
Unlike the Nile, where Ethiopia has bome the brunt o f Egypt’s policies, it can be safely 
argued that Iraq’s quandary is largely its own doing. The vast resources it spent fighting 
its neighbors and its own people cannot be disregarded in any analysis. These resources 
could have been applied to agriculture, and Iraq may have been able to cope with the 
reduction in water supplies by introducing efficient new technologies. Iran’s relatively 
large imports reflect the rapid growth of its population since the overthrow of the Shah. 
Despite immense losses during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s population more than doubled 
since the departure of the Shah. Furthermore, despite Iran’s insistence that newlyweds 
get contraceptive education, the population of Iran is likely to grow to a level that will 
dwarf even the vast population o f Turkey.
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Table 16: Current Population and the 2010 and 2020 Population Projections for Tigris- 
Euphrates Basin States in Millions.
Country 1996 2010 2020
Turkey 62.48 76.57 85.56
Syria 15.61 23.33 28.93
Iraq 21.42 34.55 46.26
Iran 66.10 88.23 104.28
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as cited by The World 
Almanac and Book o f  Facts 1997, (Mahwah, N.J.: World Almanac Books, 1996), pp. 
838-839.
The difference in projected populations of Turkey and Iran in 2020 is equivalent 
to the whole population of Syria today. This fact has two profound implications for the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin. First, the window of potential Iranian hydraulic assistance to Iraq 
and Syria is rapidly closing. Iran will face immense pressures to develop the Kharun and 
Lesser Zab rivers, despite the immense technical difficulties it is likely to face in this 
endeavor given the difficult terrain of its rivers. Traditional Iranian agriculture relied on 
the Qanat system. These naturally-replenished horizontal wells (heuristically speaking, 
special tunnels) have been used for many millennia in Iran with great success, and to a 
large extent, they remain the backbone of Iranian agriculture. One o f the first acts o f the 
Islamic government was to repair and clean as many of the Qanat systems as possible.36 
But, as population increases, it doubtful that Iran can afford to ignore the Kharun and its 
Tigris tributaries. Consequently, any serious attempts at regime construction must take 
place very soon, otherwise Iran and Iraq may be replicating the disputes that currently
36Helen Metz, ed., Iran: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research 
Division, Library o f Congress, December 1987), 
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html>. accessed 28 June 1998.
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exist between Syria and Turkey. Second, the rapid rise in Iran’s population alters the 
military balance in the Middle East. Iran is more than twice the size o f Turkey and is 
probably the only Middle Eastern state that can absorb vast casualties and replace them. 
These realities have relevance both within and without the Tigris-Euphrates basin. For 
the basin itself, the rise o f Iranian power means that agreements and regimes that exclude 
Iran are probably ineffectual. In addition, Iran’s weight is likely to influence the course 
of any conflicts in the region, including those not directly involving Iran.
REGIMES
Iran was excluded from the first attempt to set up a regional riparian regime in 
1980. The regime, so far, has been a dismal failure. Its early years were troubled by the 
Syrian-Iraqi disputes; Syrian representatives refused to attend meetings with Turkish 
representatives if the Iraqis were present.37 The regime was named after the Egyptian- 
Sudanese Permanent Joint Technical Committee, but it has failed to measure up to even 
the modest success of the Egyptian Sudanese body. The Joint Technical Commission has 
failed because Turkey and its Arab neighbors have radically different visions regarding 
its role. The regimes are not allocative and suffer from tremendous problems because 
Turkey sees the rivers as Turkish property and applies the Harmon doctrine. For Turkey, 
the regime is a consultative body and not an allocative one. Syria and Iraq see the 
regime’s future role as allocation rather than consultation. Material obtained from the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly indicates that Turkey views the Tigris- 
Euphrates Permanent Joint Technical Commission as "forum" for discussing water issues.
37Lowi, "Rivers o f Conflict," p. 138.
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Furthermore, Turkey is adamant that it is sending clean water in adequate quantities to 
Syria and Iraq.38 The Syrian, and increasingly Iraqi, position has been that the Tigris- 
Euphrates Permanent Joint Technical Commission is an allocative body. In a joint 
Syrian-Iraqi meeting held in October 1997, the two countries invited Turkey to discuss 
water distribution with them. Turkey refused to attend.39 In addition to the Permanent 
Joint Technical Commission, there have been a number of Syro-Turkish protocols 
guaranteeing Syria 500 cubic meters of water per second in return for terminating its 
support for the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party). These protocols seem to have been 
honored only in their repetitive breach by both sides. The absence of Iran in the 
Permanent Joint Technical Commission renders it less effective, because Iran brings 30- 
35 cubic kilometers of water to the equation. Iranian water, particularly the 20-24 cubic 
kilometers supplied by the Kharun to the Shatt al-Arab and shortly thereafter to the 
Persian Gulf (immediately outside the Tigris Euphrates basin) could be partially used to 
address some of the concerns o f Syria and Iraq under an arrangement with Iran. It is 
doubtful that Turkey could accept such a role for Iran given the competition between the 
two states. Turkey’s difficulties with Iraq and Syria and have roots in feelings of betrayal 
dating to World War I. The lack o f cooperation stems from Turkey’s image o f itself and 
its view o f the Arabs in general. These views will be discussed in more depth later, but 
they are ultimately rooted in the slow collapse of the Ottoman Empire between 1850 and 
1924.
38The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Water a Source o f Conflict or 
Cooperation in the Middle East" <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>. accessed 28 September 1998.
39Arabic News (10 October 1997) <http://www.arabicnews.com>. accessed 28 
June 1998.
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POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND WAR
The greatest conflict that marked the collapse o f the Ottoman Empire was the 
Arab revolt of World War I led by Hussein Al-Hashem ~  the Hashemite Sharif 
(lord/nobleman in Arabic) o f Mecca and the direct ancestor o f the current king o f Jordan 
who retains the old title despite the loss o f Mecca to the Saudis. The Arab revolt marked 
the second major modem conflict in the basin itself.
EGYPT INVADES ITS OTTOMAN MASTER 
Muhammad Ali, the ruler o f Egypt, had invaded Syria and Anatolia in the last 
century, but as with his invasions o f Sudan and Ethiopia, his aims were power, people, 
and territory. Unlike the Nile basin, however, Egyptian power in the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin was not welcomed by the great powers, and the conquest proved short-lived.
Before discussing the Arab Revolt, it is important to remember that the Arab provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire and most o f the nearby independent and British-controlled Arab 
states o f Nejd (the core o f what later became Saudi Arabia), Kuwait, the Trucial Coast 
(the future UAE), and the other Gulf emirates did not posses separate identities. People 
in these entities identified with their tribes and with their common Arab heritage. The 
creation of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Hejaz, Lebanon and Palestine was a product of both local 
and international factors that followed the war. These factors will be discussed in the 
sections dealing with the formation of Syria and Iraq.
THE ARAB REVOLT 
The factors that led to the Arab revolt are far clearer than the events that followed 
it. Before beginning, however, it is important to remember that the British were already 
cultivating S/iar/f Hussein for a long time before the Arab Revolt began. The immediate
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cause o f the revolt was the appointment of Jamal Pasha (Cemal Pasha in Turkish) as the 
governor of Syria in May 1915. In February 1915. Turkey was defeated at the Suez 
Canal by the British and their Egyptian allies. Jamal Pasha was the Turkish commander 
at the Suez canal. Two giants of pan-Arab history, George Antonius and Sulayman 
Mousa blame the events that followed on Jamal Pasha's inability to cope with that 
defeat.40 These events included deportation, execution, and imprisonment of both real 
and perceived opponents of Ottoman rule. Hasan Kayali, an Ottoman studies scholar at 
the University o f California at Berkeley, provides us with a picture o f Jamal's reign of 
terror in Syria. Jamal's capture of the French consulate in Beirut provided him with the 
details o f France’s links with Arab cultural, political and economic leaders in the Levant. 
Jamal used this documentation, most of which preceded the reconciliation of most of 
these Arab leaders with the Ottoman government, to try and execute Arab leaders in the 
Syrian provinces o f the Ottoman Empire. The first to be executed was a Lebanese 
Maronite priest. Later, 11 Lebanese leaders were executed including 10 leading Beirut 
Muslims. Gradually the circle of executions grew to include leading Arab bureaucrats 
and political leaders in Syria proper. The reign of terror reached its apex with the forceful 
removal of 5,000 elite Arab families to Anatolia. Kayali does not disregard the 
explanations offered by Antonius and Mousa outright. In his judgment, however, the 
Syrians were the targets of policies applied earlier by Jamal in Baghdad and Istanbul 
against his political opponents. According to Kayali, the measures taken by the dying
40Sulayman Mousa, T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View, Albert Boutros, trans.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 14; Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: 
Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire -1908-1918 (Berkeley, 
Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), p. 193.
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Ottoman Empire in Syria were a mild form o f the policies applied to the Ottoman 
Empire’s Armenian community. The policies of executing leaders and deporting 
populations grew out o f fears of national revolts by the Empire’s subject peoples.41
Given that there was no real border or a sense of separate identity between Syria 
and Hejaz, the Sharif o f Mecca reacted to the execution o f his fellow Arabs in Syria and 
Lebanon. In his 27 June 1916 fatwa  calling for the Arab Revolt, Sharif Hussein lists his 
services to the Ottoman Empire, his wars against Arab rebel on behalf of the Porte, 
denounces secular reforms, the curtailment o f the Ottoman Sultan’s powers, and perhaps 
most importantly, the executions in Syria. The fatwa  came as an afterthought. Hussein 
and his sons had attacked Ottoman power centers in Mecca earlier that month. The 
executions o f leading Syrian Arabs had a positive effect on Hussein’s recruitment efforts. 
Many Arab officers in the Ottoman Army defected to his side, and exiled Arab opponents 
of the Ottoman government came to Hijaz to support him. When the news of Hussein’s 
victories reached Syria proper, support for his drive for Arab independence increased. By 
fall 1916, Hussein had assumed the title of the king of Hijaz. Jamal responded by 
executing more Arab leaders, both Christian and Muslim, in Damascus. He further 
damaged the Ottoman Empire’s position in Syria by attempting to control food 
production and exchange by authorizing "safe" Syrian notables to purchase grain for the 
state with paper banknotes. Peasants refused to sell their crops and draft animals were 
either dead or impressed into military service so whatever food that existed could not be 
transported by animals. In addition, Ottoman Syria’s railways could not operate due to a 
shortage o f coal, so transporting surplus food from other parts of the Empire or from its
4lKayali, Arabs and Young Turks, pp. 193-194.
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Central Powers allies was not possible even if such a surplus had been available. By 
1919, some 90 percent of Syria’s pre-war cattle herds were gone. Faced with this crisis, 
Jamal responded by building boulevards in Damascus and Jaffa (now a part o f Tel Aviv) 
and restoring historical buildings to show that the Ottoman Empire was determined to 
retain control. Needless to say, hunger and starvation marked Jamal’s rule in Syria, 
Palestine, and Lebanon. Jamal finally resigned in December 1917 and went back to 
Turkey proper. In the meantime, Hussein’s new armies, along with the troops o f his 
British allies, and the French were pushing into Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. Arab 
cities and towns in Syria and the Tigris-Euphrates basin began to fall to Hussein’s forces 
like old wooden fences in front of elephants. By October 1918, Syria, Lebanon and 
Palestine were under the control of Anglo-Arab armies led by Hussein and Sir Edmund 
Allenby—whose name remains on the bridge that connects the West Bank with Jordan..42
Properly understood, the Arab Revolt was World War I in the Middle East. It is 
perhaps the most important conflict in the region’s history, because the war and the 
associated state-sponsored terror have built a wall of immense mistrust between Turkey 
and its Arab neighbors. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan regard the Arab revolt as the 
initial spark o f their independence which was achieved some three decades later. The 
Palestinians also regard it as an important and positive event in their history. Turkey 
regards it as "a monumental act of betrayal."43 According to Kayali, many Syrians regard 
Jamal’s reign of terror as a failed attempt to exterminate the Arabs o f Syria along the
42Ibid., pp. 192-205.
43Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Insitute of 
International Affairs, Pinter Press, 1991), p. 19; Meltem Miiftuler, Turkey in the Middle 
East: In Search o f  a New Role (Chicago: ISA Conference Paper, 21 February 1995), p. 6.
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lines o f policies carried out in Ottoman Armenia. The surviving Armenians were 
resettled in Syria and Lebanon at the same time leading Syrians were being evicted, thus 
feeding Syrian fears o f Turkey and seeding future Syrian views of Turkey with profound 
mistrust through their mere presence. Suffice it to say, the waters of the Euphrates and 
the Tigris were not a motivating factor in this war -- this was a classical national 
liberation conflict. Like the Arab Revolt, most of today’s conflicts are about national 
identity. Specifically, most of today’s wars in the Tigris-Euphrates basin are about the 
Kurdish question. Turkey contains half the Kurds in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, and its 
Kurdish community has been the source o f several revolts since 1930. The largest and 
most serious of these revolts has been the recent PKK revolt. The PKK is important for 
another important reason -  it is the only conflict in the region with what seems to be, on 
the face of it, a nexus to water disputes.
THE KURDS AND TURKEY 
The primary document of the PKK is the Path o f  the Kurdish Revolution which was 
written in Diyarbakir, Turkey in 1977. The document sees Kurdistan as a colony in the 
traditional Marxist sense. It condemns Kurds who collaborate with Turkey, Turkified 
Kurdish intellectuals, and Kurdish businessmen. The document draws a picture of a 
future Kurdish classless society as the ultimate aim of the PKK. According to PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan and his followers, such society would end tribalism, religious 
sectarianism, and the oppression of Kurdish women. The PKK seems to be dealing with 
the uncertainty about the causes of Kurdish oppression, poverty and inequality in Turkey. 
The PKK's answer, in the Path o f  the Kurdish Revolution, is that Kurds are oppressed
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because they are Kurds living in a Turkish state that prohibits them from even using their 
language and because they are sheep-herders, peasants and laborers.44
From the time o f its official founding in 1978 until the 1980 coup, the PKK took 
advantage of the polarization and the militarization of Turkish political life to conduct 
what can be described as terrorist attacks against Turkish and Kurdish targets in the 
Southeast. In addition, it began to conduct bank raids, robberies, drug deals and other 
sundry criminal activities to acquire money. Ocalan may have decided to raise money 
quickly, because he seems to have realized that a coup was in the making. Ocalan's 
successful escape to Syria suggests that he knew o f the coup and planned accordingly.
The 1980 coup brought the anarchy in Turkey under control and the military junta 
moved to arrest and imprison Kurdish and Turkish-leftist activists. The coup moved 
against Kurdish intellectuals, imprisoning a former Kurdish cabinet member in 1981.45 
But, the junta failed to destroy the PKK. In 1983, the junta handed power to an elected 
conservative civilian government, led by Turgut Ozal. Soon after the coup, the surviving 
members of the PKK established themselves in Syria and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon 
with Hafez al-Asad's approval and support. With 100 guerrillas, Ocalan and his followers 
began the insurgency. They may have started in 1983 ,and not 1984 as is widely 
reported. The insurgency is now inactive, because Abdullah Ocalan,
44Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1992), pp. 93-94.
4SGerard Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 48. 
Entessar, pp. 95-97.
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who seems to play a major role in the PKK's war efforts has been captured by Turkey. 
Ocalan seems to have the support of many, if  not most, Kurds in Turkey and Kurds 
overseas.46
Without some domestic basis for support, Ocalan's war would not have been as 
successful as it has been. The insurgency had little difficulty recruiting guerrillas. Since 
1984, Turkish politics has been characterized by the liberal use of the death penalty to 
dispose of regime opponents. Examining Keesing’s Record o f  World Events, would 
confirm this conclusion. Turkish courts have sentenced people to death for "treason" 
virtually every year. This may seem to be an efficient way to liquidate the PKK and its 
supporters, but it fed its support base and increased the number of its recruits, as the 
family members of those condemned seek vengeance on Turkey. According to Gerard 
Chaliand, the Kurds practice "group guilt." If  a Kurd is killed, his or her family will 
extract vengeance on the tribe, family, or group of the persons who killed him or her. As 
a consequence, it is very likely that the executions, both legal and extra-judicial, of 
accused PKK members were and perhaps are feeding the PKK's recruit pool. In January 
1989, Turkey launched an investigation into a mass grave. The grave is said to have been 
found outside the city of Siirt. It contained the bodies o f 350 people who were suspected 
of PKK membership, apparently killed by the Turkish Army. In June 1989, reports 
surfaced linking the government to two additional mass graves in Siirt with 100 
entombed bodies each.47 The PKK's recruit pool was been further enhanced by some o f
46Keesing's Record o f  World Events (1984), p. 33037.
47Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, pp. 20-21; Keesing's Record o f  World Events 
(1989), p. 36565; Keesing's Record o f  World Events, (1990), p. 37594.
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the Turkish government's polices. These policies include banning Kurdish political 
parties, arrest and prosecution of Kurdish members of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (GNA), and the criminalization of the use o f Kurdish in printing and 
broadcasting, and toleration of violent Turkish ultra-nationalist organizations such as the 
Grey Wolves, the Grey Arrow, and the Turkish National party of the late retired Turkish 
army Colonel Alparslan Turkes.
Since 1993, the Turkish government has banned three Kurdish parties that held 
seats in the GNA. The first party to be banned was the People's Labor Party (PLP), which 
held four seats in the GNA. In a move that foretold the ultimate fate o f the Kurdish 
parliamentary delegation, the parliamentary immunity o f three of the party's four 
representatives was lifted. The party was charged with violating the Turkish constitution 
and banned on 14 July 1993. The second party to be banned, the Freedom and 
Democracy party (FDP), was ordered dissolved for recognizing a separate Kurdish 
identity. The third Kurdish party to be banned was the "Turkish" Democracy party 
(TDP). On 16 June 1994, Turkey's prosecutor-general accused the party's GNA 
delegation of being "terrorists," and the party was banned. Six of its deputies fled to 
Europe, and Turkey was trying to extradite them.48
Several more Kurdish deputies were imprisoned for treason. In March and April 
of 1994, seven Kurdish TDP GNA deputies were arrested, five being charged with 
treason for failing to condemn the PKK. On 24 July, two additional TDP deputies were 
arrested and charged with treason. These arrests and prosecutions came following a
4SKeesing's Record o f  World Events (1993), p. 39547, (1992), p. 39882, and 
(1994), p. 40069.
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year o f assassinations that took the lives of 54 leading TDP figures, including Kurdish 
GNA member Mehmet Sincar, the leader of the TDP 17-deputy delegation, on 4 
September 1994. Forty-six days later, Sincar's heir to the party's leadership, Yasar Kaya, 
was arrested and charged with attempting to subvert the constitution. With hindsight, it 
is safe to say that the exclusion of Kurds from legal politics in Turkey began by the slow 
expulsion, resignation or ostracism of the 18 Kurdish GNA deputies belonging to the 
Turkish Social Democratic Populist party beginning 1992. Essentially, the Grand 
National Assembly was "ethnically cleansed" of Kurds and their districts were denied by- 
elections.49
Aside from the ostracism and assassination of Kurdish politicians, the conflict has 
seen the active involvement of the Turkish extreme right. Between February and 
September 1992, Goz-Ok (Grey Arrow), a Turkish extreme nationalist group, may have 
murdered 9 journalists in the Southeast. Four journalists who worked for Ozgur 
Gundem, a pro-Kurdish newspaper, were certainly murdered by Grey Arrow, including 
Musa Anter, the dean o f Turkey's Kurdish media and a founder of the PLP. Anter was 
killed in the provincial town o f Diyarbakir. No arrests have been reported. The language 
o f the media has been a thorny issue in Turkey. Kurdish was illegal for use in any 
context until 1988. On 18 February 1988, Kurdish was legalized for use in military 
prisons. In January 1991, during the GNA brief flirtation with liberalizing Turkey's 
Kurdish policy, Kurdish was legalized for singing and speaking. But Kurdish remained 
illegal for the purposes of broadcasting and printing. In April 1990, the government
49Keesing’s Record o f  World Events, (1994), p. 40069, (1994), p. 40118, (1993) 
p. 39657, (1993), p. 39755, and (1994), p. 40299.
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restricted reporting from the Southeast. Turkish police also raided publishing houses in
Istanbul and prohibited the publication of 18 periodicals that had shown sympathy
towards the Kurds. Two years later, Turkey banned private television stations in an effort
to reduce Kurdish and Islamic fundamentalist broadcasts. In December 1993, Turkey
banned Ozgur Gundem, a pro-Kurdish newspaper, for two months and sentenced its
editor to four years in prison.50 Barkey distills the essence o f the war, and the GAP
project itself, into a clash over identity:
Until recently, denial of Kurdish identity was Turkey's basic response to 
the Kurdish issue. Not only were publications in Kurdish banned, but 
writing and speaking the Kurdish language was forbidden. In effect, the 
state pretended that the Kurds were Turks of a different sort, who had to 
be assimilated into to cultural mainstream. Hence, the official and 
privately owned media never referred to the Kurds as Kurds, but rather as 
brigands or separatists. A significant segment of the Turkish body politic 
still holds to this view. In addition, to the nationalist right-wing, the statist 
left, as represented by former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit—has 
maintained that the essence of the Kurdish problem was essentially 
economic; that is, if the region's underdevelopment and feudal structure 
could be resolved, the Kurdish insurrection would simply disappear.
Consequently a great deal of hope has been placed on the completion of 
the south-east Anatolia project (GAP). This is a mammoth 22-dam project 
that will tap the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, resulting in a 
significant increase in arable land and electricity generation. By ending 
the central government's neglect of the region and reducing its chronic 
poverty, GAP — which is far from completion -- is, nonetheless, viewed as 
a step towards bringing the Kurdish insurrection under control. A more 
common view blames the Kurdish revolt on Syria, Iraq, and lately Iran and 
Armenia, for supplying the PKK with weapons and even manpower. For 
those who subscribe to this view, the problem is defined in terms of 
interdicting arms supplies. This approach, however, ignores the fact that a 
significant portion o f the PKK's infrastructure has moved inside Turkey 
and that the PKK now has numerous source o f weaponry and funds.51
50Ibid., (1992), p. 39114, (1991), p. 38158, (1990), p. 37389, (1993), p. 39434, 
and (1993) p. 39790.
5'Henri J. Barkey, Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma," Survival, Vol. 35 (Winter 1993),
p. 56.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
202
Yet given Syria's important role (which Barkey seems to grant) at the beginning o f the 
insurgency, it is nevertheless important to evaluate the roles played by outside powers. 
Syria’s relationship with the PKK has already been discussed in the section on the GAP.
Unlike Syria, Iran and Iraq have had a mixed relationship with Turkey. These 
two states are far less supportive of the PKK than Syria was. Iran and Iraq have 
frequently allowed Turkey to send troops and aircraft into their respective territories in 
pursuit o f the PKK. Iraq allowed Turkey to pursue the PKK into its territory in 1984, 
1986, 1991, 1992 and virtually every other year or two; at the time of writing, Turkey 
again entered Northern Iraq and is currently threatening to invade Syria.52 Iraq had 
allowed Turkey to bomb the PKK despite Turkey's decision to side with the United 
States. Only during the most recent incursion has Iraq expressed any reservations about 
the presence of Turkish troops on its territory. Iran's case is slightly more complex. Like 
Iraq, it allowed Turkey to pursue the PKK into its territory in 1985 and 1986. But Iran 
seems to have only tensely tolerated Turkish incursions. Neither Iran nor Iraq can 
protest Turkish actions too loudly, because Iranian troops were discovered on Turkish 
soil attempting to enter Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war; Turkey also permitted Iraqi 
warplanes to bomb Kurdish villages its territory. In early 1994, Turkish aircraft bombed 
non-PKK Iranian villages and apologized for the incident. Iran also protested Turkey's 
failure to create a safe environment for Iranian shoppers and tourists after an Iranian 
toddler was killed during the PKK's Mus train attack in June 1992.53
52 "10,000 Turk Soldiers Move Into Iraq," Associated Press (7:07 PM EDT, 3 
October 1998).
53Leon Barkho, "Baghdad Upset Over Turkish Thrust," Reuter (22 March 1995).
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The two countries have substantial Kurdish revolts of their own. Iran's problems 
are compounded by Mujahidi-e Khalq, a heavily-armed Iraqi-supported Iranian group 
opposed to the Islamic Republic. The Ayatollahs often need Turkey's support and 
cooperation to catch escaping Kurdish rebels. They have little interest in actively 
supporting the PKK. For example, Iran and Turkey signed an agreement binding Iran not 
to assist the PKK in return for Turkey's suppression of the Mujahidi-e Khalq activities. 
Yet Iran's shaky control of its own Kurdistan opened up doors for the PKK and other 
Kurdish groups who can use rural Iranian Kurdistan as a hideout, a weapons source, or a 
recovery area for the wounded. Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan also provided the PKK with 
access to looted, captured, and stolen weapons from the Operation Desert Storm and the 
Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, Iran can at least claim a measure of nominal control over 
Iranian Kurdistan. In Iraq, on the other hand, Iraqi-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) have become actors on their own right 
Middle Eastern scene.
Since 1983, PUK and the KDP have sometimes allowed the PKK refuge and 
bases in Northern Iraq, as evidenced by Turkish pursuit of the PKK into areas where 
these two groups had a great deal of influence, if not control. It is well known that PUK 
and the KDP frequently fight each other. Less well known is the cycle o f conflict and 
cooperation between the PKK and the KDP. The KDP mattered more to the PKK than 
PUK since it controls the border areas from which the PKK can conduct operations in 
Turkey. In 1983, Massoud Barazani, the leader of the KDP, went searching for allies in 
Turkey. He found that the PKK was interested in using the Northern Iraq for operation in 
Turkey. Three years later, Barzani's KDP was shaken by a massive Turkish artillery
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barrage in retaliation for the PKK's murder of 12 gendarmes in Hakkari. By 1987,
Barzani was beginning to feel threatened by the PKK and disgusted by its terrorist tactics 
which targeted civilians, including women and children. Concerned about Turkey's 
anger, and fearful for his party's own position, he ended the KDP's alliance with the PKK 
in 1987. For a time, the PKK substituted the KDP with PUK and a variety of small, 
violent, and urban Turkish leftist groups, that gave it bases and safe houses in Turkey's 
cities and towns.54
But these groups did not have the territory the PKK needed. It is safe to say that 
between 1987 and 1991, the PKK depended more on Syria and less on Northern Iraq as a 
base of operations. Operation Desert Storm saw the return of the PKK to Northern Iraq. 
The American-led war against Iraq offered PUK and the KDP military assistance against 
Saddam Hussein's forces in exchange for real estate for bases and camps. PUK and the 
KDP, already forced into a loveless alliance by Saddam Hussein's forces, were not in a 
position to refuse. As stated earlier, Turkey forced PUK and the KDP to move against 
the PKK in October and November 1992; but it was a half-hearted effort, the KDP and 
PUK must have been aware of the presence of school girls in the PKK's camps. The two 
Iraqi Kurdish factions placed 1000 PKK fighters under house arrest and then allowed 
them to disappear into Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq. Less than 400 PKK guerrillas were 
killed, but PUK and the KDP told Ankara that the PKK suffered more than 2,000 
casualties.55
54Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, p. 49.
55Aziz Scott, "PKK Opens Second Front" International Defense Review (February 
1991), p. 7023; Tammy Arbuckle, "Winter Campaign in Kurdistan: Can Turkey’s New 
Strategy Crush the PKK?" Jane's Defense Review, (February 1995), p. 59.
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One o f the positive consequences, for both Turkey and the PKK, was the creation 
of a mutually-acceptable channel of communication between Ankara and the PKK in the 
person o f PUK's Jalal Talabani. Talabani arranged the March 1993 de facto  cease-fire 
between Turkey and the PKK56 Apparently, sometime during the early nineties, the PKK 
found its way back to Northern Iraq, and re-established the camps and bases it had lost in 
1987 and 1992. The relationship between the PKK, PUK, and the KDP is complex.
While the KDP and PUK fight each other or the PKK often, neither organization seems to 
want to see the PKK totally destroyed. Perhaps, the PKK was or is giving the Iraqi Kurds 
access to Turkey or access to its financial networks in Europe and elsewhere. Suffice it to 
say, that the PKK's military capabilities were enhanced by its access to Northern Iraq.
For the Kurdish supporters of the PKK, the conflict is a war for establishing 
Kurdish identity, supported by a Kurdish state; the KDP and PUK also share the PKK 
nationalist aims and justifications, but they are forced to act upon these goals in 
dramatically different framework, Northern Iraq, where Turkey and Saddam can 
sometimes be o f use to one faction or another. For Syria, the conflict provides the 
country with a tool to punish Turkey not only for the GAP but for much larger problems. 
Syria’s problems with Turkey are historical and cultural. Mutual distrust and anger from 
the reign o f Jamal Pasha in Syria, the Arab Revolt and the giveaway o f Alexandretta 
(Hatay) by the French will poison Syria’s relationship with Turkey for decades to come, 
even a detente o f sorts emerges. Turkey may have defeated the PKK, but that hardly 
means that it has destroyed the movement, particularly in urban areas or in the villages. 
Once the gendarmes and the soldiers are gone, as they inevitably will be, the PKK’s
56Keesing's Record o f  World Events (1993), p. 39387.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
206
irregulars, or others like them, will return to haunt the wild mountains. Like the Arab 
Revolt before it, the PKK is a national liberation movement or a terrorist organization, 
depending on who you ask. While Syria was using the PKK to punish Turkey for the 
GAP, it is clear that the causes that led to its formation and insurgency have to do with 
Turkey’s internal cultural and social policies.
THE KURDS AND IRAQ
The Kurds o f Iraq rejected the formation of the Iraqi state in its current form. To 
that extent, the KDP and the PUK represent only the latest revolts against Baghdad. Iraq 
has seen Kurdish revolts in 1922, 1943-1945, 1961, 1963-1968, 1974-1975 and finally 
during and shortly after Operation Desert Storm; this latest revolt is on-going. There 
have been dozens of leaders, parties, and factions, but since 1942 the Barazani family has 
played an important role. In all of these revolts, the Kurds divided themselves into 
factions and were manipulated by outside powers.57
Iran used the Kurds superbly during the 1960s against Iraq. Aided by Israel and 
the United States, the Shah assisted mullah Mustafa Barzani's revolt in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The 1958 coup had initially led to the return of Barzani from exile, but Qasim (the first 
post-Monarchical leader in Iraq) soon began to suspect Barzani. These suspicions soured 
the relationship and fertilized the soil for Iran's Kurdish policy. Qasim gave the Shah 
further reasons for assisting Barzani when he attempted to take Khuzistan, an Iranian 
province with an Arabic-speaking majority.58 Barzani had started his revolt in 1961, and 
the presence of Iranian and Israeli aid by 1969 helped him consolidate his position. Iran
57Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, pp. 51-72.
58Metz, ed., Iraq, pp. 52-53.
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and Iraq were disputing Iran's navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab waterway in southern 
Iraq. During the same year, the Shah abrogated the Saadabad treaty that gave Iraq control 
of the waterway and obliged Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iraq to cooperate with regard 
to the Kurdish issue. By early 1966, Abd al-Salam Arif, the leader o f Iraq, attempted to 
re-establish Iraqi authority in Kurdistan, but he was defeated in May-June 1966 by 
Barzani. For the Kurds, Iranian (and indirectly U.S. and Israeli) aid was crucial. By 
1970, Barzani had established a de-facto Kurdish quasi-state in northern Iraq with Iranian 
support/9 Saddam and his immediate predecessor Al-Bakr re-ignited the civil war in 
1969, but they quickly failed to accomplish a meaningful victory, so the Baath attempted 
to restore the sort o f agreement that Arif had reached with Barazani. The resulting 11 
March 1970 agreements provided for a census to determine the limits o f the Kurdish 
region within Iraq, the legalization of the Kurdish Democratic Party, and an autonomy 
guarantee. Yet it is clear that the Baath negotiated in bad faith, because the census was 
never held and because it seems to have attempted to murder Barazani at least twice.
Iraq's Kurdish problems remain unresolved to this day, and a solution excluding strong 
autonomy is no longer realistic.60
In all instances, the Kurds’ motives are national rather than hydraulic. Since 
1922, the Kurds of Iraq have sought to secede from Baghdad and form their own state.
The United States has recently managed to bridge the gap between the KDP and the PUK,
59Ibid.; Michael Gunter, Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Rebellion in 
Iraq (San Diego, Calif.: 36th Annual ISA Conference Paper 1995), p. 1; The Middle East 
and North Africa: Europe Yearbook, 41st edition (London: Europa Publications, 1995), 
pp. 469-470.
“ Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, pp. 60-62.
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and the long suspended Kurdish assembly in Iraqi Kurdistan may be reconvened with a 
stable, United States-backed administration. Current U.S. efforts in this regard represent 
a substantial move towards statehood for the Kurds o f Northern Iraq.61 This goal, while 
denied so far, has nothing to do with control over the Tigris-Euphrates. Nevertheless, 
Turkey’s policy o f encouraging Iraq to use the Tigris is curious in light o f the Iraqi 
Kurds’s desire for independence. Turkey is essentially forcing Iraq to depend on waters 
emanating from a heavily Kurdish region within its own territory. Turkey is trying to 
lock Iraq into a position where it cannot accept Kurdish independence in its Northern 
third as a method o f ending its internal troubles. If this analysis is correct, it suggests that 
water is a tool and not a cause of war in and of itself. It also suggests that ethno-national 
motives are behind the GAP rather than hydraulic, economic or agricultural concerns.
To that extent, the efficiency of the GAP dams is co-incidental to Turkey’s policy of 
suppressing Kurdish independence. Therefore, the sourcing of Iraq’s water matters only 
to the extent that it forces the country into an alliance with Turkey against Kurdish 
independence. This would also explain Turkey’s preference for developing the Tigris and 
the Euphrates instead o f other rivers that flow entirely within Turkish territory.
THE KURDS AND IRAN 
Like the Kurds o f Turkey and Iraq, the Kurds o f Iran have revolted on more than 
one occasion. The earliest of these revolts occurred in 1918-1921. Simko, the son o f a 
Kurdish chieftain, revolted against Tehran. Simko assassinated the Assyrian Patriarch in 
the Iranian province West Azerbaijan and carried out massacres o f the local Assyrians.
61 "Turkey Kurd Rebels Seek Ceasefire in Northern Iraq," Reuter (6:13 AM 
Eastern Time, 28 September 1998).
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He was aligned with Turkey against the Assyrian and other minority inhabitants of the 
West Azerbaijan. His revolt against Iran can be described as personally motivated.
Simko revolted because an Iranian official had executed his brother. The second Kurdish 
revolt in Iran was the Mahabad Republic revolt. This republic was a Soviet-sponsored 
Kurdish state in West Azerbaijan which has a Kurdish plurality despite its name. With 
the withdrawal o f Soviet troops from Iran, this state collapsed under Iranian attacks.
Since the Mahabad Republic revolt, the Iranian branch o f  the KDP has been attempting to 
form an autonomous region in Iran. Iran has not agreed, and the Iranian KDP remains at 
odds with Tehran. Iran assassinated the party’s two leaders and garrisoned its Kurdish 
areas.62 Iran prohibits the teaching of Kurdish, but it broadcasts in the Kurdish language. 
Like Turkey and Iraq, Iran’s Kurdish problem is a question of national and religious 
identity instead o f a hydraulic issue.
THE KURDS AND SYRIA 
Syria may harbor as many as a million Kurds. Their numbers are unknown.
Syrian governments have shifted from repression to tolerance and vice versa. At any rate, 
it is clear that the Kurds of Syria have not revolted since the establishment o f  Syria in 
1918. The current regime in Syria is friendly toward the Kurds since its leadership is 
drawn from another minority community and because it views the Kurds as a non-threat 
toward the independence and integrity of the country.63
62Kurdish Democratic Party — Iran, "Statement o f the Political Bureau o f the 
Kurdish Democratic Party o f Iran," (5 August 1996),
<http://www.hartford-hwp.eom/archives/51 /Q55.html>. accessed 28 September 1998.
63Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, pp. 84-88.
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IRAQ INVADES IRAN
The Kurds have long suffered as pawns in the frequent confrontation between Iraq 
and Iran. One arena for this confrontation has been the Shatt al-Arab waterway 
separating the two countries. For Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, the Shatt al-Arab 
dispute is a "symptom” of the confrontation between these two powers. Like the dispute 
between Syria and Turkey, the Kurds were used by one to harm the other. The dispute 
was not over water consumption rights but over the location of the border. Iran favored 
the thalweg (the river’s midpoint) as the border. Iraq favored marking the border at the 
river’s east bank. For Naff and Matson, this dispute was not a cause of the war.
According to Naff and Matson, the Shah had aided the Barzanis during the 1970s to force 
Iraq to accept Iran’s claim, but the Shatt al-Arab dispute itself was about more than 
control over the waterway.64 Aside from disputes over Shatt al-Arab, several other causes 
of the war are often cited. The first explanation of the war attributes its causes to the deep 
cultural, social, and political cleavages between Iran and the Iraqi leadership: Indo- 
European/Persian versus Semitic/Arab, Shiite versus Sunni, fundamentalist versus 
secular,65 and to these opposites we may now safely add semi-democratic versus 
totalitarian. A second explanation for the war centers around the personality of Saddam 
Hussein. Saddam’s desire for the leadership o f the Arab World, his instability and 
vainglory are described as a cause of the war.66 A third explanation for the Iran-Iraq war
“ Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East, pp. 101-111.
65Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled, The Washington 
Papers 92 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 1-2.
“ Samir al-Khalil, The Republic o f Fear: The Politics o f  Modern Iraq (Berkeley, 
Calif.: University of California Press, 1989), p. 272.
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draws inspiration from pure realism. Iran was weakened by revolution, and Iraq took 
advantage of a rare opportunity.67 Another explanation, a "critical approach," focuses on 
the internal dynamics o f both states at the time. Iran’s ruling clerics are said to have been 
in need o f consolidating their authority and Iraq was in search of an external war to 
stabilize itself internally.68
There is another school that attributes the cause of the war to Iran’s attempts to 
export revolution, especially to Iraq. There is some element of truth in this, because all 
revolutionary governments seek outside validation in the form of foreign states adopting 
their new systems. Nevertheless, Iran’s actions in this regard came clearly after Iraq 
began expelling its citizens of Persian descent to Iran and after Saddam’s army and air 
force began shelling and bombing Iranian villages along the border.69 Consequently 
placing most o f the blame for the war on Iran cannot withstand the simplest objective 
scrutiny, because Iraq initiated the war and proceeded to conquer and occupy a vast tract 
of territory inside Iran until it was expelled by the Iranian army. It is unquestionable that 
Iran called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and invited the Shiites o f Iraq to revolt, 
but these moves were partially in retaliation to Iraqi actions. Furthermore, Iranian war 
propaganda clearly targeted Saddam Hussein himself. For example, he was called an 
apostate and nicknamed Saddam-Yazid; Yazid was a Ummayad Caliph who brutally put
67Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the War: From Stalemate to Ceasefire," in Hans W. 
Maull and Otto Pick, eds., The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 6.
68 W. T. Workman, The Social Origins o f  the Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Reiner, 1994), pp. 25-26.
69Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East, p. 110.
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down a Shiite revolt in the 8Ih century. That Iraq initiated the conflict is beyond debate. 
Attempts to interpret history to paint Iran as the aggressor, by segmenting the conflict 
into two separate wars or emphasizing Iran’s propaganda efforts, are motivated by an 
agenda hostile to Iran.
Iraq’s behavior is a clearer lens for understanding the war than all other 
approaches because it lets that country’s leadership pass judgment on itself through its 
own actions. First, Iraq was clearly seeking to enlarge its territory and take over Iran’s oil 
fields, because its army did not stop at the eastern bank of Shatt al-Arab. Its troops 
occupied virtually all o f the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan up to the edge o f  the 
Zagros mountain range. Second, there was attempt to push up the Zagros to conquer the 
rest of Kharun River and Iraq’s operations in the Iranian Tigris tributaries region 
remained a sideshow throughout the war. This suggests that securing water, including 
Shatt al-Arab, was not on Iraq’s agenda as a war aim. Third, Iraq attempted to mobilize 
the Arabs o f Khuzistan against Iran. The province was renamed Arabistan and a flag, 
based on the Iraqi banner, was created for the region. This suggests that the war had an 
ethnic or cultural dimension for Iraq. For the Khuzistani Arabs, Iraq’s attempts to woo 
them over were unacceptable. Fourth, Iraq has used chemical weapons against the 
Iranians as well as the Kurds. The use o f these weapons suggests that the Iraqi regime 
views its non-Arab opponents in sub-human terms. Fifth, the Iraqi name for the war is 
Oadisiyat Saddam .70 Contrary to the obvious and apparent significance of this term, the 
operative term is Qadisiyat and not Saddam. Al-Qadisiya was the critical battle in
70Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship (London: Kegan Paul International, 1987), p. 263.
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Mesopotamia between the invading Arab Muslims and the armies o f the Persian 
Sassanian Empire during the 7th century. The defeat of the Sassanian Persians in that 
battle opened Iran to Islamic conquest and effectively buried Iranian civilization, as an 
independent source of identity, for centuries until the Safavid revival during the Middle 
Ages. Use of this name suggests that Persians are inferior to Arabs in martial matters. 
To be fair, Iranians have their own negative opinions o f the Arabs, but these stereotypes 
have not led the country down the path followed by Iraq.
A larger, perhaps more sophisticated, form of this argument is advanced by R.K. 
Ramazani, an American analyst o f Iranian origin. According to Ramazani, the Arab 
world and Iran have been engaging in a Cold War. For Ramazani, the engine behind the 
Arab side in this Cold War was Saudi Arabia, but he discusses Iraq's role in the conflict at 
length. Iran was attacked because Khomeini was attempting to appeal to a larger all- 
Islamic civilization rather than a Shiite civilization. Khomeini was calling all Iraqis, of 
all Islamic backgrounds, to depose Saddam Hussein and the secular state he led in favor 
an Islamic Union. Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Arabs of Iraq were interested in 
retaining their Iraqi dominion, and the best defense was to attack Iran. Iraq's leader 
hoped that the Iranian Arabs of Khuzistan would revolt and destroy the Iranian state 
along with it Khomeini's Islamic regime. Iran offered Saddm and his ruling Takriti clan 
an attractive target. They could justify their continued rule by painting Persians as a 
threat to Arab civilization in general.71
7IR.K. Ramazani, "The Arab-Iranian Conflict: The Ideological Dimensions," in 
Hafiz Malik, ed., International Security in Southwest Asia (New York: Praeger, 1984), 
pp. 56-61.
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Finally, it is important to remember that Iran did not and does not withhold either 
Kharun or Tigris tributary waters from Iraq. Iran simply wants the right to navigate the 
Shatt al-Arab as an international river on the basis of a thalweg border, and this demand 
had some merit in the treaties governing borders and frontiers including the 1937 
Boundary Treaty and the 1975 Algiers accord.72 At any rate, the Shatt al-Arab dispute 
was not beyond resolution at the negotiating table and a war was certainly not necessary 
to resolve it. First to suffer from the Iran-Iraq war, of course, were the ordinary people of 
Iraq as their sons died, their fields withered and their treasury bled for French Super- 
Etendards and Exocet missiles instead of efficient Israeli and American drip irrigation 
systems and education on ecologically sustainable agriculture.
In short, the Iran-Iraq war was caused by the Iraqi government’s greed, 
inhumanity, bigotry and prejudice—in that order. Given the history of the Persian Gulf 
since 1988, this assessment is factual and cannot be dismissed as a declaration of 
normative preferences. Operation Desert Storm cannot be included in this discussion, 
because it was primarily about the liberation of Kuwait, which is effectively outside the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin.
IDENTITY
Nevertheless, Operation Desert Storm can be described as a conflict over national 
identity. Iraq was asserting that Kuwaitis were identical with Iraqis, and thus unworthy 
o f a separate state; of course, Kuwait’s vast oil deposits were probably more important 
from Saddam’s perspective. The discussion in the section on conflict shows that most
72Naff and Matson, Water in the Middle East, pp. 108-110.
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wars in the basin were about the Kurds’ desire for independence. The only exceptions 
have been the Arab Revolt and the Iran-Iraq war. which were also infused with vast 
elements o f national identity-based arguments and perceptions. Water does not enter the 
picture, and the region’s nation states have traditionally fought over issues o f national 
identity, territory, oil and power. Of these factors, the factor o f national identity seems to 
have been extremely important.
TURKEY
Conflicts between various peoples seed the national identities of each with 
suspicion, hostility, and mistrust. Indeed, the genius of American foreign policy has 
really been about preventing this eventuality in Europe. America’s presence in Europe 
and its inclusion o f the Federal Republic o f Germany prevented the demonization of that 
country in the rest of Western Europe, particularly after the reconstruction and the 
revitalization of the West German economy. Unfortunately, Turkey’s conflicts have not 
seen such a resolution. Turkey’s conflicts with Greece and Armenia have resulted in an 
"other" status for the Turks in the national identities of these two nations and vice versa. 
But, these two states are outside the Tigris-Euphrates basin, so Turkey’s view of the 
Arabs and its self-identification is far more important for this endeavor.
Turkey’s view of the Arabs remains infused with perceptions left-over from 
World War I. According Turkish scholar, Meltem Muftiiler, "the Arabs are perceived as 
traitors by the Turkish people."73 American analysts Graham Fuller, Ian Lesser, Paul 
Henze and J. F. Brown, explain the hostility between Turkey and the Arabs in more 
detail. Lesser and Fuller were writing at a period when the potential for a Turkish-
73Muftuler, Turkey in the Middle East, p. 6.
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centered integrated Middle East seemed to be over the horizon thanks to late Turkish 
President Turgut Ozal’s "neo-Ottomanism," so they assumed that these problems were 
"historical." But as Muftiiler argues, these problems are not historical. They continue to 
influence Turkish-Arab relations. Despite their pro-Turkish preferences, Lesser and 
Fuller note that the Arabs are spoken about in inferior terms. They also notice that 
Turkey’s sense of national identity is tied to rejecting the Arabs.
Other historical reasons supported this aloofness from the Turkish point o f
view:
• Turkish anger at the Arab populations that had rebelled against 
Ottoman Turkey (traitors to empire) during World War I.
•  A Turkish desire to disassociate itself from former non-Turkish 
parts of the Ottoman Empire and especially from the Arab world, 
which so powerfully symbolized the Islamic heritage Ataturk 
sought to reject.
•  Turkish border disputes with Syria in which Syria enjoyed the 
support o f most Arab countries.
• Turkish rejection o f Arab state of Arab state radicalism that was 
implicitly anti-Western and gravitated toward the Soviet Union -  
Turkey’s geostrategic threat.
• A general, negative Turkish reaction towards Arabs. While 
Turkish intellectuals speak knowledgeably and rationally about 
most places, when talk turns to the Arab world, a high proportion 
of them have recourse to visceral and almost racial denigration in 
stereotyping Arabs as "dirty," "lazy" and "untrustworthy." This 
emotionalism is stronger against any other nationality except 
perhaps the Greeks. In part it reflects Turkey’s visceral desire not 
to be associated in any way with anything Middle Eastern. The 
researcher who says he is in Turkey to study the Middle East is 
quickly informed that he is in the wrong place.74
By placing the anti-Arab attitudes in the bottom of the reasons for problems 
between Turks and Arabs, Fuller and Lesser desire to de-emphasize the domestic sources 
of Turco-Arab friction. Unfortunately, they miss their own point. Without some level of 
trust and mutual respect between Arabs and Turks, water disputes cannot be resolved,
74Fuller, Lesser, Henze and Brown, Turkey’s New Geopolitics, pp. 50-51.
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borders (especially those imposed by the French) cannot be accepted, and Turkish
aspirations for regional leadership cannot be realized. The Arabs, especially the Syrians,
have also demonized Turkey, rendering cooperative behavior nearly impossible. As
Lesser and Fuller illustrate, Turkey’s problem’s with the rest o f the Middle East stem
from its own internal identity crisis. As shown in an earlier section, the country’s
Kurdish population is, to a large extent, challenging the notion o f "Turkey" on the basis
of its own identity. Hardline secular Turks are at odds with religious Turks, and religious
Sunni Turks are at odds with religious Alevi Turks. Indeed, Samuel Huntington has
called Turkey a "tom" country and placed in a category of countries that are shared by
more than one civilization.75
It is not a exaggeration to say that Ataturk sought to destroy Islamic civilization in
Turkey. A massive wave of religious reforms began in 1924 with the aim of westernizing
Turkey. These reforms did not achieve their aim of secularizing Turkey, but they did
manage to put it in a "pandora’s box" that broke open after the end of the Cold War
according to Meltem Muftiiler. The reforms included the abolition of the Islamic office
of the Caliphate in 1924, the replacement of the Arabic alphabet and dozens of other
practices that tied Turkey to the Muslim World.
The ultimate aim of the new republic was "to elevate Turkey to the level 
of contemporary civilization" which o f  course was the West. Thus all 
links with the Middle Eastern culture such as the Arab[ic] alphabet, the 
Islamic calendar, the Islamic dress code, and the serial law were 
eliminated. The assumption was that the ideal Turk was to be European in 
outlook, and Turkey’s place was among the European states. The 
transformation o f the society into a European one was imposed from 
above, the traditional tendencies which favor close links with Middle
75Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 
3 (1993), p. 42.
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Eastern states and preserving the Islamic identity o f the state were 
repressed. The formulation of a modem Turkish identity was partly the 
reason for the move away from the Middle Eastern character o f Turkey.
The traditionalist elements o f the Turkish identity were closely sealed in a 
pandora’s box which opened at end of the Cold War.76
The now-banned Islamic Welfare (Re/ah) party and its success at the polls
revealed that Turkey is indeed a Muslim country, despite Ataturk’s efforts to suppress the
Islamic component o f Turkish life. The Turkish army effectively banned the Welfare
party, and the repression of Islamic life continues in Turkey today with bans over the
wearing of Islamic clothing and informal barriers in army and bureaucracy preventing
non-secular Turks from high office. The 27 March 1994 elections revealed the power of
Islamic traditionalists in Turkey, and the Welfare party showed that it is the largest party
in the country. By 28 June 1996, Welfare party leader Necemettin Erbakan became
Turkish Prime Minister. The Turkish military began a campaign to remove the
democratically elected leader o f Turkey from office and he was forced to resign on 11
June 1997. The military banned religious schools and initiated countless measures
against Turkey’s various Islamic movements. Erbakan had favored normalizing Turkey’s
relations with its Islamic neighbors including Iran, Iraq and Syria. For example, he
suggested that the army’s accusations against Syria were Western propaganda designed to
sour relations between two Muslim countries.77 The Army, on the other hand, desired a
military alliance with Israel against "no one." For Turkish analyst M. Hakan Yavuz, the
alliance with Israel was a way for Turkey’s secular elites to illustrate to Europe and the
United States that Turkey was not "Muslim," thus deserving of inclusion in
76MuftiiIer, Turkey in the Middle East, p. 7.
^Olson, "Turkey-Syria Tensions," p. 183.
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"contemporary civilization." Unfortunately, the repression o f Islamic parties attempting 
to achieve power through democratic, non-revolutionary means further isolated the ruling 
European-oriented Turkish elites from the vast majority of Muslim Turks. In addition, 
the repression further stained Turkey’s miserable human rights record in the West. The 
alliance with Israel further divided the ruling dominant secular minority in Turkey from 
the vast masses o f practicing Turkish Muslims.78
With an Islamist government, Turkey may have been able to solve some of its 
problems with its neighbors. Erbakan was implicitly offering the Kurds a change in the 
basis o f citizenship and belonging in Turkey from ethnic lines to religious lines but his 
efforts were seen as a mortal threat to Turkey by the Army, the Alevis and the secular 
elites. About 25 percent o f Turkey’s inhabitants are Alevis (the Turkish branch of the 
Syrian Alawites). Like their Syrian co-religionists, Turkish Alevis practice a heterodox 
form o f Islam. During a 1993 Alevi festival in Sivas (the old Sabastea), an Alevi 
intellectual denied the authority of the Qu’ran. In a rapid response, Sunni zealots burned 
down the hotel headquarters of the festival. In the aftermath of the attack, 80 percent of 
Sivas’ Sunni inhabitants voted for parties, including the Welfare party, that supported the 
arsonists. Nowadays, the Alevis have the support o f the army and the secular political 
establishments and their houses of worship have been allowed to openly spring up in 
Turkey’s cities for the first time.79 Nevertheless, the improved position o f Alevis in
78M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens o f the Turkish 
identity debate," Journal o f  Palestine Studies (Autumn 1997), pp. 22-38.
^The Economist, "Two Islams Clash: Despite Turkey’s Officially Secular 
Character, Strife Among its Different Religious Traditions Can Be Deadly," Vol. 347, 
No. 8054 (25 April 1998), pp.54-55.
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Turkey has not led to improvements with Alawite Syria. Perhaps the reason lies in 
history. Many secular nationalist Turks also remember that the Arabs massacred Turks 
in Hijaz and Yemen during the Arab revolt. These massacres took place probably as 
retaliation for Jamal’s policies in Syria proper, but they included the destruction of not 
just soldiers and administrators but whole unarmed civilian families. Unfortunately, their 
extent is not clear.80 The hostility felt by secular Turks to Arabs can be summed up in 
the words placed on the Ataturk dam facing Syria -  "Happy is he who can say that he is 
a Turk." The statement has several implications. First, it implies that those who cannot 
say that they are Turks are, or perhaps ought to be made, unhappy. Second, it implies 
that the very survival of Syria and Iraq is contrary to Turkish interests. These Arab states 
are to be denied water, the source of life, because their inhabitants are not Turks.
Finally, it is a direct affront to Islamic law which enjoins the sharing of water resources.
In short, it is a superb summary of Turkish elites' attitudes not only towards Arabs but 
towards Turkey’s own history and heritage.
SYRIA
Among the Arab states with the possible exception o f Jordan, Syria is probably 
the Arab state that owes most of its existence to the Arab revolt. Consequently, it has 
been the focus of a very high degree of Turkey’s ire. Aside from Israel, which lies 
outside this effort, Syria has had difficulties with both Turkey and Iraq, but for very 
different reasons. Syria’s non-hydraulic problems with Turkey include Alexandretta (or 
Hatay), Turkey’s "desertion" o f the Middle East, its alliance with the West, and its
80Discussions with Radwan Al-Said, Instructor of Arabic, University o f Chicago 
(Summer 1995).
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alliance with Israel. Centuries of Turkish domination of Syria add elements of distrust 
and hostility to the relationship. In addition, the reign of Jamal Pasha certainly continues 
to feed dark visions in Syria regarding Turkey’s intentions. Representing a pro-Turkish 
perspective, Lesser and Fuller nevertheless capture the essence o f the Arabs’ hostility to 
Turkey:
• Turkey has had a long history of rule in the regions: Turks have 
been conquerors and administrators of empireS in diverse places 
nearly from their first appearance on the stage of world history.
Persians and Arabs, on the other hand, over the last millennium 
have generally been the ruled, rather than the rulers, dominated 
either by Turks or by Western imperialist states. This has had an 
important psychological impact on their sense o f "victimization" in 
history.
• Since attaining its complete independence as a new nation-state in 
the 1920s, Turkey has no longer been threatened by Western 
Europe (except for the general danger o f fascism to all of Europe 
before World War II). Most Arab states continued to languish 
under colonialism and imperialism until well after World War II, 
and in the Persian Gulf until as late as the 1970s; various Arab 
states have also suffered from Western armed intervention in one 
sense or another right down to the Gulf War of 1991. Turkey has 
not suffered this fate.
• Turkey has been immediately threatened over the centuries by 
Russian power, both Czarist and Bolshevik. As a result, Turkey 
joined with the West to protect itself. A direct Soviet threat to the 
Arab world was always minimal (although there was often a 
significant proxy threat from radical Soviet client states ). Indeed, 
actual armed attack on the Arab states came consistently and solely 
from the West itself.
• The creation of Israel, supported fully by the West, was a direct 
threat to the Arab world, both in terms o f territory lost and the 
resulting armed conflicts in which the Arabs invariably lost. Israel 
posed no such direct problem to Turkey.
• Whereas the Arab world provided a natural network o f alignments 
among the Arab states, Turkey had no "natural" allies in terms of 
states consistently close to Turkey or sharing close ethnic or other 
cultural values. Turkey was "on its own" and more inclined to 
look further afield for its political associations either to the equally 
isolated Northern Tier States or to the West.
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• Because Turkey had aligned itself with the West, it naturally fell 
afoul o f most of its Arab neighbors, who perceived Ankara as 
serving interests directly hostile to many o f the general interests of 
the Arabs. This conflict of interests tended to perpetuate and 
reinforce itself over decades.81
In addition to these problems, Syria and Turkey also have an on-going dispute 
over the province of Hatay or Alexandretta. Until 1938, this small Syrian Mediterranean 
province had an Alawite Arab and Armenian majority. That year, the Turkish army 
moved in with French approval and expelled most o f the province’s Alawite Arabs and 
Armenians. A rigged referendum followed in 1939, and the province was annexed to 
Turkey. Independent Syria has never recognized the loss o f Alexandretta and it is 
supported in its claims by all Arab states.82 It has recently become apparent, that France 
may have given into Turkish blackmail. Turkey was threatening to join the axis against 
France, and France was anxious to keep Turkey out of the war, so it paid for peace with 
Syrian land.83
Like Turkey, Syria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. Ten percent of its 
population is not Arab. The non-Arab communities include Kurds, Armenians, 
Circassians (Cherkess, Chechens and other Muslim peoples from the North Caucasus), 
Turkmen, Assyrians, Turks and until very recently, a few thousand Jews. Most of 
Syria’s Jews departed recently to Israel and the United States without the level of 
problems that accompanied the departure of the Jewish community from Iraq.
8'Fuller, Lesser, Henze and Brown, pp. 49-50.
82Robert D. Kaplan, "Identity Crisis," The Atlantic, Vol. 271, No. 2 (February
1993), pp. 22-26.
83Qlson, "Turkey-Syria Tensions," p. 169.
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Religiously, Syria is even more divided. Seventy percent of the population is Sunni. The 
remaining 30 percent includes Alawites (12 percent), Christians (10 percent), Druze (3 
percent), Ismailis (1 percent) and others. In addition, Syria has a vast, predominantly 
Christian, overseas community with varying degrees o f attachment to their ancestral 
homeland, including well-known figures such as Argentine president Carlos Menem and 
Mexican Hollywood actress Selma Hayek. The Sunnis, the Alawites and the Druze are 
concentrated in well-defined locations in the country. The Sunnis dominate Damascus 
and its environs and other large cities in the old biblical Aram. In 1980 and 1982, the 
Sunnis revolted under the leadership of various fundamentalist elements. When the city 
of Aleppo revolted in 1980, the revolt was suppressed by the Alawite-led army. In 1982, 
the city o f Hama revolted. Assad ordered not only the revolt’s suppression, but the 
destruction of a section the historic old town and the death of many of its citizens.84
The Druze avoided conflict in Syria by aligning themselves with the Ismailis and 
the Alawites. The Druze dominate a small region near the Jordanian and Israeli border 
called Jebel al-Druze. The Alawites dominate the coastal region o f Syria. Their religion 
combines Shiite Islam with Phoenician Paganism, Christianity and the cult of Mithras. 
Wine and bread are used in religious ceremonies, and Christian celebrations such as 
Christmas and Easter are practiced. Naturally, this is a rather unusual combination in the 
Middle East, and the Alawites (and their Turkish Alevi cousins) have traditionally been 
regarded as little better, and sometimes worse, than Pagans by the Sunni majority.
Indeed, the rise of an Alawite Syrian Air Force officer, Hafiz Al-Assad, to power is
84 Itamar Rabinovich, "Stability and Change in Syria," in Robert B. Satloff, ed.,
The Politics o f  Change in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 
13-15.
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surreal within a Syrian context, because the Alawites were on the bottom of Syria’s 
pecking order. According to Robert Kaplan. Daniel Pipes compares the rise o f Assad to 
power in Syria to the enthronement of an untouchable Maharajah in India or the 
coronation of a Jewish Tsar in Russia. The force behind the rise of the Alawites was the 
military. By 1961, they had became a majority within the Syrian Army’s officer corps, 
and they quickly took advantage o f their new position of power. The Alawites quickly 
moved to end the two-year- old union of Egypt and Syria, because they felt that their 
interests were not served by alignment with predominantly Sunni Egypt.85
Kaplan echoes Pipes’ prediction that a post-Assad Syria would collapse. This 
question is debatable. But, it is clear that Syria's wars with Israel and hostilities with 
Turkey provide justification for the repression of the Sunni majority in Damascus, Hama 
and Hums (the old Biblical Aram). Pipes and Kaplan argue that Syria will collapse into 
three or four states after Assad dies. On one hand, such projections and prophecies are 
very questionable. If Syria were prone to this sort of collapse, these cleavages would 
have already been exploited by Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Jordan and even the Maronite 
Lebanese parties opposed to Syria. On the other hand, perhaps Kaplan and Pipes are 
correct in stressing Assad’s Machiavellian skills. In addition to the persuasive powers of 
his secret police and Republican Guard, Assad used Turkey and Israel as the "others" 
around which all Syrians can unite. He also cleverly and subtly called his subjects "the 
descendants of the Ummayads" in order to create and foster a national identity o f sorts
85Kaplan, "Identity Crisis," pp. 22-26. A more appropriate term for Syrian 
Alawites may be Nusayiris. Nuysair is said to have introduced the religion to Arabic 
speaking peoples. To learn about the differences between Turkey’s Turkish and Kurdish 
Alevis and the Syrian Arab Alawites, see the sections on religion in Mehrdad R. Izady, 
The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992).
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that avoids direct religious or ethnic connotations. Syria is also the only Arab country 
which does not list the religion o f its citizens in their official papers, perhaps out of an 
Alawite desire for self-protection in event of a Sunni revolution. Despite the tortured 
history of his own sect, Assad was not above reaching out to Sunni clerics to purchase 
support for his rule.86 This approach is not practiced in Iraq. It remains to be seen 
whether Syria will collapse under his son’s rule.
Sunni-dominated Iraq has been a third "other" in Syria’s discourse. Syria and Iraq 
have had extremely bitter relations, even before their independence from France and 
Britain. Conflict between Damascene political parties and Baghdad and Mosul based 
Arab organizations began even before "Syria" and "Iraq" existed as clearly separate 
entities after the collapse o f Ottoman power. The Arab troops that liberated Damascus 
and the Levant from Ottoman rule were led by officers from Iraq and soldiers from the 
Hijaz and the Trans-Jordan. Unfortunately, they were resented almost immediately by 
both the Syrian population and by the Lebanese Christians.87 Today, this quarrel finds its 
expression in the vicious conflict between the Syrian and Iraqi branches o f the Ba’ath 
party. In 1966, the party split into two, and the old leadership (Michel Aflaq and Salah 
al-din Bitar) took shelter in Iraq. Aflaq continued as the figurehead leader o f the Iraqi 
Ba’ath, and Bitar left political life. The Syrian Baath and the Iraqi Baath derive their 
respective legitimacies from demonizing each other. But the need to initiate a split can be 
understood only on a identity level, and this issue is discussed near the conclusion of the
86Itamar Rabinovich, "Stability and Change," pp. 13-14.
87Eliezer Tauber, The Formation o f  Modern Syria and Iraq (Portland, Ore.: Frank 
Cass, 1995).
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section on Iraq’s national identity. While there have been thaws in the relationship 
between the two countries, including a recent visit by the Syrian Health Minister to Iraq, 
the relationship is likely to strained until the Baath is no longer an issue in one of these 
two countries.88
IRAQ
In many ways, Iraq was bom doomed. Imperial Britain created Iraq out o f three 
mutually antagonistic regions -  Mosul. Baghdad, and Basra. Each o f these three regions 
was (and to a large extent continues to be) dominated by a major ethnic/religious group. 
Mosul, in Northern Iraq, is a Kurdish-majority region. Britain defeated a Kurdish 
chieftain attempting independence there and secured the province for Iraq in order to 
insure oil supplies for its client state, but status of the region was not settled until 1926 
when Turkey, Britain and Iraq signed a treaty assigning the territory to Iraq. Central Iraq 
is dominated by Sunni Arabs who have traditionally provided the leadership of the 
country. Finally, Southern Iraq is inhabited by Shiite Arabs who have traditionally 
looked towards Iran for spiritual, if not ethnic, belonging. Shiites number somewhere 
between 55 and 65 percent of the population. Kurds are about 20 percent of the 
population. Arab Shiites number some 13-15 percent o f the population.89
Virtually all the Kurds are at least nominally Sunni in Iraq. In addition to these 
three large groups, Iraq has some 500,000 Turkmen, virtually every minority group found 
in Syria, and a few unique local minorities like the Christian Chaldeans -  the community
88Arabic News (30 March 1998) <http://www.arabicnews.coml>. accessed 28 June 
1998; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 200-205.
89The Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 1997.
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from which Tariq Aziz is drawn.90 Until the forties, Iraq also had a large Jewish 
community o f some 100,000-300,000 persons. Aside from becoming a source of 
unimaginable wealth for ruling groups, the state of Iraq has not been a positive influence 
on these various communities. Saddam’s brutal treatment of the Kurds is widely known, 
but he is not alone among modem Iraq’s leaders in brutalizing the Kurds. Earlier Sunni 
governments, both Baath and non-Baath, have mistreated the Kurds. Saddam simply 
took earlier policies to a new low. Under his rule, Iraq has used poison gas on its 
Kurdish citizens and Iranian troops at the Kurdish town of Halabaja after the town fell to 
Iranian troops assisted by Kurdish paramilitaries in September 1987. The sight of 
thousands o f dead men, women and children revealed the true demonic nature of the Iraqi 
government.91 Like the Kurds, the Iraqi Shiite Arabs have seen their religious leaders 
killed and exiled, their secular leaders marginalized, and their population as a whole de­
emancipated by the dominant Arab Sunni political leadership. The leading Shiite cleric 
and the probable national spokesman for the country’s majority community, Muhammed 
Baqir al-Sadr, was executed by Saddam’s Baath on 9 April 1979, along with his sister 
Bint Huda. So effective were these and other executions that no visible national 
leadership for Iraq’s Shiite majority has emerged since al-Sadr’s departure, despite the 
post-war Shiite revolt in Southern Iraq.92 The Sunni leadership, o f course, includes 
Saddam’s Takriti elites, who were and still are Ottoman in outlook and policy, especially 
when the object of these outlooks and policies are Kurds and Shiites—whether Iraqis or
^Metz, ed., Iraq, < http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html >.
91Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, pp. 70-72.
92Farouk-SlugIett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 199-200.
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Iranians.93 The roots of this unusual tilt towards Turkey, episodically manifested through
Iraq’s alliance with Turkey in CENTO and the Baghdad Pact, its occasional tacit approval
of Turkish operations against the PKK, and a water policy that partially conforms to
Turkey’s policies are very old:
Iraqi youths, bom in the 1880s and the early 1890s, who had left Iraq 
during the last years of Sultan Abd al-Hamid II or in the period of the 
Young Turks in order to enter the military academy in Istanbul, who had 
served as officers during World War I in the Ottoman army or in the Arab 
Revolt army, and who had thereafter filled senior positions in the short­
lived Syrian state of Faysal, had returned to Iraq. The circle was closed.
They were now to become the ruling establishment of Iraq during the rule 
of [Faisal] and afterwards, for almost two decades.94
The 1958 coup d ’etat did not replace the attitudes that these men brought back 
with them to Iraq. True enough, they were swept from power, but they had selected, 
trained, and built the bureaucracy with British help. It was a neo-Ottoman bureaucracy in 
many ways, with one significant exception. Before its rapid descent into the chaos and 
insanity of World War I, the Ottoman Empire’s bureaucracy was multi-ethnic and multi­
religious. In contrast, this Iraqi bureaucracy was drawn from the officers’ own 
community, and the "revolution" did not change this reality95 -  in fact it entrenched it 
further, especially after the execution of Qasim (who was, after all o f religiously mixed 
parentage) by the Baath in 1963. The Baath was overthrown shortly afterwards, but it 
returned in an even more virulent form in 1968..
93Abbas Kelidar, "A Quest for Identity," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 
(April 1997), pp. 413-414.
94Tauber, The Formation o f  Modern Syria and Iraq, p. 324.
95 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 5.
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But the brutality of this Baathist Sunni ruling group did not and does not stop 
with the two largest components o f the country’s population. The Jewish community 
was among the mid-sized to smaller communities in the country at the time o f Iraq’s 
creation. At a time when Iraq’s population was much smaller, it numbered somewhere 
between 100,000-300,000 making it a significant player in Iraqi life, especially because it 
was concentrated in Baghdad. The troubles started in 1933 when the Assyrian Christians 
became the victims of an Army campaign designed to thin their numbers and to destroy 
their military power. This massacre was not the first and unfortunately not the last, and it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the repression of the Assyrians continues to this 
day.96 It foreshadowed the pogroms the Jewish community was to suffer a few years 
latter. A few months after the massacre, Faisal, the founding king o f Iraq, died. Iraq’s 
future probably died with him. Faisal had tried to strike a balance in order to insure the 
survival o f the country and its various communities including the Jewish community. 
Between 1921 and 1948, including the whole o f Faisal’s rule, Iraq intervened in 
Palestine to protect the interests o f the Palestinian Arabs but the word "Palestine" was 
mentioned only three times in order to prevent the seepage of the dispute into Iraqi 
internal politics and to avoid complicating relation with Britain. Indeed, the instances in 
which Palestine is mentioned took place between 1946 and 1948. Faisal’s record reign 
was not perfect, but his death marked the end of all realistic hope for a peaceful Iraq.97
96Assyrian International News Agency, Genocides Against the Assyrian Nation 
(1989), <http://aina.Org/martvr.htm#August 4-5.1933>. Assyrians are being targeted by 
the Turkish and Iraqi governments as well as by the PKK, PUK, and the KDP. Their 
survival, condition and status is severely endangered.
97Kelidar, "A Quest for Identity," pp. 414, 422-423.
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Faisal’s son, Ghazi, became king in 1933. Ghazi was a bigoted admirer of Nazi 
Germany. With the king turning to Nazi Germany, the position of the Jewish community 
eroded. Ghazi died in an auto accident in 1939; he was replaced by his infant son Faisal 
II and two conservative pro-British regents. British influence in the country continued to 
prevent the country from joining the Axis until 1941. In 1941, a coup d'etat brought a 
pro-Nazi party to power, and Britain (from Palestine and the Trans-Jordan) and British 
India (from the Persian Gulf) sent armies to restore the empire’s clients to power. But on 
the orders of the British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the Anglo-Indian armies 
and the Trans-Jordanian Arab legion did not enter the center o f Baghdad for several 
days, allowing the ragtag remnants o f the Iraqi Army’s pro-German factions to massacre 
and kill unarmed Iraqi Jewish civilians in what became known as the farhud  pogrom.
The massacres alarmed the Jewish Agency in Palestine and elsewhere. The agency began 
arranging for the movement o f the Iraqi Jewish community to the forthcoming state of 
Israel. Young Iraqi Jewish men were trained to set up an alternative Jewish community 
government within Iraq to arrange for the departure of the Jewish community. With the 
payment of the appropriate bribes to the appropriate officials and at the cost o f 
abandoning the fruits o f two and half millennia of effort, the overwhelming majority of 
the Jewish community departed in 1948 under conditions that would render the word 
"expulsion" more appropriate. The Iraqi government, like the others one before it, seized 
the "abandoned" property o f the "emigrants."98 Reduced to a  small fraction o f its former 
self, the Jewish community continued to suffer. In 1969, Saddam and his mentor, AI-
98Elie Kedourie, "Operation Babylon; The Story o f the Rescue o f the Jews of 
Iraq," The New Republic, Vol. 199, No. 1(17 October 1988), pp. 48-50.
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Bakr, staged a show trial o f nine Jewish Iraqis who were later hanged in public for 
"spying for Israel."99
In many ways, the suffering of Iraqi Jews under the minority Sunni Arab 
government has been an accurate miniature representation of the suffering of all Iraqis 
outside the ruling circles. Other groups, like the Turkmen also suffered from policies 
created in Baghdad. These policies include using various Kurdish factions to harass, kill, 
and otherwise harm the Turkmen perhaps to encourage them to migrate to Turkey. Iraqi 
Christians have been fleeing Iraq whenever possible despite the presence of Tariq 
Mikhail Aziz on Saddam’s right hand.100 Properly understood, Iraq is a counter- 
traditional, modem despotic Sunni Arab state at war first with its own people and second 
with most o f its neighbors who do not share its identity. Indeed, when viewed from the 
prism o f identity, the Syrian-Iraqi split in the Ba’ath makes sense. Religious Sunnis 
regard the Alawites in extremely lowly terms, but the Alawites rule Sunnis in Syria. The 
Ba’ath’s leadership is drawn heavily from Sunni Arab towns and regions in Iraq that 
border Sunni-dominated areas within Syria -- the Sunni triangle that includes Takrit. Iraq 
stood by and watched as Turkey built the GAP project, because Saddam understood that 
it harmed Syria more. Despite the grave consequences o f the GAP for Iraq, which 
include losing the Euphrates, perceived obligations derived from identity mattered more. 
While Iraq does protest the project, it does not cooperate with Syria in opposing Turkey. 
To be fair, Assad’s Syria is very difficult to cooperate with, but Iraq could have refused to 
implement a Tigris-based water policy and chosen to diplomatically confront Turkey over
"Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 121-122.
I00KeIidar, "A Quest for Identity," p. 414.
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the Euphrates instead o f wasting 10 years on a war against Iran; after all, it does enjoy the 
rights o f prior-use under international law, according to Kliot. But despite the routine 
protests every time Turkey invades Northern Iraq, Turkey is not an "other" in Iraq.
Turkey restored diplomatic ties with Iraq and has been helping it smuggle oil in 
contravention of United Nations sanctions.101 On an international plain, Iraq's "others" 
are Syria and Iran. But, Iraq's biggest "others" are the Iraqi people themselves. As one 
Old Dominion University Kuwaiti undergraduate student put it, "Iraq is a country that 
wants to destroy its own people." The contrast with Syria is instructive, because it shows 
how identity-driven the Iraqi polity really is. Assad curries Sunni clerics while 
oppressing the Sunnis through the instrument of the secret police and selective 
elimination except in cases o f popular revolt, but Saddam and his Takriti Baath are more 
comfortable executing Shiite clerics and massacring Kurds en masse often with minimal 
provocation.
IRAN
The West’s initial impression o f the Shiite clerics who came to power in Iran in 
1978 was almost wholly negative. As the Islamic regime evolved in Iran, a new more 
balanced view is emerging. Given the region, Iran may well be a relative "island o f 
stability" in terms of its identity problems and the methods it uses to resolve them. With 
regard to treatment o f non-majority groups, something may have remained from the 
policy o f the Achaemenids of tolerating ethnic and religious differences among their 
subject peoples. With the exception of the Baha’i community, Iran does not, generally
io! "Turkey Restores Ties with Iraq," Associated Press (11:49 EDT 27 September 
1998); James Risen, "U.S. Reportedly Ignoring Iraqi Oil Smuggling Along Turkish 
Border," The New York Times (19 June 1998).
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speaking, oppress minority faiths as much as its neighbors do. Jews, Assyrians, 
Armenians and Zoroasterians elect their representatives to the Majlis in relatively free 
elections. O f course, Twelver Shiism is the state faith, so the country would fail a 
United States style test of separation of Church and State. In addition, Iran is led by a 
partially-elected clerical leadership so it is the furthest thing from a secular state. In sharp 
contrast to the 1905 revolution, the revolution o f 1978-1979 produced not a liberal 
regime but a religious half-democracy/half-theocracy. Like Turkey, Iran is tom between 
secularism and religious politics. But unlike Turkey, Iran’s conflict seems to be marked 
by shifts o f the social and political pendulum from one paradigm to the other. Thus, 
Iran’s movements are marked by temporal separation of the two approaches to life. In 
Turkey, Islamic politics and secular nationalism have had to co-exist and struggle against 
each other, openly or in private. Ataturk’s Turkey simply suppressed the country’s 
Islamic tendency without really replacing it or really marginalizing those who were 
cautious enough to evade him while practicing their religious beliefs.
The 1905 revolution can be traced back to the infusion of Western ideas into Iran, 
including rule o f law, economic liberty and national independence. Iranian elites were 
also inspired by the victory of Japan (with its constitutional system) over Russia (an 
absolute monarchy), and many Iranian intellectuals came to regard constitutions as "the 
secret" o f the West’s power. Also, Iran had begun to re-discover its pre-lslamic past at 
the turn o f the century and many Iranian intellectuals were purging Arabic words and 
Islamic concepts out o f Farsi and examining Iran’s pre-lslamic history for metaphors and 
symbols with which to oppose the ruling Qajar dynasty which used Islam to legitimate its
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rule.102 There were also some very unpopular tariffs on the Iranian economy. As a 
consequence, Iranian reformists, moderate Shiite clerics and merchants o f all sorts 
brought about a revolution that established an Iranian parliament, an Iranian constitution 
and a legal system. The constitution provided for a measure o f free speech and for the 
security o f individuals against the state. The Qajar Shah who signed the constitution on 
30 December 1906, died a few days afterwards, and his son was determined to cancel the 
document and the institutions it created. A civil war broke out between the Shah and the 
M ajlis' supporters. The Shah lost and his minor son was placed under a regency held by 
a Bakhtiari tribal chieftain. Russian support for the Shah changed the picture, and by 
1911, the revolution could be said to have ended. Instability did not end, however, and 
by 1925 Reza Pahlavi, an army commander, managed to depose the ruling dynasty and 
replace it with his own family.103 Under the new Pahlavi Shah and his son, secularism 
reached new highs or lows, depending on one’s perspective. Reza Pahlavi was removed 
from the throne by the British and the Russians because o f his pro-German stance and 
replaced by his minor son, Muhammed Reza Pahlavi {the Shah desposed in 1978). Later, 
his son was restored thanks to British and American intervention. Like Ataturk before 
him, Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, attempted to force his country to pass through "the gate 
of the great civilization."
l02Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, The Formation o f Two Revolutionary Discourses in 
Modern Iran: The Constitutional Revolution o f 1905-1909 and the Islamic Revolution o f  
1978-1979 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Ph.D. dissertation, 1988).
,03Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, Roots o f  Revolution: An Interpretive 
History o f  Modern Iran (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 63-112.
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This last Shah owed his very political survival and rise to power to the United 
States. He was deposed by his Prime Minister. Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq in 1953. The 
Shah himself told Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer who restored him to power, that he 
attributed his restoration to Britain and the United States. "I owe my throne to God, my 
people, my army—and to you." Roosevelt adds that the Shah used "you" to mean 
Roosevelt personally and the United Kingdom and the United States.104 For many 
Iranians, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's restoration was a repetition o f his ascent o f the 
throne. The Shah was enthroned in 1941 as the puppet of the Allies who had invaded 
Iran and deposed his pro-German father. The Allies feared an oil-seeking German thrust 
into Soviet Azerbaijan and the Persian Gulf and could not risk the elder Pahlavi's German 
leanings.105 From the beginning, the Shah was seen as a product o f Great power 
intervention in Iranian affairs. The appearance or suspicion of foreign involvement in his 
restoration did not help his image with the Iranian nationalist-leaning middle class. Back 
on the throne, the Shah soon set about eliminating all possible sources of opposition, 
including the generals who helped him recover his throne and royalist-oriented 
independents in the Majlis. In 1957, he established the Information and Security 
Organization of the Nation (known by its Farsi acronym SAVAK) with CIA assistance 
and technical support. He also established two puppet political parties in 1957 (the 
Meliyn) and 1958 (the Mardom) to soak up the Iranians' political ambitions. Pahlavi also 
established the Royal Inspection Organization, a government organ accountable to the
l04Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle fo r  Control o f  Iran (New York: 
McGraw Hill Books, 1979), p. ix.
l05Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
p. 189.
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Shah alone, to supervise all aspects o f Iran’s government. In 1941, the Shah was puppet-
king. By 1960, he was an autocrat.106
In 1963, he began an ambitious program of social and economic reforms called
the "White Revolution." His social reform program targeted the influence of the Iranian
clerical class. These reforms included granting women the right to vote, the substitution
of the word "Qu'ran" with the words meaning "Holy Book" in the oath of Majlis deputies,
the replacement of the Islamic calendar with an Imperial one, and the grant of
extraterritorial status to U.S. military personnel stationed in Iran and their dependents.107
These reforms attracted the wrath of Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters. Accusing
the United States of creating the "White Revolution" as part of an anti-Islamic conspiracy
and comparing Iran to an American colony, Khomeini complained about the special
status of the United States in Iran in an angry speech in Qom:
Even if the Shah himself were to run over a dog belonging to an 
American, he would be prosecuted. But if an American cook runs over the 
Shah, the head o f state, no one will have the right to interfere with him ...
If some American's servant, some cook, assassinates your marja' [the 
highest ranking Shi'ia cleric and source of religious authority] in the 
middle of the bazaar or runs over him, the Iranian people do not have the 
right to apprehend him.'08
Between June 1963 and January 1964, Khomeini and his students and supporters
were imprisoned or under house arrest in Tehran. The Shah allowed Khomeini to
I06Mohsen Milani, The Making o f  Revolutionary Iran (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1988), pp. 76-79.
107Ibid., p. 94.
108Khomeini, Ruhollah, Ayatollah and Faqih o f Iran, "Speech at Feyziye in Qom," 
in Hamid Algar, ed. and trans., Islam and Revolution (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 
1981), pp. 181-182.
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return to Qom in January, 1964, but the Ayatollah refused to remain silent. Being 
"a man of the cloth," made Khomeini safer alive as far as the Shah was concerned. 
Pahlavi did not want to transform the Ayatollah into a martyr, and decided to exile 
him. By November 1965, the Shah's government finally secured Turkey’s 
hospitality as a host country for Khomeini's exile, a role later played by Iraq and 
France. In addition to Khomeini's concern about social and moral issues, there 
was also a reaction against "White Revolution's" land reform provisions that 
forced religious foundations (awqaf) to lease land to sharecroppers at rents 
beneath their then current rents.109
The Shah's economic program was o f American design. In a letter to 
Secretary Rusk, the United States ambassador to Iran, J.C. Holmes, describes the 
"White Revolution" as a program designed to destroy "the political, and to a great 
extent, the economic power o f the traditionally most powerful class o f the county 
and the replacement of this class with a new class of enfranchised peasantry."
Holmes then outlines the financial, technical, managerial, and technical assistance 
that the United States government can offer to Iran in support of the "White 
Revolution." It is ironic that Holmes correctly argues that the United States is 
likely to be blamed for the "White Revolution" if American advice is accepted 
and fails to accomplish the economic, social, and political changes the Shah’s 
goals.110 With the failure o f  the White Revolution and increasing cultural friction
109Milani, The Making o f  Revolutionary Iran, pp. 84, 94.
110 J.C. Holmes, "Message from the United States Ambassador in Tehran to the 
Secretary of State, 15 May 1963," in Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, eds., The United 
States and Iran: A Documentary History, (Fredrick, Mary.: Aletheia Books, University
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between Americans working in Iran and traditional elements of the society, 
movement towards religious politics became inevitable. The secular 
constitutionalism of 1905 was hijacked by the Shah and was tarnished by his 
association with it. Students, clerics and many middle class people were 
demanding sexually-segregated facilities, more religion in politics and end to the 
Shah’s westernization program. Students were now using Islam as an argument 
against the monarchy, because the monarchy had claimed secular, pre-lslamic 
credentials.111 The pendulum between religion and secularism swung back, and a 
quick bloodbath after the revolution ended the hopes of secularists. Among those 
executed in the aftermath of the revolution were a few ethnic secessionists from 
the Turkmen Sahara region and the Azeri-speaking Shi’ite Qash’qai tribe of 
Southern Iran. The Qash’qai number less than 500,000. Despite the war with 
Iraq, the secessionists were not able to challenge the authority of Tehran since 
1979 to any significant extent. Furthermore, it is clear that their 1979 challenges 
were of romantic, almost Jacobite nature. For now, Iran is defining its identity in 
Islamic terms, but there are clear signs that this is changing and softening — 
particularly with the election of liberal Ayatollah Khatami as president. Given 
this history, the leading "other" in the structure of Iran’s national identity, "the 
Great Satan" in the angry oratory of many Iranians, is the United States.
Iran’s attitudes towards the Arabs and Turkey are a little more subtle.
They are linked with its own internal ethnic and religious dynamics. Like Turkey,
Publications of America, 1980), pp. 349-353.
"'Keddie and Richard, Roots o f  Revolution, pp. 183-229.
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Syria and Iraq, Iran is a multi-ethnic state. It is also a multi-religious state to 
some extent. The number of Shiites in Iran, however, is probably about 89 
percent, so other faiths would be o f marginal influence even in democratic setting. 
Ten percent of the population is Sunni and Jews, Christians, Zoroasterians, Bahais 
and others make up 1 percent. Iran's ethnic divisions, on the other hand, in 
remarkable contrast to its relative religious homogeneity. The table below lists 
the various ethnic communities in Iran. It is important to remember that the two 
largest groups are Shiite and have both contributed to the leadership of the Islamic 
Republic.
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Table 17: Ethnic and Linguistic Groups in Iran.
Groups (main religions) Percentage of Population
Indo-European Family
Persian Group
- Persians (Shiite, few  Zoroasterians, 
Baha ’is)
51%
- Gilaki & Mazandarani (Shiite) 8%
- Lur & Bakhtiari (Shiite) 2%
Kurdish Group (Sunni & Alevi-related
sects)
9%
Baloch (Baluch) (Sunni) 1-2%
Armenians (Christian) Less than 1%
Turkic Family
Azeri Group (Shiite, few  Baha ’is ) 26%
Turkmen and Turkish (Sunni) 2%
Semitic Family
Jews (Orthodox Judaism) Less than 1%
Arabs (Shiite in Khuzistan, Sunni 
elsewhere)
1%
Assyrians (Christian) Less than 1%
SOURCE: The Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 1997. Table adds 
up to more than 100 percent because o f approximations.
The problems of the Kurds in Iran have been discussed to some extent 
earlier. They are building a national identity of their own, and this brings friction 
into their relationship with Iran. It remains to be seen whether the softer line 
adopted by the new Iranian president will extend to the Kurds. The Shah sought 
integrate the Kurds by emphasizing their "kinship" with Persians through an 
emphasis on Iran’s Indo-European heritage, but with the Islamic Republic, the
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emphasis has been on Shiite Islam and Islam more broadly put as a source o f 
unity. Khomeini condemned pan-Iranianism. pan-Arabism and pan-Turanianism. 
He also branded Saddam Hussein an "apostate" given the latter’s Sunni Arab 
nationalist policies. Khomeini’s regime also introduced the notion of "language" 
as being something distinct from the primary sense of belonging. For him, all 
that mattered was the religion o f the people in question. He re-defined full 
membership in Iran’s national community on the basis of belonging to the 
Twelver Shiite faith regardless of ethnicity or language. This approach melded 
well with earlier fusions of Shiite Islam with Iranian nationalism and weakened 
the centrifugal forces that could have divided Iran.112 For example, Azeri 
speakers are called "Turkish-speaking Iranians," the group is integrated into the 
leadership of the country and there are very high rates of intermarriage between 
Persians and Azeri-speaking Iranians. Finally, the use of the Azeri language is 
legal in Iran. Iran’s overall approach seems to work in terms preventing internal 
ethnic conflict. When Azerbaijan proper attempted to induce Azeri-speaking 
Northwestern Iran into union, it was politely given the cold shoulder by the local 
inhabitants. The Soviets had established a state in the province after World War 
II, but it collapsed after their withdrawal from Iran. In sharp contrast to Turkey’s 
nationalities policy, Iran’s policy is to live with the differences and emphasize
112Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, in Hooshang Amirahmadi and 
Nader Entessar, eds., "Iranian-Arab Relations in Transition," Iran and the Arab World, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 2-4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
commonality. The policy results in the erosion of the minority identities."3 
Commonalities that unite the Middle East are the cornerstones o f the current 
Iranian charm offensive in that region. Iran’s relationships in the region are 
somewhat handicapped by its Islamic universalist ideology, especially when 
dealing with a regime like Syria’s."4 Aside from the the Iraqi government, the 
Baha’i community and Afghanistan’s Taliban, Iran’s only "other" is the United 
States. Nevertheless, Iran’s recent policies suggest an attempt to bridge the 
Sunni-Shiite gap, to stabilize its relationships with its neighbors, and move 
towards normalization with the United States.
Perhaps Iran’s advantage stems from the fact that it is the state with the 
oldest roots in the region. While it is true that Iran did was not reintegrated into 
its current form until 1501 when the Safavid dynasty imposed itself and its Shiite 
faith on the country, it clearly has a historical identity in both Islamic and non- 
Islamic times. It is the one country that does not have unmanageable historical 
baggage about itself or its immediate neighbors. While it is true that Shiite Islam 
has not forgotten the death of Ali, his sons, and grandsons on the battlefields o f 
Karabala and Najaf, these renactment of these events is now mainly a part of the 
world of ritual and spirituality, even in Iran. Nevertheless, Iran does have some 
issues to resolve with a distant power renowned for its post-World War II realism.
1 l3Patricia Carley, A Conference Report: Turkey s Role in the Middle East
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace January 1995), pp. 14-15.
"4Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance," in
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, eds., Iran and the Arab World, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 198-216.
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CONCLUSION
The dispute over the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates basin cannot be 
solved until the underlying clash of identities is solved. The water dispute 
complicates, exacerbates and sours a complex array o f trans-cultural relations in 
the region. This array is a direct result of the unresolved difficulties left from 
World War I. Turkey has never really come to terms with the war or attempted a 
policy of national reconciliation with any o f its neighbors, with the possible 
exception of Iraq. Syria too has yet to reach for the future by putting the past into 
perspective. Iraq is too involved in its permanent war against its own population 
to come to terms with its external disputes and problems. External differences also 
feed the conflict more than water disputes. Hydrologists from Tigris-Euphrates 
countries, meeting in Cairo or Lussane, would face a flood o f history and an 
immeasurable amount of difficulty in dealing with each other, especially if  they 
came from the various countries’ ruling groups. The Syrians would suspect that 
Turkey is planning to dry up Syria. Turks would suspect that the Syrians plan to 
use the PKK to destroy their dams and barrages, and the Iraqis would blame the 
Syrians for their water shortages. A functionalist approach that would pin the 
region’s hopes on technical cooperation is not only unrealistic, it is naive. To that 
extent, Mariam Lowi’s argument that the national conflicts must be resolved 
before the water disputes is accurate.
The case study strongly suggests that the mainstream literature is not on 
the correct track when it comes to water disputes and serious conflicts. If  the 
literature were correct to assume that water disputes cause serious conflict, then
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Syria would have engaged in a war against Turkey during the shortages caused by 
the GAP. Despite relative conventional weakness, Syria does posses an arsenal of 
missiles capable o f hitting Turkey’s main population centers. Armed with 
chemical or biological weapons, these primitive missiles are more than an 
adequate counter-balance to Turkey’s overwhelming conventional superiority. 
Syria followed a policy similar to that of Pakistan in its conflict with India: i.e. 
avoid conventional warfare and concentrate on guerrilla warfare (in the form of 
the PKK) and pursue weapons o f mass destruction. Consequently, it cannot be 
said that Syria does not have military options against Turkey in a state-to-state 
conflict. Syria’s problems with Turkey are not caused by the dispute over the 
waters of the Euphrates, and this is the cardinal reason for the non-occurrence of a 
direct Syro-Turkish war. Put in the abstract, water disputes are a function of 
conflict when the two occur together and not vice versa.
Identity tends to be both the organizing criteria and cause of conflict. It is 
rooted in the language of exclusion and inclusion of groups into or out of the 
respective national governing communities o f the states involved. Kurds are 
excluded from full citizenship in Turkey, non-Alawites are excluded from full 
citizenship in Syria, and non-Sunni Arab peoples are excluded from full 
participation in Iraq. Conflicts have erupted within each of these three states 
precisely along the lines of internal identity markers. The sole exception to 
serious internal civil wars and conflicts has been Iran which oppresses its small 
Bahai community. The Mujahidi-e Khalq cannot be considered a serious internal 
problem for Iran, because it is clearly an instrument o f Iraqi policy towards Iran.
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In our quest for rational explanation of phenomena like war and conflict, 
we tend to assume that these problems are caused by rational reasons like disputes 
over property. Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. Revulsion felt by 
states towards other states and by peoples towards each other does not recognize 
rationality and reason. Conflict is a function of history and culture, or more 
precisely identity. A Kurdish state would greatly reduce the scope and frequency 
of warfare in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. Alternatively, genuine democratization 
in Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq would ameliorate the Kurds’ demands somewhat. 
Under either scenario, the states in the region need to reduce the barriers to 
cooperation. Turkey needs to understand that it is rather un-European to bully and 
intimidate its neighbors or internal minorities. With changes in Turkey’s 
behavior, Syria could begin to move toward meeting Turkey halfway. Iran is 
already playing a far more stable and cooperative role in the regions, and a change 
in Turkey towards a coexistence-based foreign policy would entangle Iran further 
into peaceful relations with its neighbors. As for Iraq, it is not likely that any 
improvements will take place under a minority Takriti Baathist Sunni Arab 
government. Increased cooperation would cut the cycles of mutual satanization 
that dominate the Tigris-Euphrates basin and would allow for the creation of 
mutually acceptable allocative water distribution regimes. Confirming the Nile 
case study, this case study shows that there is no causal link between water 
disputes and conflict.
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CHAPTER V 
THE INDUS CASE STUDY
Like the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates basins, the Indus basin is one of the earliest 
cradles o f civilization. The Indus valley civilization saw the rise o f cities like Harappa 
and Mohenjo Daro five thousand years ago. The civilization was based on agriculture. It 
declined for disputed and perhaps unknowable reasons. What is clear is that Indo- 
European peoples moved into the North Indian plain and settled it, bringing the basics of 
Hindu culture and religion as well as the Sanskrit language with them. While being ruled 
by centralizing native dynasties from time to time, the country was divided into many 
polities during most o f  its history. Furthermore, India saw invasions, conquests and 
governance by Persians, Macedonians, Huns, Arabs, Turks and finally the British. The 
British reunited India by imposing direct rule in most o f its regions and subordinating the 
remaining princely states to their paramountcy.
Like the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the Indus basin saw no conflict during its 
imperial period. British rule rendered conflict moot. But with the departure of the 
British, British India’s two successor states, India and Pakistan, began to squabble over 
the waters o f the river as a part o f their overall struggle. Water hardly mattered as a 
source of conflict. The water disputes could and were reduced to engineering questions 
and the Indus River is under a settled regime today. Indian and Pakistani hydrologists 
meet, coordinate and exchange information while their respective countries fight wars, 
build nuclear weapons, subvert each other, and engage in brinksmanship.
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The nature of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is emotional and religious. There is little 
in terms of "realistic" goals being pursued by either country. The pain of the partition 
process continues to embitter both sides and the conflict has evolved into intractability, 
rendering resolution more difficult with each passing year. This difficulty has been 
exacerbated by the construction o f each country’s independence myths. For Pakistan, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah led a glorious struggle that resulted in the creation of the country. 
Jinnah accepted Viceroy Mountbatten’s form o f Pakistan without joy, because his true 
aim was to create a federation o f Muslim states within India enjoying a position of 
equality with a Hindu federation also within India. Jinnah’s threats of separation were 
intended as bargaining chips. Likewise, Congress was not as opposed to partition as the 
standard history texts suggest. Certainly, Gandhi would have preferred a united India, but 
most of his chief lieutenants, including the crucial Jawaharlal Nehru, actually favored 
partition and the creation of Pakistan for economic, ideological and nationalistic reasons.
Since 1960, the Indus has seen the conflict between the two states, each 
encapsulating an emerging national population that share its banks and waters. Its flow 
and direction are regulated by a special priesthood drawn from each state. This is a 
priesthood dedicated to the dams, barrages, and other "temples o f modernity" that impede 
its natural flow and impose a heavy price on its flora and fauna. This priesthood shares a 
language. Using the language o f river-control, this priesthood can talk in ways that the 
two states themselves cannot. The existence o f this channel o f  communication and this 
common language did not create greater opportunities for cooperation between the states, 
because the roots o f their conflict lie deep in their respective identities and the painful 
circumstances o f their birth.
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NATURAL HYDROLOGY
Like the Nile, the Indus has been studied and developed by British hydrologists. 
Nevertheless, the precise size of its basin is not clear to this day. The basin lies in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China. Yet, it is clear that most of the water enters the 
river from Indian, or at least Indian-controlled, sources. The Indus is a very large river 
by world standards. It is about 2,900 kilometers long and drains an area between 980,000 
and 1,165,000 square kilometers. The river’s annual discharge is 207 cubic kilometers, 
more than twice the discharge of the Nile. Seventy thousand square kilometers of the 
drainage basin are in the Kabul River sub-basin in Afghanistan. Pakistan controls about 
518,000 square kilometers that lie inside Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, and 
India is sovereign over some 389,000-453,000 square kilometers, with the balance under 
Chinese rule. The river’s headwaters lie 5000 meters above sea level inside Chinese- 
controlled Tibet. It flows within Tibet for about 320 kilometers. Once the river enters 
the Indian-controlled Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir, it is joined by its first 
tributary, the Zaskar. While in the Indian-Controlled Jammu and Kashmir Himalaya 
highlands, the river is fed by glaciers and ice streams such as the Shyok, the Shigar, the 
Gilgit and the Astor. Avoiding the Nanga Prabat Massif, it enters Pakistan while flowing 
in very deep wide gorges (about 18-24 kilometers wide and 4500-5,500 meters deep). At 
this point, the river flows at an elevation o f some 1,200-1500 meters. It moves on to the 
area between Swat and Hazara in Pakistan as a very rapid mountain stream, similar in 
some respects to the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, and continues in that form until it reaches the 
Tarbela dam in Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, the river is joined by the Kabul river at 
Attock. At this point the river is 600-700 meters above sea level and is crossed by the
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first bridges built to span it. At the Salt Range near Kalabagh, the river enters the plains 
of Pakistani Punjab. At this point it is joined by its Punjab tributaries which flow into 
each other before flowing into the Indus. These tributaries include the Jhelum, the 
Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. With the waters of these tributaries absorbed, 
the Indus becomes a much larger river and flows southward towards the dry plains of 
Sindh and into the Arabian Sea of the Indian Ocean. Near the Indian Ocean, the river 
slows down and silt is deposited at its bottom and the river begins to form a delta near 
Thatta. The delta covers an area of 3,000 square kilometers southeast of the Karachi 
metropolitan area.1
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan’s primary contribution to the basin’s waters’ is the Kabul River. The 
Kabul flows largely within Afghan territory and is heavily utilized in the rural areas 
surrounding Kabul. Of the river’s 700 kilometer-length, 560 kilometers flow within 
Afghanistan. The river’s basin comprises 12 percent o f Afghanistan’s territory, fed by 
the Kunar tributary at Jalalabad. The Kunar adds 10 cubic kilometers a year to the 
Kabul’s flow. The river also has three other tributaries, the Lowgar, the Alingar and the 
Panjsher. The Kabul river flows East towards Pakistan, and along the way, it is joined 
by the Panjsher (Five Lion) River. After merging with the Panjsher, it flows into 
Pakistan. In areas West of Kabul, the river is heavily used for agriculture and it
'Center for Natural Resources, Energy and Transport o f the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, Register o f  International Rivers 
(Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1978), p. 15; Encyclopedia Britannica Online,
"Indus River," <http://www.eb.com> , accessed 15 November 1998; Charles Joy,
Taming Asia's Indus River: The Challenge o f  Desert Drought and Flood (New York: 
Coward-McCann, 1964), pp. 17-18.
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sometimes runs dry. Afghan use o f the river is largely in the form of simple water 
extraction for irrigation purposes.2 Despite its occasional demise, the river does flow into 
Pakistan, providing that country with a fair amount of water.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
In addition to its share of the main channel of the Indus itself and a part of the 
Kabul sub-basin, several major tributaries flow within Pakistani territory. The Jhelum 
River begins within Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir from a spring near Vemag. 
The river flows Northwest and enters Wular Lake at the Vale o f  Kashmir. It leaves the 
lake to cross the Pir Panjal heights in a 2,100 meter deep gorge into the Pakistani- 
controlled section of Jammu and Kashmir. It then flows towards the Northwest Frontier 
Province o f Pakistan and partially constitutes the province’s border with the Pakistani- 
controlled state of "Azad Kashmir." The river then breaks through a kind o f hill or ridge 
region, called a siwalik, in India and Pakistan and begins to flow into the Pakistani 
Province o f Punjab. Near a town named after it, the Jhelum joins the Chenab River. The 
Jhelum River is about 725 kilometers long with most of its length well within Pakistan. 
The Chenab follows a similar path. It starts in the Indian State o f Himchal Pradesh and 
flows westward into Jammu and Kashmir. From Kashmir, the river flows into Pakistan 
proper and absorbs the Jhelum. The Chenab is longer than the Jhelum at 974 kilometers. 
The Chenab, now merged with the Jhelum, flows southward and westward in Pakistan 
where it is joined by the Ravi south o f Lahore. Like the Jhelum, the Ravi originates in
2Food and Agriculture Organization, "Aquastat: Afghanistan" (March 1997), 
<http://www.fao.org/ag/aglw/aqiia«itflt/afghanis.htm>. accessed 29 November 1998; 
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, "Kabul River," <http://www.eb.com>. accessed 29 
November 1998.
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India’s Himchal Pradesh. It flows towards Jammu and Kashmir, but turns southward and 
westward at its border. It straddles the border between Indian and Pakistani controlled 
portions o f Kashmir for 80 kilometers before flowing into the plains o f Pakistani Punjab. 
It flows into the Chenab south of Lahore in Pakistani Punjab. The Ravi is 725 kilometers 
long and was the center of India and Pakistan’s pre-1960 water disputes. Unlike the 
Ravi and all the other rivers o f the Punjab, the Beas flows almost entirely within India. It 
begins from the Indian State of Himchal Pradesh and flows southward into the Indian 
State o f Punjab where it flows into the Sutlej River. Its entire length o f 470 kilometers is 
within India. The Sutlej, on the other hand, is much longer, larger and more 
international. The Sutlej begins in Tibet at an elevation of 4,600 meters. It enters 
India’s Himchal Pradesh State and from there it flows southwards into the Indian State of 
Punjab. In Indian Punjab, the Sutlej absorbs the Beas and forms 105 kilometers o f the 
Indo-Pakistani border. It enters Pakistani Punjab and joins the Chenab near Bahawalpur. 
With the merger of the Chenab and the Sutlej, the Panjnad is formed. The Panjnad flows 
into the Indus after a short flow westward in the plains o f Pakistani Punjab. The Sutlej is 
1,450 kilometers long, making it the second largest river in the Indus basin. Like the 
Ravi, the Sutlej was a source of friction between India and Pakistan before I960.3
WATER UTILIZATION
The Indus basin served as the home of the Indus valley civilization. This 
agricultural civilization may have disappeared as a result o f natural or hydrological
3Encyclopedia Britannica Online, "The Ravi," "The Beas," "The Sutlej," "The 
Chenab," and "The Jhelum," <http://www.eb.com>. accessed 29 November 1998.
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disasters that were followed by the movement of Indo-European peoples into the region. 
The same disasters probably resulted in a dry climate on the steppes, forcing people there 
to look for better pastures. By 1500 BC, many of these steppe dwellers found themselves 
in the areas known today as India, Pakistan and Iran. This movement of peoples into 
India resulted in the creation of a unique new civilization combing elements of the older 
civilization with the culture of the new settlers. Like its predecessor, the new Hindu 
civilization of India was an agricultural civilization relying on the cultivation o f wheat 
and rice in the Ganges and Indus basins. Like every other great civilization, the 
intellectual, artistic, and philosophical accomplishments of this civilization depended 
ultimately on the agricultural output of its farmers and peasants. These early Indo- 
European settlers were followed, in time, by Zoroasterian Persian, Hellenistic, Muslim 
Arab, Mongol, Shamanistic Turkish, Hunish , Muslim Persian, Muslim Turkish, 
Portugese, French and British invaders. Throughout all the cycles o f  invasion, 
settlement, assimilation and cultural change, the sub-continent remained dependent on its 
river systems and the monsoons for agriculture and food production.4 The peoples of 
India drew water from these rivers with canals and other traditional water diversion 
methods. The first modem attempts to develop the Indus began in the 1850s under the 
British. In 1859, the British completed their first hydraulic project on the Indus. The 
project consisted of a canal, called the Upper Bari Doab canal, that was fed from the 
Madhopur head works constructed on the Ravi River. This project later became a subject 
of a dispute between India and Pakistan, because the canal was allocated to Pakistan
4Arthur Geddes, Man and Land in South Asia (New Delhi: Concept Publishing 
Company, 1982), pp. 91-112.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
253
while the headworks remained in India. The next major British project, the Sakkur 
barrage, was completed in 1932. The barrage was India's first truly modem hydraulic 
project. It is now in Pakistan’s Sindh province. Since that time, India and Pakistan have 
completed many other water projects in the Indus basin.5 China has yet to try to develop 
its share of the Indus basin. Given the altitudes and the terrain involved, it is unlikely that 
China would try to dam its portions o f the Indus and its associated tributaries. 
Afghanistan, on the other hand, has completed one major project on the Kabul tributary 
of the Indus.
AFGHANISTANI WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Afghanistan sits on four major hydraulic basins, including the Helmand river 
basin which is shared with Iran, and the Amur Darya basin which is shared with 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Kabul River catchment within Afghanistan is a part of 
the Indus Basin, and it constitutes 12 percent of Afghanistani territory. It has been 
estimated that the country’s rivers and qanat systems provide it with 55 cubic kilometers 
of water a year— including 10 cubic kilometers that flow from Pakistan. Afghans use 
26.11 cubic kilometers of this water a year. As noted earlier, water is drained from the 
Kabul River to irrigate fields on a traditional basis. The only modem development on the 
Kabul River has been the hydroelectric station at Panjsher. Afghanistan’s total installed 
electrical generation capacity is 281 MW. Seventy percent of this comes from two 
hydroelectric plants including the power station near Panjsher. Before the Soviet 
invasion, Afghanistan cultivated 2.8-3.1 million hectares of land throughout its various
5Food and Agriculture Organization, "Pakistan," Irrigation In the Near East 
Region in Figures, <http://www.fao.org/news/desert/docs/372135/3721350o.htm>. 
accessed 30 November 1998.
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basins. About half o f this land was under rain-fed agriculture and the rest irrigated along 
traditional lines. Perhaps an eighth o f this land was in the Indus basin. Before the Soviet 
invasion, Afghanistan enjoyed the world’s highest per capita wheat output. There are no 
current statistics regarding Afghanistan’s cultivated area and agricultural output.6
PAKISTANI WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Pakistan’s water development programs date to the British projects discussed 
earlier. The country has 29.9 million hectares o f cultivable land. Thirty-seven percent of 
this arable land lies inside the Indus basin. Pakistan cultivates 16.96 million hectares of 
land throughout its entire territory. Of this amount, some 14.33 million hectares are 
within the Indus basin Pakistan’s share of the Indus basin includes the whole area of the 
Provinces of Sindh, Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Agency Province. In addition. 
Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir also lies entirely within the Basin. The only 
remaining Pakistani territory, Balochistan (altemativealy Baluchistan) also partially lies 
within the Indus Basin. Aside from the Warsak Dam on the Kabul River, Pakistan relies 
almost exclusively on the Indus for water. The Warsak Dam was built with Canadian 
assistance during the 1950s and 1960s. It is safe to say that Pakistan is the "gift of the 
Indus." The Pakistani government manages the world’s largest coordinated irrigation 
project, the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS), and has several dams and dozens of 
major canal works under its control. IBIS includes 13.97 million hectares o f  land. A 
variety of private, provincial and other Water and Power Development Authority
6Food and Agriculture Organization, Aquastat: Afghanistan; Encyclopedia 
Britannica Online, "Kabul River," <http://www.eb.com> , accessed 29 November 1998.
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(WAPDA) programs cover the balance of the cultivated land within the Indus basin.7 
While it is a part of the Pakistani government, WAPDA operates within the framework of 
the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty with India. It has two major dams under its control: the 
Mangla Dam and the Tarbela Dam.
Located at the lower end of the Jhelum river, the Mangla Dam was built by 1967. 
It is more than 120 meters high and has a storage capacity o f 58.8 cubic kilometers of 
water. It is used to irrigate 1.2 million hectares of land. It has an installed hydroelectric 
power generation capacity o f 300-1000 MW. This wide range o f figures for the dam’s 
installed hydroelectrical output may be caused by the increasing siltation it faces. The 
problem is not the Mangala Dam’s alone however. Pakistan’s other major dam, the 
Tarbela, which blocks the Indus, also suffers from some siltation. The dam’s 
construction ended in 1975, and it is claimed by the Pakistani government to be the 
largest earth and rock-fill dam in the world. It is about 180 meters high, with a storage 
capacity of 106.4 cubic kilometers of water. It has an installed power generation capacity 
of 3,500 MW. Next in importance in the Indus are the eight massive inter-river canals 
constructed in Pakistan to move water from the Jhelum, Chenab and the Indus into the 
Pakistani canals that once relied on water from the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej whose 
waters are assigned to India. These canals are over 622 kilometers long and approach 
major natural rivers in their size and ability to move immense amounts of water. In fact, 
the Bucketwheel (a machine now rusting into oblivion in the Upper Nile) was built to dig 
these canals. To regulate the rate of water flow into these canals, five major barrages
7Food and Agriculture Organization, Aquastat: Pakistan-, Joy, Taming Asia's 
Indus River, p. 90
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have been built on the various rivers. The Sidhani barrage regulates the flow of water on 
the Ravi. The Qadirabad and Maral regulate water flow out o f the Chenab. The Rasul 
regulates water flow out the Jhelum. The largest and most important barrage is the 
Chashma on the Indus River. This barrage has been modified to function as both a 
barrage and water reservoir. It has a storage capacity of 9.2 cubic kilometers in its pond. 
WAPDA also has a number of pending projects. These projects include the Chashma 
Right Bank Canal which is to have been completed in the late 1990s. This canal will take 
water out o f the Indus near the Chashma and carry it for about 150 kilometers. A second 
project aims to clean, repair and modernize the canal system in Eastern Baluchistan. With 
these repairs, WAPDA hopes to bring more than 100,000 hectares o f land into production 
in the province’s portion o f  the Indus basin. In addition to these projects, WAPDA has 
several power generation projects. One of these is located downstream from the Tarbela 
Dam. Water from the Indus would be diverted to 52 kilometer-long power channel to a 
power generation complex near the city of Attock. The cost o f this project is estimated to 
be U.S. $2.3 billion. Another 1500 MW capacity power-production project involves the 
Jhelum River, but it is at the conceptual stage at the time o f writing. Despite these 
gigantic projects, WAPDA seems to be concentrating on smaller, run-of- the waterway 
projects. Many of its pending projects entail 100-180 MW o f installed capacity.8
The only major pending WAPDA project is the Kalabagh Dam. This dam is 
important in several ways. First, it is designed to replace the dams at Tarbela and 
Mangala, because the two older dams are silting up. Second, the Kalabagh Dam is
Government of Pakistan, WAPDA, <http://www.pak.pov.pk/govt/wapda.htm>. 
accessed 16 October 1998.
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controversial in several ways. Its environmental impact is being debated and its cost- 
efficiency is open to question. Third, the debate over the dam brings to question the 
hydrological wisdom o f the Indus’ current dams. Finally, the Kalabagh Dam seems to 
have set off an internal Pakistani dispute between Punjab and the other three provinces. 
The dispute goes beyond water, because it partially parallels Pakistan’s internal cultural 
borders. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the NWFP is attempting to adopt the name 
"Pukhtunkhwa" in reference to its dominant ethnic group. Thus far, Pakistan has 
managed its internal water disputes between its five regions (the four provinces and Azad 
Kashmir) quite well, thus the internal Pakistani Kalabagh-related water disputes represent 
a departure for internal Pakistani politics. On the face of it, the dam appears like a good 
idea. The Kalabagh dam is a major multi-purpose dam. It is designed to replace the lost 
reservoir capacity o f the two older dams and to add an installed capacity of 3600 MW of 
hydroelectric generation capability. It will hold 74.6 cubic kilometers o f water in its 
reservoir and it will be used to irrigate areas currently irrigated by the Mangla and 
Tarbela dams.9
The reservations o f Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP "Pakhtunkhwa" center 
around two issues: fear o f reduced supplies in the future (Baluchistan and the NWFP) and 
fear of Punjab’s ability to restrict the flow of the Indus (Sindh). Sindh bitterly disputes 
the projections put forth by WAPDA. The Kutch area o f Sindh would receive less water 
causing it to lose precious wetland habitat. In the NWFP, the dam will displace more 
than 30,000 people. The NWFP contends that the 2,000 people displaced by the Trabela
9Abdul Majid Kazi and A. N. G. Abbasi, Nadeem Jamali, trans., Kalabagh Dam: 
Look Before You Leap," (7 June 1997), <http://osl.cs.uiuc.edu/~iamali/kalabagh>. 
accessed 1 December 1998.
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dam were not compensated, so it has no reason to expect the central government of 
Pakistan to compensate those who will be displaced by the Kalabagh Dam.10
INDIAN WATER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Unlike Pakistan, India enjoys many river basins, and some o f its internal states 
cover more than one river basin. The Indian states o f Jammu and Kashmir, Himchal 
Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujrat, and the Indian Union territories of 
Chandigarh and Delhi are at least partially located inside the Indus basin. Like Pakistan, 
India has a federal water authority. In India, this authority is called the Ministry o f Water 
Resources. Having multiple river basins gives India the luxury of meeting shortfalls in 
one basin with surpluses from another. Consequently, much o f the MWR's recent focus 
has been on intra-Indian, inter-state water transfers. India has the potential to irrigate 
78.78 million hectares and was planning to increase this potential irrigated area to 89.42 
million hectares in 1996. This includes land outside in the Indus basin and land that is 
irrigated under India’s current and pending inter-basin water transfer projects." 
Nevertheless, India has several already-completed programs in the Indus basin. These 
include the Bhakara Dam, the Pong Dam, the Nangal Dam and the Sirhind Canal on the 
Sutlej, and headworks of the Upper Doab canal that feeds water into Pakistani Punjab on 
the Ravi. The Nangal Dam was begun under the British and was built to divert the Sutlej
l0Beena Sarwar, "Environment Pakistan: Kalabagh Dam Ignites Political 
Discord," Inter Press Service (June 1998),
<http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/iune98/09 16 034.html>. accessed 1 December 1998.
"Government of India, Press Information Bureau. Water Resources 
<http://www.nic.in/India/PIB/bwater.htm>. accessed 11 April 1999; Government of 
India, Press Information Bureau, Water Highlights, 
<http://www.nic.in/India/PIB/water.htm>. accessed 11 April 1999.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
259
into a new canal. In the wake of the Indus Waters Treaty, a new, much larger dam was 
built a short distance upstream in India with American and World Bank assistance. This 
was the Bhraka Dam with a storage capacity o f ten cubic kilometers of water, an installed 
hydroelectric power generation capacity of 1,050 megawatts, and an immense capacity 
for irrigation. The two primary beneficiaries o f this new dam were the Indian states of 
Punjab and Rajasthan.12 The main means of moving the water downstream from the 
Nangal-Bharka project to Punjab and Rajasthan is the Indira Gandhi Canal (formerly the 
Rajasthan Canal). This canal carries Nangal-Bharka reservoir water from the Harike 
Barrage on the confluence of the Sutlej and the Beas into Punjab and Rajasthan and 
terminates after carrying water 470 kilometers from its source.13. It has had a remarkable 
effect on life in these two states.
In Punjab, the area under cultivation increased from 3.76 million hectares in 1960- 
1961 to 7.6 million hectares in 1996-1997 and the crop yields increased dramatically.
With the construction of the canal and the advent o f the Green Revolution’s introduction 
of dwarf wheat varieties, wheat yields increased from 2.238 tons per hectare to 4.01 tons 
per hectares. These changes transformed Punjab from a net importer of grains and 
agricultural products into India’s breadbasket and wealthiest state.14 This has profound
12Encyclopedia Britannica Online, ”Himalavas"<http://www.eb.com>. accessed 
12 April 1999.
13Encyclopedia Britannica Online, "Thar Desert" <http://www.eb.com>. accessed 
12 April 1999.
l4Govemmant o f Punjab (India), Punjab-Agriculture: Agricultural Scenario in the 
State, The Green Revolution, and Factors behind the Success o f  Green Revolution, and 
Punjab-Economy ’ Agriculture and Allied Sector <http://www.nic.in/punfab>. accessed 5 
April 1999.
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political implications for those seeking to create a Sikh state in India’s Punjab state, and 
these shall be discussed in the section on conflict. Rajasthan was also able to benefit 
from Indian Indus basin water programs but not to the same extent. Rajasthan receives 
12 cubic kilometers o f water from the Indus basin river system’s Ravi, Beas and Sutlej 
tributaries. This water is carried by the Indira Gandhi canal which is in its second stage 
of construction. Some 0.545 million hectares were irrigated in the first stage which was 
completed in 1986 and 0.731 million hectares are likely to come under irrigation with the 
completion o f the second stage. Since the 1950s, cereal production in Rajasthan 
increased from 3.38 million tons to 13.19 million tons, due to irrigation and the dwarf 
strains o f wheat introduced by the Green Revolution. Despite this progress, Rajasthan’s 
agricultural development remains hampered due to several factors openly admitted to by 
the government o f Rajasthan. Included among these factors are the increases in 
population, the low status of women (who do most of the farming in the local social 
culture), and the continued reliance o f an overwhelming number of farmers on rain-fed 
agriculture and the short monsoon season. Clearly, Rajasthan has made progress with the 
introduction of the Indus Rivers’s water into its Thar Desert, but it is progress trails the 
strides made by Punjab in many respects.15
PATTERNS OF WATER USE IN THE INDUS BASIN 
Unlike the Tigris-Euphrates, water consumption in the Indus basin is largely 
regulated by treaty. Afghanistan, which is not a party to the Indus Waters Treaty, 
withdraws water only from the Kabul and does not have a share in the rivers constituting
ISGovemment o f Rajasthan, Irrigation and Flood Control and Agriculture 
Production <http://www.raigovt.org/plan>. accessed 5 April 1999.
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the Punjab system. The Afghan portion o f the Indus basin contributes some water to 
Afghanistan’s annual consumption o f 26.11 cubic kilometers of water. Kabul waters 
constitute a mere 12 percent of the country’s annually renewable base o f 55 cubic 
kilometers o f water, which means that most of the country’s agriculture takes place 
outside the Indus basin, and most o f the water is allowed to flow into Pakistan after being 
harnessed for electric power. Like Sudan and Ethiopia, the country also enjoys 
substantial rain-fed agriculture Consequently, it is safe to say that Afghanistan is not a 
major user o f Indus basin waters.16
The largest user of Indus waters is Pakistan, although it contributes very little 
water to the system. In terms of the basin’s water capturing regions, it controls only a 
part of the highlands o f Kashmir, leaving Harayana and Himchal Pradesh totally outside 
Pakistan. Under the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan has the right to the unrestricted use of 
the three Western rivers-the Indus itself, the Jhelum and the Chenab. India has 
unrestricted use of the smaller three Eastern tributaries, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. 
The erratic nature of the Indus system makes planning controversial and difficult. It also 
influences the published data on the river. As a result, this study uses the figures used in 
the making o f the treaty itself. Under these measurements, Pakistan has the right to use 
166.14 cubic kilometers of water as it sees fit. India is entitled to use 34.24 cubic 
kilometers o f water from the Eastern rivers plus an authorized transfer from Pakistan that 
varies by year. At independence, Pakistan was using 78-79 cubic kilometers o f water 
and allowed the balance to flow to the sea and the swamps at the mouth of the river. 
Today Pakistan uses 129.6 cubic kilometers o f water and plans to utilize 143.5 cubic
l6Food and Agriculture Organization, Aquastat: Afghanistan.
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kilometers of water in the future. Pakistan was planning to release 12.29 cubic 
kilometers of water into the sea, but has reduced the amount to 7.01 cubic kilometers. 
These plans will make the country very vulnerable during low-flow years and during 
drought; the environmental strain on the swamps at the mouth of the river and the nearby 
shallow seas is bound to increase. Kazi and Abbasi, two critics o f Pakistan’s plans, cite 
the reduction and destruction o f the mangrove forest area in the Indus delta, the 
destruction o f important fish species, the threat posed to the Indus river dolphin and the 
deforestation of the lower reaches of the river as evidence for what they regard as 
Pakistani government mismanagement of the river’s water resources.17
India, with its smaller allocation, appears to have been more ambitious than 
Pakistan in some respects. Of its allocation, India uses 19.38 cubic kilometers of water.
It allocates this water to some o f its states. Punjab and Haryana receive 4.28 cubic 
kilometers of water each, Rajasthan is allocated 10.53 cubic kilometers of water, the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir receives 0.795 cubic kilometers of water, and the Indian capital of 
Delhi is allocated 0.25 cubic kilometers of water. Many in Punjab are not pleased with 
Rajasthan’s allocation. Critics o f India’s Indus waters program argue that the Indira 
Gandhi Canal and the water it delivers to Rajasthan are inefficient and economically 
unjustifiable. Furthermore, the Sikh claims to the waters from the Ravi and Beas have 
become a litmus test for Sikh nationalism, despite India’s immense investments in 
Punjab’s agriculture.18 The rise in India’s population and its demand for food may make
17Geddes, Man and Land, pp. 143-144..
I8S. Gurpeet Singh Dhillon, Punjab Crisis: An Analysis, 
<http:///www.khalistan.net/pu-crisis.htm>. accessed 29 November 1998.
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the dispute between the Sikhs and Rajasthan moot. Given the immense challenge of 
India’s population growth, the whole Indian allocation may not be enough to satisfy 
either Rajasthan or Punjab.
AGRICULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
By applying the lessons of the Green Revolution, both India and Pakistan have 
avoided national food catastrophes. The national account of the agricultural sector, 
measured in constant 1980/1981 billions Pakistani Rupees, has almost doubled between 
1981 and 1997. India, on the other hand, has seen its equivalent measure rise by about 50 
percent.19 Haryana and the state of Punjab produce 60 to 65 percent of India’s foodstuffs 
with their water allocation, and both states have so far managed to increase yields to meet 
the needs of India’s growing population, but Punjab enjoys only 1.5 percent of India’s 
area, and it is not likely to be able to meet India’s future needs. Consequently, India’s 
attention is shifting to areas outside the Indus valley for food. Unlike Iraq, Syria, Egypt 
and Iran, India is a net food-exporter. The country exports a modest 5-6 million tons of 
cereals a year. The country retains 30 million tons of grain as a buffer against crop 
failure and produces about 200 million tons of grain a year. Its 1950-1951 production, in 
contrast, was a paltry 50.8 million tons.20 India’s population increased by 2.5 times but 
its food output has quadrupled. Pakistan has not been as fortunate as India, especially
I9Asian Development Bank, "Pakistan National Account -  Agriculture," 
<http://intemotes.asiandevbank.org/notes/pak/27ae.htm>. accessed 29 November 1998; 
Asian Development Bank, "India National Account Agriculture," 
<http://intemotes.asiandevbank.org/notes/ind/2826.htm>. accessed 29 November 1998.
20M.G. Srinath, "India’s Food Security Continues To Be Fragile Despite 
Progress," Deutsche Press Argentur (5 August 1997), 
<http://infoweb4.newsbank.com/bin/gate.exe>.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
264
recently. Pakistan wheat production was stagnant in the mid-1990s, and rice production 
increased by only 15 percent. The country had to import some 4 million tons of 
American wheat in 1994. Unlike the sustainable gains in yield per hectare experienced in 
India, Pakistan’s per hectare wheat yields dipped slightly in the mid-1990s.21 In contrast, 
India has become a net exporter of wheat. While Pakistan’s production has increased 
greatly since the treaty, it has not kept pace with India’s. The Indians face a much larger 
population problem and the success of the Green Revolution in India may be a 
consequence of the harsher necessities facing the country. Table 1 below illustrates the 
demographic pressures facing India and Pakistan.
Table 18: Projected Population Growth in Indus Basin States in millions o f people.
Country 1996 2010 2020
Afghanistan 22.7 34.1 43.0
Pakistan 129.3 170.8 198.7
India 952.1 1,155.8 1,289.5
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as cited in The World 
Almanac and Book o f  Facts, (Mahwah, N.J.: World Almanac Books, 1997), pp. 838-839.
While the proportion o f Pakistanis to Indians will not change by the year 2020, the
absolute numbers paint a different picture. Between 1996 and 2020, India is projected to
add more people than there will be in the projected population of Pakistan for 2020.
India will have a billion more people, and should it manage to keep up its agricultural
improvements, it will have a even greater advantage over Pakistan in terms of military
power. In the age o f the nuclear-armed mega-state, the country most able to absorb the
2‘Government o f Pakistan, Agriculture: Production, 
<http://www.pak.gov.pk/govt/agri/agri 1 .htm>. accessed 29 November 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
265
blows from its enemy’s arsenal is the more powerful state-blessed with the option of 
initiating nuclear conflict at will. As the population grows, the pressure to abrogate the 
Indus Waters Treaty will grow. To the extent that there is a regime already in place, the 
opportunity that presented itself in the 1960s can be said to have been successfully 
exploited. Whether the regime will withstand the pressure o f the increases in population 
is an open question, and whether it would lead to conflict is yet another question. It is 
clear, however, that water has not been a cause o f conflict between India and Pakistan. 
Disputes over the Indus have always been and continue to be a function o f the broader 
Indo-Pakistani rivalry and its root causes: religion and identity.
REGIMES
Despite this grave and sometimes deadly rivalry, India and Pakistan have been 
able to divide the waters of the Indus Basin in an orderly manner. The Indus Waters 
Treaty is as close to a universal basin-wide agreement as possible. It does not include the 
waters of the Kabul -  which are left for bilateral Afghan-Pakistani arrangements. It does 
not include China either, but given the flow o f the streams in China and their gradients, it 
is doubtful that China would be developing the streams that flow out o f it into the Indus 
basin. Consequently, the Indus Waters Treaty represents the most complete regime 
among the three case studies in this effort. The treaty was preceded by the Inter- 
Dominion Accord of 4 May 1948 and represents a formalization o f arrangements made 
then. Under the Inter-Dominion Accord, India agreed to release water for Pakistani use
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on an annual fee basis. This temporary accord was meant to be replaced by a more 
permanent arrangement, but by 1951, neither side was willing to compromise.22
It was believed that without a settlement on the issue of water rights, India and 
Pakistan would not be able to resolve their differences on Kashmir and other issues. 
According to one official Indian source, "India and Pakistan can go on shouting on 
Kashmir for all time to come, but an early settlement on the Indus waters is essential for 
maintenance of peace in the sub-continent."23 While this assessment certainly may have 
encouraged the swift negotiation of an agreement, it was certainly inaccuarate. India and 
Pakistan have fought two major conventional wars since the treaty’s implementation; in 
addition, both states have engaged in destabilizing each other through the use of proxy 
guerilla organizations in Kashmir and Sindh. But in 1951, it was believed, at least in 
some parts of the Indian government, that a settlement on the issue of Indus Water rights 
was essential for the peaceful development o f the sub-continent.
That same year, the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. David Lilienthal was visiting India and 
Pakistan, ostensibly to write an article for Collier’s magazine on the region. Before he 
flew to India and Pakistan, Lilienthal had been briefed by state deparment and White 
House officials. It is clear that the Eisenhower administration sought to defuse the Indo- 
Pakistani rivalry. So, it resorted to what can be described as engineering politics.
“ Michael Newbill, "Indus Waters Treaty: A History," Confidence Building 
Measures Project, Henry Stimson Center <http://www.stimson.org/cbm/sa/indus.htm>. 
accessed 20 November 1998.
2jNiranjan Gulhati, The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International 
Mediation (Mumbai India: Allied Publishers, 1982), p. 16. As cited by Newbill, "Indus 
Waters Treaty."
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Lilienthal suggested that the two countries approach the World Bank to begin looking for 
ways to solve their problems. Lilienthal and the president o f the World Bank, Eugene R. 
Black, immediately suggested severing the political from the "functional" aspects o f the 
mediation/conduit-work. As a result, a working party composed of Indian, Pakistani and 
World Bank engineers (i.e. irrigation engineers and hydrologists) began to meet. After 
two near-breakdowns in the talks, the two sides along with the World Bank and six donor 
countries (primarily the United States and the United Kingdom), agreed to the terms and 
the funding of the treaty. The agreement took effect on 1 April 1960 after being signed 
by Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Field Marshall Ayub 
Khan.24
The treaty has three important features: allocation, finance and adjudication. O f 
these, the most important function is allocation. The treaty clearly defines which waters 
belong to India and which waters belong to Pakistan. As stated earlier, the treaty defines 
the Indus and its five (Punjab) tributaries as main rivers and assigns the three Western 
rivers (Indus proper, Jhelum and Chenab) to Pakistan and the three Eastern rivers (Ravi, 
Beas and Sutlej) to India. Each country enjoys unrestricted use of the river waters 
assigned to it. The agreement’s financial aspects included 71 million British pounds to 
be paid by India, 190 million pounds to be granted by the World Bank, the United States 
and other western countries. Pakistan contributed 10 million pounds sterling. The treaty 
also set up the Permanent Indus Committee to help resolve future disputes. This 
Committee continues to function despite two wars. It facilitates the exchange of data,
24Geddes, Man and Land, pp. 113-114.
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visits and provides a conduit o f communication between the two countries regarding the 
construction o f water works in the basin.25
The Indus Waters Treaty can be called a success, but a limited one. The division 
of "functional" and "political" problems in the Indus remained just that-a separation of 
hydrology and politics. While Lilienthal, Black and probably Eisenhower had hoped to 
reduce Indo-Pakistani conflict through the machinery o f "functional" cooperation, the 
very separation they attempted to use to foster better relations between the two countries 
manifested itself in precisely the opposite manner these men hoped for. India and 
Pakistan have separated their Indus Water consumption disputes from their other 
disputes, preferring to relegate their water disputes to the realm of engineering and 
hydrology while they continue to fight over Kashmir, Sindh and other issues closely 
related to their respective founding and national identities. More than any other case, the 
Indus shows us that there is actually little link between disputes over water allocation and 
war.
POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND WAR
INDO-PAKISTANI WARS
There have been three major wars between India and Pakistan. These were all 
wars over territory or more precisely wars over symbolic territory. The first and second 
wars were about who controls Kashmir. The third war was about East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) and whether it should be independent. In both cases (Kashmir and 
Bangladesh), the two sides were attempting to assert their respective identities with their
25Ibid., p. 114.
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opponent defined as the "other." As this case study illustrates, the conflicts were never 
about water. The conflicts appear to be about territory at first glance, but religious and 
identity issues almost always appear to be important if not the primary factors in the 
conflict.
THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1947 
The Muslim-majority Kashmir valley was sold by the British to the Hindu Singh 
dynasty in thel850s. Upon India’s independence on 14 August 1947, the region’s 
Maharaja attempted to keep the state independent. By October 1947, Kashmir was 
invaded by Pathan irregulars from Pakistan. Faced with the inability to protect his 
dominions, which included Buddhist Ladakh and Hindu Jammu, the Maharaja elected to 
join India. As a result, Indian troops entered Kashmir and fought Pakistani troops and 
irregulars. The war occurred in an atmosphere of great chaos due to the communal 
rioting and mass migration that occurred upon the independence of India and Pakistan.
The war left Pakistan with 35 percent of the state o f Jammu and Kashmir. India initially 
controlled all the remaining territories until China took over some 20 percent of 
Kashmir’s territory mostly in uninhabited areas such as Aksai Chin in 1962. India 
annexed its portion of Kashmir as an Indian state with a special status, provided for under 
article 370 of the Indian constitution. The article designates Kashmir as a "special"
Indian state and forbids non-natives from buying land there. Pakistan organized its 
portion of Kashmir as the puppet state o f'A za d " (free) Kashmir. The cease fire, arranged 
by the United Nations, called for a plebiscite to resolve the dispute. India has rejected the 
idea of a vote on Kashmir’s status, arguing that the Maharaja’s decision to join India and
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Kashmiri participation in the Indian political process provided the requisite legitimacy for 
Indian sovereignty over Kashmir.26
The causes of the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir and the Indian intervention lay in 
the views held by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, then Governor-General of Pakistan, and Nehru 
regarding the respective purposes for their countries’ existence. For Jinnah, Pakistan was 
to be the home of the subcontinent’s Muslims (Pakistan means the land of the pure). 
India’s Nehru, on the other hand, believed that India must be a secular multi-religious 
country. For Nehru, having a Muslim state within India meant that the country included 
Muslims. These two views were not and are not compatible; this difference in opinion 
led to the initial conflict between the two states, but the differences mask one crucial area 
of agreement between Pakistan and India. Both India and Pakistan agree that Kashmir 
ought not be an independent state. An independent Muslim Kashmir would undermine 
Pakistan’s stated raison d'etre. For India, such a development would open the floodgates 
of secession in Punjab (which lies in the Indus basin and is discussed below), Tamil 
Nadu, Nagaland and Assam. Kashmir is certainly not going to become an independent 
state. Unfortunately, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir did not stop 
in 1947. It continued and developed to what has been called an intractable conflict that 
has lasted to the present day.27 The existence of some of the sources of the Indus waters 
in Kashmir was hardly a motivating factor for Pakistan. Himchal Pradesh, then part o f
26Jeffrey Key, "Beyond Tilting Both Ways: A New Post Cold War South Asia 
Policy," Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 89-10;. 
Economist, "A Question of Identity," Vol. 332, No. 7746 (15 February 1992), pp. 17-18; 
Economist, "Kashmir’s Proxy War," Vol. 324, No. I l l  A (29 August 1992), p. 29.
^Ibid-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
the Indian Punjab, is perhaps as important as Kashmir, because most o f the water flows 
through it at one point or another, but that Indian state has not been a target for Pakistan. 
This fact, along with the virtual settlement o f the water allocation dispute in 1960 and the 
continuation o f the war, suggests that the Indus waters are not a cause of conflict with 
regard to Kashmir.
THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1965 
To secure support for their respective positions on Kashmir, India and Pakistan 
exploited the Cold War. Pakistan joined Iran, Turkey, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the 
United States in the Central Treaty Organization. The country was rewarded with $1.5 
billion dollars in United States military assistance. India, on the other hand, became a 
recipient o f Soviet weapons and military aid. The armed conflict began in January 1965 
after a series o f skirmishes in the "Rann o f Kutch " (a massive swamp in the lower Indus 
basin, where India and Pakistan had conflicting claims). By September 1965, the conflict 
expanded into Kashmir where Pakistan attempted to use irregular troops and guerillas. 
India responded by reinforcing its garrisons in Kashmir. Pakistan reacted by sending its 
troops towards Chhamb in Kashmir on 1 September 1965. After 22-23 days o f fighting, 
Pakistan and India agreed to a cease-fire. Both sides had failed to accomplish their 
military objectives, and the Soviet-sponsored peace agreement o f January 1966 returned 
India and Pakistan to their pre-war frontiers. Pakistan came into the war hoping to re­
open the issue o f Kashmir with India and with the world community.28 Pakistan did not 
go to war to secure additional water. It went to war to bring all o f Kashmir into Pakistan.
28Ashley Brown, Modern Warfare: From 1939 to the Present Day (London: 
Orbis, 1985), pp. 264-269.
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With regard to this aim, Pakistan failed. Needless to say, the war had no impact on the 
Indus waters treaty arrangements.
THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1971 
While this war was fought largely in East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh), some 
fighting actually took place in the Indus basin. The East Pakistani-based A warn i League 
and its leader. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had won the December 1970 Pakistani election. 
This party stood for home rule in East Pakistan. In March 1971, the West Pakistani- 
dominated military declared martial law and prevented the A warn i League from taking 
office. In addition, it went on a rampage in East Pakistan in an attempt to terrorize 
Bengalis into accepting West Pakistani leadership. As a result, millions o f refugees 
flowed into India. Some of these refugees, organized as Mukti Bahini guerillas, struck 
back at West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan from bases in India. Naturally, these 
guerillas had India’s support, and India was planning to go to war against Pakistan, but it 
was Pakistan that attacked first. On 3 December 1971, the Pakistani Air Force struck 
Indian Air Force bases near the Western (Indus) front. These failed air strikes were 
accompanied with Pakistani armored thrusts into Kashmir and Rajasthan. India staved 
off these attacks in the Indus basin and sent its troops deep into East Pakistan forcing the 
surrender of the West Pakistani troops there. The war was effectively over on 15 
December 1971 and Bangladesh became an independent state the following day.29 
India’s support for the Bangladeshi guerillas had an obvious cause — a desire to weaken 
an enemy state by partitioning it along ethnic lines. West Pakistan went to war to protect 
Pakistan’s territorial integrity and to take Kashmir and parts of Rajasthan if  possible. At
29Ibid.
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this stage, the Indo-Pakistani conflict can be said to have become a permanent feature of 
the relationship between the two countries-water issues, whether in the Indus or the 
Ganges were not a cause or a factor in this war.
KHASMIR’S INSURGENCY AND THE PAKISTANI INVASION OF 1999 
The insurgency in Kashmir and the recent Pakistani attempts to intervene in the 
Indian portion o f Jammu and Kashmir date to the 1980s. Under Article 370 of the Indian 
constitution, Kashmir enjoyed powers denied to other Indian states. This meant that the 
elected Chief Minister of Kashmir, if allowed to develop an independent power base, 
would be able to make Indian Kashmir independent in all but name. The central 
authorities in New Delhi were not about to let any Kashmiri politician reach this degree 
of power. New Delhi developed a policy o f political destabilization of Kashmir in order 
to force its leadership to be dependent on the central government. In 1984, New Delhi 
helped Ghulam Mohammed Shah depose his brother-in-law Chief Minister Farooq 
Abdullah. By 1987, New Delhi dumped Shah and replaced him with Abdullah in an 
election seen by many Kashmiris as dubious. Both Abdullah and Shah belonged to a 
party called "The National Conference." The opposition parties, led by the Muslim 
United Front, rejected the results o f the election and saw their leadership clusters 
imprisoned. Once the leadership o f the Muslim United Front and other opposition parties 
was released from prison, they fled to Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir and set up 
headquarters and began to recruit guerillas for an insurgency in Kashmir. The war in 
nearby Afghanistan was producing hundreds of battle hardened Muslim Mujahedin who 
could be relied upon to train, assist and lead the anti-New Delhi Kashmiris in their war 
against India. The militants struck Indian targets in Kashmir in July 1989, and within
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weeks, civil war gripped the Vale of Kashmir section o f the Indian state o f Jammu and
Kashmir.30
India responded with an iron fist policy. There are at least 250,000 Indian 
soldiers in Kashmir including 1,500 paramilitary companies such as the "Rashtriya 
Rifles" -- one of many paramilitary forces o f the Indian government. The presence o f the 
Indian troops and their heavy-handed tactics caused further alienation in Kashmir and fed 
the ranks of the insurgents. The insurgents themselves, however, began fighting each 
other over whether Kashmir was to join Pakistan or be independent. The Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and many Kashmiri Muslims would like Kashmir to be 
independent. Islam, as practiced in Kashmir, differs from the varieties practiced in 
Pakistan and much o f the Middle East. Kashmiri Islam is overwhelmingly Sufi and by 
implication, anti-fundamentalist. It is similar to the folk Islam practiced in Turkey and 
Egypt. As a result, many Kashmiri Muslims fear union with Pakistan and prefer 
independence for the Vale o f Kashmir with Ladakh and Jammu staying with India. The 
JKLF is opposed by Pakistan and India as well as pro-Pakistani Kashmiri organizations 
like Hizb-ul Mujahedin. In the meantime, the number of armed Kashmiri paramilitaries 
has reached 36, including the JKLF and its main rivals. O f these organizations 30 are 
supported by Pakistan and 6 have various arrangements with India ranging from tacit 
truces to outright cooperation with the Indian armed forces. The JKLF has such a tacit 
understanding with India, but is forced to rhetorically attack India and kidnap soldiers on
30Surinder Singh Oberoi, "Kashmir is Bleeding," The Bulletin o f  the Atomic 
Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 3 (April-March 1997), Internet edition, 
<http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1997/ma97/ma97oberoi.html>. accessed 7 August 
1999.
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occasion to retain its credibility with the Kashmiri public. The numerous new 
organizations have begun to increasingly replace the JKLF and the Hizb-ul Mujahedin in 
the number and scope of military operations. The Hindu Pandit community of the Vale 
o f Kashmir has been effectively destroyed since 1989. Hindu Kashmiris have been 
forced to leave the Vale in the wake of attacks by Kashmiri militants of all stripes. Most 
have sold their homes and fled to Jammu or other more hospitable Indian states like 
Himchal Pradesh or Maharashtra.31
The JKLF is under attack from Pakistan. One of its leaders, Mr. Amanullah 
Khan, wrote an editorial in a Pakistani paper calling for support for an independent 
Kashmir in 1995. The newspaper, called "The Nation," published a response a week 
later. While unofficial, the response reflects Pakistan’s reaction to the JKLF’s plans for 
an independent Kashmir. Pakistan’s opposition to an independent Kashmir can fairly be 
described as categorical. Mr. Omar Khalid, a Pakistani commentator, describes the 
JKLF’s position as "treachery," and negates any differences between the Muslims of 
Kashmir and those of Pakistan. India is never referred to as India. It is initially described 
as Hindustan, and only later does Khalid use the the term Bharat which is India’s proper 
name in Hindi and Urdu. Khalid is adamant that annexing Kashmir would "bring about 
the second renaissance of Muslim power in the Sub-continent."32
3IIbid.; Economist, "Kashmir’s Proxy War," Vol. 324, No. 7774 (29 August
1992), p. 29; Roger Howard, "Evolving Rather than Receding, the Killing in Kashmir 
Continues," Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1999), p. 40.
32Omar Khalid, "JKLF’s Politics: A Rejoinder to Amanullah Khan," The Nation 
(Lahore, Pakistan, 20 July 1995), <http://geocities.com/CapitolHill/3023/reioinder.html>. 
accessed 7 August 1999.
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With the JKLF as the main movement in Kashmir and with the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear weapons tests and avowals o f possession, Pakistan saw both an 
opportunity and a need to strike at India’s position in Kashmir. Believing that it could 
infiltrate Kashmir without facing an Indian conventional attack due to the risk o f nuclear 
war, Pakistan sent hundreds of Kashmiri militants, regular troops, Afghan Taliban 
volunteers and a collection of sundry Islamic activists into the Kargil, an Indian- 
controlled sector of Kashmir in May 1999.33 After hundreds of deaths on both sides,
India pushed back Pakistan’s intruders from all areas they occupied on the Indian side of 
the line o f control. The surviving guerillas were withdrawn by Pakistan under United 
States pressure. On 4 July 1999, United States President William Clinton and Pakistani 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif issued a joint statement saying that the line o f control in 
Kashmir must be respected by both sides. India clearly won the confrontation, because 
the United States did not support its former ally -- Pakistan. Nevertheless, India seems to 
have been duped by Pakistan to let its guard down. Atal Bihari Vaijpaye, a leader in the 
currently ruling Bharatiya Janta Party and Indian Prime Minister, took a bus ride to 
Lahore Pakistan in March 1999 and issued a joint statement with Nawaz Sharif.34 In the 
joint statement, India and Pakistan agreed not to intervene in each others’ internal affairs 
and to seek negotiated solutions to all outstanding issues between them, including the 
dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. Until the infiltration of Pakistani irregulars into the 
Indian state o f Jammu and Kashmir in May, the relationship could have been described as
32 The Times o f  India, "Kargil: A Troubled Front" (5 July 1999),
<http://www.timesofindia.com/kargil/pakus-text.html>. accessed 8 August 1999.
^Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "A Commitement to 
Peace," Presidents and Prime Ministers, Vol. 8, Issue 2 (March 1999), p. 6.
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"improving," but the Kargil crisis effectively aborted the possibility of improved relations 
between the two countries in the immediate future. Barring Pakistani overtures to India, 
it is clear that Vajpayee’s bus trip to Lahore was a wasted opportunity. There is no sign 
that Pakistan intends to make peace overtures towards India, because its armed forces 
continue to shell Indian-held Kashmir and its proxy paramilitaries inside Kashmir 
continue to wage guerilla war against the Indian forces there. In fact, the Sharif 
government faced the wrath o f the Pakistani public for having "betrayed Kashmir." The 
coup that brought General Pervez Mushraff to power must be seen through the prism of 
Kashmir. Given these realities, Kashmir is likely to continue to be a bone o f  contention 
between India and Pakistan until the facts on the ground in Kashmir change, probably 
with the JKLF eliminating its rivals and negotiating for enhanced autonomy for the Vale 
o f Kashmir within India.35
The renowned Indo-British author, Salaman Rushdie, is of Kashmiri origin and 
has written about the reasons for the recent explosion of conflict in Kashmir. Rushdie’s 
analysis clearly shows that the Kashmiris of the Vale are not likely to welcome Pakistani 
rule due to the differences in the forms of Islam practiced in Kashmir and in Pakistan. 
Rushdie posits that the Pakistani intervention in Kashmir was instigated by the army.
The Pakistani army, according to Rushdie, disapproved of the Sharif-Vajpayee thaw in 
the aftermath of the bus trip, because peace with India means that it would lose control
35Naveen S. Garewal, "India Says Pakistan Attempting Intrusions," Reuters (7 
August 1999); Dinesh Kumar, "Kargil Infiltrators identified as Taliban Militia," The 
Times o f  India (22 May 1999), <http://www.timesofindia.com/220599/22indi9.htm>. 
accessed 7 August 1999; Mubasher Bukhari, "Anger in the Streets," The Nation (Lahore, 
Pakistan, 1 August 1999), <http://www.nation.com.pk/review2.htm> , accessed 8 August 
1999.
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over the society it has dominated for the last fifty years. Rushdie’s view of the role of the 
Pakistani army in the crisis is endorsed by both the Indian home minister, L. K.
Advani and also partially by the Economist. Rushdie’s analysis also corroborates 
Oberoi’s arguments in The Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists regarding the role of India’s 
policies in the current crisis in Kashmir. The attempts by the central government in India 
to keep Kashmir’s home rule government dependent on New Delhi have de-legitimized it 
in the eyes of many Muslim Vale o f Kashmir residents.36 As a result, India would 
probably need to give the Vale of Kashmir more autonomy (than currently) after 
separating it from the regions o f Jammu and Ladakh. Pakistan’s attempts to intervene in 
the Indian sections o f Kashmir both by proxy and by the use o f its irregular forces, on the 
other hand, cannot be ignored or disregarded by the global community, because with the 
presence of nuclear weapons in both arsenals, such actions are the apex of international 
irresponsibility. The absence o f water disputes as a source o f conflict in the Jammu and 
Kashmir crisis is nearly total. While occasional disagreements on navigation rise from 
time to time, neither India nor Pakistan have agitated for any changes to the water regime 
established by the Indus Waters Treaty. The source of conflict in Kashmir is, plainly put, 
religious politics.
INDIAN PUNJAB
Like Kashmir, the Indian State of Punjab was a source o f insecurity to New Delhi. 
This insecurity stemmed from the fact that the ruling political party, the Akali Dal, in the 
state was based on the Sikh religious community. As such, it had an independent power
36Salman Rushdie, "Kashmir, the Imperiled Paradise," The New York Times (3 
June 1999), <http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/kargil/RushdieKashmir.html>: Economist,
"Who Really Runs Kashmir," Vol. 351, No. 8125 (26 June 1999), p. 41.
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base and did not rely on the central government. The A kali Dal rose to control the state 
by the late 1970s. It asked for more Indus water and/or more support for Punjab from 
New Delhi. It was a relatively moderate party that did not seek to create an independent 
state. To counter its influence, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used the Sikh religious- 
political movement led by Sant Bhindranwale. Indira Gandhi banned smoking in 
Amristar, declared it a Holy City and gave Bhindranwale’s followers free reign over the 
airwaves in Punjab. These policies seriously weakened the state government of Punjab, 
but they also resulted in the empowerment of Bhindranwale to the point where Indira 
Gandhi lost control over him and his followers. Bhrinadranwale’s faction began to attack 
Sikh apostates, heretics and Anally, it began to attack infidels (mostly Hindus and 
Muslims) in Punjab. These actions forced New Delhi to move against Bhindranwale. 
Along with his lieutenants, he took shelter inside the Golden Temple in Amristar -- a site 
sacred to the Sikhs. From the Temple, the Sikh militants conducted their political, 
religious and military insurgency. Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Army into the temple 
to dislodge the militants on 6 June 1984 in a military raid called "Operation Bluestar." 
Under the Sikh faith, the entry of the Indian Army into the Temple meant that the Golden 
Temple was desecrated. On 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her 
Sikh bodyguards, and a civil war erupted in the Indian Punjab pitting the Indian 
government against the Sikh separatists who sought to create an independent 
"Khalistan."37
Punjab began to descend into chaos, and by May 1987, the moderate Akali Dal 
government was dismissed and "President’s Rule" or the suspension o f an Indian state’s
37Varshney, "Contested Meanings," pp. 337-362, Infotrac Edition, p. 15.
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autonomy was established. President’s Rule lasted 57 months in Punjab, but the Indian 
government was able to crush the Sikh insurgency. India accomplished this through a 
ruthless anti-militant campaign conducted by Punjab’s Chief o f Police, K. P. S. Gill.
Gill’s methods were described by many as the imposition of a "Police Raj" on the Indian 
Punjab. By the middle of 1992, it became apparent that the Sikh separatists were losing 
the war. Their demise was hastened and perhaps caused by the social structures of rural 
Punjab. The guerillas wove themselves into the social fabric of the Jat Sikh peasantry of 
the state. This meant that they became actors in rural kinship feuds, rivalries and 
business deals, thereby creating allies for the Indian government’s forces within the very 
communities they championed. By 1993, a transitional election with very low turnout 
was held in the state, but the war and the troubles of the state had died down. Punjabis, 
of all religious communities, were celebrating the return of "egg, leg and peg."38 Today, 
Punjab is the wealthiest state in India thanks to the Green Revolution.
The conflict in the Punjab was a direct result on the invasion of the Golden 
Temple by the Indian army. The demand for more water by the government of Punjab 
did not result in conflict. The demand for more water was a part of a matrix of demands 
that included more support from New Delhi. Ironically, giving in to the demands of the 
moderate Sikh government may well have increased its dependence on New Delhi, 
thereby accomplishing the very goal that attracted Indira Gandhi to Sikh radicalism.
There may have been other reasons for Mrs. Gandhi’s tilt towards Sikh radicalism. 
According to Varshney’s work for Daedalus, towards the end of her life, Mrs. Gandhi
38Economist, "Peace at Last in Punjab: India," Vol. 327, No. 7812 (22 May
1993), p. 45; Gurharpal Singh, "Punjab since 1984: Disorder, Order, and Legitimacy," 
Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 4 (April 1996), pp. 410-422, Infortrac Edition, pp. 3-5.
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became increasingly religious. Sikhism is an offshoot of Hinduism, but whether Mrs. 
Gandhi personally developed an interest in the faith is not known. After the invasion of 
the temple and the assassination o f Mrs. Gandhi, however, the Sikh and Hindu 
communities in India experienced a fallout that took many years to patch and may be 
impossible to heal completely. The explosion o f Punjab in the aftermath o f Operation 
Bluestar proves that the conflict in the Punjab had nothing to do with the state’s water 
demands. The Punjab crisis shows that disputes over water do not necessarily lead to 
serious conflict and are generally insufficient to ignite a war. People lift rifles, put their 
lives at risk and rise against their states or against outside states for reasons that are closer 
to the cores of their souls such as their language, their culture and their faith. In other 
words, people are always capable o f dividing water but no one has yet calculated how to 
compromise on identity, especially when sacred sites and a political expression o f faith 
are in question. Put another way, no recent or current major conflict has been or is free 
from religious and linguistic factors.
KARACHI, SINDH AND PAKISTANI PUNJAB 
At first glance, Pakistan may appear religiously homogenous compared to India. 
Yet, the country is riddled by both religious and ethnic conflict. The city o f Karachi 
alone has two ongoing separate conflicts. The first conflict is a complicated three-way 
affair pitting Sindhi nationalists against two warring Mohajir (Urdu-speaking immigrant 
communities originally from India) factions. The second conflict features a Shiite/Sunni 
(especially Wahabi) fault line. With two separate wars fought between multiple factions, 
Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, has witnessed its descent into chaos and anarchy that 
approximate Hobbes’ state of nature. Analysts for Jane's Intelligence Review call the
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situation in Karachi and increasingly the rest o f Pakistan "Kalashinkov Culture." This 
"culture" seeped in from Afghanistan and the NWFP into Karachi and is now spreading 
to Pakistani Punjab. The problems are further compounded by Indian support for some of 
these groups in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for militants in Kashmir. The 
Sunni/Shiite conflict is easier to detail and its origins are clearer. It began as a 
consequence o f government policy. During the 1970s, Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq 
proposed a Sunni-style zakat (alms) tax. Concerned that their religious views are being 
relegated to secondary status, Pakistani Shiites formed the Tehrik-e Nefaz Figh-e Jafaria 
(TNFJ -- The Movement for the Defense of Jafari Jurisprudence). When neighboring 
Iran exploded in an Islamic Shiite revolution, the TNFJ received Iranian support and was 
renamed Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP — Pakistani Shiite Movement). The appearance 
o f the TJP coincided with the war in Afghanistan and the rise o f Sunni religious schools 
in Pakistan. These students attracted the sons o f the impoverished. Aided by Saudi 
Arabia and with affiliates in Afghanistan and Kashmir, several Sunni parties began to 
recruit the seminarians for the wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. These Sunni groups are 
too numerous to list, but the most important ones are the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP - 
- Society for the Companions o f the Prophet Pakistan) and Jama 'at-e-lslami (Islamic 
Group). With the both Muslim communities organized into paramilitary parties, the 
gunpowder was mixed for conflict. The spark took the form o f  the Iran-Iraq war. The 
struggle between Sadaam and Khomeini spilled into the streets o f Karachi pitting the TJP 
and its hyper-radical offspring, the Shiite Sipah-e Mohammed (Society of Mohammed) 
against the Sunni organizations. These groups attack each others’s leadership clusters
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and include whole tribes in the NWFP as well as sections o f the Punjab. While Karachi 
is the center o f the conflict, the Shia-Sunni conflict has spread into Pakistani Punjab.39
Religious conflict in Pakistan continues in a parallel manner to ethnic conflict.
The Mohajir community of Karachi is divided between two factions of its original 
political party, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement MQM). The 
mainstream part o f the party has been renamed the Muttahida (United) Quami Movement 
and the rump, which receives support from India is now called Mohajir Qaumi Movement 
-Haqiqi (The "real" MQM). The MQM-Haqiqi is led by Mr. Altaf Hussein from exile in 
London. The two factions have been locked in armed struggle against each other, killing 
each other's leaders and members. Outside the cities of Sindh, Sindhis remain an 
overwhelming majority. Ethnic animosity exists between Sindhis and Mohajirs and a 
secessionist organization called Jeay Sindh carries out guerilla activities against the 
Pakistani government and the Mohajir community. Increasingly, gunmen are also 
serving their own interests through involvement in crime and corruption, and the level of 
violence is rising as a result.40
The internal conflicts in Pakistan are about ethnicity, power and religion. It is 
noteworthy that the Pakistani provinces have had disputes over the distribution of water, 
with the smaller provinces protesting the lion’s share used by Punjab. The dispute over 
water has had no impact on the conflicts. Pakistan’s internal conflicts erupted for reasons 
far removed from water. Pakistan’s experience with ethnic and religious conflict
39Anthony Davis, "Pakistan: State of Unrest," Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, 
No. I (January 1999), pp. 33-36.
40Ibid.
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suggests that the country is not able to control itself. Unlike India which was successful 
in Punjab and earlier in Assam, Pakistan has not yet pacified any o f its troubled regions. 
The invasion of Kashmir may have been an attempt to gain some control not necessarily 
over Kashmir but over Karachi by presenting Pakistanis with an issue that they could all 
agree about. Pakistan’s instability was predicted by the very British officials who hand in 
creating it. Without the depth and population of India or the expanses of Iran, Pakistan is 
ultimately a vulnerable enclave. Iran can easily destabilize the country by arming its 
Shiite community (perhaps 22-25 percent of the population), and India is already 
destabilizing it in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri separatists. The Soviet 
experience shows that nuclear weapons are useless against ethnic and religious 
separatists, so the utility of the Pakistani nuclear explosions is like rain-less thunder. The 
country’s support for the Afghan Taliban, on the other hand, gives the country a much 
needed ally.
AFGHANISTAN’S WARS 
Afghanistan was bom in the 18th century as a reaction against dominance by Iran. 
Its kings kept Russia and Britain at bay. Afghanistan is one of the few Third World 
countries to avoid European colonial domination. It is also one o f an even smaller 
number of Third World countries that have been able to defeat, albeit at great cost, 
invasions by more than one great power. Afghanistan pushed back Britain twice and the 
Soviets once. It also escaped Imperial Russia’s encroachments and Iran’s desire to 
reestablish its sovereignty over its territory. Like India, Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan is 
a multiethnic state. The country’s internal ethnic and religious divisions have played a 
major role in both its ongoing civil war and its resistence to the Iran, Imperial Russia,
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Britain and the Soviet Union. Having had the will, courage and ability to resist foreign 
domination, Afghanistan did not enjoy the subtle but real benefits of colonialism which 
include the creation o f a modernized bureaucratic elite, modernized educational systems 
and connections with the outside world. Naturally, the country benefitted from avoiding 
the disruptions o f colonialism, but it needed the reforms and changes colonialism 
brought. So in 1929, King Amanullah attempted to persuade the tribes to accept change. 
He convened the Loya Jirga, the traditional Afghan assembly o f tribal chieftains, for a 
three day lecture on the need to reform the country. The tribes responded by revolting 
and overthrowing the reform-minded monarch. The results o f the conservative revolt of 
1929 can be felt to this day. Having failed at grass-roots modernization, Afghanistan 
developed two small educated elite cliques. One elite group looked toward Pakistan, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran for models and ideas. Initially, it included modernizers as 
well as Islamic fundamentalists, but it increasingly became fundamentalist in view and 
orientation. The second turned to the Soviet Union and Marxism for its ideas and 
models. Both groups agreed on one thing: Afghanistan must be changed and that this 
change must be directed by the government. In other words, the government was to force 
people to change. Naturally, this was bound to attract resistence from both the other elite 
group and the population at large. The monarchy was overthrown by a member of the 
royal family who established a republic with the backing o f  one of the factions inside the 
People’s Democratic Party o f Afghanistan (The Afghan Communist Party). But by 1978, 
the PDPA’s militant Communist Khalqi (a Pakhtun-dominated group) took over the 
country in a coup. The Khalqi faction sought to impose Marxism on a society that was 
pre-feudal at best. The predictable resulting chaos and instability prompted the Soviet
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Union to invade and replace the Khalqi faction with another, more flexible faction, in 
December 1979. According to Fred Halliday, the internal coup within the PDPA and the 
associated Soviet invasion unleashed three forms of anti-Soviet Afghan nationalism: a 
pan-Islamic nationalism centered around "defending Islam," ethnic nationalism (Pakhtun, 
Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek) sometimes also using the language and symbols of Islam, and 
the nationalism of the communist factions that were out o f favor with Moscow. Pakistan 
favored working with Islamic Pakhtun-based groups and the United States allowed 
Pakistan to channel aid according to its priorities. According to Robert Gates, former 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, it did not matter who was getting the aid as 
long as they accomplished the goal of "killing Russians." Moderate Islamic and 
Monarchist anti-Soviet groups were not only denied military aid, but saw their leaders 
assassinated and their organizations shattered by Pakistani-aided groups. The king was 
(and probably is) more popular than the various Islamic guerilla faction, but the rural 
people of Afghanistan stood the Islamic guerilla groups anyway. In a dramatic repeat of 
history, the people of Afghanistan defeated a superpower and forced it to depart. After 
suffering 15,000 casualties and the loss of hundreds of aircraft, the Soviets left early in 
1989. With the Soviets gone, the Khalqi faction attempted a coup, but the more moderate 
Communists defeated them and forced them to take shelter in Pakistan. Once in Pakistan, 
the Khalqis made common cause with their fellow Pakhtuns — the Taliban. The Taliban 
Air Force and the movement’s armored units are manned by the Khalqis.41
4lFred Halliday, "The Un-Great Game: the Country That Lost the Cold War. 
(Afghanistan)," The New Republic, Vol. 214, No. 12 (25 March 1996), pp. 38-43.
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The Taliban took advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the placement 
of a relatively weak mujahedeen government at the helm in Kabul. Using the camps 
established by the Central Intelligence Agency in Pakistan, the organization invaded the 
country and eliminated or absorbed other Pakhtun factions in the country. Only the 
Tajik-dominated Panj Shir (Five Lion) valley escaped their rule and is still being 
administered by the internationally recognized Afghan Mujahedeen government. The 
Taliban had worked with Osama bin Laden to raise funds and to bring Arab Muslim 
volunteers to Afghanistan to "kill Russians." After taking over 90 percent of the country, 
they offered Osama bin Laden a base of operations after he was exiled from Saudi Arabia 
and expelled from the Sudan. After the G ulf War, the United States stationed troops in 
Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden persuaded himself that his country was occupied by "Zionist 
Crusaders," and began a terrorism program that resulted in the deaths o f hundreds of 
Americans, Tanzanians and Kenyans in the explosions at the Khobar towers in Saudi 
Arabia and the two embassies in Africa. Today, bin Laden’s organization operates in 
dozens of countries including China and the United States. It is a direct consequence of 
the Afghan policy created by Zbigniew Brzezinski and continued by the Reagan 
administration. Richard Murphy, Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East 
and South Asia, put it best when he said: "we did spawn a monster in Afghanistan."42
The policy, with hindsight, can also be judged as a failure in another crucial 
respect. The aid to the Mujahedeen was designed to expel "the Russians" from Central 
Asia and replace the Communist governments of the five Central Asian republics and oil-
42Dilip Hiro, "The Cost o f an Afghan ‘Victory,’" The Nation, Vol. 268, No. 6 (15 
February 1999), p. 17.
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rich Azerbaijan with pro-Western Islamic nationalist governments. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, these states not only retained their Communist elites, they have become 
the objects o f American courtship. Ironically, Taliban is now an unmitigated threat to 
their existence. The policy o f confronting the Soviets in Afghanistan and the failure to 
engage the Afghan government after their departure has shown itself to be harmful to 
United States interests, because it allowed for the creation o f Taliban and provided bin 
Laden and thousands of like-minded people with arms, training and military experience.43 
This suggests that military aid policies created without careful examination of the 
ideologies and aims of the aid’s recipients are likely to backfire. Russophobia is not a 
substitute for good information and tight control over the parties getting United States 
assistance whether they are allied states, other states or non-state actors capable of 
independent military action.
As Halliday argues, the wars in Afghanistan are far from over. It is more than 
likely that the Taliban will fragment themselves with the former Khalqis forming a 
"Socialist Islamic" faction. Iran continues to support the Hazara Shiite Mujahedeen, 
while Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will probably continue to back Ahmed Shah 
Masood’s Tajiks. Taliban has also alienated Iran by murdering Iranian diplomats in 
Afghanistan. Theordinary people of that country will continue to pay a heavy price for 
the strategies and political power plays created in Moscow, Islamabad, Tehran, Riyadh 
and Washington. These wars have already "spilled over" to Africa and Russia in the form 
of terrorist attacks against American embassies and territorial incursions against Russian 
Daghestan. The Soviet invasion was motivated by a desire to consolidate a new
43Halliday, "The Un-Great Game," pp. 38-43.
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communist country, and the resistence to the Soviets was motivated by nationalism. 
America’s motives were clear, as were Pakistan’s goals. Control over the Indus waters 
played no role in the country’s wars. The waters of the Kabul tributary were never an 
issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s policies in the country were 
clearly linked to religious-political considerations rather than a calculated policy to 
control the Kabul river. It is important to remember that most o f the Islamic political 
movements in Pakistan have affiliates in Afghanistan, thus conflict will inevitably be 
spilling from each country into the other until social change relegates religion to the 
margins o f political life in all three countries.
IDENTITY
INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
Relegating religion to the margins of political life will be very difficult for 
Pakistan. The country shares a long colonial and pre-colonial past with both Britain and 
India, and as a result, its founding was directly influenced by the difficult political 
choices made by the British, the leadership of the Indian Congress Party and the 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah -  then the leader of Muslim League of India. The conventional 
view, that is the historical interpretation that suits most factions, is that Jinnah pushed for 
and secured the creation of Pakistan on the basis of his "two nations theory." The reality, 
as always, is more complex. First and foremost, Jinnah was a victim of his own rhetoric. 
His "two nations" arguments were designed to secure from the Indian Congress Party a 
united India in which Muslims would have an equal say in the government with the 
Hindu majority. He was outsmarted by Congress, which despite Gandhi’s pleas to the
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contrary, wanted partition. Understanding the partition process is crucial to
understanding the national identities o f  India and Pakistan and the core o f their dispute
over Kashmir. The partition was not a smooth process, and its scars run deep in both
countries. Its human costs need to be explained and their inevitable contribution to the
difficulties in the relationship needs to be acknowledged.
Partition really began during World War II. The Indian Congress party, which
dominated the provincial governments, wanted India to remain neutral. The Viceroy of
India, acting in place of the Indian emperor (the British monarch), declared war on
India’s behalf. With Congress opposing the war, the only remaining all-India
organization was Jinnah’s Muslim League. With Muslims composing half of the army,
the British needed Jinnah’s cooperation. A day after the declaration of war, the Viceroy
invited Gandhi and Jinnah to the palace. The move gave Jinnah a degree of visibility and
importance that his hitherto small party did not have. Encouraged, Jinnah’s Muslim
League adopted the "Two Nation" theory at its next conference in Lahore. The resolution
meant that India’s Muslims refused to live in a state with a Hindu majority. "State" did
not necessarily mean an independent Muslim state or states in an international sense. The
Lahore Pakistan resolution of the Muslim League was deliberately vague:
... that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or 
acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following 
principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into 
regions which should be so constituted ... that the areas in which the 
Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and 
Eastern zones o f India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States 
in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.44
^Muslim League of India, "Lahore Resolution," as cited by Francis Robinson,
"The Muslims and Partition," History Today, Vol. 47, No. 9 (September 1997), pp. 40-47, 
Infotrac Edition, pp. 8-9.
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The resolution leaves the issue o f separation from India unanswered. Were these states to 
become independent outside India or "autonomous and sovereign" within it? Jinnah’s 
goal seems to have been a united India, with Muslim states within it and about half the 
power at the center reserved for Muslims. In 1942, with the Japanese bombing Calcutta 
and the war progressing poorly for Britain. Jinnah was offered a Pakistan state by the 
British. The move drove Congress over the edge. It began an open revolt against the 
British called the "Quit India" movement. This was a step beyond the resignations of the 
Congress governments in 1939 to protest India’s entry into World War II. Congress’ 
opposition to the war landed its leadership, including Nehru, and some 60,000 of its 
activists in prison. In view of Congress’ later acceptance of partition, the British offer of 
a Pakistan to Jinnah seems to have been a convenient pre-text for Congress’ revolt. But 
the revolt proved utterly catastrophic for Congress, and the Muslim League emerged as 
the only viable all-India political organization. In 1946, Jinnah became the undisputed 
spokesman for Muslim India when his party won over 90 percent o f Muslim seats in 
provincial elections. The Labor government in Britain essentially proposed what Jinnah 
wanted. India was to become a union of two federal states, one for each major faith. On 
6 June 1946, Jinnah accepted this plan. Congress also accepted this plan, but refused to 
accept an interim government to execute it. In essence, Congress’ response was "yes, but 
no." Congress’ motives were partially economic and partially nationalistic. Nehru 
wanted to put his Fabian socialist ideas into effect, and the power o f Muslim landlords 
would have certainly been a problem. A second major leader of the Indian National 
Congress Party, Vallabhbhai Patel, wanted India to have a powerful central government, 
and communal federations certainly were not conducive to his centralizing plan. It is this
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reality that faced Moutbatten when he arrived in India in February 1947, and attempted to
prevent further catastrophe by excluding the Hindu and Sikh majority areas of Punjab and
Bengal from Pakistan. When the Muslim League and Jinnah protested the exclusion of
what became the Indian states o f West Bengal. Himchal Pradesh, Harayana and Punjab
from Pakistan, Moutbatten and the British responded by using the League’s own "Two-
Nation" rhetoric. Jinnah unhappily accepted what he termed "truncated or mutilated and
moth-ridden Pakistan."45
Having been dealt a poor hand, Jinnah attempted to make the best of the situation.
He told the subcontinent’s Muslim masses that they were different and special:
We are a nation . . .  with our own distinctive culture and civilization, 
language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, 
sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and 
calendar, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have 
our own distinctive outlook on life and o f life.46
For Jinnah, Islam was what made Pakistan different from India. To leave Muslim
majority areas within India meant the negation o f the justification of a separate Pakistan.
Kashmir has become an intractable conflict, because the Vale is viewed as an inherent
part of Pakistan by Islamabad. After all, the "k" in Pakistan stands for Kashmir. The
independence-oriented JKLF is unwelcome in Pakistan, because it stands for a cause as
abhorrent to Pakistan as the retention o f Kashmir within India. While Islam retains a
great deal of power in the realm o f Pakistani politics, it has failed to protect the country
from internal strife resulting from denominational and ethnic divisions. The spectacular
45Ibid.
46Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as cited by Economist, "Has Anybody Seen Our Future? 
The Islamic Republic o f Pakistan Has Lost its Way," Vol. 321, No. 7734 (23 November 
1991), p. 21.
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independence o f Bangladesh in 1971 and the constant blood-letting in Karachi testify to 
the failure of the Pakistani government’s nation-making efforts. Kashmir has also 
become more useful as the internal divisions within Pakistan mounted. It provides an 
anti-Indian focus for the Muslim people of Pakistan. In their hostility to India and desire 
to "liberate" Kashmir, Pakistanis of all ethnic and religious groups find concord. The 
question of Pakistan’s identity, and not the waters of the Indus, has caused most of the 
wars in the basin.
The partition was not a velvet divorce. It was major surgery without anaesthesia. 
Muslims and Hindus had lived inter-connected, albeit it not always serene, lives. Clans, 
castes and tribes had Hindu, Sikh and Muslim branches which interacted economically, 
socially and personally. The movement of populations continued well into the fifties. It 
meant the movement of 12.5-13 million people and the death of hundreds of thousands of 
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in communal riots. The partition was accompanied with the 
annexation o f the Princely states into India and Pakistan. The most important state, 
Hyderabad, was ruled by a Shiite Nizam — ruler. The Nizam owned vast mango 
plantations and supported a significant percentage of his state’s population with the 
revenues. The absorption o f Hyderabad into India and Congress’ ill-devised land reform 
programs led to the decimation of the former state’s Muslim middle classes and the end 
of its lucrative mango exports. With the disappearance of their revenue streams, many 
Muslim ex-landlords moved to Pakistan angry at Nehru and India for depriving o f their 
lands. Lands that were left in the hands o f Muslim landlords were declared "enemy 
property" if the owner, or a part o f his or her family, moved to Pakistan. A similar fate 
awaited Hindus who lived in Pakistan. In short, the partition was a difficult process that
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claimed the lives, the wealth and the well being o f millions of people. The pain of
partition was further compounded with the economic policies o f India and the hostility
towards Hindus in Pakistan. A Muslim historian, Mushirul Hasan, argues that the "Two
Nation" theory must be repudiated, because "the Hindu and Muslim communities lived
together in peace and amity."47
Until the relatively recent rise o f the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), the viewpoint expressed by Hasan was the official approach o f India towards its
identity. At independence, India refused to become Hindustan. The country retained the
name "Bharat" in Hindi and "India" in English. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s leader at
independence, viewed India as territorial and cultural entity — not a religious one. In fact,
Hinduism was absent from Nehru’s concept of India:
When I think o f India, I think o f broad fields dotted with innumerable 
small villages . . .  o f the magic of the rainy season which pours life into 
the dry parched-up land and converts it suddenly into a glistening expanse 
of beauty and greenery, or great rivers and flowing water . . .  o f the 
southern tip of India . . .  and above all, o f the Himalayas, snow-capped, or 
some mountain valley in Kashmir in the spring, covered with new flowers 
and a brook bubbling and gurgling through it.48
For Nehru, to be Indian was a question of belonging to a culture defined by boundaries
created by nature, and faith did not matter. One could belong to any religion and be an
Indian. Nehru was irreligious, but his views were shared by Gandhi, who was motivated
by religious considerations. Gandhi believed that Hinduism enjoined tolerance.
Ironically, it was Gandhi’s very religious orientation towards tolerance that made him
47Mushirul Hasan, "Partition: the Human Cost," History Today, Vol. 47, No. 9 
(September 1997), pp. 47-54.
48 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery o f  India (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1989), p. 63.
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suspect in the eyes in India’s Muslims. Gandhi was a nationalist and a devout Hindu, but 
he was not a Hindu nationalist. Nevertheless, his use of Hindu ideas and principles 
alienated the Muslim community and led to some o f the early divisions between the two 
communities. Gandhi responded to the Muslims’ suspicions with open arms, rendering 
him an anathema to the Hindu nationalists. It was a exactly such a Hindu nationalist who 
murdered Gandhi. The murder of the Mahatma set back the cause of the Hindu 
nationalists for decades.49
Within the context of the secular, territorial national identity established by Nehru 
and Gandhi, Kashmir acquired extraordinary importance. It was the only part of India 
that retained a Muslim majority. It manifested India’s claims o f commitment to a secular 
inclusive state and its claimed rejection of the "Two Nation" theory. India also argued 
that the presence o f Kashmir within India guaranteed a secular India, which is in the 
interests of its Muslim community. As a result, both India and Pakistan regard the 
disputed region as a crucial part of the composition of their identities.50 The partition of 
Kashmir is the only viable solution, because it would require compromise on both sides. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Pakistan, given its deep internal divisions, could 
survive an Indian withdrawal from Kashmir; a key rallying cry would be gone, and the 
country would face a near total collapse of inter-ethnic and inter-denominational concord.
Due to Kashmir and the construction o f their respective national identities, India 
and Pakistan regard each other as "the other." This should be self-evident and needs no
49Varshney, "Contested Meanings," Infotrac Edition, p. 4..
50Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., "India: The Dilemmas o f Diversity," Journal o f  
Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 4 (4 October 1993), pp. 54-68.
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further clarification. Despite the country’s commitment to secularism, India’s sense of 
national identity is gradually changing. India is slowly becoming a Hindu state. The 
shift has manifested itself in the rise of the BJP. The Hindu-centric definition o f Indian 
identity is as old as the secular tradition embodied by Nehru. The Rashtriya 
Swamyamsevak Sangh (RSS — National Voluntary Corp) was established in 1925 in 
Maharashtra to resist the British and revive Hindu culture. It represents the institutional 
core o f the Hindu nationalist movement. The Hindu nationalists regard "Indian" and 
"Hindu" as interchangeable terms. According to the movement’s founding thinker, 
Savarkar, "a Hindu means a person who regards this land . . .  From the Indus to the Seas 
as his fatherland as well as his Holyland." For the BJP, Hinduism is culture as well as 
faith, and the physical geography of India is a sacred geography. Unlike other religious 
political movements, the BJP regards Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and others as a part of 
the Indian national community provided that members o f  these minority communities 
accept certain principles. For non-Muslim minorities, this means straightforward 
acceptance o f the crucial role of Hinduism in Indian civilization or assimilation into the 
Indian Hindu mainstream. Indian Jews and Zoroastrians are regarded as integrated into 
the Indian mainstream. Indian Christianity became largely apolitical with the departure 
of the British. The only remaining unintegrated minority faith, in the view of the Hindu 
nationalists, is Islam. Muslims are expected to accept the centrality of Hinduism in 
Indian life. Muslims are to accept Hindu figures like Ram as civilizational rather 
religious figures, the fact that India’s Muslim rulers inflicted great damage upon Indian 
civilization, and they are to refrain from claiming any special protections and privileges 
on the basis o f their faith. These arguments threaten to overwhelm the distinctions
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between Muslims who regard Islam as a personal faith and those who regard it as a 
political ideology, rendering a confrontation between the Hindu nationalist movement 
and the Indian Muslim community increasingly likely. The BJP is the governing party in 
India at the time of writing, its support has risen from 7 percent between 1948 and 1988 
to some 26 percent in 1998. The party won the most elections easily. The rise of the 
party inevitably means increased pressure on India’s remaining Muslims to accept a 
degree of assimilation or immigrate, but some Indian Muslim politicians accept the BJP’s 
reading of Indiem history and its interpretation o f Indian identity. The BJP itself faces 
pressure from parties espousing harsher varieties of Hindu nationalism, and in many 
ways, the destruction of the Babri Mosque/Ram Temple at Ayodhya represented a 
breakdown in party discipline. The pressure to strip India’s Muslims from their special 
privileges is rising and is bound to cause further riots, further confrontation and more 
Indo-Pakistani conflicts.51
In the end, India’s Muslims will have to accept living as a relatively powerless 
minority in a Hindu-dominated India or immigrate to Pakistan and become Mohajirs. It 
is not a position to which Muslims are accustomed, and their adjustment to voicelessness 
wall be very difficult but inevitable. In many ways, the BJP represents Hindu 
wholehearted acceptance of Jinnah’s "Two Nation" theory, so Jinnah’s rhetoric is still 
being played back to Pakistan. India’s political leadership faces dozens o f internal ethnic, 
caste and linguistic differences, and the temptation to use all-Indian symbols, myths and 
images will only increase. This means that the government will try to coopt Hindu 
symbols. Unlike Pakistan, India has a solid record of preventing ethnic secession and
5lVarshney, "Contested Meanings," Infotrac Edition, pp. 3,4, 8, 9, 10, 18.
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pacifying rebellious provinces, but it needs a national mythology and a clear national 
identity to replace the dying secular nationalism championed by Nehru’s Congress. 
Viewed from this perspective, partition is still on the national agenda of both India and 
Pakistan. It is not a historic event but an active and on-going process. The sad irony is 
that Muslims are producing India’s best movies, playing its best music, leading its cricket 
teams and even designing the nuclear weapons and missiles it targets at Pakistan. The 
national identities o f India and Pakistan are deeply intertwined, and they play an 
important role in each other’s demonologies. Pakistan, lacking support in the JKLF- 
supporting parts o f the Kashmiri Muslim community, is not likely to win the conflict in 
Kashmir. India may coopt the JKLF and the Kashmiri Muslims or may even grant the 
Vale independence as Side facto  protectorate. In either case, Pakistan stands to lose its 
game in Kashmir. This suggests that Pakistan is likely to undergo severe centrifugal 
pressures that may lead to its breakup. India's Hinduism has the advantage o f having 
thousands of sects, rendering interdenominational conflict nearly meaningless; Islam’s 
sects, on the other hand, are far fewer with their respective differences formalized and 
highlighted along the Sunni and Shiite tracks.
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan’s tragic present is likely to become Pakistan’s unhappy future. Self- 
righteous movements like Taliban are not given to kissing the hands that feed them.
Their interests extend into Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province "Pakhtunkhwa," and 
sooner or later they are likely to assert the traditional Afghan claims to the province.
Like Pakistan, all non-communist Afghan governments have used Islam in an attempt to 
unite the country. Unfortunately, these governments have also followed Pakistan’s path
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to failure in this endeavor. In fact, the Taliban foreign policy represents the clash of 
Islams. The regime has made an enemy out o f Iran by executing Iranian diplomats and 
oppressing the Shiite Afghan Hazara community. Its primary backers are Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan — countries led by Sunni (especially Wahabi) 
elites.
CONCLUSION
Water is also not an object in the Indus basin, but the conflicts continue. A 
simplistic approach would entail saying that India and Pakistan are fighting for the 
territory o f Kashmir. But such an argument requires the consideration of religion in order 
to make an analysis o f the conflict’s causes coherent. The regime of the Indus was 
constructed, maintained and developed while Pakistan and India fought several wars, 
developed nuclear weapons, and continued to confront each other in a wide variety of 
ways. The hydraulic inter-dependence between the two countries did not lead to peaceful 
relations.
The constant conflict between India and Pakistan confirms the validity o f the 
central point o f this dissertation: Identity issues cause war, water does not. Broadly put, 
the tragedy o f India and Pakistan correlates, in general, with the friction between Hindu 
and Islamic populations. While the two communities lived side by side for centuries in 
peace, they also lived with conflict and estrangement to some extent. The division of 
India into Muslim and Hindu resulted in alienation between the two communities. This 
estrangement took the shape o f separate marriage patterns, holy lands and economic 
opportunities. Yet to fixate on Hindu-Muslim divisions can lead us down logical
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pathways that risk oversimplification. Any analysis of the Indus basin needs to look at 
the clash of Islams and the clash o f various concepts the Indian national identity.
The absence of water as a cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict is very clear. This case 
study separates disputes over river water from conflict once and for all. The case study is 
also a cautionary tale about the limits of cooperation in hydraulic matters. Countries may 
solve their water disputes and have conflicts anyway. This strongly suggests that water is 
an arena of conflict between states and peoples rather than a cause of conflicts. In its own 
optimistic way, the case study shows that people fight and die for goals other than water.
The hostility between India and Pakistan is about the creation of two national 
communities through the device o f exclusion o f "the other" from the national community 
and through the definition of the national community along religious-cultural lines in 
both countries. India attempted to become a secular state, but it was hobbled with two 
crucial handicaps in its quest for a secular existence. First, Gandhi used Hinduism to 
build the Indian National Congress, thus making the party unacceptable to most Muslims 
in the pre-independence period. Second, the country chose to follow an almost Lebanese- 
style of secularism. Under this form of secularism, the state supports all religions instead 
of withdrawing from the sacred realm. Invariably, this leads to comparisons; each 
community feels that the state favors other communities. As a result, politics becomes 
increasingly infused with religion. The study confirms the results of the Nile and Tigris- 
Euphrates case studies. Disputes over the waters o f the Indus did not contribute to Indo- 
Pakistani conflict.
The mainstream literature in this field focused in on the water dispute as a 
causative factor in intra-basin conflict. Water disputes are linked to conflict, but in the
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reverse order of causality. Conflict seems to cause water disputes rather than vice versa. 
Conflict is not a disagreement between friends. Conflict stems from viewing the other 
part as a threat to one’s self-image and self-interpretation. The problems between India 
and Pakistan are also compounded by the construction of national ideologies around each 
identity. Given its internal divisions, Pakistan would have to invent India if it did not 
have it as a neighbor. Ideology, especially the non-economic variety, often creates 
immense conflicts. "Hindutva," "the two nation theory," and "secular India" are attempts 
to give the state logical coherence. In all three cases, however, this coherence is gained at 
the expense of creating an outside enemy and an "internal fifth column" seen as aligned 
with that external enemy. Internal factors, particularly those related to identity and 
culture, seem to exert a powerful influence over the foreign policies of the various states 
on the Indus River. This confirms the findings in the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates 
basins where the various states and peoples are undergoing similar difficulties.




The case studies lead to one clear conclusion: the mainstream school’s core 
assumption, that water disputes cause conflict, is flawed and must be strictly scrutinized. 
Of course, this does not imply that the mainstream school fails to make any contributions 
to the field. In terms o f cataloging information, defining basins and bringing attention to 
the study o f international river systems, the contributions of the mainstream school are 
significant. The alternative school, on the other hand, takes a more thoughtful approach. 
It questions the relationship between water disputes and conflict, and in doing so, reveals 
that national reconciliation among and within states is a precondition for peace.
The Indus River case study stands as a strong cautionary tale about the limits of 
ascribing conflict-causation to water disputes. In that case study, the conflict between 
India and Pakistan continued despite a bilaterally-accepted allocative water regime on the 
Indus. The Eisenhower administration attempted to use the development of the Indus 
River as a vehicle for peace between the India and Pakistan, but it succeeded only in 
taking Indus River water out of the overall Indo-Pakistani conflict which continues 
unabated.
Conflict is not influenced by the location of a basin’s dominant country. In the 
Nile Basin, Egypt is the downstream riparian, but it has been able to impose its will on 
the river. With regard to its Nile policy, Egypt is not motivated by rational hydrology but 
by issues o f identity. As a result, Egypt selected the most inefficient solution to its
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flooding and irrigation problems, but, Egypt’s case is not unique. Turkey is the dominant 
power on the Euphrates and it is also an upstream country where dam development is 
favored by hydrology due to low seepage and evaporation rates in cool highland areas. 
Turkey’s decision to unilaterally develop its share of the two river systems came at an 
immense political price in terms o f the country’s relationship with Syria and the rest of 
the Arab world. While the dams were a sound idea from a hydrological view, they were 
extremely expensive to build and probably uneconomical under normal circumstances. 
Turkey’s decision to build the dams was at least partially motivated by a desire to 
negatively reward Syria for its "betrayal" of Turkey in World War I, and it was also 
motivated by plans to assimilate the Kurds of Southeast Turkey into Turkish society. As 
with Egypt, the choice to build had little to do with the effectiveness of the dams. The 
hydrological effectiveness of the GAP dams is coincidental. The dams on the Indus 
River, despite their rising inefficiency in Pakistan, are similar in some ways to the dams 
of the GAP. They are mostly located upstream. Like Turkey, India is a dominant 
upstream country that is at constant conflict with a weaker and perhaps overambitious 
downstream neighbor. In both the Indus and Tigris-Euphrates basins, the weaker states 
and non-state actors attempt to use unconventional warfare against the dominant state in 
pursuit o f  non-hydraulic, identity interests. The Indo-Pakistani water dispute was 
resolved during the sixties but the conflict continued. It is almost certain that the creation 
of an allocative regime in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin will not remove the underlying 
causes o f Tuco-Syrian conflict. Given the mix of outcomes in the case studies, it is safe 
to discount states’ riparian location as predictive in terms of constructing regimes or 
initiating conflict.
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Identity factors are more important in terms o f causing conflicts and regimes. 
Regimes were constructed for managing the waters of the Nile and the Indus among 
countries that had a degree of commonality in terms of language and culture. Arabic is 
the dominant language of Egypt and Northern Sudan. India and Pakistan also share 
common languages. They also shared a common pre-partition British-controlled 
bureaucracy. As a result, the four countries have maintained their river regimes intact 
since their inception. Turkey and its Arab neighbors, on the other hand, have developed 
very negative images of each. In its drive to become a part of Europe, Turkey made an 
assumption that it had to cut its ties with the Arab and Islamic Worlds, including the 
rivers that bound Turkey (and previous states in the region) to the fertile crescent and 
ultimately to Arabia and Egypt.
THE ALTERNATIVE SCHOOL LITERATURE
The dissertation confirms the validity of the alternative school’s approach. Lowi, 
Butts and Dowlatyar argue that water has not been an object of war in the past and that 
the reasons for conflict are more likely to lie elsewhere. Lowi examines how Israel 
constructs its national identity and the role water plays in Israel’s vision of itself. On the 
whole, the dissertation’s findings validate Lowi’s approach and confirm her findings of 
the Jordan and the Euphrates.
Nevertheless, the dissertation finds that a political settlement, which is a first step 
towards reconciliation, is not necessary for ending water disputes. India and Pakistan 
have a remarkably effective water allocation regime despite their ceaseless conflict. To 
that extent, Thomas N aff s call for the construction of freshwater regimes is sound
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despite its mainstream school logical basis. Naff tends to operate from a largely realist 
point of view, but his realism tends to be a o f the structural rather than the classical 
variety.
Applying classical realism implicitly in his article, Ken Butts reaches a conclusion 
remarkably similar to Lowi’s. Butts confines water disputes to the position of being a 
possible trigger of conflict. He argues that water disputes are not a cause of conflict, and 
assigns causation to cultural and identity factors, but he does not tell us more about the 
factors that create these ethnic, religious and racial antagonisms. His approach is directly 
applicable to Egypt’s 19th century foreign policy o f imperial expansion, and can provide 
adequate explanations for Egypt’s historical. Going further than either Butts or Lowi, 
Dolatyar argues that Islamic law enjoins the sharing o f water and that conflict in the 
Middle East is unrelated to water disputes. In essence, he argues that Islamic law was the 
water regime in the whole region. Dolatyar’s approach leads to conclusions that 
independently confirm the findings of this dissertation.
As Dolatyar implicitly argues, cooperation occurs within well-defined 
cultural/religious zones. Egypt and Northern Sudan share a language and a dominant 
faith. In addition they are both uncomfortable with Coptic-dominated Ethiopia. While 
holding different faiths, India and Pakistan share languages (Punjabi, Urdu/Hindi, 
Kashmiri) and a common heritage that went undivided until 1947. People outside o f the 
subcontinent think o f the two countries’ peoples as "South Asians," and regard them as 
similar in many respects. Common cuisine, common myths, and a common British-style 
education are powerful aides to cooperative behavior. Of course, the prodding of the 
Eisenhower administration, the World Bank and donor money was instrumental in
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securing what was, up to that point, only potential cooperation.
In contrast, the chasms between Turkey, its Kurds and its Arab neighbors are now- 
very difficult to bridge. Attaturk rejected his country’s Islamic heritage and sought to 
establish a European-style national identity that excluded the Kurds and anyone who 
cannot say that they are Turkish. By de-Islamizing the Turkish state, Turkish elites have 
been attempting to cut the religious ties that still bind Turkey to the new Arab states to 
the south. These ties were already strained by Jamal Pasha’s massacres in the fertile 
crescent and the destruction of the Turkish communities o f the Levant, Iraq, Hijaz and 
Yemen. Many educated Arabs and Turks spoke each other’s languages before the First 
World War, but the new national states ended multilingual education on the basis of 
fostering national unity. From the three case studies, we can conclude that cooperative 
behavior requires a certain degree of cultural commonality between the cooperating 
states. Another difference between the Indus and the Tigris-Euphrates may well lay in 
the continued presence of the previous imperial power in the basin as an actor. Britain 
controls no territories on the Indus River today, but Turkey sits on the headwaters of the 
Tigris and the Euphrates. Any historical analysis that takes issues of national identity 
into account would probably result in findings that support the alternative school’s 
primary argument about the lack of a link between water disputes and conflict.
THE MAINSTREAM SCHOOL LITERATURE
By assuming a link between water disputes and conflict, the mainstream literature 
makes a leap o f faith. Indeed, Gleick fiats the link rather than examine the historical 
evidence. The school is also driven by another assumption. It also assumes that
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population increases will cause future water disputes and conflict. By assigning water 
dispute-caused conflict to the future and focusing on population as the sole determinant 
of water use, the mainstream school assumes that in the past, when populations were low, 
there were few if any water shortages. We know that droughts have been with humanity 
since its inception. Naturally, the study of conflicts caused by droughts in the past would 
make an excellent test o f the mainstream school's basic assumption, but no such analysis 
has been conducted. Given the lack o f a present link between water and conflict, 
mainstream school analysts attempt to move water conflicts into the future. But by doing 
so, they cross the line from argument and logic to prophecy.
The rivers confound the mainstream school’s prophecies. The Sudan, Iraq, and 
Syria act against their hydraulic interests by refusing to cooperate with countries whose 
interests overlap theirs. In the face of massive demographic increases, Egypt wastes 10- 
13 cubic kilometers of water a year in order to continue to operate the inefficient Aswan 
High Dam. The wasted water can meet the needs o f Ethiopia and the Great Lakes states 
and leave a surplus for Egypt. Realizing this water surplus entails storing it in Ethiopia 
and Lake Victoria. Egypt rejects upstream storage because it rejects Ethiopia (Coptic 
Christian and Black) and the Great Lakes states (Black and Western Christian) as 
"others." The Nile has also become the manifestation of Egypt’s national identity. The 
geography created by the Nile forced Egypt’s diverse peoples to coexist and mingle. 
Without the Nile, Egypt would only lack the water for its survival, it would lack the 
reason for its survival. Sadat understood this well, but he responded to this knowledge 
by embracing a traditional anti-Ethiopian and ultimately and anti-Sudanese perspective.
Of course, the irony is that Sadat himself was half-Sudanese. The Sudan’s case is even
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more tragic than Egypt’s. Its attachment to Egypt is killing the country through a 
senseless series o f civil wars that have claimed two million people since 1955 ~  or 110 
percent of the population of Kosovo. The Sudan is currently undergoing the ecological 
and social devastation depicted by Thomas Homer-Dixon.
Homer-Dixon’s dire environmental prophecies are also taking place in the Syrian 
and Iraqi shores of the Euphrates. Hundreds o f thousands o f hectares of land are already 
poisoned with salt and gypsum. Iraq produces less food today than it did in I960, but 
Homer-Dixon’s predictions of environmentally-caused conflict have not materialized. 
Instead, conflict in the basin is caused by three primary factors: Saddam Hussein, the lack 
of a Kurdish state and Turkey’s overbearing regional foreign policy. Turkey’s foreign 
policy is informed with the negative image of the Arab in Turkish culture. Conflict is not 
not taking place to secure more water and better land, it is taking place for the same 
reasons that drove the Hatfields and the McCoys, the Croatians and the Serbs and the 
Pakistanis and Indians to their rifles. Belonging to an adoptable species, humans learn to 
adjust to desertification and the poisoning of water supplies through immigration, having 
fewer children and keeping animals such as camels that withstand the new dry 
environment. People fight for identity, for faith and for other supposedly "irrational" 
reasons. They do not fight for water.
IDENTITY AND CONFLICT
Conflict within a country is often a product o f inequality within a context of 
diverse national identities. Inequality is the twin of diversity, because diversity is almost 
always a consequence of imperial projects which entail one group conquering other
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peoples. There is a tendency to regard the lack of conflict between ethnic and religious 
groups as the equivalent of peace. This is the "they-lived-at-peace" argument which is 
ultimately an excuse for dismissing study o f a region’s history and sometimes 
demonizing one o f the parties to the conflict. The Sudanese "lived in peace" with the 
Egyptians from 1821 until 1881. Of course, this was peace based on Egypt’s possession 
of cannons, musketry and rifles. They again enjoyed "peace" with Egypt between 1899 
and 1959. This time, Egyptian guns were supplanted with British ones. The same 
dismissive argument can be used to ignore the historical and identity-related causes o f 
internal Sudanese and Ethiopian civil wars, ethnic conflict in Eurasia and the Indo- 
Pakistani conflict. With regard to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, a caveat must be added 
pointing out that the "Two Nation" theory was imposed by Jinnah and ultimately also the 
leadership o f the Indian National Congress on the people o f today’s Pakistan. The theory 
enjoys wide support in Pakistan today. In India, support for Jinnah’s theory takes the 
form of Hindu nationalism, which increasingly replacing Nehru’s secular nationalism as 
the state’s ideology. A similar conflict o f identities is taking place in the Nile Basin 
within and between Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and even Egypt.
Both cooperation and conflict are taking place along the lines of identity. Muslim 
and Arabic-speaking Egypt cooperates with the Northern Sudanese despite intense 
friction between the two states over Halaib and the Sudan’s interest in cooperation with 
Ethiopia in the Blue Nile plains. African, Animist and Christian South Sudan, as 
represented by the SPLA, finds succor in Uganda and Ethiopia -- countries with an 
African orientation with dominant Christian communities. Within these last two states, 
civil wars have also been fought on tribal and religious lines. Negus Yohannes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
310
complained bitterly to the German Emperor about being encircled by Muslim powers.
The Mahdists’ wars against Egypt, Ethiopia, Darfur and the British in Egypt were 
ultimately motivated by what was, at its core, an innocent desire to save the world from 
what they regarded as injustice and paganism.
The strongest evidence for the impact of national identity on conflict comes from 
the confrontation between Turkey, the Kurds and Syria. Turkey’s assault against the 
Kurds and its own Islamic heritage has created a country belonging to neither Europe nor 
the Middle East. The state is also alienated from the vast traditionalist segment of its own 
population. Ironically, the former Erbakan government, based on Islamic ideologies 
distilled from Sufism instead of Wahabism, proved more "European" than the secular 
government that followed it. His government attempted to end the civil war by 
recognizing the Kurds’ national identity while emphasizing Islam as a unifying factor 
between Kurds and Turks. Using Islam as a common identity, Erbakan reached out to 
Syria, the Arab World and Iran. The Turkish Army responded by issuing a coup by 
memorandum. Instead o f negotiating, the Army’s new puppet government threatened 
war with Syria. Through its actions, the Turkish Army recreated a chasm that separates 
Turkey from both Europe and the Middle East. Turkey became an unattached fragment 
clashing with the Arab Middle East, Iran and Armenia on one side and with Greece on 
the other. Instead o f becoming a bridge, Turkey seems fated to remain an island until 
Kemalism is dethroned. It remains to be seen whether Attaturk’s attempt at constructing 
a Turkish national identity has taken materialized outside the Turkish Army.
But once a national identity is forged, it becomes real to those who belong to it.
In other words, it becomes a critical factor in the domestic arrangements o f states and in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
311
International Relations. A country may have a population with more than one identity. 
For example, Iran is both a Shiite Muslim and a Persian country. Turkey is tom between 
pro-European Kemalism and its Islamic heritage. Sudan is divided between its Afro- 
centric South and Arab-centric North. The question of "which identity" could become a 
tool in and in of itself. The mix of cooperation and conflict between India and Pakistan 
can be understood by asking this question. The national identity of Pakistan is critical to 
the answer. Today’s Pakistan has internalized Jinnah’s rhetoric thanks to the pain of 
partition and the wars with India. Yet, enough of the old Mughal and pan-Indian culture 
remains to make cooperation with India possible in some matters. Only in India can 
Pakistanis find people who speak three of Pakistan’s dominant languages. Only in India
x
can Pakistanis find a foreign audience that enjoys their music and cricket. The 
commonalities between India and Pakistan render Pakistan both Islamic and Indie. The 
country faces the same crosscutting cleavages that torment Turkey, but it has been able to 
build some bridges to India despite the conflict.
Identity factors have shown themselves to be more important than water as causes 
of conflict in the three basins examined. Despite aridity, droughts and degraded water 
quality, the states and peoples of all three basins fought mainly for their cultures and 
identities. They fought against the "other" to confirm their own identities. Water 
disputes are a function of identity-based conflict rather than a cause o f conflict. For 
example, the Syro-Turkish water dispute is a product of conflict is spawned by the Arab 
Revolt, the population policies of Jamal Pasha and the retaliation meted out on Turkish 
communities living behind the Hashemite Arab Army’s front lines. Water and the Kurds 
were simply the latest fronts to fight on. Unfortunately, the World War I is alive in the
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Middle East where there is also a widespread fear o f minorities. Even Western-allied 
Turkey severely curtails personal freedoms including speech and religion. Its generals 
dominate the political process and justify their dominance by refusing to reconcile Turkey 
with its neighbors. By insisting that only Turks live in Turkey and depriving the 
country’s Kurds o f the right to speak Kurdish, Turkey’s generals created the conditions 
that led to the PKK insurgency. Syria merely took advantage of the crisis, it did not 
create it. As a result, outcomes that result from pressuring Syria will not lead to peace in 
Turkey. The Turkish nationalist left, in alliance with the Army, seeks to use the waters 
of the Euphrates to settle the Kurds and integrate them into Turkish national life. While 
this is a more humane approach, it is also built on the premise that to be Kurdish is 
unacceptable in Turkey. To be Kurdish is to be a threat to the Kemalist Turkish state just 
as being Armenian or Arab was a threat to late Ottoman Turkey.
Being Kurdish is also a threat to the Iraqi state, but this not unique to Iraq’s 
Kurds. Being Shiite, and thus a member of the country’s majority community, is also a 
threat to the Iraqi state. Being Sunni is no protection either, because the Iraqi state is now 
the Takriti Sunni Arab state. Iraq is completely artificial state, kept alive through brutal 
repression and the desire of the United States and its Western allies to "keep Saddam in 
his box" to counter Iran. The United States "keeps" Saddam, because the collapse o f Iraq 
will create an independent Kurdish state and increase the relative wealth and power of 
Iran and Syria. As a democracy, the United States’ interests are best served when it can 
win over and bind over the populations o f critical states like those of the Middle East. 
While this does not entail entering popularity contests, it does mean trying to avoid a 
negative image among the populations o f these countries. Ultimately, the peoples of
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these states will determine their borders and deal with problems like water allocation.
The people o f Iran attempted democratization during the 1950s. Unfortunately, 
the West was not comfortable with a democratic nationalist Iran, and Mossadeq was 
replaced with the Shah in an Anglo-American financed coup d ’etat. His autocracy 
eventually got the better o f him, and his alliance with the West cost America Iran’s 
friendship. Khomeini’s Iran has been able to create a functioning elective government. 
By emphasizing Shiite Islam, Iran avoided the centrifugal forces that bedevil all but one 
of its neighbors. It has not developed its Tigris tributaries because it has alternative 
sources of water. But as its population grows, the high expenditures required to develop 
its mountainous river systems will seem smaller and smaller. Its decision not to develop 
its Tigris and Shatt-al-Arab tributaries has had a beneficial effect on the region, because 
the water helps Iraq compensate for its loses in the Euphrates. While perfectly capable of 
intimidating its smaller and weaker neighbors, Iran has not pursued a policy of 
constructing overt regional hegemony. Perhaps, it has the luxury of developing this 
hegemony by default due to its size, population and increasingly modem arms industry.
It may not need to impose its order in the region, because many of its smaller neighbors 
are already gravitating toward it.
Afghanistan is the exception to the trend toward detente with Iran. The Taliban 
mlers of the "Islamic Emirate" are firmly aligned to Pakistan whose interest in 
Afghanistan has no connection with the Kabul river. Pakistan believes that it needs the 
"strategic depth" provided by Afghanistan to defend itself against the relatively 
overwhelming strength of India. Despite massive increases in population, neither country 
has challenged the allocative regime of the Indus Waters Agreement, so the Indus case
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
314
study proves water is not a cause o f conflict between states. This hypothesis is also 
supported by analysis o f conflicts in the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates basins. The 
sources of conflicts in all three basins have been primarily issues o f identity.
A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA
The importance o f identity in the realm of conflict cannot be understated. As a 
consequence, examinations of international and trans-ethnic/religious reconciliation will 
become an increasingly important component of the study o f the amelioration of water 
disputes. This does not necessarily entail complete peace and harmony, because 
hydrology requires only a floor level of cooperation. Dams and irrigation schemes 
function effectively and water resources are maximized when all parties involved are 
cooperating. Given the predicted increases in population, all riparian parties have an 
increased interest in settling their identity-based conflict. So, "hydraulic reconciliation" 
in this context can be operationalized to mean the construction of an allocative riparian 
regime.
Without implementing this partial or hydraulic reconciliation, cooperation over 
international rivers would be at a level lower than the minimum level required by 
hydrology. A good example of the minimum level of cooperation can be found in the 
hydraulic relationship between India and Pakistan. The Indus Waters Agreement is, of 
course, the very sort of allocative regime rejected by Egypt, Turkey and to a lesser extent 
the Sudan. Research needs to be conducted over the mechanics that induce a country like 
Egypt or Turkey to agree to water allocation regimes.
Another problem facing the field is the extent of basins and the contributions of
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River and the figures for the Euphrates are in dispute. More research needs to be 
conducted on the actual natural hydrology and water-use patterns o f these various river 
systems. This is research that can help enrich the field by clarifying the contribution and 
consumption patterns o f the various countries. Understanding the water contribution and 
water consumption of all riparians is critical for constructing allocation regimes.
Finally, the relationship between the state and hydrology needs to be weakened. 
To maximize the supply of water to people and to the natural environment, hydrologists 
need a measure of independence from the state. In Egypt, where hydrology is very 
advanced, hydrologists have been forced to defend positions they know are without merit. 
The creation of more powerful international hydrological institutions and the 
depoliticization of the discipline are an essential first step in accomplishing the sort of 
hydraulic reconciliation that exists today between India and Pakistan. Despite conflicts 
and wars, Indian and Pakistani hydrologists continue to work jointly on the Indus River 
in a professional manner. To that extend, it is perhaps safe to say that the Eisenhower 
administration probably achieved all that was possible in the Indus Basin.
SUMMATION
While the existence of allocative river water regimes does not end conflict 
between states and peoples in a river basin, it does allow for the development o f  water- 
optimizing riparian projects like dams and reservoirs in the proper location. To achieve 
peace between foes like India and Pakistan is perhaps beyond the skills of today’s 
political scientists and diplomats. While reconciliation studies would help, ultimately it
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will be up to the peoples of these river basins to make the decision to accept "the other." 
Water disputes do not cause conflicts, because they are manifestations o f conflicts that 
have roots in the formation of countries and the identity-based justifications given for 
their formation. International Relations theories attempt to ascribe "rational reasons" to 
conflict, so International Relations scholars are attracted to water disputes as a cause, but 
conflict is inherently irrational. "Irrational" factors such as faith, ideology and identity 
are not mere justifications for conflicts, they are real causes of conflict. People fight for 
their cherished myths, and not for water
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Annual discharge: A river’s annual output o f water. River discharge varies from year to 
year, so the dissertation uses the commonly accepted annual average total 
discharge for each river.
Barrage: A low dam built to divert water rather than store it in a reservoir. Barrages are 
closely associated with headworks and canals. They can be modified to store 
water in small reservoirs.
Basin: The area drained by a river.
Bucketwheel: A canal digging machine designed in France, constructed in Germany, 
used in Pakistan and destroyed in the Sudan.
Canals: Ditches that carry water from reservoirs, lakes and rivers to farms, factories and 
cities.
Cataracts: Rapids in the Nile, impassable by water when the Nile is low. Bypassing the 
cataracts is crucial for any riparian invasion of the Sudan.
Catchment: The area within a basin that collects rain water.
Cubic Kilometer: The unit used to measure water in this dissertation. It is equal to 1 
billion cubic meters of water.
Dam: A man-made or (rarely) a natural structure that slows the down and stops the flow 
of the river to store water for electricity production or water consumption.
Evaporation: Loss of water from a dam reservoir due to heat and the sun. Storing water 
in dammed mountain valleys reduces evaporation substantially.
GAP: The Southeastern Anatolia Project (in its Turkish acronym). A series of dams in 
Southeast Turkey.
Headworks: A structure that controls the flow of water into main canals.
Hurstian Plans: Dam construction plans based upon developing the water resources of the 
entire basin in a coordinated way. Words associated with Hurst include "Nile 
Control," "Century storage." The only implemented part o f Hurst’s plans is the 
Owens Falls dam in Uganda.
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Hydrology: The science that studies the waters o f the earth, including the fresh water
cycle o f evaporation, condensation, rain and the its flow of water to the sea. It is 
intimately linked with irrigation, dam construction and reclamation. The disciple 
was pioneered by the British and is now strong in Britain, Egypt, Turkey, India 
and the United States.
Irrigation: Supplying food and fiber crops with water through artificial means like canals, 
pumps, water screws (Archimedes screws). Irrigation is critical for the existence 
of cities and civilization.
Mahdi: Arabic for "rightly guided one." The title o f the leader o f a religious political 
movement that expelled Egypt from the Sudan in 1885, establishing a state that 
lasted 14 years.
Megawatt: One million watts. Equivalent of one million times 1/746 horsepower. It is 
used to measure the installed potential electricity production capability at dams.
Nilotic Peoples: Peoples who speak Nilotic languages such as Dinka, Shulluk, Nuer and 
Masai. These tribes are often dependent on cattle and grazing in grasslands.
Rain-fed agriculture: Farming that is dependent on rain for water. Common in India, 
Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. It is cheap to carry out but it has very low yields 
compared to irrigated farming.
Reservoir: A lake that forms behind the dam, used to store water.
Riparian and Co-Riparian: Associated closely with a river, sharing a river.
Seepage: The flow of water from a dam’s reservoir to the water table underground.
The Sudd: A giant plant clogged swamp in South Central Sudan, crucial to sustain the 
grasslands used by the Nuer, the Dinka and the Shulluk. Egypt and the Sudan 
planned to drain part of the swamp to add water for Egypt through the Jonglei 
canal.
Wadi: A dry creek bed in the Nile or Tigris-Euphrates basins, given to flooding during 
the rainy season.
Water table: Underground water, usually fossil water. Sometimes it flows towards the 
sea much like a surface water after being fed by rainwater that seeps through the 
soil.
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